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ABSTRACT 
Satellite navigation is a promising technology for terrestrial applications that requires the monitoring 
of the vehicle position thanks to costly ground infrastructures. In the rail domain, the European train 
control system (ETCS) relies on a combination of radio beacons (that provides information of absolute 
position) and odometry to propagate the position between two balises groups. The use of Global 
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) in ETCS has been proposed in order to reduce the amount of 
beacons. In the road domain, the GNSS is one of the technologies recommended by the European 
Union directive for Electronic Toll Collection (ETC), and GNSS based ETC systems already exists for 
heavy good transportation in Germany (Toll Collect) and Slovakia (MYTO). For these two 
applications that are either safety critical (train control) or liability critical (toll collection), it is not 
acceptable to estimate the position of the vehicle with a large error without warning the system within 
a sufficiently short delay. It is firstly necessary to define the operational requirements for the 
navigation system for these terrestrial applications. This kind of problematic has already been handled 
in the context of civil aviation which is also a critical application, but currently, the operational 
requirements associated to GNSS are not standardized for the train control and ETC. Based on the 
model of civil aviation, a state of the art of possible requirements for train control and electronic toll 
collection is proposed. For train control, a solution based on redundant independent GNSS 
constellations has been proposed in order to relax the integrity risk requirements on each sub 
constellation. In the case of ETC, the requirements will depend on the case of study and are indirectly 
imposed by the toll charger. For terrestrial applications, the vehicles are likely to operate in 
constrained environment (including urban environment). In urban environment, the performances of 
GNSS are highly degraded due to multipath interference, tracking of non-line-of-sights and masking 
effects. These phenomena are likely to degrades the accuracy, integrity, availability and continuity of 
the GNSS based positioning system. It is proposed to augment the solution proposed for each 
application by integrating measurements from a six axis inertial measurement unit which are 
insensitive to the receiver surrounding environment. Integrating information from other sensors such 
as a track database for train control or odometry for toll collection is investigated. The nominal error 
models and fault modes of the sensors are then studied. The nominal error models will be used to 
weight the measurements in the fusion algorithm and to test the performances of the fusion algorithm 
by realistic simulations. In particular, the characterization of the distribution and the modelling of the 
errors dues to multipath and non-line-of-sights in urban environment is studied on simulator and on a 
data collection campaign conducted in Toulouse downtown (France) and its surroundings. The 
extended Kalman filter used to fuse the GNSS measurements and the measurements from other 
sensors are then presented. A tight coupling architecture in closed loop is presented as it is the most 
adapted to the cases of study. The integration of a track database in the solution is discussed in the 
case of train control. The extension of the solution to the multi-constellation case is also presented. 
The solutions have been validated and tested on a simulator as well as in real condition in Toulouse 
downtown. It is shown that additional sensors such as track database or wheel speed sensors enable to 
limit the drift of the position error in costing/degraded constellation condition. Then, it is proposed to 
improve the robustness and the reliability of the GNSS measurements in urban area by developing 
multipath detection algorithms at the signal processing level. A detection algorithm based on the real 
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time analysis of the correlation function is proposed. This algorithm aims at assisting the integrity 
monitoring algorithm upstream by protecting it against the faults due to multipath with large 
amplitudes. However, this algorithm does not protect against non-line-of-sights that can lead to 
integrity failures as this phenomenon is not associated with any abnormal distortion. Several methods 
based on the elevations of the satellites, the signal to noise ratio, or the coherence of the measurements 
based on the comparison with non GNSS sensors measurements have been studied in order to protect 
the solution against this phenomenon. Two snapshots integrity monitoring algorithms adapted to the 
Kalman filter are presented. Finally, the performances of these algorithms are tested on the data 
collected in Toulouse downtown and surroundings. The improvement obtained by assisting the 
integrity monitoring algorithm upstream by testing the quality of the measurement is quantized (with 
respect to a simple inflation of the nominal models in urban environments).  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivations of the work 
Due to the modernization of current Global Positionning System (GPS) and GLObal NAvigation 
Satellite System (GLONASS), the development of Galileo and Beidou, and the developments of 
augmentation systems, the fields of application that could benefit from Global Navigation Satellite 
Systems (GNSS) is constantly expanding.  
GPS together with augmentations has been a proven technology for safety-critical applications such as 
civil aviation for which the GNSS use is performed in a fair environment (mostly open sky reception, 
controlled frequency bands, etc…). With the advent of multiple GNSS systems and the availability of 
signals located in different frequency bands, better performance can be expected from GNSS even in 
more challenging conditions. As a consequence, there is a trend to investigate the use GNSS for other 
critical applications taking place in locations where GNSS signal reception can be difficult (forest, 
light urban, urban). These applications are not necessarily safety-critical, but can be liability-critical 
and thus still require a certain quality of service to be maintained. This is for instance the case for 
terrestrial rail and road position monitoring systems, which currently requires costly ground 
infrastructures.  
 In the rail domain, the European Train Control System (ETCS) is the automatic signaling, 
control and train protection system that is currently being deployed for an improved 
interoperability in Europe. In ETCS level 2 and 3, the vehicles have to self-monitor their 
position and speed based on a combination of radiobeacons (Eurobalises) installed along the 
railway to provide reference positions - and odometry. The density of these radiobeacons 
should be at least one per 2.5 km. The possible introduction of GNSS in ETCS could thus 
allow a significant reduction in the number of radiobeacons resulting in an important cost 
saving and a reduced exposition to degradations and robbery.  
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 In the road domain, GNSS could be used as a technology for Electronic Toll Collection (ETC) 
in order to replace or limit the amount of costly tolling gates necessary for other technologies. 
GNSS is already used for tolling of heavy good transportation in Germany (Toll Collect) and 
Slovakia (MYTO).  
The main objective of this PhD thesis is to investigate the feasibility of using GNSS-based positioning 
for these two above-mentioned applications, which means understanding of its specificities, 
construction of a position solution and insurance of the matching of the positioning quality provided 
with the application requirements. 
The first challenge that slows down the introduction of satellite navigation in these critical terrestrial 
applications is the lack of standardized requirements for the GNSS-based positioning system. This 
process took long years in civil aviation and is a work in process in rail and road. The first objective of 
the thesis is thus to investigate the foreseen operational requirements for train control and ETC.  
As mentioned earlier, unlike aircrafts and ships that operate in open sky conditions, terrestrial vehicles 
are likely to operate in constrained environments such as forests, urban canyons and tunnels. The 
performances of GNSS in terms of accuracy are highly dependent on the environment in which the 
receiver is located. The thesis focuses on the most challenging environments which are suburban and 
urban environment. In urban environment, the obstacles such as buildings and vehicles usually mask 
several satellites and thus degrade the geometry of the constellation from the receiver point of view. In 
deep urban canyons and tunnels, even less than 4 satellites may be in view which leads to GNSS 
unavailability (depending on the dimension of positioning, e.g. 2D, 3D, 4D). As standalone GNSS can 
have poor availability in constrained environment, it requires the use of complementary sensors. For 
instance, inertial navigation provides a positioning solution by integrating angular rates and specific 
forces from Inertial Measurement Units (IMU). Therefore, unlike GNSS, the resulting solution is 
independent from the propagation environment of the vehicle. However this technology cannot be 
used on its own for navigation as the position error is unbounded due to integration of biases. By 
coupling GNSS with a 6 axis IMU, it is possible to get a solution that is more accurate than each 
system taken separately because of the complementarity of their error models. Other sensors or 
information can be available on terrestrial vehicles such as wheel speed sensors and track database for 
rail applications. The integration of these measurements can be used to improve the accuracy and the 
robustness of the whole navigation algorithm. A second objective of this PhD thesis is to propose 
concrete system architectures that integrate the different sensors available on board for both rail and 
road applications.  
In order to design the sensor fusion algorithm (as well as to design an efficient integrity monitoring 
algorithm), it is necessary to characterize and model the measurement error associated to each sensor 
integrated in the solution. These errors, classified into nominal and faults (from an integrity point-of-
view) and their different sources are investigated in this thesis. In particular, the distribution and 
magnitude of the GNSS measurement errors specific to an urban environment are of interest. In 
suburban and urban environments, the GNSS measurements can frequently be affected by large errors 
due to strong multipath. If the satellite is not in view which is likely to happen when the satellite is 
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masked by a building, the receiver may track a diffracted or reflected ray. This phenomenon is referred 
to as Non Line-Of-Sight (NLOS) reception. The range measurements that result from NLOS signals 
are positively biased compared to the true geometric ranges due to the non-direct trajectory of the 
signal. They can thus lead to erroneous positioning. Such error sources and their distributions should 
be investigated and modelled in order to derive realistic models. This is another objective of this 
thesis.  
Then, another objective of this thesis is to design the data fusion algorithms and assess their 
performance in order to check that they are coherent with the anticipated performance requirements. 
This study can be conducted by simple simulations, by feeding the algorithm with measurements 
generated by a measurement generator that integrates the realistic sensors measurement error models 
developed in this thesis. Another objective of this study is to implement the proposed fusion 
algorithms on real data campaigns. Quantizing the benefit of integrating as much measurement and 
sensors as possible is of particular interest. 
Then the possibility to improve the reliability of the solutions by pre selecting the GNSS measurement 
according to the values of different criterion is investigated. The objective is to assist the integrity 
monitoring algorithm by excluding from the solution the faulty-prone measurements (due to the 
effects of the environment). In particular, one of the motivations of this thesis is to detect abnormal 
measurements at the signal processing level. Moreover, the use of additional sensors appears to be a 
promising technique to protect against outliers among the GNSS measurement.  
Finally, the positioning systems have to be augmented to fulfill the integrity requirements of the 
critical applications of interest. Current augmentations systems were designed to monitoring integrity 
of GNSS positioning in the context of civil aviation. Algorithms inspired from ABAS are deemed to 
be the best candidates because they are able to detect failures of the receiver. The last objective of this 
PhD thesis is thus to adapt integrity monitoring algorithms to the proposed GNSS/Sensors architecture 
and assess their true performances in real urban/sub-urban environments.  
1.2 Contributions 
The major contributions of this thesis are: 
 A state of the art of the existing operational requirements for train control and ETC has been 
done.  
 A realistic way to fulfill the very low integrity risk requirement for train control is proposed 
based on using redundant subsystems based on independent constellations 
 A characterization of pseudorange error measurements due to multipath have been conducted 
by connecting a realistic receiver simulator to the Land Mobile Satellite channel developed by 
the DLR. After overbounding of the error distribution, an error model has been proposed for 
urban environment. The results have been published in [Brocard et al., 2014 (1)].  
 New results have been found for the detection of abnormally large multipath interference by 
monitoring the correlation function. It includes rigorous threshold expressions to design the 
tests, and a theoretical way to assess the performance of such tests in terms of sensitivity. The 
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behavior of such metric was investigated on the tracking simulator connected to the DLR 
model. The results have been published in [Brocard et al., 2014 (2)]. 
 The measurement model of GNSS, IMU, Wheel Speed Sensors (WSS) and track database 
have been proposed. The models are added to the ideal sensor measurements that are 
generated by simulations. It is used as the reference for the validation of the system in the 
nominal case. Failure sources and models for each sensor are proposed in this work. 
 An Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) that couples GNSS and a 6 axis IMU has been proposed, 
and implemented. The IMU measurements are processed by a quaternion based mechanization 
that has been implemented. A method for the validation of the GNSS/IMU hybridized filter is 
proposed. Two architectures for ETC and train control have been developed. In particular, a 
method to integrate the measurement from the track database is given in this thesis. Early 
results obtained by simulations and real signals have been published in [Brocard et al., 2015 
(1)]. 
 A statistic NLOS error model in urban environment is proposed in the Thesis. The distribution 
of NLOS error is also assessed thanks to a real measurement campaign. It will be used to 
characterize this source of failure in urban environment. A test based on the predicted 
pseudorange (innovation) is used to detect the abnormally large jumps and exclude or down 
weight the dangerous measurements due to NLOS and residual multipath. 
 A method to calculate the biases that are critical in the sense that they can make the error 
exceed the 𝐻𝐴𝐿 is given. The output of this calculation is used as the input of the multipath 
detection algorithm and the innovation monitoring test.  
 An integrity monitoring algorithm designed for GPS/INS architectures in civil aviation is 
adapted to our case of study. It aims at providing protection levels and detecting the residual 
faulty measurements. The results obtained with such an algorithm have been published 
[Brocard et al., 2015 (2)]. A reliability checking algorithm for the IMU is also proposed. 
 Finally, accuracy and integrity performances of the proposed solutions are assessed in real 
urban environment in downtown Toulouse.  
1.3 Outline 
Chapter 1 contains the context and the objective of the thesis and an introduction to the chapters of 
the thesis.  
Chapter 2 is a state of the art of GNSS and inertial navigation. It describes the GNSS signals, a basic 
least square navigation algorithm and the principle of an autonomous integrity monitoring algorithm 
through the example of receiver autonomous integrity monitoring algorithm. The second part of the 
chapter is an introduction to inertial navigation that describes the 3D quaternion based mechanization 
that has been implemented in the thesis. 
Chapter 3 is a state of the art on the existing examples of requirements for the GNSS to be used in 
train control and ETC.  
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Chapter 4 discusses the choices in terms of GNSS receiver and of additional sensors that are available 
on board and that can be used to improve navigation. The choice of the coupling integration strategy is 
discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 contains a full description of the nominal error models for every sensor including GNSS, 
gyroscopes, accelerometers, wheel speed sensors and track database. These nominal error models will 
be used to generate simulated realistic sensor outputs and validate the navigation algorithm. They are 
used for modelling the error in the Extended Kalman Filter observation and propagation models. The 
failure sources are investigated in the second part of the chapter for GNSS and sensors. In particular, 
the distribution of NLOS pseudorange biases in urban environment is modelled statistically and 
compared to the observations real measurements. 
Chapter 6 describes the implemented hybridized solution for ETC and train control. The design of the 
fusion algorithms are detailed in this chapter. The integration of the data from WSS and a track 
database in the measurement model are detailed in this chapter. Moreover, the extension of the 
algorithm to the dual constellation case is presented. The second part of the chapter consists in the 
validation and the results obtained on simulated GNSS and sensor measurements. The third part of the 
chapter describes the results and assesses the performances in term of accuracy of the two 
architectures proposed in urban environment on real receiver processing GPS and GLONASS and a 
MEMS 6 axis IMU. The ways to improve the accuracy of the solutions are discussed in the chapter. 
Chapter 7 discusses ways to select the GNSS measurements in order to assist the integrity monitoring 
algorithm by excluding the measurements that are likely to be affected by large local errors. This 
chapter firstly describes a way to enhance integrity at the signal processing level and presents a 
method to design and assess the performances of signal quality monitoring indicators. These metrics 
quantizes the distortion of the correlation function and inform the integrity monitoring algorithm of the 
potentially dangerous measurements due to multipath interference. The metrics are tested on the DLR 
model processed by a realistic tracking simulator. Then the possibility of selecting the measurements 
based on other criterions such as elevation or 𝐶/𝑁0 is investigated.  
Chapter 8 investigates the approach to monitor integrity in urban environment. The integrity risk 
allowed for each application is firstly allocated among the sensors that are integrated. Then the 
integrity risk allocated to GNSS is shared among the different failure modes. Then, the section 
describes the integrity monitoring algorithms for both the GNSS and IMU. The snapshot integrity 
monitoring algorithm used is firstly described. The performances of this integrity monitoring 
algorithm are assessed on a real dataset in urban environment. Then, this chapter describes an 
advanced way to adjust in real time the thresholds for the outlier detections algorithms (multipath 
detector and innovation monitoring) as a possible way to improve the integrity of the solution. Finally, 
the way to monitor the reliability of the inertial measurement is looked at. 
Chapter 9 presents the conclusion and perspectives of this thesis 
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2 STATE OF THE ART ON GNSS 
AND INERTIAL NAVIGATION 
This chapter introduces the two main technologies that are used in this thesis for the navigation, that is 
to say GNSS and inertial navigation. First the basic principles of GNSS are investigated. Then, the 
possible ways to augment the GNSS that have been developed in the context of civil aviation are 
presented. These augmentation systems have been used to monitor the integrity of the GNSS solution 
and measurements. Second, the basic principles of inertial navigation are presented. The different 
sensors’ technologies are introduced. Then the frames of reference are defined, and finally, the way to 
estimate the vehicle position, velocity and attitude from inertial sensors is detailed. 
2.1 Principle of GNSS and possible augmentations 
The GNSS enables civil and military users to determine they positions, velocity and time anywhere in 
the world at any time. The GNSS that are operational are GPS developed by the USA and GLObal 
NAvigation Satellite System (GLONASS) developed by Russia. The other GNSS that are currently 
under development are Galileo developed by Europe and BeiDou developed by China.  
A GNSS is composed of three segments, referred to as the space segment, the control segment and the 
user segment. This section describes briefly these three segments successively. Then the augmentation 
systems that have been developed for monitoring the integrity of the GNSS measurements in the case 
of civil aviation are described.  
2.1.1 Space segment 
The space segment corresponds to the constellation of the transmitting satellites.  
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 The GPS system, which was declared operational in 1995 by the US Department Of Defence, 
is specified with a minimum of 24 Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) satellites located in 6 circular 
orbital planes inclined of 55°. The constellation is designed so that any user will have at least 
4 satellites in view anywhere at any time. The GPS constellation currently (November 2015) 
consists of 30 Healthy satellites. GPS satellites are at an altitude of 20200 km. 
 The GLONASS system was initially (1995) composed of 24 satellites located at an altitude 
19100 km on three orbital planes inclined of approximately 65°. The GLONASS constellation 
currently consists of (November 2015) 23 operational satellites (on 28 satellites in orbit). 
 Galileo is expected to be composed of 30 satellites (24 + 6 spares) located on 3 orbits located 
at an altitude of 23222 km. The orbital planes are inclined of 56° with respect to the equatorial 
axis.  
The satellites are transmitting the GNSS signals that enable the receivers to estimate their positions. 
These signals are using direct sequence - spread spectrum techniques, meaning that they have three 
main components: 
 a sinusoidal carrier. As an example, for GPS, the carrier frequencies are L1: 1575.42 MHz, 
L2: 1227.60 MHz, and L5: 1176.45 MHz. For GPS and Galileo, all the satellites of a given 
constellation transmit in the same frequency band without interfering thanks to the use of 
Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA). For GLONASS, each satellite transmits a signal at 
its own slightly shifted carrier frequency. This multiplexing method is referred to as 
Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA).  
 a Pseudo Random Noise (PRN) code, also referred to as ranging code or spreading code. The 
PRN code is a sequence of zeros and ones that are used by the GNSS receiver to acquire and 
get synchronized with the received signal, thus enabling it to generate relatively accurate 
pseudorange measurements for each satellite. Each satellite uses its own spreading code, 
which is known by the receiver. The spreading codes used by GPS L1 C/A signals are Gold 
code which length is 1023 chips. The chip rate of the PRN code is significantly high with 
respect to the bit rate of the navigation message thus spreading the frequency occupation of 
the useful signal. This is why this type of communication is referred to as spread spectrum 
technique. For GPS L1 C/A, the chip rate is equal to 1.023 Mchips per second.  
 The navigation message, which is a binary sequence that provides all the necessary 
information for the user to compute pseudorange measurements. This message is narrowband 
with respect to the PRN code (for GPS L1 C/A, the data rate is 50 bits per second). For GPS 
L1 C/A, the navigation message is periodic with a period of 12.5 minutes. In the case of GPS, 
the navigation message contains, among others, the satellite ephemeris, the satellite clock error 
model, the ionosphere delay model, the satellite health status and the constellation almanac. 
Some GPS and Galileo signals do not contain any navigation messages. They are referred to 
as pilot signals and enable more robust tracking capabilities. 
The model of the signal transmitted by a GNSS satellite is the following: 
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 𝑠(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑑(𝑡)𝑐(𝑡) cos(2𝜋𝑓0𝑡) Eq. 2-1 
where: 
 𝑑 is the is the materialization of the navigation message of the satellite 
 𝑐 is the PRN code after pulse shaping 
 𝑓0 is the frequency of the carrier. 
 𝐴 is the amplitude of the signal 
The GPS, Galileo and GLONASS satellites transmit different signals with different characteristics 
which are summarized in Table 1. 
System 
Carrier 
Frequency 
(MHz) 
Signal 
Band 
Width 
(MHz) 
I/Q Modulation 
Spreading Code Navigation Data 
Primary 
(chips) 
Second 
(chips) 
Mcps Period ENC Data 
Rate 
(sps) 
Rate 
(bps) 
FEC 
GPS 
1575.42 
L1C/A 2.046 Q BPSK (1) 1,023 - 1.023 1ms - NAV 50 50 - 
L1P(Y) 20.46 I BPSK (10) 1week - 10.23 1week (Y) NAV 50 50 - 
L1M N.A N.A BOC (10,5) N.A N.A 5.115 N.A Y N.A N.A N.A N.A 
L1C 
30.69 
I/Q 
TMBOC 
(6,1,4/33) 
10,230 - 1.023 10ms - 
CNAV-
2 
100 50 1/2 
30.69 10,230 1,800 1.023 18s - - - - - 
L2P(Y) 20.46 I BPSK (10) 1week - 10.23 1week (Y) (NAV) (50) (50) - 
L2M N.A N.A BOC (10,5) N.A N.A 5.115 N.A Y N.A N.A N.A N.A 
L2C 2.046 I/Q BPSK (1) 
10,230 - 0.5115 20ms - (CNAV) (50) (25) 1/2 
767,250 - 0.5115 1.5s - - - - - 
1176.45 
L5-I 20.46 I BPSK (10) 10,230 10 10.23 10ms - CNAV 100 50 1/2 
L5-Q 20.46 Q BPSK (10) 10,230 20 10.23 20ms - - - - - 
GLONASS 
1602.00+ 
0.5625K 
L1C/A 1.022 
I/Q 
BPSK 511 - 0.511 1ms - NAV 50 50 - 
L1P 10.22 BPSK 5,110,000 - 5.11 1s (Y) NAV 50 50 - 
1246.00+ 
0.4375K 
L2C/A 1.022 
I/Q 
BPSK 511 - 0.511 1ms - NAV 50 50 - 
L2P 10.22 BPSK 5,110,000 - 5.11 1s (Y) NAV 50 50 - 
1204.704+ 
0.423K 
L3C/A 8.19 I BPSK N.A - 4.095 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 
L3P 8.19 Q BPSK N.A - 4.095 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 
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Galileo 
1575.42 
E1-A 35.805 Q 
BOC 
(15,2.5) 
N.A N.A 2.5575 N.A Y G/NAV N.A N.A N.A 
E1-B 24.552 I 
CBOC 
(6,1,1/11) 
4,092 - 1.023 4ms - I/NAV 250 125 1/2 
E1-C 24.552 Q 
CBOC 
(6,1,1/11) 
4,092 25 1.023 100ms - - - - - 
1191.795 E5 51.15 I 8-PSK (10) 10,230 100 10.23 100ms - - - - - 
1176.45 
E5a-I 20.46 I BPSK (10) 10,230 20 10.23 20ms - F/NAV 50 25 1/2 
E5a-Q 20.46 Q BPSK (10) 10,230 100 10.23 100ms - - - - - 
1207.14 
E5b-I 20.46 I BPSK (10) 10,230 4 10.23 4ms - I/NAV 250 125 1/2 
E5b-Q 20.46 Q BPSK (10) 10,230 100 10.23 100ms - - - - - 
1278.75 
E6-A N.A Q BOC (10,5) N.A N.A 5.115 N.A Y G/NAV N.A N.A N.A 
E6-B 40.92 I BPSK (5) 5,115 - 5.115 1ms Y C/NAV 1,000 N.A N.A 
E6-C 40.92 I BPSK (5) 5,115 100 5.115 100ms Y - - - - 
Table 1 GNSS signals specifications [RTKLIB] 
The first step in the generation of the GNSS signal consists in mapping the two binary sequences 
(navigation message and the PRN code) into BPSK symbols (+1 or -1). This operation is called pulse 
shaping. The data symbols are shaped by a Non-Return to Zero (NRZ) waveform, defined by: 
 ℎ𝑁𝑅𝑍(𝑡) = {
1 𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇𝑑
0 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒
 Eq. 2-2 
where 𝑇𝑑 represents the data bit duration. 
 𝑑(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑑𝑘ℎ𝑁𝑅𝑍(𝑡 − 𝑘𝑇𝑑)
𝑁−1
𝑘=0
 Eq. 2-3 
The PRN symbols can be shaped differently.  
 In the case of legacy signals, such as GPS L1 C/A or GLONASS L1, the shaping waveform is 
also an NRZ waveform except that the time support of the waveform is the chip duration 𝑇𝑐 
(chip duration). 
 Some new signals are modulated by a different waveform. For instance, Galileo E1 OS is 
shaped by a Composite BOC (CBOC) waveform [RTKLIB].  
The shaped PRN sequence and data bits are then synchronized and multiplied. This product then 
modulates the carrier.  
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2.1.2 Control segment 
Each GNSS has its own control segment which consists in a network of monitoring stations, control 
stations and upload stations. The control segment has to: 
 monitor the quality of the transmitted signals and parameters,  
 predict the satellites’ orbits, clock drift with respect to GNSS time, and some other parameters, 
 upload these information on each satellite.  
It is thus a key element in the reliability of the system.  
2.1.3 User segment 
The User Segment consists in the equipment which receives and processes the GNSS signals, compute 
pseudoranges (and other observables), and user location and clock. The structure of a GNSS receiver 
is composed of an Antenna, an RF Frontend, a signal processing unit, and a data processing unit. 
These elements are discussed in this section.  
2.1.3.1 Antenna/frontend 
The receivers are equipped with an antenna to capture the GNSS signals in the L-band. GNSS 
antennas can be of different types (patch, helical, spiral, choke ring, phased-array), sizes, shapes, 
prices and therefore adapted to different types of users. The GNSS signals are transmitted from the 
antenna to the front-end by cable. If the antenna is located at a non-negligible distance from the 
receiver, the transmission may be associated with power losses. This phenomenon can be mitigated by 
including a low-noise amplifier in the antenna, that is then referred to as active antenna (in contrast 
with passive antennas). At the output of the receiver’s antenna, the signal 𝑟(𝑡) from one single GNSS 
satellite can be modelled as: 
 𝑟(𝑡) = 𝑔(𝑡) ⊗ 𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑤(𝑡) Eq. 2-4 
where: 
 𝑔 is the pulse response of the propagation channel. 
 𝑤 is an additive white noise  
 ⊗ is the convolution product 
If the channel is modelled as only adding a pure delay to the signal, the expression of 𝑟(𝑡) becomes: 
 𝑟(𝑡) = 𝐴(𝑡)𝑑(𝑡 − 𝜏(𝑡))𝑐(𝑡 − 𝜏(𝑡)) cos(2𝜋𝑓𝑡 + 𝜙(𝑡)) + 𝑤(𝑡) Eq. 2-5 
where: 
 𝜏 is the code delay 
 𝜙 is the time-varying carrier phase delay due to the propagation 
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 the amplitude 𝐴 varies with time 
The signal is then transmitted to the RF Front-End where it is amplified with a Low Noise Amplifier 
(LNA), filtered, and downconverted to an intermediate frequency denoted 𝑓𝐼 by multiplying by the 
carrier generated by a local oscillator. The signal is then filtered, quantized and sampled with an 
Analog to Digital Converter (ADC). The processing of the signal by the RF front end induces the 
addition of a thermal noise to the received signal. 
2.1.3.2 Signal processing unit 
The samples processed by the RF frontend are then transmitted to the signal processing module of the 
receiver. The GNSS signal from a given satellite at the output of the RF frontend can be modelled as 
(the channel is considered as a delay): 
 
𝑟𝑓(𝑘) = 𝐴(𝑘𝑇𝑠)𝑑(𝑘𝑇𝑠 − 𝜏(𝑘𝑇𝑠))𝑐𝑓(𝑘𝑇𝑠 − 𝜏(𝑘𝑇𝑠)) cos(2𝜋𝑓𝐼𝑘𝑇𝑠 + 𝜙(𝑘𝑇𝑠))
+ 𝑛(𝑘𝑇𝑠)  
Eq. 2-6 
where: 
 𝑇𝑠 is the sampling period of the receiver 
 𝑐𝑓 represents the code filtered by the user’s antenna and the front end filter 
 𝑛(𝑘𝑇𝑠) represents the thermal noise 
The receiver has to synchronize itself with this GNSS signals. This operation is necessary to 
demodulate the data message and to estimate the pseudorange observables. The synchronization of the 
receiver consists in estimating the delay of the PRN code 𝜏 and the phase offset of the carrier of the 
incoming signal 𝜙. The synchronization is done in two consecutive steps.  
 First, the receiver assesses the presence of the signal during the acquisition phase. This 
process is coupled with the coarse estimation of the incoming signal code delay and Doppler 
frequency. The principle of the acquisition is not presented here because this step is not further 
looked at in the thesis. However acquisition principles can be found in e.g. [Foucras, 2015].  
 Then the receiver enters a tracking mode in which the code delay and carrier phase are tracked 
more precisely using two different control loops. The principle of tracking loops is introduced 
here as techniques to improve the robustness of these loops have been investigated during the 
thesis. In a conventional receiver, the incoming signal code delay is tracked with a Delay 
Locked Loop (DLL) and the incoming carrier phase is tracked by a Phase Locked Loop 
(PLL).  
For the acquisition and both loops, the GNSS receiver needs to go through a specific signal processing 
step referred to as the correlation operation. This correlation operation consists in correlating the 
incoming GNSS signal with a local replica of this signal composed of the PRN code and the carrier 
over a duration 𝑇𝑖  which is a multiple of the PRN code repetition period. For GPS L1 C/A, the 
integration time varies from 1ms to 20ms, which corresponds to the duration of a data bit. The local 
carrier is generated with a phase denoted ?̂? as estimated by the PLL and the local PRN code with a 
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delay denoted ?̂? that is estimated by the DLL. For the simplicity of the notations, the parameters which 
are time dependent are indexed by 𝑘. Assuming that the variations of the code phase delays are small 
during the integration time, the In-phase correlator output can be approximated by [Holmes, 2000]: 
 𝐼𝑃(𝑖) =
𝐴𝑘
2
𝑑𝑘  𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝜏𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘)sinc(𝜋(𝑓𝑘 − 𝑓𝑘)𝑇𝑖) cos(𝜙𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘) + 𝑛𝐼𝑃(𝑘) Eq. 2-7 
where: 
 𝑓𝑑𝑘  represents the Doppler frequency of the received signal, it is such as 𝑓𝑑𝑘 =
1
2𝜋
 
𝑑𝜙
𝑑𝑡
|
𝑡=𝑘𝑇𝑠
  and 𝑓𝑘, its estimation. 
 𝐾𝑐𝑐 represents the autocorrelation function the spreading code 
It is also usual to compute the Quadra-phase correlator output by using a local carrier in quadrature-
phase with the incoming signal. Its model is given by: 
 𝑄𝑃(𝑖) =
𝐴𝑘
2
𝑑𝑘  𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝜏𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘)sinc(𝜋(𝑓𝑘 − 𝑓𝑘)𝑇𝑖) sin(𝜙𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘) + 𝑛𝑄𝑃(𝑘) Eq. 2-8 
2.1.3.2.1 Principle of a conventional DLL 
In a conventional DLL, after being multiplied by the in-phase and quadrature phase local carrier, the 
signal is multiplied by three versions of the code replica: 
 The prompt replica which delay is the code delay estimated by the DLL (?̂?(𝑘)),  
 the early replica which delay is ?̂?(𝑘) + 𝛿/2, and  
 the late replica which delay is ?̂?(𝑘) − 𝛿/2.  
The parameter 𝛿 is referred to as the chip spacing, and is a fundamental parameter which has an 
impact on the performances of the DLL. This provides 6 correlator outputs as detailed in Figure 1: the 
in-phase prompt, early and late correlator outputs, as well as the quadrature-phase prompt, early and 
late correlator outputs. Their expressions are given hereafter: 
𝐼𝐸(𝑖) =
𝐴𝑘
2
𝑑𝑘  𝐾𝑐𝑐 (𝜏𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘 +
𝛿
2
) sinc(𝜋(𝑓𝑘 − 𝑓𝑘)𝑇𝑖) cos(𝜙𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘) + 𝑛𝐼𝐸(𝑖) 
Eq. 2-9 
𝑄𝐸(𝑖) =
𝐴𝑘
2
𝑑𝑘  𝐾𝑐𝑐 (𝜏𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘 +
𝛿
2
) sinc(𝜋(𝑓𝑘 − 𝑓𝑘)𝑇𝑖) sin(𝜙𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘) + 𝑛𝑄𝐸(𝑖) Eq. 2-10 
and the two late correlator outputs are formed:  
𝐼𝐿(𝑖) =
𝐴𝑘
2
𝑑𝑘  𝐾𝑐𝑐 (𝜏𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘 −
𝛿
2
) 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐(𝜋(𝑓𝑘 − 𝑓𝑘)𝑇𝑖) 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝜙𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘) + 𝑛𝐼𝐿(𝑖) 
Eq. 2-11 
𝑄𝐿(𝑖) =
𝐴𝑘
2
𝑑𝑘  𝐾𝑐𝑐 (𝜏𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘 −
𝛿
2
) sinc(𝜋(𝑓𝑘 − 𝑓𝑘)𝑇𝑖) sin(𝜙𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘) + 𝑛𝑄𝐿(𝑖) Eq. 2-12 
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The correlator outputs are then combined to estimate the code delay tracking error 𝜀𝜏𝑘 = 𝜏𝑘 − 𝜏?̂?. This 
estimation operation is referred to as discriminator function. A code disciminator is referred to as 
coherent when its value is dependent of the value of the carrier tracking error: 𝜀𝜙𝑘 = 𝜙𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘. The 
Early-Minus-Late (EML) discriminator is an example of coherent discriminator. Its expression is 
given by: 
 𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐿 = 𝐼𝐸 − 𝐼𝐿 Eq. 2-13 
For noncoherent discriminators, the estimation of the code delay is independent of the quality of the 
estimation of the phase delay (but still depends on the residual Doppler error between the incoming 
and local carriers). Non coherent discriminators are more suitable in urban environment because 
frequent losses of phase lock can occur, and may degrade the quality of the code measurements. The 
Early-Minus-Late Power (EMLP) is an example of classic non coherent discriminators: 
 𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐿𝑃 = (𝐼𝐸
2 + 𝑄𝐸
2) − (𝐼𝐿
2 + 𝑄𝐿
2) Eq. 2-14 
Finally, the estimation of 𝜀𝜏 provided by the discriminator is low-pass filtered to update the frequency 
of the DCO used to generate the local PRN code replica. The principle of the conventional DLL is 
summarized by Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 Principle of the Delay Lock Loop 
2.1.3.2.2 Principle of a conventional PLL 
The PLL consists in generating a local carrier with a DCO which frequency is adjusted so that the 
local carrier is in phase with the received carrier. The prompt In-phase and Quadrature phase 
correlator outputs are combined in a phase discriminator to estimate the phase error 𝜀𝜑. Several PLL 
discriminators can be found in the literature. The arctangent discriminator is one of them that is 
defined as: 
 𝐷𝐴𝑡𝑎𝑛 = Atan(
𝑄𝑝
𝐼𝑝
) Eq. 2-15 
The phase error estimate is then low-pass filtered by the loop filter to update the phase of the local 
carrier. 
A frequency locked loop (FLL) may be used instead of a PLL for carrier synchronization (not a phase 
synchronization). The principle of this control loop can be found in [Curran et al., 2012].  
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2.1.3.3 GNSS position estimation 
The code delay and carrier phase synchronization allows to have an in-phase correlator output that can 
be simplified into: 
 𝐼𝑃(𝑖) =
𝐴
2
𝑑(𝑖) + 𝑛𝐼𝑃(𝑖) Eq. 2-16 
It can thus be seen that the correlator output can then be used to demodulate the data bits as long as the 
signal to noise ratio is high enough. 
As a consequence, when the tracking loops are locked, their outputs are: 
 The navigation message bits 
 The knowledge of the received time and phase of the incoming signal. This, with the 
knowledge of the transmit time, can be translated into raw pseudorange measurements 
These raw measurements can be used to compute the user position. Prior to the estimation of the 
position, however, the ionospheric, tropospheric and satellite clock corrections are applied to the raw 
measurements. The receiver then has to estimate its position based on the following observables: 
 {
𝜌1(𝑡) = √(𝑥(𝑡) − 𝑥1(𝑡))2 + (𝑦(𝑡) − 𝑦1(𝑡))2 + (𝑧(𝑡) − 𝑧1(𝑡))2 + 𝑐∆𝑡𝑢 (𝑡) + 𝜀1(𝑡)
⋮
𝜌𝑛(𝑡) = √(𝑥(𝑡) − 𝑥𝑛(𝑡))2 + (𝑦(𝑡) − 𝑦𝑛(𝑡))2 + (𝑧(𝑡) − 𝑧𝑛(𝑡))2 + 𝑐∆𝑡𝑢 (𝑡) + 𝜀𝑛(𝑡)
 Eq. 2-17 
where : 
 𝜌𝑖 are the GNSS pseudoranges 
 𝑥, 𝑦 and 𝑧 are the coordinates of the receiver that have to be estimated. They are generally 
expressed in the Earth-Centered Earth-Fixed Frame (ECEF). 
 𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖 and 𝑧𝑖 are the coordinates of satellite 𝑖 in the same frame 
 𝜀𝑖  is the residual error on the pseudorange measured with respect to the satellite 𝑖  after 
correction 
 ∆𝑡𝑢 is the clock offset between the receiver’s internal clock and the GNSS system time 
Let us denote 𝑋(𝑡) the vector which components are the four parameters to estimate: 𝑥(𝑡), 𝑦(𝑡), 𝑧(𝑡) 
and ∆𝑡𝑢(𝑡). The observable can be related to 𝑋(𝑡) with the function: 
 ℎ𝑖,𝑡(𝑋(𝑡)) = √(𝑥(𝑡) − 𝑥𝑖(𝑡))
2
+ (𝑦(𝑡) − 𝑦𝑖(𝑡))
2
+ (𝑧(𝑡) − 𝑧𝑖(𝑡))
2
+ 𝑐∆𝑡𝑢(𝑡) Eq. 2-18 
The system can be written in terms of vector with:  
 𝑌(𝑡) = ℎ𝑡(𝑋(𝑡)) + 𝜀(𝑡) Eq. 2-19 
where:  
 ℎ𝑡 corresponds to the concatenation of the ℎ𝑖,𝑡 functions 
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 𝜀(𝑡) = [𝜀1 … 𝜀𝑛]𝑇  
Different estimation methods can be used to estimate 𝑋𝑡  such as iterative Least Squares Estimator 
(LSE)/Weighted Least Squares Estimator (WLSE), recursive least squares [Yuheng et al., 2010], 
Bancroft method [Bancroft, 1985] or Kalman filtering if the dynamic of the vehicle is modelled. The 
LSE/WLSE method to estimate 𝑋𝑡 is detailed hereafter.  
Let us denote ?̂?0(𝑡) an initial estimate of 𝑋(𝑡). The previous estimation is generally used as ?̂?0. Let us 
denote 𝑋(𝑡) = ?̂?0(𝑡) + ∆𝑋(𝑡). The measurement model can be rewritten: 
 𝑌(𝑡) = ℎ𝑡 (?̂?0(𝑡) + ∆𝑋(𝑡)) + 𝜀(𝑡) Eq. 2-20 
The model linearized ?̂?0(𝑡) around becomes: 
 𝑌(𝑡) ≅ ℎ𝑡 (?̂?0(𝑡)) +
𝜕ℎ𝑡
𝜕𝑋
(?̂?0(𝑡)) ∆𝑋(𝑡) + 𝜀(𝑡) Eq. 2-21 
The linearized model can be written: 
 ∆𝑌(𝑡) ≅ 𝐻(𝑡)∆𝑋(𝑡) + 𝜀(𝑡) Eq. 2-22 
where: 
 ∆𝑌(𝑡) = 𝑌(𝑡) − ℎ𝑡 (?̂?0(𝑡)) 
 𝐻 is the Jacobian of ℎ𝑡 
 𝐻 =
[
 
 
 
 
𝑥0(𝑡) − 𝑥1(𝑡)
𝑑1
?̂?0(𝑡) − 𝑦1(𝑡)
𝑑1
?̂?0(𝑡) − 𝑧1(𝑡)
𝑑1
1
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
𝑥0(𝑡) − 𝑥𝑛(𝑡)
𝑑𝑛
?̂?0(𝑡) − 𝑦1(𝑡)
𝑑𝑛
?̂?0(𝑡) − 𝑧1(𝑡)
𝑑𝑛
1
]
 
 
 
 
 Eq. 2-23 
 𝑑𝑖 = √[𝑥0(𝑡) − 𝑥𝑖(𝑡)]2 + [?̂?0(𝑡) − 𝑦𝑖(𝑡)]2 + [?̂?0(𝑡) − 𝑧𝑖(𝑡)]2 
Once the observation model has been linearized, the LSE solution to Eq. 2-22 is given by: 
 ∆?̂?(𝑡) ≅ [𝐻(𝑡)
𝑇𝐻(𝑡)]−1𝐻(𝑡)𝑇∆𝑌(𝑡) Eq. 2-24 
When the measurement error covariance matrix (denoted 𝑅) is known, the WLSE can be used. The 
WLSE estimation is: 
 ∆?̂?(𝑡) ≅ [𝐻(𝑡)
𝑇𝑅−1𝐻(𝑡)]−1𝐻(𝑡)𝑇𝑅−1∆𝑌(𝑡) Eq. 2-25 
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2.1.4 Augmentation systems 
Augmentation systems have been developed in the context of civil aviation because the performances 
of standalone GPS (which are specified in [GPS SPS, 2008]) were not sufficient to fulfill the integrity 
requirements specified by the ICAO which definitions are detailed in chapter 3 and given in Table 2. 
There are three sorts of existing augmentation systems which are referred to as Ground Based 
Augmentation Systems (GBAS), Satellite Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) and Aircraft Based 
Augmentation Systems (ABAS). The augmentation systems enable the receiver to monitor the 
integrity of the GNSS navigation solution by computing Horizontal Protection Levels (𝐻𝑃𝐿) and 
Vertical Protection Levels (𝑉𝑃𝐿). The definitions of 𝐻𝑃𝐿 and 𝑉𝑃𝐿 are:  
 𝐻𝑃𝐿 is the radius of a circle in the horizontal plane (the local plane tangent to the WGS-84 
ellipsoid), with its center being at the true position, that describes the region assured to contain 
the indicated horizontal position [RTCA, 2006]. 𝐻𝑃𝐿 is a horizontal region where the missed 
alert requirements is met for the chosen set of satellites. Missed alert occurred when the 
position error exceeds the protection level and there is no detection [RTCA, 2006]. 
 𝑉𝑃𝐿 is half the length of a segment on the vertical axis (perpendicular to the horizontal plane 
of the WGS-84 ellipsoid), with its center being at the true position, that describes the region 
assured to contain the indicated vertical position [RTCA, 2006]. 𝑉𝑃𝐿  is a vertical region 
where the missed alert requirements is met for the chosen set of satellites. 
The system is said to be available if the 𝑃𝐿 estimated thanks to the augmentation system are within the 
maximum values allowed in the operational requirements, referred to as Alert Limits (𝐴𝐿), which 
definitions are given in Chapter 3. This configuration is represented in Figure 2. The system is said to 
be unavailable if the 𝑃𝐿 exceeds the 𝐴𝐿 as illustrated in Figure 3.  
  
Figure 2 Integrity monitoring algorithm available Figure 3 Integrity monitoring algorithm unavailable 
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2.1.4.1 Principle of GBAS 
GBAS has been developed for civil aviation applications, in order to enhance the integrity and the 
accuracy of GNSS in the airport areas. The principle of this augmentation system is similar to the 
Local Area Differential GPS (LADGPS) concept, but with the provision of integrity information. 
GBAS systems consist of three subsystems:  
 The GNSS satellite subsystem that provides ranging signal and navigation message.  
 The GBAS ground system is a station settled near the airport which sends data to the aircrafts 
within 23 Nautical Miles (42 km), up to Flight Level 100 through a dedicated data link in the 
VHF frequency band (108-117 MHz). Each station uses several GNSS receivers to measure 
pseudoranges and compute the augmentation data.  
 The Aircraft subsystem that uses the data to correct its measurements, measure its protection 
levels and exclude the faulty satellites from the computation. 
2.1.4.2 Principle of SBAS 
The principle of SBAS is similar to that of Wide Area Differential GPS (WADGPS), but with the 
provision of integrity information. SBAS consist of three subsystems: 
 The ground subsystem which contain a network of reference stations and a master station. The 
stations calculate integrity information and differential corrections for each monitored 
satellites. The integrity information contains integrity flags and conservative bounds of the 
range error after application of the differential corrections. Ground transmitters are used to 
send the data calculated to the GEO (geostationary orbit) satellites. 
 The space subsystem contains the GEO transparent satellites that broadcast the SBAS signals 
with a modulation that is similar to that of GPS L1 C/A.  
 The user subsystem is composed of the receivers that process the SBAS data.  
The satellites may broadcast additional ranging signal similarly to GNSS satellite but this service is 
optional. Currently, four SBAS are in an operational capability: Wide Area Augmentation System 
(WAAS) in North America, European Geostationary Navigation Overlay System (EGNOS) in Europe, 
MTSAT Satellite Augmentation System (MSAS) in Japan and GPS Aided GEO Augmented 
Navigation (GAGAN) in India. SBAS frequency band are identical to that of the GPS L1 signal, 
broadcast in the L1 band, and the signal modulation is BPSK(1). 
2.1.4.3 Principle of ABAS 
ABAS augment the GNSS information autonomously with information available on the aircraft. It can 
either employ only GNSS information or take advantage of other sensors like barometric altimeters or 
inertial sensors. The ABAS scheme referred to as fault detection and exclusion (FDE) enables to 
monitor the integrity of the position information by taking advantage of the redundancy of the 
measurements.  
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The autonomous integrity monitoring algorithms are classified as Receiver Autonomous Integrity 
Monitoring (RAIM) algorithm when they exclusively use GNSS information and Aircraft 
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (AAIM) if they include other on-board sensors [ICAO, 2006]. 
2.1.4.3.1 Fault detection, Fault exclusion 
Fault Detection (FD) or Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE) are the principles of autonomous 
integrity monitoring algorithms performed by the receiver. The FDE consists of two distinct parts:  
 The Fault Detection part detects the presence of an unacceptably large position error for a 
given mode of flight. This part is referred to as Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring 
(RAIM). FD requires at least 5 satellites available to use redundancy. 
 The fault exclusion follows and tries to exclude the source of the unacceptably large position 
error, thereby allowing navigation to return to normal performance without an interruption in 
service. FDE requires at least six satellites with sufficiently good geometry. 
 
Figure 4 Diagram of FDE configurations [RTCA, 2006] 
The several scenarios that can lead to the FDE events are defined in [RTCA, 2006], and summarized 
in Figure 4: 
 A Positioning failure is defined to occur whenever the difference between the true position 
and the indicated position exceeds the applicable alert limit. 
 An Alert is an indication provided to the receiver when the positioning does not meet the 
integrity requirements. 
 Chapter 2: State of the art on GNSS and inertial navigation  
 
43 
 A False Alert is defined to occur when a position failure is detected by the algorithm whereas 
no position failure actually occurred. If the equipment is not aware of the navigation 
mode/alert limit, a positioning failure is defined to occur whenever the difference between the 
true position and the indicated position exceeds the applicable protection level. 
 A Missed alert is defined to occur when position failure is not detected within the time to 
alert. 
 A Missed detection is defined to occur when a position failure is not detected 
 A Failed exclusion is defined to occur when a true positioning failure is detected and the 
detection condition is not eliminated within the time-to-alert. 
 A Wrong exclusion is defined to occur when a detection occurs, and a positioning failure 
exists but is undetected after exclusion, resulting in a missed alert. 
RAIM algorithms are divided into “snapshot” and “sequential” depending whether the measurements 
used are only from the current epoch or from a time period. 
2.1.4.3.2 RAIM 
RAIMs are algorithms which take advantage of the redundancy of GNSS measurements to monitor 
integrity. In order to have redundancy: 
 at least an additional range measurements with respect to the minimum required to compute 
the navigation solution is needed for the fault detection function,  
 at least two additional range measurements are required for fault exclusion.  
First, the weighted least squares residuals (WLSR) RAIM used in civil aviation is analyzed. Then, 
other RAIM algorithms are discussed including the solution separation (SS) RAIM. 
2.1.4.3.2.1 WLSR RAIM 
Least Square Residuals (LSR) and Weighted Least Square Residuals (WLSR) are two of the most 
used algorithms in civil aviation that are discussed in this chapter. These two types of RAIM are 
snapshot algorithms based on least square position estimation. LSR/WLSR RAIMS usually 
outperforms solution separation. The LSR RAIM that was published in [Parkinson and Axelrad, 1988] 
assumes that the errors are described by independent Gaussian distributions with equal variance, 
which was a meaningful assumption when the selective availability (SA) dominated the pseudorange 
error. As the SA no longer exists, this assumption is no longer valid and the pseudorange errors shall 
be characterized by their own variances. The WLSR RAIM which has been proposed in [Walter and 
Enge, 1995] addresses this case. These two algorithms provide integrity for a navigation solution 
obtained by applying LSE or WLSE. 
Measurement model 
The measurement model used for the WLSR RAIM assumes that the pseudorange errors are divided 
into nominal errors and faults: 
 Nominal errors are assumed to follow independent, zero-mean and gaussian distribution 
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 𝜀(𝑡)~𝒩(0, 𝑅(𝑡)) Eq. 2-26 
where: 
 𝑅(𝑡) =
[
 
 
 
𝜎1
2 0 … 0
0 𝜎2
2  ⋮
⋮  ⋱ 0
0 ⋯ 0 𝜎𝑛
2]
 
 
 
 Eq. 2-27 
In the case of a LSR RAIM, the 𝑅(𝑡) matrix is replaced by the identity matrix times the 
variance of the pseudoranges (denoted 𝜎2). 
 Faults are biased measurements. Only one biased satellite is assumed in the LSR/WLSR 
RAIM assumptions 
 𝑏 = [0 … 0 𝑏𝑖 0 … 0]
𝑇 Eq. 2-28 
Test statistics 
The RAIM is a decision test. Two hypotheses to test are defined: 
 𝐻0: the measurements are nominal, in this case, 𝜀(𝑡)~𝒩(0, 𝑅(𝑡)) 
 𝐻1: a satellite is faulty, 𝜀(𝑡)~𝒩(𝑏, 𝑅(𝑡)) 
LSR/WLSR RAIM computes the test statistic processing the pseudorange residual vector, defined as 
the difference between the measured pseudorange vector and the peudorange vector derived from the 
estimated navigation solution: 
 𝑟(𝑡) = ∆𝑌(𝑡) − 𝐻(𝑡)∆?̂?(𝑡) Eq. 2-29 
The expression of the residual vector can be rewritten by replacing ∆?̂?(𝑡) by its expression: 
 𝑟(𝑡) = (𝐼 − 𝐵(𝑡)) ∆𝑌(𝑡) = (𝐼 − 𝐵(𝑡))𝜀(𝑡) Eq. 2-30 
with: 
 𝐵(𝑡) = 𝐻(𝑡)[𝐻(𝑡)
𝑇𝐻(𝑡)]−1𝐻(𝑡)𝑇 for LSR Eq. 2-31 
 𝐵(𝑡) = 𝐻(𝑡)[𝐻(𝑡)𝑇𝑅(𝑡)−1𝐻(𝑡)]−1𝐻(𝑡)𝑇𝑅(𝑡)−1 for WSSR Eq. 2-32 
A scalar metric called sum of the square residual errors (𝑆𝑆𝐸) is defined in the LSR case, and the 
weighted sum of square error (𝑊𝑆𝑆𝐸) is defined for the WLSR algorithm: 
 
𝑆𝑆𝐸(𝑡)
𝜎2
=
𝑟(𝑡)𝑇𝑟(𝑡)
𝜎2
~{
𝜒𝑘
2      𝑖𝑓 𝜀(𝑡)~𝒩(0, 𝜎2𝐼)
𝜒𝑘,𝜆
2    𝑖𝑓 𝜀(𝑡)~𝒩(𝑏, 𝜎2𝐼)
 Eq. 2-33 
Or 
 Chapter 2: State of the art on GNSS and inertial navigation  
 
45 
 𝑊𝑆𝑆𝐸 = 𝑟(𝑡)
𝑇𝑅(𝑡)−1𝑟(𝑡)~ {
𝜒𝑘
2      𝑖𝑓 𝜀(𝑡)~𝒩(0, 𝑅(𝑡))
𝜒𝑘,𝜆
2    𝑖𝑓 𝜀(𝑡)~𝒩(𝑏, 𝑅(𝑡))
 Eq. 2-34 
where: 
 𝑘 is the number of degrees of freedom of the distribution 
 𝜆 is the non-centrality parameter 
If the measurement errors follow independent centered normal distributions, 𝑆𝑆𝐸 and 𝑊𝑆𝑆𝐸 are chi-
squared distributed random variables. These variables follow non-central chi-squared distributions in 
the faulty case and a centered chi-squared distributions in a fault-free case. The number of degrees of 
freedom 𝑘  of the squared distribution is the number of redundant pseudorange measurements (in 
general the number of satellites tracked minus 4).  
In the faulty case, for the WSSR, the non-centrality parameter is: 
 𝜆 = 𝑏
𝑇𝑅(𝑡)−1(𝐼 − 𝐵(𝑡))𝑏 Eq. 2-35 
𝑅 must be replacted by 𝜎2 in Eq. 2-38 to have the expression for the LSR.  
Assuming that only the satellite 𝑖 is biased, the previous equation is equivalent to: 
 𝜆 =
(𝐼 − 𝐵)𝑖𝑖
𝜎𝑖
2 𝑏𝑖
2 Eq. 2-36 
The test statistics (denoted 𝑇) for the LSR and WLSR are respectively 𝑆𝑆𝐸(𝑡) 𝜎2⁄  and WSSE. The 
LSR RAIM test statistic is defined differently in [Parkinson and Axelrad, 1988] (√𝑆𝑆𝐸 𝑘⁄ ). The 
WLSR RAIM test statistic has also been defined differently in [Walter and Enge, 1995] (√𝑊𝑆𝑆𝐸). 
Detection thresholds 
Once the decision test variable has been determined as well as its distribution, it is necessary to set the 
detection threshold for the test. The fault detection process consists in comparing the test statistic 
value to a detection threshold. If the test statistic exceeds the detection threshold, a fault detection is 
declared. False alarm means that there is no fault (i.e. the null hypothesis, 𝐻0  holds) but the test 
statistic is over the detection threshold. As we assume that there is no fault, the test follows a chi-
square distribution with 𝑘 degrees of freedom. 
 𝑃𝐹𝐴 = 𝑃(𝑇 ≥ 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑|𝑇~𝜒𝑘
2) Eq. 2-37 
Using the probability density function of the chi squared distribution, the threshold is calculated with: 
 𝑃𝐹𝐴 = 1 − 𝑐𝑑𝑓𝜒𝑘
2(𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑) Eq. 2-38 
Equivalently, from a required 𝑃𝐹𝐴, it is possible to find the appropriate threshold. 
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Figure 5 Selection of the detection 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 to set the 𝑃𝐹𝐴 
 
Minimum detectable failures 
The probability of non-detected failure (𝑃𝑀𝐷) can be derived from the integrity risk requirements and 
the probability of occurrence of a fault. Provided the detection 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 and 𝑃𝑀𝐷 , the minimum 
value of the non-centrality parameter 𝜆𝑑𝑒𝑡 corresponding to a fault that can be detected with 𝑃𝑀𝐷 as 
illustrated in Figure 6 and so that: 
 𝑃𝑀𝐷 = 𝑃(𝑇 ≤ 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑|𝑇~𝜒𝑘,𝜆𝑑𝑒𝑡
2 ) Eq. 2-39 
where 𝜆𝑑𝑒𝑡 is independent of the satellite.  
The smallest bias that is detectable with the algorithm for each pseudorange can be derived from 𝜆𝑑𝑒𝑡 
with: 
 𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑡,𝑖 = 𝜎𝑖√
𝜆𝑑𝑒𝑡
(𝐼 − 𝐵𝑖,𝑖)
 Eq. 2-40 
 
 
Figure 6 Representation of 𝑃𝑀𝐷 in the faulty case 
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2(𝑇) 
𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 
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Protection levels 
The objective of a RAIM algorithm is to raise an alarm if the horizontal error exceeds the 𝐻𝑃𝐿 within 
the required 𝑃𝑀𝐷 and 𝑃𝐹𝐴. An alarm is raised when the test statistics exceeds the detection threshold. It 
is thus necessary to assess the impact on the position of a maximum measurement bias that would not 
trigger and alarm (minimum detectable fault). It is then required to relate the minimum detectable 
fault, the test statistic and the horizontal position error in order to bound the position error with the 
𝐻𝑃𝐿. The position error and the measurement errors, in the case of a biased measurement, are related 
by: 
 ∆𝑋 = 𝑋 − ?̂? = −𝐴(𝑡)
[
 
 
 
 
0
⋮
 𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑡,𝑖
⋮
0 ]
 
 
 
 
= [
𝐴𝑁,𝑖
𝐴𝐸,𝑖
⋮
] 𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑡,𝑖 Eq. 2-41 
where 𝐴(𝑡) = 𝐼 − 𝐵(𝑡)  
Thus the impact of the bias 𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑡,𝑖 in the horizontal plane is given by: 
 ∆𝑋𝐻 = √𝐴𝑁,𝑖
2 + 𝐴𝐸,𝑖
2 𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑡,𝑖 Eq. 2-42 
Replacing 𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑡,𝑖 by its expression (Eq. 2-40): 
 ∆𝑋𝐻 = √
𝐴𝑁,𝑖
2 + 𝐴𝐸,𝑖
2
(𝐼 − 𝐵𝑖,𝑖)
𝜎𝑖√𝜆𝑑𝑒𝑡 = 𝐻𝑆𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑖√𝜆𝑑𝑒𝑡 Eq. 2-43 
Denoting: 
 𝐻𝑆𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑖 = √
𝐴𝑁,𝑖
2 + 𝐴𝐸,𝑖
2
(𝐼 − 𝐵𝑖,𝑖)
𝜎𝑖 Eq. 2-44 
The slope quantizes the coupling between the effect of a bias in the range domain (i.e. the test 
statistic's), and what the RAIM aims to bound (i.e. the horizontal position error). Each satellite has its 
own slope. 
 𝐻𝑆𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥 = max𝑖
(𝐻𝑆𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑖) Eq. 2-45 
The horizontal protection level is then defined based on to the worst satellite: 
 𝐻𝑃𝐿 = 𝐻𝑆𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥√𝜆𝑑𝑒𝑡 Eq. 2-46 
The vertical protection levels can be computed analogously. 
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2.1.4.3.2.2 Examples of other RAIM algorithms 
Other RAIMs algorithms that can be found in the literature are introduced in this subsection.  
The maximum solution separation (MSS) RAIM which principle is described in [Brown and Mc 
Burney, 1988] is one of them. It is said to be outperformed by LSR RAIM [Van Graas and Farrell, 
1993]. The maximum solution separation method consists in monitoring the separation between the 
position estimate generated by the full-set filter that processes all the satellite measurements and the 
position estimate generated by each possible subset filters (each using all satellite measurements 
except one).  
These techniques can be further extended to include multiple hypotheses. Multiple Hypothesis 
Solution Separation (MHSS) which was proposed by [Pervan et al., 1998] for a GBAS monitoring 
application is a RAIM technique that comprises a protection level computation procedure that admits 
multiple simultaneous faulty measurements. 
Novel Integrity Optimized RAIM (NIORAIM) [Hwang and Brown, 2006]. NIORAIM is a method to 
improve RAIM availability by weighting the pseudorange measurements in a non-linear fashion so 
that the integrity limits (or slopes) of the satellites become nearly equal. The non-linearly weighted 
measurements are then used to compute a position fix. The weights are designed to improve 
availability of the RAIM at the cost of accuracy.  
Advanced Receiver Autonomous Monitoring (ARAIM) is based on dual frequency (L1/E1 and 
L5/E5a) measurements and at least two independent GNSS core constellations for civil aviation. As 
opposed to what indicate its name, ARAIM is not autonomous because it relies on a ground system in 
order to provide periodic updates of the nominal performance and fault rates [Blanch et al., 2012]. 
This integrity data is contained in the Integrity Support Message (ISM) that is created on the ground 
and broadcast to the aircrafts. ARAIM places the greatest integrity responsibility on the aircraft and 
the smallest burden on the ground monitors. ARAIM algorithms are developed from the Multi-
Hypothesis Solution Separation (MHSS) algorithm. Unlike RAIM, ARAIM does not assume that the 
probability of a constellation failure is negligible.  
2.1.4.3.2.3 AAIM algorithms 
AAIM algorithms have been designed to monitor the integrity of the GNSS measurements on a system 
that integrates GNSS and inertial measurements in a tight coupling scheme (the notion of tight 
coupling is defined in Chapter 4). Three main integrity algorithms have been developed for tight 
integrated systems. 
The most popular method is the Multiple Solution Separation (MSS) algorithm. MSS is a snapshot 
algorithm which has been developed in [Brenner, 1995]. A different version of the MSS has been 
proposed in [Young and McGraw, 2003] and is patented by Rockwell Collins [US7219013]. MSS for 
hybridized systems consists in monitoring the separation between the position estimated by a fusion 
filter that processes all the satellite measurements and the position estimate by sub fusion filters (each 
processing all satellite measurements except one).  
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The second AAIM algorithm is Assured Integrity monitoring by Extrapolation Method (AIME). 
AIME was developed by John Diesel for Litton systems in 1996. This algorithm is patented [US 
5583774A] and it is certified as primary mean of navigation for up to the non-precision approach 
(NPA) on the Airbus 300 Series aircraft [Diesel and Dunn, 1996]. The purpose of AIME navigation is 
to identify the satellites whose clock drifts are within specification and to use only those satellites 
within specification in estimating the user’s position. According to [RTCA, 2006], this algorithm 
provides exclusion capability for large steps, ramps and ramp rates. Moreover multiple failures can be 
handled. However, detection and exclusion of slow drifts or drift rate are not guaranteed by this 
technique. For the fault detection, the Extrapolation Method compute three test statistics that are all 
based on the Kalman filter innovations (i.e., measurement residuals). The first test is based on the 
innovation that have been averaged over the last 2.5 min duration and the others, are obtained by 
averaging the innovations over 10 min and 30 min. The three tests variables follow Chi-square 
distributions in the nominal case [Lee and O'Laughlin, 2000]. AIME is a sequential integrity 
monitoring algorithm because it uses measurements from several epochs (current and past).  
A third method called Generalized Likelihood Ratio, which is sequential, is also introduced in this 
chapter. It is proven in [Giremus and Escher, 2007] that this algorithm outperforms MSS in term of 
protection level. Generalized Likelihood Ration (GLR) is applied in to detect possible component 
failure in system. This algorithm was first introduced by [Willsky, 1976] and it is applicable to any 
dynamical system that estimates its state using Kalman filter. This algorithm can detect multiple 
simultaneous failures and is robust to disturbance of small magnitude. However, since no fault-free 
solution is maintained, after a fault is detected, a compensation step is necessary to remove the 
induced errors on the Kalman filter estimates. In GLR, test statistics are the jump/ramp occurence 
Likelihood Ratios (LR).  
2.2 Principle of inertial navigation 
Inertial navigation is used in plenty of applications such as aviation, military ships, submarines and 
guided weapons. Unlike GNSS, inertial sensors are not sensitive to the surrounding environment of the 
vehicle. This property is of particular interest for the navigation in constrained environments such as 
urban canyons, tunnels, and indoor. In term of position estimation, Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) 
have a good short term accuracy. However, the main drawback of INS is that the estimated position 
error slowly drifts and is not bounded. This is due to the integration of errors in the dead reckoning 
process. Therefore, inertial navigation is complementary to the technologies that estimate an absolute 
position with a bounded error such as GNSS or Wi-Fi based positioning (in indoor environments).  
2.2.1 Introduction to inertial sensors 
Inertial sensors comprise gyroscopes and accelerometers.  
Gyroscopes generally measure angular rates (except mechanical gyroscopes) or angular increments 
(rates multiplied by the sampling period). There are three main technologies used for gyroscopes: 
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 Mechanical gyroscopes which are made of a spinning wheel mounted on two gimbals which 
enable it to rotate around the three axes. They directly measure the orientation of the device.  
 Optical gyroscopes regroup the Fiber Optical Gyroscopes (FOG) and Ring Laser Gyroscopes. 
They operate by sensing the difference in propagation time between beams of light traveling 
in clockwise and counter-clockwise directions about a closed optical path [Stedman, 1997]. 
This difference is referred to as Sagnac effect. Optical gyroscopes are usually associated with 
high grades (tactical grade at minimum) and high costs. 
 Microelectromechanical (MEMS) gyroscopes are made of silicon micromachining techniques. 
MEMS gyroscopes contain vibrating elements to measure the Coriolis effect. At present 
MEMS sensors cannot reach the accuracy level of optical devices, however, they are expected 
to do so in the future. Unlike Mechanical and Optical gyroscopes, MEMS gyroscopes are 
cheap to manufacture and therefore suitable for applications that demands low cost devices 
such as ETC and, to a minor extent, train control.  
Accelerometers measure the specific forces (or equivalently, velocity increments). The specific force 
is defined as the difference between the true acceleration in space and the acceleration due to gravity 
[Titterton and Weston, 1997]. 
 There are three main technologies used for accelerometers: 
 A mechanical accelerometer consists of a mass suspended by springs. The displacement of the 
mass is measured. A signal proportional to the force acting on the mass in the direction of the 
input axis is generated. The acceleration of the mobile is deduced by dividing the magnitude 
of the force by the  
 Solid state accelerometers can be classified into sub-groups, including surface acoustic wave, 
vibratory, silicon and quartz devices. An example of a solid-state accelerometer is the surface 
acoustic wave (SAW) accelerometer. Such accelerometer consists of a cantilever beam which 
is resonated at a particular frequency. A mass is attached to one end of the beam which is free 
to move whereas the other end is rigidly attached to the case. The acceleration along the input 
axis makes the beam bend. This causes the frequency of the surface acoustic wave to change 
proportionally to the applied strain. Therefore, the acceleration of the vehicle can be deduced 
from this change of frequency.  
 MEMS accelerometers can be divided into two classes. The first class consists of mechanical 
accelerometers that measure the displacement of a supported mass. The second class consists 
of devices which measure the change in frequency of a vibrating element caused by a change 
of tension, similarly to SAW accelerometers. 
Inertial measurement unit (IMU) are typically made of three gyroscopes, three accelerometers, a 
processor, a calibration-parameter store [Groves, 2013], a temperature sensor, and the power supplies. 
IMUs with fewer than six inertial sensors are usually referred to as partial IMUs. IMUs that include 
more than 6 sensors for fault-detection or isolation also exist, and referred to as Redundant IMU 
(RIMU). Current INS uses a strapdown architecture, in which the inertial sensors are attached to the 
vehicle frame. Strapdown technology has the advantage of decreasing the IMU size, power and cost 
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with respect to stabilized platforms. The main drawback of strapdown technology is that the 
computational complexity is increased. An IMU does not calculate any navigation solution such as 
position, velocity and attitude. In general, the IMU outputs are angular rates and the specific forces (or 
angular and velocity increments, which corresponds to rates multiplied by the IMU sampling period) 
as measured by the sensors which are calibrated.  
An Inertial Navigation System (INS) contains a combination of an IMU and a computer running 
navigation equations. An INS estimates the position, velocity and orientation of the vehicle by dead 
reckoning principle. The processing of navigation equations is referred to as mechanization. After a 
summary of the reference frames given in section 2.2.2, the principle of a 3D inertial mechanization is 
detailed in section 2.2.3. 
2.2.2 Frames of reference 
Inertial navigation involves several frames of references that are defined in this section. The Inertial 
Frame (i-frame) has its origin at the Earth’s center of mass. Its Z-axis is parallel to the spin axis of the 
Earth, and its axes are non-rotating with respect to the fixed stars. The X-axis is pointing toward the 
mean vernal equinox, and the Y-axis completes a right handed orthogonal frame. 
 The ECEF frame has its origin located at the Earth’s center of mass. Its axes are fixed with 
respect to the Earth. The Z-axis is parallel to the spin axis of the Earth. The X-axis points 
towards the mean meridian of Greenwich, and the Y-axis completes a right handed orthogonal 
frame.  
 The local navigation frame (n-frame), also known as the local-level frame or local geodetic 
frame, has a fixed origin with respect to the Earth, usually a point on the surface. The Z-axis is 
orthogonal to the reference ellipsoid pointing up. The Y-axis points towards geodetic north, 
and the X-axis completing a right handed orthogonal frame. If the east, north, up (ENU) 
system of coordinate is used in this thesis, north, east, down (NED) is also often used in the 
litterature.  
 The Body frame (b-frame) is usually centered on the center of gravity of the vehicle. The Y-
axis points towards the forward direction, and corresponds to the roll angle (𝛾) axis. The X-
axis points towards the transverse direction, and corresponds to the pitch angle (𝜃) axis. The 
Z-axis points towards the vertical direction (up) and completes a right handed orthogonal 
frame. It corresponds to the yaw angle (𝜓) axis. 
2.2.3 Principles of inertial mechanization 
This section describes the process referred to as 3D mechanization for an IMU composed of 3 
gyroscopes and 3 accelerometers. This mechanization operates in the navigation frame. The 
parametrization used for the IMU orientation plays a major role in inertial navigation. The attitude 
representations that are commonly used in inertial navigation are the direction cosine matrix (DCM), 
quaternion, rotation vector and Euler angles. Relations between these parametrizations can be found in 
[Shin, 2001]. A quaternion mechanization is used in this thesis. Compared to Euler angles, it enables 
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faster computations and avoids the problem of gimbal lock. Compare to DCM, quaternion are more 
numerically stable. The inputs of the algorithm are the calibrated outputs of the inertial sensors. The 
outputs of the mechanization are the position (𝑥𝑛), velocity (𝑣𝑛) (both expressed in the n-frame) and 
attitude (𝑎𝑡𝑡 ) estimated by dead reckoning. This subsection describes the principle of the 3D 
mechanization that is used in this thesis and which can be summarized by Figure 7 [Groves, 2013].  
 
Figure 7 Principle of an inertial navigation processor, from [Groves, 2013] 
Initialization step: 
By principle of dead reckoning, the mechanization requires the knowledge of the initial position (𝑥0), 
velocity (𝑣0) and attitude of the IMU (𝑎𝑡𝑡0). The quaternion must be initialized by using the initial 
value of the attitude angles. This can be done by forming the initial 𝐶𝑏
𝑛  matrix, from which the 
quaternions can be deduced with [McGreevy, 1986]: 
 𝑞𝑏
𝑛 = [
𝑞0
𝑞1
𝑞2
𝑞3
] =
[
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 Eq. 2-47 
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Attitude integration step: 
After having converted the IMU measurements from the sensor reference frame to the b-frame by 
simple rotation, it is necessary to update the quaternion based on the gyroscopes’ measurements. The 
IMU measures the angular increment of the body frame with respect to the inertial frame expressed in 
the body frame (∆𝜃𝑖𝑏
𝑏 ). However, the attitude corresponds to the orientation of the b-frame with respect 
to the n-frame. The body angular increments with respect to the navigation frame are obtained by 
correcting the rotation of the navigation frame with respect to the inertial frame expressed in the body 
frame:  
 ∆𝜃𝑛𝑏
𝑏 = ∆𝜃𝑖𝑏
𝑏 − ∆𝜃𝑖𝑛
𝑏 = ∆𝜃𝑖𝑏
𝑏 − 𝐶𝑛
𝑏(𝜔𝑖𝑒
𝑛 +𝜔𝑒𝑛
𝑛 )∆𝑡 Eq. 2-48 
where: 
 𝐶𝑛
𝑏 = (𝐶𝑏
𝑛)𝑇, and 𝐶𝑏
𝑛 can be exactly calculated from the quaternion with: 
 𝐶𝑏
𝑛 = (
𝑞0
2 + 𝑞1
2 − 𝑞2
2 − 𝑞3
2 2(𝑞1𝑞2 − 𝑞0𝑞3) 2(𝑞1𝑞3 + 𝑞0𝑞2)
2(𝑞1𝑞2 + 𝑞0𝑞3) 𝑞0
2 − 𝑞1
2 + 𝑞2
2 − 𝑞3
2 2(𝑞2𝑞3 − 𝑞0𝑞1)
2(𝑞1𝑞3 − 𝑞0𝑞2) 2(𝑞2𝑞3 + 𝑞0𝑞1) 𝑞0
2 − 𝑞1
2 − 𝑞2
2 + 𝑞3
2
) Eq. 2-49 
 𝜔𝑖𝑒
𝑛  is the rotation of the e-frame w.r.t the i-frame expressed in the n-frame: 
 𝜔𝑖𝑒
𝑛 = [
0
𝜔𝑖𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝜑)
𝜔𝑖𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝜑)
] Eq. 2-50 
 𝜔𝑒𝑛
𝑛  is the rotation of the n-frame w.r.t the e-frame expressed in the n-frame: 
 𝜔𝑒𝑛
𝑛 = [
−𝑣𝑁/(𝑅𝑁 + ℎ) 
𝑣𝐸/(𝑅𝑀 + ℎ)
𝑣𝐸 𝑡𝑎𝑛(𝜑) /(𝑅𝑁 + ℎ)
] Eq. 2-51 
where 𝑣𝐸 and 𝑣𝑁 corresponds to the velocity as estimated in the mechanization.  
 𝑅𝑁 is the radius of curvature in the prime vertical, which can be calculated with: 
 𝑅𝑁 =
𝑅𝑒(1 − 𝑒
2)
[1 − 𝑒2 sin2(𝜑)]3 2⁄
 Eq. 2-52 
 𝑅𝑀 is the meridian radius of curvature, which can be calculated with: 
 𝑅𝑀 =
𝑅𝑒
[1 − 𝑒2 𝑠𝑖𝑛2(𝜑)]1 2⁄
 Eq. 2-53 
 𝑒 is the eccentricity of the earth, equal to 0.0818191908425 
 𝑅𝑒 is the radius of the earth, which is equal to 6378140 m 
 ωie is the earth rotation rate, which is equal to 7.2921151467.10
-5
 rad/s 
Let us denote ∆𝜃𝑥, ∆𝜃𝑦 and ∆𝜃𝑧 the three components of the angular increment vector. ∆𝜃𝑛𝑏
𝑏  
The quaternion at the time index 𝑘 is updated with: 
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 𝑞𝑘+1 = 𝑞𝑘 +
1
2
(
 
 
0 −∆𝜃𝑥 −∆𝜃𝑦 −∆𝜃𝑧
∆𝜃𝑥 0 ∆𝜃𝑧 −∆𝜃𝑦
∆𝜃𝑦 −∆𝜃𝑧 0 ∆𝜃𝑥
∆𝜃𝑧 ∆𝜃𝑦 −∆𝜃𝑥 0 )
 
 
𝑞𝑘 Eq. 2-54 
The quaternion is then normalized with: 
 
𝑞𝑘+1 =
𝑞𝑘+1
√𝑞𝑘+1
𝑇 𝑞𝑘+1
 
Eq. 2-55 
Specific force frame transformation 
The specific forces or velocity increments (Δ𝑣𝑓
𝑏) measured by the accelerometers are expressed in the 
body frame. The corresponding velocity increment expressed in the body frame is converted to the 
navigation frame by multiplying the measurement vector by the DCM.  
 𝛥𝑣𝑓
𝑛 = 𝐶𝑏
𝑛𝛥𝑣𝑓
𝑏 Eq. 2-56 
Gravity model and Coriolis force correction 
The velocity increment in the navigation equation in the n-frame (Δvn) can be obtained by adding the 
acceleration due to gravity and by removing the Coriolis acceleration. 
 Δ𝑣
𝑛 = Δ𝑣𝑓
𝑛 − (2𝜔𝑖𝑒
𝑛 +𝜔𝑒𝑛
𝑛 )^𝑣𝑛∆𝑡 + 𝛾𝑛∆𝑡 Eq. 2-57 
where: 
 ∆𝑡 is the sampling period of the IMU 
 𝛾𝑛 is the gravitation model (the WGS84 model has been used in this thesis) 
 ^ denotes the cross product 
Velocity update 
The velocity of the vehicle in the navigation frame is updated by adding the velocity increment: 
 𝑣𝑘+1
𝑛 = 𝑣𝑘
𝑛 + Δ𝑣𝑛 Eq. 2-58 
Position update 
The position of the vehicle is updated by integrating the velocity: 
 𝑥𝑘+1
𝑛 = 𝑥𝑘
𝑛 + 𝑣𝑘+1
𝑛 Δ𝑡 Eq. 2-59 
This version of the 3D mechanization has been implemented in the thesis. 
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2.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has firstly described the principles of GNSS, which is one of the two main technology 
used in this thesis. The principles of GNSS augmentations which have been developed in the context 
of civil aviation have been introduced. This is particularly interesting because, like the applications of 
interest investigated in this thesis, civil aviation is a critical application (from a safety point of view) 
which already integrates GNSS.  
Then, the principle of inertial sensors and the way to integrate their measurements in order to estimate 
the navigation parameters (position, velocity and attitude) has been presented through a 3D 
mechanization. This algorithm has been implemented and has been used in the rest of the thesis.  
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3 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
Unlike civil aviation [ICAO, 2006] and maritime transport [IMO, 2001], no standardized operational 
requirements for the use of GNSS in critical terrestrial applications exist. Each country has its own 
systems for toll collection and train control, which slows down the process of defining common 
standards and requirements for the use of GNSS. Moreover, the need for interoperability is lower for 
terrestrial application compared to aviation and maritime as most vehicles stay within the network of 
one country. This tendency is evolving for train control in Europe with the development of the 
European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) for an improved interoperability. Before ETCS, 
trains had to carry several control systems to travel from a country to another in Europe. However, 
other countries such as USA, China and Russia are already using GNSS for train control in different 
systems. For toll collection, countries have their own systems, therefore the On Board Units (OBU) 
usually includes several technologies to travel through different countries.  
This chapter introduces the performance metrics that will be used to define the operational 
requirements for GNSS in the critical terrestrial applications of interest. The metrics and requirements 
used by civil aviation will be presented for references, as they are the most consolidated ones. Then, 
this section discusses the propositions that exist in the literature for train control. In particular, the 
work will focus on the use of GNSS for the European Train Control System (ETCS). The operational 
requirements for ETC are then discussed.  
3.1 Performance requirements criterion used for civil aviation 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is an organization that codifies the 
principles and techniques of international air navigation and fosters the planning and development of 
international air transport. For safety considerations, civil aviation requires safe, secure and high-end 
air navigation systems. ICAO recognizes in [ICAO, Doc 9750] the Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GNSS) as a key element of the Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance/Air Traffic 
Management (CNS/ATM) systems as well as a foundation upon which States can deliver improved 
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aeronautical navigation services [ICAO, Doc 9849]. Standards requirements for GNSS in civil 
aviation have been defined by ICAO in November 2002 in [ICAO, 2006].  
The GNSS Signal-In-Space (SiS) requirements are defined in terms of accuracy, integrity, continuity 
and availability [ICAO, 2006]: 
 Accuracy: GNSS position error is the difference between the estimated position and the 
actual position. For an estimated position at a specific location, the probability should be 
at least 95 per cent that the position error is within the accuracy requirement. 
 Availability: The availability of a navigation system is defined as the ability of the system to 
provide the required function and performance at the initiation of the intended operation. 
The availability of GNSS is characterized by the portion of time the system is to be used 
for navigation during which reliable navigation information is presented to the crew, 
autopilot, or other system managing the flight of the aircraft. 
 Continuity: The continuity of a system is the ability of the total system to perform its 
function without unscheduled interruption during the intended operation. More 
specifically, continuity is the probability that the specified system performance will be 
maintained for the duration of a phase operation, presuming that the system was available 
at the beginning of that phase operation and was predicted to operate throughout the 
operation.  
 
 Integrity: Integrity is a measure of the trust that can be placed in the correctness of the 
information supplied by the total system. Integrity includes the ability of a system to 
provide timely and valid warnings to the user (alerts) when the system must not be used 
for the intended operation. Integrity requirements are defined with four parameters: 
- Integrity risk (𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡): The integrity risk is the probability of providing a position that is 
out of tolerance without warning the user within the time-to-alert. 
- Alert limit (𝐴𝐿): To ensure that the position error is acceptable, an alert limit is 
defined. It represents the largest position error allowable for a safe operation. The 
position error cannot exceed this alert limit without annunciation [ICAO, 2006].  
o The Horizontal Alert Limit (𝐻𝐴𝐿) is the radius of a circle in the horizontal 
plane (the local plane tangent to the WGS-84 ellipsoid), with its center being at 
the true position, that describes the region that is required to contain the 
indicated horizontal position with the required probability for a particular 
navigation mode.  
o The Vertical Alert Limit (𝑉𝐴𝐿) is half the length of a segment on the vertical 
axis (perpendiculat to the horizontal plane of WGS-84 ellipsoid), with its 
center being at the true position, that describes the region that is required to 
contain the indicated vertical position with the required probability for a 
particular navigation mode. 
- Time to Alert (𝑇𝑇𝐴): The TTA is the maximum allowable elapsed time from the onset 
of a positioning failure until the equipment annunciates the alert. 
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The combination of GNSS elements and a fault-free GNSS user receiver shall meet the signal-in-space 
requirements which are defined by ICAO in [ICAO, 2006] and are summarized in Table 2. The fault-
free receiver is assumed to be a receiver with nominal accuracy and time-to-alert performance. Such a 
receiver is assumed to have no failures that affect the integrity, availability and continuity performance 
[ICAO, 2010]. 
The operational requirements for terrestrial applications will be understood based on the civil aviation 
definition of the criteria as civil aviation is the most advanced application in terms of safe GNSS-
based positioning operations. The proposed operational requirements are therefore presented in the 
same way as in Table 2.  
Operation 
Accuracy-95% Integrity 
Continuity Availability 
𝐻𝐴𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑉𝐴𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐻𝐴𝐿 𝑉𝐴𝐿 𝑇𝑇𝐴 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡  
En-route 3.7 km N/A 
7.4 km 
(oceanic) 
3.7 km 
(continental) 
N/A 5 min 10
-7
/h 
1-10
-4
/h  
to  
1-10
-8
/h 
0.99 to 0.99999 
En-route, 
Terminal 
0.74 km N/A 1.85 km N/A 15s 10
-7
/h 
1-10
-4
/h  
to  
1-10
-8
/h 
0.99 to 0.99999 
Initial approach, 
Intermediate 
approach, NPA, 
Departure 
220 m N/A 556 m N/A 10s 10
-7
/h 
1-10
-4
/h  
to  
1-10
-8
/h 
0.99 to 0.99999 
APV I 16 m N/A 40 m 50m 10s 
2.10
-7
/h in 
any 
approach 
1-8.10
-6
/h in 
any 15 s 
0.99 to 0.99999 
APV II 16 m 20m 40 m 20m 6s 
2.10
-7
/h in 
any 
approach 
1-8.10
-6
/h in 
any 15 s 
0.99 to 0.99999 
CAT I 16 m 
6m to 
4m 
40 m 
35m to 
10m 
6s 
2.10
-7
/h in 
any 
approach 
1-8.10
-6
/h in 
any 15 s 
0.99 to 0.99999 
Table 2 SiS performance requirements [ICAO, 2006] 
N/A: Not applicable 
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3.2 Derivation of performance requirements for train control 
GNSS is already used for train position monitoring in the USA (Positive Train Control), China (for 
high velocity lines) and Russia. The present thesis focuses on the European system ETCS. In Europe, 
each country has its own train control system. In order to improve interoperability, the ERTMS system 
is being developed. ERTMS aims at replacing the different national train control and command 
systems in Europe. One component of ERTMS, the European Train Control System (ETCS), 
guarantees a common standard that enables trains to cross national borders and enhances safety. Three 
levels of ETCS exist: 
 ETCS level 1 can be applied as an overlay to existing signaling system. In level 1, Eurobalises 
radio beacons transmit track side signals to the vehicle as a Movement Authority which are 
permissions to cross rail sections. Route data information at fixed points is also transmitted to 
the vehicle. The on-board computer continuously monitors and calculates the maximum speed 
and the braking curve from this data. Because of the spot transmission of data, the train must 
travel over the Eurobalise beacon to obtain the next movement authority. 
 In ETCS level 2, the Eurobalises are used as positions of reference and the vehicle estimates 
its position between two beacons by odometry. The trains report their position to the RBC 
(Radio Block Center) with GSM-R. The RBC monitors the train movements and transmits 
speed information, route data and movement authorities to the train with GSM-R. Most of the 
signals are displayed in the vehicle. The train detection is still ensured by track-circuits or axle 
counters. 
 In ETCS level 3, the vehicle has to estimate its position as in ETCS level 2 and transmits it to 
the RBC. The train detection function does not rely on track circuits but on the position 
calculated by the onboard equipment. The possibility for frequent update of the movement 
authority allows trains to run closer together and the line capacity to be increased. The train 
also has an on-board integrity system that monitors the train. 
In ETCS level 2 and 3 the vehicles have to self-monitor their position and speed, based on a 
combination of radiobeacons (Eurobalises) installed along the railway that provide reference positions, 
and odometry. An average separation between balise groups of 2 km is adopted in Europe for fast 
trains with speed up to 300 km/h. The possible use of GNSS in ETCS has been investigated in several 
European-funded projects listed in Table 3. 
Project Name Period Funding References 
GADEROS 2002-2004 5th FP 
[Bustamante and De Miguel, 
2003] 
INTEGRAIL 2001-2004 ESA [Bedrich and Gu, 2004] 
LOCOPROL/ 
LOCOLOC 
2001-2004 ESA-EC [Simsky et al., 2004] 
ECORAIL 2001-2005 ESA [Wasle and Ringert, 2003] 
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RUNE -2006 ESA [Marradi et al., 2008] 
GRAIL 2005-2008 6th FP, GSA [Ballesteros, 2006] 
GRAIL-2 2010-2012 7th FP, GSA [González et al., 2012] 
SATLOC 2012- 
7th FP, GSA, 
UIC 
[Barbu and Marais, 2014] 
3InSat 2012-2015 ESA [Rispoli et al., 2013] 
Table 3 List of projects targeting the introduction of GNSS in ETCS 
The potential use of GNSS for ETCS was discussed by the rail European authorities and it has been 
stated by the European Railway Association (ERA) that [MoU, 2005]: “The Navigation Satellite 
System (GNSS) can play a major role in the rail sector, both for fleet management and rail safety 
(signalling and train control)”. The motivation for the use of GNSS in ETCS is the reduction of the 
frequency of the balises distributed along the tracks that are needed to reset the train odometer error. 
Different realistic ways to integrate GNSS in ETCS are possible: 
 The use of GNSS and sensors to enhance odometry is one of the options investigated in the 
projects INTEGRAIL, GRAIL and GRAIL-2. In INTEGRAIL, it is assumed that near a balise, 
odometry provides better precision than GNSS-based odometry. As the vehicle moves away 
from the balise, the GNSS odometry, at some point, becomes better than the classical one and 
thus replaces it. GRAIL and GRAIL-2 investigated a GNSS-based odometer to integrate 
and/or replace the traditional odometric systems.  
 The second approach consists in using GNSS technology as a virtual balise. This provides 
information of absolute position. This approach enables the reduction of the frequency of 
balises distributed along the track line to reset the train odometer error. The integration of 
GNSS as a virtual balise has been studied in RUNE and the recent projects Satloc and 3InSat.  
The present thesis investigates the integration of GNSS in ETCS as a virtual balise as this trend seems 
to be adopted by the rail community. Replacing the Eurobalise/Odometry-based train Location 
Determination System (LDS) by a hybridized GNSS/Sensors system is not currently realistic as it 
would require significant change in the system. 
In any case, the operational requirements must be adapted to the way in which the GNSS is included 
in the system. 
3.2.1 Alert limit derived from ETCS 
There is no vertical requirement for GNSS in train control as the train is travelling in the horizontal 
plane. For train control, it is rather necessary to separate the along track and across track requirements. 
In ETCS, the track discrimination is done by reading Eurobalises, therefore no across track 
requirements exists for the existing odometry-based location system. To replace all the beacons, 
GNSS-based LDS should be able to discriminate the parallel tracks. According to [Hartwig et al., 
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2006], the minimum separation between parallel tracks is 3.80 meters. Therefore, for tracks 
discrimination, an across track 𝐴𝐿 of 1.90 meters is required. In [Rispoli et al., 2013] and [Filip et al., 
2008], it is said the across track confidence interval should not exceed 2.5 meters for the same reasons. 
The 2.5 meters across track 𝐴𝐿 is taken as a reference as it is used in most recent projects. As GNSS 
will be integrated in ETCS as a virtual balise, the first approach is to expect the same level of along-
track accuracy as a real Eurobalise. The position accuracy requirement of the eurobalise is the 
following: “the location accuracy shall be within ±1 m for each Balise, when a Balise has been 
passed” [UNISIG 1]. However such level of performance is not realistic for GNSS with high level of 
integrity. It is assumed that the determination of the railtrack on which the vehicle is driving is still 
determined by radiobeacons which are located after intersections. The objective is thus to use GNSS to 
reduce the amount of beacons and not to remove all of them.  
In the along-track direction, the standard “accuracy” requirements for the LDS in ETCS are adapted to 
odometry and given in term of distance travelled [UIC 1]: The minimum ETCS on-board odometer 
accuracy presently required for distance measurement is defined as 5 meters plus 5 % of distance 
travelled from the last reference point. Assuming that the separation between two balise groups must 
not exceed 2.5 km [UNISIG 3], it is possible to obtain an upper bound of the maximum along-track 
tolerable error of 130 meter. The term “accuracy” mentioned is not clearly defined. Thus, this 
maximum tolerable error is not understood as a 95% confidence interval but as an along track 𝐴𝐿 
(conservatively).  
It will be assumed in this study that the position is propagated with odometry between two virtual 
balises. If it is assumed that the along-track error must not exceed 130 meters, and that the 
contribution of the error that is proportional to the distance travelled is assigned to the odometry, the 
maximum tolerable error for GNSS is related to the distance between two consecutive virtual balises 
with: 
 𝐴𝐿 ≤ 130 − 0.05𝛿(𝑉𝐵𝑖, 𝑉𝐵𝑖+1) Eq. 3-1 
where 𝛿(, ) represents the curvilinear distance between the two consecutive virtual balises 𝑉𝐵𝑖  and 
𝑉𝐵𝑖+1. 
Moreover, the minimum distance (𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛 ) between two virtual balises is limited by the sampling 
frequency of the GNSS receiver output (𝐹𝑠,𝐺𝑁𝑆𝑆) and the maximum velocity of the vehicle (𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥) in 
the area of interest. If the availability of GNSS is assumed to be 1, the minimum theoretical distance 
allowed between two consecutive balises is given by:  
 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝐹𝑠,𝐺𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 Eq. 3-2 
Finally, we have the following upper bound for the across track: 
 𝐴𝐿 ≤ 130 − 0.05𝛿(𝑉𝐵𝑖, 𝑉𝐵𝑖+1) ≤ 130 − 0.05𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛 Eq. 3-3 
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As the standard ETCS requirements for odometry does not make it possible to derive more than an 
upper bound for the GNSS along track 𝐴𝐿, non-official requirements have been investigated in the 
litterature. In [Rispoli et al., 2013], it is said that on main corridor lines a 2.5 m confidence interval is 
required and on medium / low traffic lines the maximum confidence interval is several tens of meters 
or larger. [Mocek et al., 2010] gives requirements that must be fulfilled by GNSS to be used as a train 
location determination system for ETCS. In [Mocek et al., 2010], the along track 𝐴𝐿 is set to 25 meters 
for the main corridor lines and stations, from 25 m to 125 m in main and secondary lines and from 50 
to 250 m in Regional and industrial lines. It can be noticed that for Regional and industrial lines the 𝐴𝐿 
values may exceed the bound that have been derived in Eq. 3-3.  
Finally, the along track  𝐴𝐿  will be assumed to take values between 25 and 125 meters (which 
corresponds to 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛 at a 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 of 300 km/h with 𝐹𝑠,𝐺𝑁𝑆𝑆 of 1 Hz).  
3.2.2 Accuracy 
Assuming the gaussianity of the along track and across track error in the nominal case, the accuracy 
requirement can be derived from the 𝐴𝐿 requirements with the following formula: 
 𝐴𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝐴𝐿
𝑐𝑑𝑓𝒩(0,1)
−1 (1 −
0.05
2 )
𝑐𝑑𝑓𝒩(0,1)
−1 (1 −
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡
2 )
 Eq. 3-4 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 is the integrity risk requirement (per sample).  
To calculate the integrity risk requirements per sample, it is necessary to define the number of 
independent samples per hour. The correlation in time depends on the correlation of measurement 
errors, the variations of the satellite constellation geometry [Salos, 2012] (which occurs frequently in 
urban environment due to the variations in the configuration of the buildings) and the navigation 
algorithm that is used. The results that are used in civil aviation cannot be used in the case of study 
because the main sources of error are different, and their correlation time is different. It is proposed to 
define the minimum time between two independent samples in terrestrial urban/suburban environment. 
Let’s model the position error by a first order Gauss-Markov process. In this case, its correlation 
function has the following form [El-Diasty and Pagiatakis, 2009]: 
 𝐸[𝛿𝑥(𝑡)𝛿𝑥(𝑡 − 𝜏)] = 𝜎𝛿𝑥
2 𝑒−|𝜏|/𝑇𝑐 Eq. 3-5 
where: 
 𝛿𝑥(𝑡) is the position error 
 𝜎𝐺𝑀 is the standard deviation of the position error  
 𝑇𝑐 is the correlation time of the error 
It is proposed to estimate 𝑇𝑐  on the measurements collected in the campaign described later on in 
Chapter 5.  
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Figure 8 Correlation of position error for GPS L1 C/A receiver with Least Square position estimation 
algorithm 
 GPS GPS/GLO GPS IMU/MAP 
GPS/GLO/IMU/
MAP 
GPS/GLO/IMU/
WSS 
Algorithm Least Square Least Square EKF EKF EKF 
Along track 𝑇𝑐 2 s 14 s 110 s 71 s 75 s 
Across track 𝑇𝑐 7 s 10 s 18 s 41 s 146 s 
Table 4 Estimated correlation time on real data 
The estimated 𝑇𝑐 are given in Table 4 for the different architectures tested in the thesis on real data and 
described later on in chapter 6.The GNSS receivers that have been used only process one frequency 
(L1 C/A for GPS and L1 for GLONASS). The results obtained are not representative of all study cases 
as they have been obtained using 1-hour data collections. The organizations that are responsible for the 
definition of standardized requirements for terrestrial applications will have to determine these 
parameters on larger data collections as it has been done in civil aviation. It can be inferred from Table 
4 that 𝑇𝑐 is much larger for EKF based positioning due to the smoothing effect and the memory of the 
filter.  
As for dual-frequency receiver, according to [Salos, 2012], (that have not been tested on real data), 
they present an error correlation of a few seconds which is driven by thermal noise and multipath.  
Finally, it is assumed that the minimum time elapsed between two independent samples is 3𝑇𝑐 , 
because at 3𝑇𝑐 the autocorrelation of the Gauss-Markov process is 5% of its maximum value. The 
decorrelation period are approximately 30 second for standalone GNSS with Least Square position 
estimation and approximately 300 seconds for sensor augmented GNSS with EKF position estimation.  
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3.2.3 Integrity risk 
For train control, requirements for the maximum probability of occurrence of a failure are given in 
terms of Tolerable Hazard Rate (𝑇𝐻𝑅) instead of integrity risk as in civil aviation. It is necessary to 
find a relation between both values.  
The integrity risk from the civil aviation point of view is defined as the probability of dangerous 
failure 𝑃𝑓 per interval of time 𝛥𝑡 [Filip et al., 2008]: 
 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 =
𝑃𝑓
𝛥𝑡
 Eq. 3-6 
Let 𝑇 be the instant at which the failure occurs, 𝑇 is a random variable which support is ℝ+. It is 
assumed that Δ𝑡 is short enough so that the probability of multiple dangerous undetected failures in the 
interval is neglected. The probability that a failure occurs between 𝑡 and 𝑡 + Δ𝑡 can be written as: 
 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 =
𝑃(𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 ≤ 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡)
𝛥𝑡
 Eq. 3-7 
Without loss of generality, let us set 𝑡 to zero. Let’s define 𝐹(𝑡) the failure distribution function of the 
system,  
 𝐹(𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑇 ≤ 𝑡) Eq. 3-8 
Then 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 can be expressed as: 
 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 =
𝐹(𝛥𝑡)
𝛥𝑡
 Eq. 3-9 
The risk of failure is defined as the probability that a failure occurs in a time interval [𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡] given 
that it did not occur in [0, 𝑡[ : 
 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘(𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑇 ≤ 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡|𝑇 > 𝑡) Eq. 3-10 
The Hazard Rate (𝐻𝑅), also called hazard function is defined as:  
 𝐻𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑑𝑡→0
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
 Eq. 3-11 
Using the conditional probability expression: 
 𝐻𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑑𝑡→0
[
𝑃(𝑇 ≤ 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡 ∩ 𝑇 > 𝑡) 𝑃(𝑇 > 𝑡)⁄
𝑑𝑡
]   Eq. 3-12 
Therefore, using the failure distribution function gives :  
 𝐻𝑅(𝑡) =
𝐹′(𝑡)
1 − 𝐹(𝑡)
   Eq. 3-13 
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If it is assumed that the failure distribution of GNSS is memoryless 𝐻𝑅(𝑡) = 𝐻𝑅. The 𝑇𝐻𝑅 is the 
maximum value allowed for the 𝐻𝑅 . The failure distribution function allowed for the system is 
overbounded by the failure distribution obtained with 𝐻𝑅 equal to the 𝑇𝐻𝑅 is: 
 𝐹(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑒−𝑇𝐻𝑅𝑡 Eq. 3-14 
This result is injected in equation and gives: 
 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 =
1 − 𝑒−𝑇𝐻𝑅𝛥𝑡
𝛥𝑡
 Eq. 3-15 
It is assumed that 𝑇𝐻𝑅Δ𝑡 is close to zero, therefore it is possible to apply a Taylor expansion to the 
exponential term around zero. At the first order, it gives : 
 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 ≅ 𝑇𝐻𝑅 Eq. 3-16 
As a simple relation has been found between the integrity risk and the tolerable hazard rate, it is then 
possible to express the failure probability requirements in the system of metric described in section 
3.1. The main challenge for the introduction of the GNSS in ETCS is the very low 𝑇𝐻𝑅, which, for the 
total on board ETCS, shall not be above 1.10
-9
/h/train to fulfill the Safety Integrity Level 4 
requirement. Therefore, this value of 1.10
-9
/h/train does not apply to GNSS but to the whole 
positioning including GNSS and eventually other sensors.  
A generic and non mandatory functional fault tree of ETCS level 2 is proposed in [UNISIG 3]. It has 
been stated in [GRAIL, 2008] that the gate 58 of this fault tree, which is given in Figure 9 and 
corresponds to the event “incorrect determination of train location ref to LRBG” (Last Relevant Balise 
Group) shall not exceed 1.10
-10
/h/train. The 𝑇𝐻𝑅 of Gate 58 has to be allocated between KERNEL-7 
(Incorrect LRBG), ODO-3 (Incorrect actual physical speed direction), KERNEL-15 (Incorrect cab 
status) and GATE147 (Incorrect determination of distance travelled). If it is assumed that the risk is 
equally allocated between these events, the 𝑇𝐻𝑅 associated to GATE147 is 2.5.10-11/h/train.  
Finally the 𝑇𝐻𝑅 associated to GATE147 has to be divided into KERNEL-28 (Incorrect confidence 
interval) and ODO-4 (Speed sensor underestimates distance). If the risk is equally allocated between 
these events, the 𝑇𝐻𝑅 allocated to the incorrect confidence interval event is 1.25.10-11/h/train. The 
introduction of GNSS in ETCS would require modifications in the functional fault tree. As in our case 
of study the GNSS is used to provide confidence intervals, the 𝑇𝐻𝑅  allocated to the confidence 
interval shall be 1.25.10
-11
/h/train. 
The 𝑇𝐻𝑅 value obtained for GNSS by simple fault tree analysis can be compared with the reference 
values used in the literature and in previous projects. [Mocek et al., 2010] mentions a THR between 
1.10
-10
/h and 1.10
-11
/h for a GNSS based Train Position Locator (TPL), [Mertens et al., 2003]  
mentions a THR between 1.10
-11
 and 1.10
-12
/h. In [Zhen et al., 2009], the authors set the integrity risk 
requirement (𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡) value to 4.10-12/h for the use of GNSS in ETCS level. In [Rispoli et al., 2013], that 
describes the requirements used as a reference for the 3InSat project, it is said that “the value of 1.10-
11
/h has been derived by means of the ETCS functional fault trees, but that there is an effort to allow 
the LDS to operate with a 𝑇𝐻𝑅  of 1.10-9/h/train even for the most demanding initial position 
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determination”. The value of 𝑇𝐻𝑅 obtained here by simple fault tree analysis is thus relevant with 
respect to the state of the art. However as the 𝑇𝐻𝑅 for GNSS in ETCS is not standardized yet, two 
reference values will be considered, 1.10
-9
/h and 1.10
-11
/h. 
 
Figure 9 Generic functional fault tree of ETCS level 2 proposed in [UNISIG 3] 
3.2.4 Availability 
In order for the GNSS to replace Eurobalises, it has to fulfill at least the same availability requirement. 
The maximum unavailability for the Eurobalise is 10
-7
 according to [UIC 2].  This value is used as a 
reference in [Genghi et al., 2004], [Mocek et al., 2010], [Rispoli and al., 2013]. Moreover, in [Rispoli 
and al., 2013] an availability requirement of 2.10
-4
 is given for low traffic lines. Both values are taken 
as a reference in the study. 
Incorrect determination 
of train location ref to 
LRBG 
GATE58 
Incorrect LRBG 
Incorrect actual 
physical speed 
direction 
Incorrect cab 
status 
Incorrect 
determination of 
distance travelled 
GATE147 
KERNEL-7 ODO-3 KERNEL-15 
Incorrect 
confidence 
interval 
Speed sensor 
underestimates 
distance 
KERNEL-28 ODO-4 
 Chapter 3: Operational Requirements  
 
69 
3.2.5 Continuity 
No continuity requirement for GNSS in the particular case of ETCS was found in the literature. The 
value of 99.98% is given as an example as it was defined within the GNSS Rail Advisory Forum in 
2000 [GRAF, 2000] for GNSS in train control. It shall be noted that this continuity of service 
requirements is not given in the same units as in civil aviation. 
3.2.6 Time to alert 
The 𝑇𝑇𝐴 requirement for the LDS that was recommended within the GNSS Rail Advisory Forum and 
UIC Galileo WG is 1 s [Wiss et al., 2000]. This value is taken as a reference in recent projects such as 
3InSat [Rispoli et al., 2013], and in the literature [Mocek et al., 2010]. 
3.2.7 Summary of the requirements of GNSS for train control 
A table of non-official requirements which summarizes the analysis presented in section 3.2 is given in 
Table 5. The accuracies have been derived from the 𝐴𝐿  with Eq. 3-4. To simplify the table, the 
accuracy has been derived with the maximum number of independent sample (1 per 30 seconds). For 
main and secondary lines as well as regional and industrial lines, no across track requirement is given. 
It is assumed that the track on which the vehicle is located is known.   
Operation 
Accuracy-95% Integrity 
Continuity Availability 
𝐻𝐴𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐻𝐴𝐿 𝑇𝑇𝐴 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡  
Main 
corridor 
lines, 
stations 
Along 
track 
Across 
track 
Along 
track 
Across 
track 
1 s 
10
-9
/h 
or 
10
-11
/h 
> 99.98% 1 – 10-7 
6.6 (or 7.2) 
m 
0.7 m 25 m 2.5 m 
Main and 
secondary 
lines 
6.6 (or 7.2) m to 
 33 (or 36) m 
25 to 125 m 1 s 
10
-9
/h 
or 
10
-11
/h 
> 99.98% 1 – 2.10-4 
Regional 
and 
industrial 
lines 
13.1 (or 14.3) m to 
 33 (or 36) m 
50 to 125 m 1 s 
10
-9
/h 
or 
10
-11
/h 
> 99.98% 1 – 2.10-4 
Table 5 Proposition for operational requirements to use GNSS for Train Position Locator in ETCS 
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3.3 Derivation of performance requirements for GNSS in Electronic 
toll collection 
Electronic Toll Collection (ETC) consists in charging cars that drive through a road network without 
the necessity for them to stop at toll gates. The first objective of such system is to improve the traffic 
by removing the delay at toll gates. Different technologies can be used for ETC.  
 For Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC)-based ETC, the vehicles are equipped 
with On Board Units (OBU) that are activated by the signal transmitted by toll gates at 5.8 or 
5.9 GHz. DSRC technology is used in France in TIS PL system, in Spain in VIA-T and in 
Poland (viaTOLL). This technology is reliable and the cost of OBU is low as they are just tags 
that do not include costly sensors. The main drawback of DSRC is that it requires gantries 
which deployment and maintenance are costly.  
 The second main technology that is being used for ETC is called Automatic Number Plate 
Recognition (ANPR). In ANPR, cameras are located on gantries and can detect/identify by 
image processing (and therefore charge) the vehicles that are driving in the road network. 
ANPR is, for instance, used for congestion charging in London. The main advantage of ANPR 
is that it does not require the vehicles to be equipped with any OBU. The drawbacks are 
related to reliability issues and to the dependency of gantries. 
 Thirdly, GNSS is one of the recommended technologies in the EU directive for ETC [EU, 
2004]. In GNSS-based ETC, the vehicle is equipped with an OBU that contains a GNSS 
receiver. The position information is sent to the charging authorities by GSM. GNSS based 
ETC systems already exists for heavy good transportation in Germany (Toll Collect) and 
Slovakia (MYTO). The advantage of GNSS is that it does not require any ground 
infrastructures. However the main drawbacks of GNSS are the high cost of the OBU and 
privacy (because the vehicles are tracked anywhere). Thus the GNSS technology seems more 
adapted for large road networks with low number of vehicle, which is typically the case for 
heavy good vehicle charging.  
Several approaches can be adopted in order to design GNSS-based ETC systems. Three charging 
schemes can be distinguished according to the literature [Cosmen-Schortmann et al., 2009], [Grush et 
al., 2009]. 
 In the discrete charging approach, toll events are associated to the identification of objects. It 
includes single object charging such as bridges or tunnels, closed road charging, road segment 
charging, cordon charging or zone presence charging (also called congestion charging). 
 In the continuous charging approach, the vehicles are charged as a function of the measured 
distance toll or in function of time in use in a predefined area. 
 In the mixed charging approach, a combination of discrete and continuous approach is used. 
An example of this scheme consists in charging for cumulative distance or time considering a 
different price for each road segment [Toledo-Moreo et al., 2010]. 
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Performance metrics for GNSS-based ETC have been proposed by the GNSS Metering Association 
for Road user charging (GMAR). The metrics are different for discrete and continuous charging 
approaches.  
 For discrete ETC schemes, the event configurations that may occur are defined in Table 6.  
The metrics proposed by GMAR for discrete ETC are the following [GPAF, 2009]: 
o The Charging Availability is the probability that, assuming that the vehicle is using 
the infrastructure, a Missed Recognition Event does not occur 
o The Charging Integrity is the probability that, for the vehicle that is not using the 
infrastructure, a False Recognition Event does not occur [GPAF, 2009]. 
 The metrics proposed by GMAR for continuous ETC schemes are the following [GPAF, 
2009]: 
o The Charging Availability is the probability that the relative charging error is within 
the accepted charging error interval. This is the probability that the toll charger is 
getting sufficiently charged for road usage, and that there is an acceptable level of 
overcharging. 
o The Charging Integrity is the probability that the Relative Charging error is below the 
upper bound of the accepted charging error interval. This is the probability that the 
used is paying no more than required. 
 
 
System detects charging event 
Yes No 
Charging event 
takes place 
Yes 
Correct 
Recognition 
Missed 
Recognition 
(Undercharging) 
No 
False 
Recognition 
(Overcharging) 
Correct 
Rejection 
Table 6 Event matrix decision: theoretic event matrix for discrete schemes [Grush et al., 2009] 
The CEN (European Committee for Standardization) ISO TS 17444 1-2 norm has been created in 
2012. It standardizes the performance metrics for ETC schemes defined in accordance with ISO 17573 
(Electronic Fee Collection systems). The metrics in CEN ISO TS 17444 1-2 are defined at different 
level: End-to-End, User Account, Payment Claim, Bill Detail, Toll Declaration and Charge Report 
[Wedlock et al., 2012].  
As proposed by [GPAF, 2009], the continuous and discrete schemes are differentiated, and metrics are 
proposed to each systems. Moreover, metrics for mixed charging schemes are included [Wedlock et 
al., 2012]. However the standard CEN ISO TS 17444 “does not propose specific numeric performance 
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bounds, or average or worst-case error bound in percentage or monetary units. Those decision are left 
to the toll charger” or to agreement between the Toll charger and the service provider. 
An example of requirement for the adapted metrics is given in [Wedlock, 2012]. This example is 
representative of the way in which the requirements can be addressed, even if the values cannot be 
taken as reference.  
For continuous charging scheme,  
 For the vehicles not using the infrastructure, the probability that for any predefined 
Chargeable Event the front-end improperly detects it (false positive) shall be smaller than 10
-5
. 
 Correct charging rate shall be greater than 99%, where the Accepted Charging Error Interval is 
between -1% and 0.3%. This metric corresponds to the Charging Availability defined by 
GMAR. 
 Overcharging rate shall be smaller than 0.1%, where the upper limit of the Accepted Charging 
Error Interval is 0.3%. This metric corresponds to the Charging Integrity defined by GMAR. 
For a discrete charging scheme: 
 Correct charging rate shall be greater than 99%, where the confidence interval is he one 
determined by the sample size of 50.000 (i.e. < 0,2%-points). This metric corresponds to the 
Charging Availability defined by GMAR 
 For the vehicles not using the infrastructure, the probability that a front-end improperly detects 
a charging event (false positive) shall be smaller than 10
-5
. This metric corresponds to the 
Charging Integrity defined by GMAR  
Once the standard format of requirement is determined, it is necessary to find values. Requirements 
for the charging scheme can be found in the literature and are listed in [Salos, 2012], but most of them 
are not compliant with the recent CEN ISO TS 17444 metric system as they were published before 
2012. However, in [EG 9, 2004], it is indicated that "it is necessary to define a specific set of test 
conditions in which test geo-objects are guaranteed to be successfully recognized with a success rate 
of at least 99.99 %. False recognition of a geo-object should be less than 1 in 10
6”. The requirement is 
equivalent to a discrete charging scheme with Charging Availability of 99.99 % and a Charging 
Integrity of 10
-6
.  
It can be inferred from this analysis of the state-of-the-art of requirements for GNSS in ETC, that the 
requirements depends on the charger and are given at the charging level. Nonetheless, it is necessary 
to define requirements at the position level. This can be done by following the methodology used by 
civil aviation.  
3.3.1 Alert limit 
The present work investigates a discrete GNSS-based event charging and it has to be stressed that the 
following methodology cannot be applied to continuous charging schemes. Let us define a geo-object 
as an area associated to a discrete charging event. The vehicles that are located in the geo-object shall 
be charged for the fare of the object, without consideration of travelled distance or time spent in the 
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area. The geo-object must be soundly designed in order to minimize the probability to erroneously 
charge the vehicles that are not meant to be charged and to maximize the probability to charge the 
vehicles that are inside the charging section. A simple way to solve this problem is to locate the geo-
object boundary at an equal distance between the road section to charge and the road section that shall 
not be charged. It is assumed that the vehicle is charged when the estimated position is inside the geo 
object (actually, the decision takes into account the protection levels). Let us denote 𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 the actual 
position of the vehicle in the across track direction, and 𝑥 the estimated position based on GNSS. If the 
vehicle is on the road to be charged, it is located in 𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 = 0. If the vehicle is on the free road, it is 
located in 𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 = 𝐷. The location of the geo object boundary is denoted 𝐺. An improved way to set 
the geo-object boundaries consists in choosing 𝐺  in order to minimize the probability of charging 
error, by considering the position of the vehicle as a random variable. The probability of charging 
error (𝑃𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟) is given by: 
 
𝑃𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 = 𝑃(𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 = 0)𝑃(𝑥 > 𝐺|𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 = 0)
+  𝑃(𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 = 𝐷)𝑃(𝑥 < 𝐺|𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 = 𝐷) 
Eq. 3-17 
It is assumed that the cross track error distribution is the same on both roads. The error 𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 is 
modelled by a centered normal distribution with a standard deviation 𝜎𝐺𝑁𝑆𝑆, which is assumed to be 
the same on both road segments. Thus: 
𝑃𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 =
𝑃(𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 = 0)
2
𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐 (
𝐺
√2𝜎𝐺𝑁𝑆𝑆2
) +
(1 − 𝑃(𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 = 0))
2
𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐 (
𝐷 − 𝐺
√2𝜎𝐺𝑁𝑆𝑆2
) Eq. 3-18 
The value of 𝐺0  that minimizes the probability of charging error is chosen so that 
𝜕𝑃𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
𝜕𝐺
(𝐺0) = 0. The expression of the value 𝐺0 is thus:  
 𝐺0 =
𝜎𝐺𝑁𝑆𝑆
2
𝐷
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃(𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 = 0)
1 − 𝑃(𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 = 0)
) +
𝐷
2
 Eq. 3-19 
If the probability of being on each road is equal, then the optimal boundaries is located at the same 
distance from each road segment. This result can increase the size of the geo-object when the road 
section within the geo object has significantly more traffic than the free road section, which is usually. 
The value of  𝐺0 is plotted in Figure 10, for 𝐷 = 20 m and 𝜎𝐺𝑁𝑆𝑆 = 5m.  
The 𝐻𝐴𝐿 is defined as the minimum distance between the position estimated with GNSS and the geo 
object boundaries. The result given in Eq. 3-19 enables to increase the 𝐻𝐴𝐿  and therefore the 
availability of the system for dense roads.  
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Figure 10 Example of optimal Geo-object boundary for 𝐷 = 20 m and 𝜎𝐺𝑁𝑆𝑆 = 5m 
Unlike civil aviation, the 𝐻𝐴𝐿 value is varying over time, therefore different values are considered in 
the Thesis. The thesis tests different values of 𝐻𝐴𝐿, from 15 to 50 meters.  
3.3.2 Accuracy 
The accuracy requirement is obtained from the 𝐻𝐴𝐿, and the integrity risk (given in) by using Eq. 3-4. 
3.3.3 Integrity risk 
In ETC, the probability of failure is given at the charging level by the charger, therefore no standard 
requirement exists. It is then necessary to derive integrity risk requirements in the position domain 
corresponding to the definition in 3.2.2. In [Salos, 2012], a method to derive the 𝑃𝑀𝐷 of the GNSS 
integrity monitoring algorithm from the probabilities of missed object detection (Charging 
availability) and false object detection (Charging integrity) is proposed. This approach assumes that 
the geo-objects are charged with the same fare and assumptions on the length of the geo-objects and 
the velocity of the vehicles must be made. This approach consists in adapting the design of the 
integrity monitoring algorithm to the charging requirements, with constraints on the design of the geo-
objects.  
In this thesis, a different approach is preferred. Here again, the charging requirements are taken as 
inputs. However, the approach consists in adapting the design of the geo-objects to the charging 
requirements, with constraints on the design of the integrity monitoring algorithm. This approach is 
preferred because the requirements that are found in the literature are examples, and different chargers 
may require different performances. It appears simpler to change the design of the geo-objects than the 
integrity monitoring algorithm. 
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In this Thesis, it is proposed to set different values for the integrity risk of the GNSS positioning at 10
-
4
/h, 10
-5
/h, and 10
-6
/h. Lower integrity risks are not investigated as they are associated with safety 
critical applications.  
It is possible to design the geo-object recognition algorithm to fulfill the false object and missed object 
requirements. Indeed, for a given geo-object, the number of available independent GNSS position 
measurement (𝑛) when driving across the geo-object is related to the length of the geo-object, the 
velocity of the vehicle and the minimum time between two independent samples. To decide whether 
the vehicle is inside the geo-object or not, the number of estimated positions that have been are inside 
the geo-object is compared to a defined threshold.  
Let us denote 𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛 this threshold and 𝑛𝑖 the number of estimated position that are in the geo-object, 
𝑛𝑖 is a discrete random variable. The probability of charging the vehicle that is outside the geo-object 
is denoted 𝑃𝐹𝑂𝑅 (False Object Recognition) and is associated to the probability that 𝑛𝑖 is higher than 
the threshold 𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛, which is given by: 
 𝑃𝐹𝑂𝑅 = ∑ 𝑃(𝑛𝑖 = 𝑖|𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 ∉ 𝑔𝑒𝑜 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡)
𝑛
𝑖=𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛
 Eq. 3-20 
To wrongly decide that a vehicle outside the geo-object is charged, its estimated position and its 
confidence interval must be inside the geo-object. As the true position of the vehicle is assumed to be 
outside the geo-object, the confidence interval cannot contain the true position of the vehicle which 
means that there is an undetected positioning failure. However all positioning failure do not lead to a 
false object detection. Therefore the operational 𝑃𝐹𝑂𝑅 can be bounded by: 
 𝑃𝐹𝑂𝑅 ≤ ∑ (
𝑛
𝑖
)𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑖 (1 − 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡)
𝑛−𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛
 Eq. 3-21 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 represents the integrity risk per independent GNSS position estimation.  
Finally, one has to set the value of 𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝑛 so that: 
 ∑ (
𝑛
𝑖
)𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑖 (1 − 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡)
𝑛−𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛
≤ 𝑃𝐹𝑂𝑅,𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 Eq. 3-22 
Thus the operational 𝑃𝐹𝑂𝑅 is lower than the requirements. It has to be noted that several 𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝑛 
fulfills the requirement. Indeed the term on the left in Eq. 3-22 is a decreasing function of 𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛, thus, 
all values of threshold higher than 𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛  fulfills the requirement. To maximize the availability the 
minimum threshold has to be chosen.  
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3.3.4 Availability 
The second requirement is the Charging availability. The probability of not charging the vehicle that 
is inside the geo-object is denoted 𝑃𝑀𝑂𝑅  (Missed Object Recognition) is the probability that 𝑛𝑖  is 
lower than the threshold 𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛, which is given by: 
 𝑃𝑀𝑂𝑅 = ∑ 𝑃(𝑛𝑖 = 𝑖|𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 ∈ 𝑔𝑒𝑜 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡)
𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛−1
𝑖=0
 Eq. 3-23 
To decide not to charge a vehicle which true position is inside the geo object, two configurations can 
occur: 
 If the estimated position is inside the geo-object, it means that the confidence radius exceeds 
the 𝐻𝐴𝐿 or that there is a false alarm. The probability of the confidence radius to exceed the 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 or that there is a false alarm is denoted (𝑃𝑢).  
 If the estimated position is outside the geo-object, and the confidence radius does not exceed 
the 𝐻𝐴𝐿. This case is a particular case of positioning failure because the confidence interval 
does not include the real position of the vehicle, it is thus bounded by 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡.  
 𝑃𝑀𝑂𝑅 ≤ ∑ (
𝑛
𝑖
) (𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝑃𝑢))
𝑖(1 − (𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝑃𝑢)))
𝑛−𝑖
𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛−1
𝑖=0
 Eq. 3-24 
Then it is necessary to find the value for 𝑃𝑢 that verifies: 
 ∑ (
𝑛
𝑖
) (𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝑃𝑢))
𝑖(1 − (𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝑃𝑢)))
𝑛−𝑖
𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛−1
𝑖=0
≤ 𝑃𝑀𝑂𝑅,𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 Eq. 3-25 
In the example of section 3.3.3 𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 1. Therefore, 𝑃𝑢 must verify: 
 𝑃𝑢 ≤ 1 − √𝑃𝑀𝑂𝑅,𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑛 − 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 Eq. 3-26 
If 𝑃𝑀𝑂𝑅,𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 is set to 99.99 %, 𝑃𝑢 must be lower than 99.99%.  
3.3.5 Continuity  
No continuity requirements have been found for GNSS in ETC.  
3.3.6 Time-To-Alert 
No Time-To-Alert requirements have been found for GNSS in ETC. 
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3.3.7 Summary 
A table of non-official requirements that summarizes the results obtained in 3.3 is given in Table 7. 
The accuracy has been calculated for a time between independent samples of 30 seconds. 
Operation 
Accuracy-95% Integrity 
Continuity Availability 
𝐻𝐴𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐻𝐴𝐿 𝑇𝑇𝐴 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 
ETC 
6 to 20 m 
5.5 to 18 m 
5.1 to 17 m 
15 to 50 m - 
10
-4
/h 
10
-5
/h 
10
-6
/h 
- Variable 
Table 7 Proposition for operational requirements for GNSS to be used in ETC 
3.4 Conclusions 
There is currently no standardized requirement for the use of GNSS in the two terrestrial applications 
of interests. However, examples of what these requirements could be have been found in the 
litterature.  
 For train control, it has been stated that the integrity risk requirement is extremely stringent 
(10
-9
 to 10
-11
/h) and associated with a maximum 𝑇𝑇𝐴 requirement of 1 s. The third main issue 
for the introduction of GNSS in this application is the across track 𝐴𝐿 of 2.5 meters in order to 
identify on which track the train is located. 
  For ETC, the standardization process appears to be more advanced. Metrics at the charging 
level have been defined so that the charging organism can emit requirements. Then these 
requirements can be used in order to define the requirements for the positioning system. 
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4 POSITIONING PLATFORM 
DEFINITION FOR TRAIN 
CONTROL AND ETC 
The chapter firstly proposes technical choices in terms of GNSS receiver for both terrestrial 
applications. As standalone GNSS may not meet the operational requirements for both applications, 
the sensors and information that are available on board will be used to augment GNSS. These sensors 
are discussed along with the possible fusion strategies. A hybridized navigation solution is proposed 
for each application. 
4.1 GNSS receivers’ architectures 
This subsection discusses technical choices that have been made on the GNSS receiver characteristic 
for train control and ETC. The solutions proposed have to respect the primary objective of the using 
GNSS for monitoring the position of terrestrial vehicle: the reduction of the ground infrastructure. 
Therefore, this Thesis does not investigate solutions that are based on a network of ground stations 
such as Ground Based Augmentation Systems (GBAS) or differential GNSS. Moreover, the use of 
Real Time Kinematic (RTK) receivers has not been investigated in the Thesis for integrity monitoring 
issues due to the frequency of occurrence of cycle slips in urban environment and to the dependency 
with a network of ground stations. For both applications, it is proposed to use dual frequency receivers 
in order to cancel the ionosphere biases. In this section, the location system is assumed to use GNSS 
only in order to put forward the design choices related to GNSS. As it will be seen later on, the final 
chosen system will use other sensors. 
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4.1.1 Train control 
Apart from the sub-meter across track accuracy requirement, the 10
-9
/h to 10
-11
/h integrity risk is the 
main challenge for using GNSS to monitor the position in train control. To design the system, it is 
necessary to characterize the error sources with a sufficient confidence. The very stringent integrity 
risk makes it impossible to use the existing error models that were developed for civil aviation because 
they are adapted to an integrity risk of 10
-7
/h or higher. Moreover, to validate a solution with such 
probability, it would require a yet unavailable amount of independent data. It is thus crucial to find a 
way to relax this stringent integrity requirement. An example of such method is the 1D algorithm 
[Rousseau and Cadet, 2006] that has been proposed to fulfill the same requirements in the context of 
the LOCOPROL project. The 1D algorithm consists in dividing the constellation in satellite subsets of 
two satellites. According to [Rousseau and Cadet, 2006], the final confidence interval, which is the 
union of the confidence intervals of each subset, is ensured to bound the true position with a failure 
rate between 10
-9
/h and 10
-11
/h. Using independent solutions to relax integrity risk is also proposed as a 
solution in [Rispoli et al., 2013].  
4.1.1.1 Definition of the concept used to relax the integrity risk requirement 
In this work, it is proposed to divide the visible satellites into two independent satellite subsets (also 
referred to as GNSS sub-systems in this section). It is thus necessary to work with multi-constellation 
receivers so that each subsystem has sufficient availability and accuracy. The choice of the 
independent subsystems and the hypothesis of independence to be carefully analyzed: 
 The satellite faults are assumed to be independent events between satellites and thus for both 
subsystems (as satellites are different).  
 The constellation fault, which is defined as a fault affecting several satellite of the same 
constellation, must be considered as a fault mode. To protect against this mode, the 
subsystems must use satellites taken from independent GNSS: for instance GPS and Galileo. 
If the constellation failures were not considered in the failure modes (or detected by other 
means), performances of the algorithm could be optimized by forming two hybrid 
constellations with optimized geometry. Currently the probability of constellation failure for 
GPS is assumed to be zero [Walter et al., 2013] (more recent works such as [WG-C,ARAIM] 
assumes that it is bounded by 10
-7
/h). However, for the other constellations (e.g GLONASS), 
it is not the case. Thus, the two sub systems will have to integrate satellites from different 
GNSS. A fault affecting multiple satellites from two constellations simultaneously is assumed 
to be negligible with respect to the integrity risk requirement (which is assumed comprised 
between 10
-9
 and 10
-11
/h). 
 A failure due to abnormal ionosphere and interferences may affect both sub systems even with 
separated constellations. It is proposed in this thesis to use dual frequency receivers in order to 
remove ionosphere delay. Thus the ionosphere common mode failure is assumed removed.  
 Failures due to interference or jamming are not investigated in this thesis.  
 The environment, which is the same for the two subsystems, may introduce a common fault 
mode. As the satellites from each subsystem are at different locations with respect to the 
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immediate environment (in terms of elevation and azimuth) and have signals with different 
received power, the independency assumption between both subsystems should hold (except 
in deep urban canyon configuration). The validity of this subsystems’ independence 
hypothesis against local errors shall be tested in real measurement campaigns. If the 
hypothesis does not hold, it is possible to decorrelate the local error sources by separating the 
two receivers associated to each subsystem with a sufficient distance. Such approach is 
possible for train control as the vehicle is long enough to separate the receivers with a 
sufficient distance. However, in this case, the receiver located at the back of the train will go 
through the same environment after a delay that depends on the velocity of the train. Thus in 
this case, to keep independency it may be necessary not to use any position estimation 
algorithm that introduces time correlation (such as Kalman filtering).  
For the following of this section, let us denote 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 the position estimated by the two subsystems 
based on the two satellite subsets. The radius of the confidence interval associated to these positions 
solutions are denoted 𝐻𝑃𝐿1 and 𝐻𝑃𝐿2. The combined position solution and the associated confidence 
intervals are respectively denoted 𝑥12 and 𝐻𝑃𝐿12.  
As the sub-systems are considered independent, the integrity risk 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 can now be equally allocated to 
each subsystem (√𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡), provided that the confidence interval of the combined position solution is 
defined as the union of the confidence intervals of each sub-system. The principle consists in finding 
the minimum area that is sure to include both confidence intervals. Two configurations have to be 
taken into account. 
4.1.1.1.1 First configuration 
It has to be kept in mind that the integrity and accuracy requirements are given in the horizontal plane 
and therefore we do not investigate the vertical position. 
The first configuration occurs when the confidence circle of a sub-system is included into the 
confidence circle of the other subsystem. This corresponds to ‖?̂?1 − 𝑥2‖ ≤ |𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2|. In this 
case the combined horizontal position and confidence radius are given by: 
 
𝑥12 = 𝑥argmax
𝑖
𝐻𝑃𝐿𝑖   
𝐻𝑃𝐿12 = max(𝐻𝑃𝐿1, 𝐻𝑃𝐿2) 
Eq. 4-1 
The first configuration is illustrated in Figure 11.  
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Figure 11 Definition of the confidence interval for train control, first configuration 
4.1.1.1.2 Second configuration 
The second configuration corresponds to ‖?̂?1 − 𝑥2‖ > |𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2|. In this case, the combined 
horizontal position and confidence radius are given by: 
 
𝑥12 =
1
2
[𝑥1 + 𝑥2 +
𝑥2 − 𝑥1
‖?̂?1 − 𝑥2‖
(𝐻𝑃𝐿2 −𝐻𝑃𝐿1)] 
𝐻𝑃𝐿12 =
𝐻𝑃𝐿1 +𝐻𝑃𝐿2 + ‖?̂?1 − 𝑥2‖
2
  
Eq. 4-2 
The second configuration is illustrated by Figure 12.  
 
Figure 12 Definition of the confidence interval for train control, second configuration 
The validity of the concept is proven in appendix A.  
𝑯𝑷𝑳𝟏 𝑯𝑷𝑳𝟐 
𝑯𝑷𝑳𝟏 
𝑯𝑷𝑳𝟐 
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4.1.1.2 Theoretical performance of the concept 
It has to be noted that the proposed solution based on two sub-systems will have degraded 
performance in terms of accuracy andavailability compared to the case of single system based on all 
available satellite (dual constellation) even if associated with very low integrity risk.  
Moreover, for the system to be available, it is necessary, but not sufficient, that each sub-system is 
able to provide its position estimate and the associated confidence interval. For this to happen, each 
sub-system requires at least 4 satellites-in-view per subsystem and thus 8 satellites. As it will be seen 
later, this drawback can be lifted by using Kalman filtering and hybridization with complementary 
sensors (in a tightly coupled architecture). 
It is possible to assess the theoretical performance of the proposed method by simple modelling. The 
performance is assessed in terms of position error and size of confidence intervals compared to each 
subsystem taken independently.  
To do so, let us model the GNSS errors for each subsystem (𝛿𝑥1  and 𝛿𝑥2 ) by two-dimensional 
independent normal variables: 
 
𝑥1 = 𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 + 𝛿𝑥1 
𝑥2 = 𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 + 𝛿𝑥2 
Eq. 4-3 
where 𝛿𝑥1~[
𝒩(0, 𝜎1
2)
𝒩(0, 𝜎1
2)
]  and 𝛿𝑥2~[
𝒩(0, 𝜎2
2)
𝒩(0, 𝜎2
2)
]  and these random variables errors are assumed 
independent. 
Since both errors are independent, ‖?̂?1 − 𝑥2‖  is Rayleigh distributed with a scale parameter 
√𝜎1
2 + 𝜎2
2. 
 ‖?̂?1 − 𝑥2‖~ℛ(√𝜎1
2 + 𝜎2
2) Eq. 4-4 
4.1.1.2.1 First configuration 
The probability of occurrence of the first configuration is given by: 
 
𝑃(‖𝑥1 − 𝑥2‖ ≤ |𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2|) = 𝑐𝑑𝑓
ℛ(√𝜎1
2+𝜎2
2)
(𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2) Eq. 4-5 
The distribution of the norm of the horizontal position error is given by: 
 
𝑃(‖?̂?12 − 𝑥‖ ≤ 𝑢|‖?̂?1 − 𝑥2‖ ≤ |𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2|)
= {
𝑐𝑑𝑓ℛ(𝜎12)(𝑈) 𝑖𝑓 𝐻𝑃𝐿1 ≥ 𝐻𝑃𝐿2
𝑐𝑑𝑓ℛ(𝜎22)(𝑈) 𝑖𝑓 𝐻𝑃𝐿1 < 𝐻𝑃𝐿2
 
Eq. 4-6 
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In the first configuration, the cumulative distribution function of the confidence radius 𝐻𝑃𝐿12 is given 
by: 
 𝑃(𝐻𝑃𝐿12 ≤ 𝑢|‖𝑥1 − 𝑥2‖ ≤ |𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2|) = {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑢 < 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐻𝑃𝐿1, 𝐻𝑃𝐿2)
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑢 ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐻𝑃𝐿1, 𝐻𝑃𝐿2)
 Eq. 4-7 
4.1.1.2.2 Second configuration 
The probability of occurrence of the second configuration can be easily obtained and is equal to:  
 
𝑃(‖𝑥1 − 𝑥2‖ > |𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2|) = 1 − 𝑐𝑑𝑓
ℛ(√𝜎1
2+𝜎2
2)
(𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2) Eq. 4-8 
Let us investigate the distribution of the norm of the horizontal position error. The combined position 
error is: 
 𝑥12 − 𝑥 =
1
2
[𝛿𝑥1 + 𝛿𝑥2 +
𝛿𝑥2 − 𝛿𝑥1
‖𝛿𝑥2 − 𝛿𝑥1‖
(𝐻𝑃𝐿2 −𝐻𝑃𝐿1)] Eq. 4-9 
The error distribution is unknown as it is the sum of correlated terms. The expectation of the position 
error is given by: 
 𝐸[𝑥12 − 𝑥] = (𝐻𝑃𝐿2 −𝐻𝑃𝐿1)𝐸 [
𝛿𝑥2 − 𝛿𝑥1
‖𝛿𝑥2 − 𝛿𝑥1‖
] Eq. 4-10 
The expectation of 
𝛿𝑥2−𝛿𝑥1
‖𝛿𝑥2−𝛿𝑥1‖
 must be determined.  As it is a normalized vector, its coordinates can be 
written: 
 
𝛿𝑥2 − 𝛿𝑥1
‖𝛿𝑥2 − 𝛿𝑥1‖
= [
cos(𝜃)
sin(𝜃)
] Eq. 4-11 
It is thus necessary to find the distribution of 𝜃 to deduce the distribution of the bi-variate vector, and 
then its expectation. We can form tan(𝜃) in order to get rid of the norm. tan(𝜃) is the ratio of the two 
components of 𝛿𝑥2 − 𝛿𝑥1, which are independent and with the same variance by definition. The ratio 
of two independent standard Gaussian distribution follows the standard Cauchy distribution (Unit-
variance), therefore tan(𝜃)~𝐶𝑎(0,1). It is well known [Cuadras, 2002] that if a variable follows a 
uniform random distribution on the interval [−
𝜋
2
,
𝜋
2
], the tangent of this variable follows a standard 
Cauchy distribution. However, the reciprocal may not be true. In the case of study, simulations have 
shown that 𝜃 is uniformly distributed over [0,2𝜋]. The expectation of cosine and sine of a uniformly 
distributed random variable over [0,2𝜋] is null. Thus: 
 E[𝑥12 − 𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒] = [
0
0
] Eq. 4-12 
Therefore the combination of both solution does not introduce any bias on the estimated position. 
However, no analytical expression of the position error distribution has been established. 
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As for the distribution of the confidence radius, in the second configuration, it is given by (proof in 
appendix B): 
If 𝑢 ≥ max(𝐻𝑃𝐿1, 𝐻𝑃𝐿2), 
 
𝑃(𝐻𝑃𝐿12 ≤ 𝑢 | ‖?̂?1 − 𝑥2‖ > |𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2|)
=
𝑐𝑑𝑓
ℛ(√𝜎1
2+𝜎2
2)
(2𝑢 − 𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2) − 𝑐𝑑𝑓
ℛ(√𝜎1
2+𝜎2
2)
(𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2)
1 − 𝑐𝑑𝑓
ℛ(√𝜎1
2+𝜎2
2)
(𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2)
 
Eq. 4-13 
Else, 
 𝑃(𝐻𝑃𝐿12 ≤ 𝑢 | ‖?̂?1 − 𝑥2‖ > |𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2|) = 0 Eq. 4-14 
4.1.1.2.3 Overall performances 
The distribution of the horizontal error ‖?̂?12 − 𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒‖ cannot be described a simple mathematical 
expression. In the particular case where 𝜎1 = 𝜎2, and assuming that the same probability is allocated 
to both GNSS subsystems and thus, 𝐻𝑃𝐿1 = 𝐻𝑃𝐿2 = 𝐾𝜎1  (where 𝐾  is the inverse cumulative 
distribution function of Rayleigh distribution with a scale parameter of one evaluated in 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡), the 
combined solution can be characterized as. 
 𝑥12 − 𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 =
1
2
[𝛿𝑥1 + 𝛿𝑥2]~
[
 
 
 
 𝒩 (0,
𝜎1
2
2
)
𝒩 (0,
𝜎1
2
2
)
]
 
 
 
 
 Eq. 4-15 
Thus the standard deviation of the combined position error on each component is attenuated by √2 
compared to the standard deviation of the solution of each independent subsystem.  
The cumulative distribution of 𝐻𝑃𝐿12 is given by the law of total probability: 
 
𝑃(𝐻𝑃𝐿12 ≤ 𝑢) = 𝑐𝑑𝑓
ℛ(√𝜎1
2+𝜎2
2)
(2𝑢 − 𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2)𝐻[𝑢 − max(𝐻𝑃𝐿1, 𝐻𝑃𝐿2)] Eq. 4-16 
where 𝐻[ ] represents the Heaviside function. This expression has been verified by simulations. By 
construction its minimum is the maximum of both 𝐻𝑃𝐿1 and 𝐻𝑃𝐿2.  
The distributions of both 𝐻𝑃𝐿12 and 𝐻𝑃𝐿1 = 𝐻𝑃𝐿2 are represented in Figure 13, in the case where 
𝜎1 = 𝜎2 = 5 𝑚. 𝐻𝑃𝐿12 is associated with  a probability of (e.g.) 10
-11
 whereas 𝐻𝑃𝐿1 is associated 
with either 10
-5.5
 or 10
-11
 for comparison. It can be seen that the use of a scheme based on redundant 
constellations may improve the availability by reducing the 𝐻𝑃𝐿 size compared to a scheme based on 
a single constellation with the same associated integrity risk.  
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Figure 13 Distribution of 𝐻𝑃𝐿12 with respect to 𝐻𝑃𝐿1 
4.1.1.3 Choices for the GNSS receivers 
The technical choices proposed for the GNSS receivers are discussed in this section.  
4.1.1.3.1 Types of receivers for train control 
To ensure the independence of the two sub-system solutions, it is necessary to use two different GNSS 
receivers. Using one receiver would add a common-mode: a hardware failure may lead to a failure in 
both subsystems. The proposed configurations for the GNSS receivers in train control are the 
following: 
 Two single frequency single constellation receivers (to ensure integrity even in case of 
constellation failures): 
o receiver 1 that processes GPS L1 C/A 
o receiver 2 that processes Galileo E1 OS 
This solution is not expected to guarantee a sufficiently high level of integrity due to the 
sensitivity of both sub system to faults due to abnormal ionosphere conditions. However, this 
solution will be used to validate the concept and to anticipate the performances of the 
proposed solutions on real data.   
 Two dual frequency single constellation receivers (to ensure integrity in case of constellation 
failures and abnormal ionosphere): 
o receiver 1 that processes GPS L1 C/A and L5 frequencies 
o receiver 2 that processes Galileo E1 OS and E5a frequencies 
Even if not investigated in the thesis, the use of quad-constellation receivers would improve the 
performances of the solution by improving the geometry of the constellation of both sub systems. 
4.1.1.3.2 Signal tracked 
The characteristics of the GNSS signals that are tracked by the receivers proposed are described in this 
section.  
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The GPS L1 C/A signal has the following characteristics [IS-GPS-200-D]: 
 Its carrier is located at 1575.42 MHz.  
 The carrier is modulated by a pseudorandom code (PRN) and a navigation message by Binary 
Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) with a Non-return to zero (NRZ) waveform.  
 The spreading code is 1023 chips long and is transmitted at a rate of 1.023 Mchips/s.  
 The navigation message has a bit rate of 50 bit/s. 
The Galileo E1 OS has the following characteristics [OS SiS ICD]: 
 Its carrier is located at 1575.42 MHz.  
 The signal is the sum of a data channel which waveform is CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) and a pilot 
channel modulated with CBOC(6,1,1/11,-).  
 The spreading code is 4092 chips long and is transmitted at a rate of 1.023 Mchips/s. 
The GPS L5 signal is broadcast by the Block IIF (6 operational satellites in mid-2014). It has the 
following characteristics [IS-GPS-705C]: 
 Its carrier is located at 1176.45 MHz.  
 The carrier is modulated by a pseudorandom code (PRN) and a navigation message by Binary 
Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) with a Non-return to zero (NRZ) waveform.  
 The spreading code is transmitted at a rate of 10.23 Mchips/s.  
 A pilot and data components are transmitted in quadrature 
The Galileo E5a has the following characteristics [OS SiS ICD]: 
 Its carrier is located at 1176.45 MHz. 
 The carrier is modulated by a pseudorandom code (PRN) and a navigation message by Binary 
Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) with a Non-return to zero (NRZ) waveform.  
 The chipping rate is 10.23Mchips/s. 
 A pilot and data components are transmitted in quadrature 
The spectra of the GNSS signals of interest are plotted in Figure 14. 
 Chapter 4: Positioning Platform Definition for Train Control and ETC  
 
91 
 
Figure 14 Spectra of GNSS signals 
4.1.1.3.3 Technical characteristics of the receivers 
The first two parameters that have to be selected and that will have an impact on the receiver’s 
performances are the chip spacing between the Early and Late correlators of the DLL denoted (𝛿, 
defined in section 2.1.3.2.1), and the front-end one sided bandwidth denoted 𝐵𝑊. The rule-of-thumb 
for the selection of the chip spacing is to fix 𝛿 = 1/𝐵𝑊. Reducing 𝛿 improves the robustness of the 
DLL with respect to multipath and thermal noise (as detailed in chapter 5). When a data and a pilot 
component are available, it will be assumed that the tracking is conducted on the pilot. Finally, it is 
proposed to use high end wideband GNSS receivers for train control: 
 To track L1 C/A or E1 OS, a wideband receiver with a double-sided (2𝐵𝑊 ) front end 
bandwidth of 16 MHz is chosen. The chosen bandwidth is large enough to take into account 
the contribution of the BOC(6,1) in the power spectral density of the CBOC(6,1,1/11,-). A 
narrow chip spacing value of 0.125 chip is used.  
 To track L5 or E5a, a wideband receiver with a double-sided bandwidth of 20 MHz is 
proposed. It is large enough to process the main lobe of the BPSK(10) modulation. The chip 
spacing has been set to 𝛿 = 0.1 chip. 
The parameters described hereafter are the same for the different models of receiver. The loop 
bandwidth of the DLL was set to 1 Hz which is a typical value for this loop in a GNSS receiver. The 
Early Minus Late Power discriminator which expression is given in Eq. 2-14 is preferred as it is not 
coherent. Moreover, in order to avoid the estimation of the delay to be biased due to a Doppler shift, a 
second order DLL is proposed to be used.  
Note: The possibility to use receivers that integrates multipath mitigation algorithms have been 
investigated during the thesis. Different algorithms have been tested in [Brocard et al., 2014]:  
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 Double-Delta (∆∆) algorithms [McGraw and Braasch, 1999] that use more correlators than a 
conventional DLL (typically 5 instead of 3), also referred to as strobe correlator (patented by 
Ashtech) or High Resolution Correlator (Patented by Rockwell Collins).  
 Septentrio’s A Posteriori Multipath Estimation (APME) [Sleewaegen and Boon, 2001] which 
relies on a multipath error estimation module. 
These techniques have shown to improve the multipath interference level in [Brocard et al., 2014]. 
However, the performance improvement has not appeared to be sufficient compared to the 
increase in term of receiver complexity and thermal noise level. Therefore, it is chosen in the rest 
of the thesis not to integrate these kind of algorithm in the receiver. 
An FLL is preferred over a PLL for an improved robustness of the carrier tracking at the cost of a 
reduced precision. The bandwidth of the second order FLL is set to 5 Hz, a typical value for such a 
loop in actual GNSS receivers and a non-coherent arctangent discriminator is used to estimate the 
frequency error based on the correlator outputs. This discriminator is defined as [Curran et al., 2012]: 
 𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑁 =
1
𝑇𝐼
𝑈𝑊 [𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑛 (
𝑄𝑃(𝑖)
𝐼𝑃(𝑘𝑖)
) − 𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑛 (
𝑄𝑃(𝑖 − 1)
𝐼𝑃(𝑖 − 1)
)] Eq. 4-17 
where the function 𝑈𝑊 is defined by : 
 𝑈𝑊(𝑥) = {
𝑥 − 𝜋 for 𝑥 ≥ 𝜋/2
𝑥 for 𝜋/2 > 𝑥 ≥ −𝜋/2
𝑥 + 𝜋 for −𝜋/2 > 𝑥
 Eq. 4-18 
4.1.2 Electronic toll collection 
In ETC, the integrity risk requirements (10
-4
, 10
-5
 and 10
-6
/h) are within the range of integrity risks that 
are already dealt with in other applications, such as civil aviation. ETC requirements are sufficiently 
lose not to need any separation of the positioning system into two subsystems as done for Train 
control. Therefore, dual constellation receiver can be used in this context.  
4.1.2.1 Choices for the GNSS receivers 
The technical choices proposed for the GNSS receivers are discussed in this section.  
4.1.2.1.1 Types of receivers for ETC 
For ETC, it is proposed to use either: 
 A dual constellation single frequency GPS L1 C/A Galileo E1 OS receiver. 
 A dual constellation dual frequency GPS L1 C/A, L5 and Galileo E1 OS, E5a. Indeed, GPS 
and Galileo signals are located in the same frequency bands L1/E1 and L5/E5a. They can thus 
be processed by multi-constellation devices at a lower cost.  
The signals of reference have been presented in section 4.1.1.3.2. These signals have been selected 
because of their interoperability in dual constellation GPS/Galileo receivers. 
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4.1.2.1.2 Technical characteristics of the receivers 
In the single frequency configuration, it is proposed to use a low end narrow band GNSS receiver for 
ETC to limit the cost per OBU parameter which is critical for this application.  
The parameters of the DLL associated with the proposed applications are given by: 
 To track L1 C/A and E1 OS, a narrowband receiver with a double-sided (2𝐵𝑊) front end 
bandwidth of 4 MHz is chosen. The chosen bandwidth is large enough to take into account the 
main lobe of BPSK(1) as well as the two main lobes of the CBOC(6,1,1/11,-). After the 
filtering by the front end, the CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) signal is equivalent to a BOC(1,1). A wide 
chip spacing value of 0.5 chip is used.  
 To track L5 or E5a, a wideband receiver with a double-sided bandwidth of 20 MHz is 
proposed. It is large enough to process the main lobe of the BPSK(10) modulation. The chip 
spacing has been set to 𝛿 = 0.1 chip. 
The other characteristics of the tracking loops for ETC are those described in section 4.1.1.3.3.  
4.1.3 Observations 
For both applications, the considered vehicles are likely to operate, at least partially, in degraded 
conditions, creating degraded constellations due to the masking angles of the obstacles such as 
buildings, trees and other vehicles. This induces that the use of GNSS-only (in single- or dual-
constellation configuration) would not be able to provide the required availability and/or accuracy as it 
will be apparent later on during measurement campaigns. As a consequence, it is necessary to 
complement the GNSS sensor with other complementary sensors that are present on the considered 
platform. 
4.2 Sensor augmentation and integration strategies 
To improve accuracy, availability and continuity in urban environment, it is proposed to augment the 
GNSS with additional sensor for both considered applications. ETC and train control are treated 
separately as the sensors and information that are already available on board are different. For both 
applications, it is proposed to couple the GNSS with a 6-axis MEMS IMU. Three coupling schemes 
are possible to hybridized IMU measurements with GNSS, referred to as loose, tight and ultra-tight 
coupling. 
 Loose coupling, is the simplest way to hybridized GNSS and inertial sensors. In a loose 
scheme, the GNSS receiver and the INS are computing their own position solution 
independently. A final position is obtained by blending the information from both devices 
thanks to a fusion algorithm (Kalman Filtering for instance). In loose coupling, it is necessary 
to have 4 satellites-in-view to benefit from the GNSS solution and thus, to limit the drift of the 
IMU. For a single-constellation GNSS, in urban environment, loose coupling approach is not 
relevant due to the duration and the frequency of occurrence of GNSS outages. Therefore it 
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cannot be used for train control. The use of a dual constellation receiver makes it possible to 
use loose coupling because the availability of GNSS is improved. 
 In tight coupling, GNSS pseudoranges and pseudorange rates measurements are blended with 
the position estimated from the inertial sensors (mechanization output). Unlike loose coupling, 
tight fusion scheme takes advantage of GNSS measurements when less than 4 satellites are 
used, which often occurs for single constellation receivers in urban environments and 
shadowed areas. Moreover, tightly integrated systems tend to have a more accurate navigation 
solution because the observables used in the blending process are not as correlated as the 
position and velocity solutions used in loose integration [Farrell and Barth, 1999]. The 
implementation of a tightly-coupled architecture requires an access to the pseudoranges and 
pseudorange rates of the GNSS receiver which is more and more the case. This scheme is all 
the more interesting for train control as this application is based on two single-constellation 
receivers, and therefore subject to frequent GNSS outages. Finally, tight integration enables to 
monitor the quality of pseudorange and Doppler measurements through the KF innovation 
states. 
 The most complex integration scheme is referred to as ultra-tight coupling or deep 
integration in the literature. Ultra-tight GNSS/IMU integration is the process of including an 
IMU (and corresponding INS solution) to improve signal tracking [Petovello et al., 2007]. The 
receiver architecture is fundamentally different from loose or tight coupling. Indeed, compared 
to a classic GNSS receiver architecture, code and carrier tracking loops are replaced by a 
vector loop. The ultra-tight coupling scheme is said to offer the most benefits in terms of 
accuracy and robustness among the three integration schemes [Alban and Gebre-Egziabher, 
2003]. In the present cases of study, it is preferred to not use ultra-tight coupling to keep the 
independence between the signal processing stage and the navigation filter. By doing so the 
propagation of a GNSS or INS positioning failure in the tracking loops is avoided. Moreover 
for implementing it, it would be necessary to modify the tracking loops, which is not possible 
in mass market GNSS receivers. 
From the above description, the tight coupling scheme is preferred over the two other existing 
schemes. It is then necessary to choose between an open-loop and a closed-loop architecture. 
 In the open-loop configuration, also referred to as feed-forward, the position, velocity and 
attitude errors estimated by the filter are used to correct the inertial solution. The errors are not 
corrected into the INS mechanization, which is running independently from GNSS. Moreover, 
in an open-loop mode, the inertial sensor outputs are not corrected before mechanization. An 
open-loop architecture is generally suitable for high grade IMUs as the drift of the raw inertial 
navigation solution is small, thus leading to low linearization errors (around the mechanization 
output). The main benefit of an open-loop architecture is that it ensures independence between 
GNSS and INS subsystems, and therefore avoids GNSS failures propagating in the INS. 
 In the closed-loop scheme, inertial error estimates are fed back to the INS in order to limit the 
drift of the inertial solution. In a closed-loop implementation, the sensor measurement biases 
and scale factor errors are usually corrected before their integration in the mechanization. For 
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low-grade inertial sensors, only the closed-loop configuration is suitable [Groves, 2013]. 
Indeed for low-grade inertial sensors, the raw INS position solution is drifting very fast, which 
leads to large linearization errors (around the drifting position). For both considered cases of 
study, low- to medium-costs sensors will be used. Thus, a closed-loop architecture is chosen 
in this work. The main disadvantage of the closed-loop integration is that a failure will 
propagate into the inertial navigation solution. It is possible to run a back-up mechanization 
that is independent from GNSS to replace the failed inertial solution after fault detection. 
The proposed fusion algorithm is thus an EKF which is adapted to the closed-loop configuration 
(linearization around the prediction, which is the mechanization output in this case).  
4.2.1 Train control 
As already discussed, the proposed architecture for positioning in train control is based on redundant 
independent subsystems to fulfill the very stringent integrity risks. Each sub-system will be augmented 
by inertial sensors. However, to avoid the introduction of common-mode failures, it is necessary that 
the inertial sensors used to augment the two subsystems must be different and made by different 
manufacturers. In this type of application, it is anticipated that mid-cost IMUs can be used (~2000 
Euros). 
However, a train platform also possesses other useful sources of position. It is then possible to take 
advantage of the knowledge of the railtrack on which the train is located. It is thus proposed to 
augment the GNSS/IMU hybridized system with a track database in order to improve the position, 
velocity and attitude estimation. As in the case of the inertial sensors, to avoid the introduction of 
common-mode failures it is necessary to use different track databases in each sub-system. 
Finally, a train also has wheel speed sensors that are available on board. However, it is proposed not to 
integrate them in the solution to keep the independence between the virtual balise function and the 
odometry function. The position between radiobeacons will still have to be propagated with odometry. 
Although non optimal, this approach seems to be the most realistic way to introduce GNSS technology 
into ETCS without modifying the whole system architecture according to the rail community. 
The architecture of the solution proposed for train position determination in train control is given in 
Figure 15. 
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Figure 15 Basic architecture of the solution proposed for train position determination in train control 
4.2.2 Electronic Toll Collection 
In ETC, the cost per OBU is of particular interest for the charging organism. Therefore low-cost IMU 
shall be used for such application. Moreover, as most cars are equipped with wheel speed sensors, it is 
proposed to use the measurements from these sensors in the fusion algorithm. The architecture of the 
solution for ETC is given in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16 Basic architecture of the solution proposed for ETC 
4.3 Conclusions 
For train control, the solution proposed is based on two redundant EKF that each integrates 
measurements from different GNSS, track databases and IMUs in a tightly coupled architecture. As 
medium cost IMU are used, the inertial sensors are calibrated in real time prior to the inertial 
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mechanization. It is assumed that actual beacons are kept at crossing in order to determine on which 
track the train is located.  
The solution developed for ETC is an EKF that integrates measurements from a dual constellation 
receiver, an IMU and wheel speed sensors which are already available on board. As for train control, a 
tightly coupled architecture operating in a closed loop scheme is preferred.  
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5 MEASUREMENT MODELS 
The monitoring of a system as well as the verification of the compliance of a system with respect to 
specific requirements is always based on the accurate knowledge of the measurements that are used. 
Note that the level of accuracy of these models has to be adapted to the level of the requirements, 
which is related to the integrity risk in the case of this Thesis. 
 
This chapter presents the measurement model that has been used to validate and assess the 
performances of the solutions proposed by simulations. It include GNSS and sensors error model. 
The error sources are categorized between nominal errors and faults. Nominal errors are always 
affecting the sensor measurements. They are investigated in subsection 5.1. Faults are the errors that 
are not considered in the nominal case. They are punctual and characterized by their distribution and 
probability of occurrence. The faults are discussed in subsection 5.2. The Non-Line-Of-Sight error 
which affects the GNSS requirements in urban environment is of particular interest in this Thesis, and 
a specific subsection is dedicated to it (5.3.2).  
5.1 Nominal measurement model 
5.1.1 GNSS 
In this thesis, a tight coupling fusion scheme is used. As explained in 4.2, in tight coupling, the GNSS 
pseudoranges are used as measurements. Moreover, pseudorange rates are also generally used. As a 
consequence, models for both of these GNSS measurements will be provided. 
Note that the solutions that have been proposed in chapter 4 are based on GPS (L1 C/A and L5) and 
Galileo (E1 OS and E5a). To assess the performances and validate the proposed architectures on real 
signals for dual constellation receivers, it has been necessary to replace Galileo with GLONASS 
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because the number of Galileo satellite deployed is not sufficient at the time. Therefore, in this 
chapter, the measurement models are given for GPS, Galileo and GLONASS.  
5.1.1.1 Pseudoranges error model 
The GNSS code pseudorange measurement associated to the 𝑖𝑡ℎ  satellite can be modelled as : 
 𝜌𝑖 = √(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑖)2 + (𝑦 − 𝑦𝑖)2 + (𝑧 − 𝑧𝑖)2 + 𝑐∆𝑡 + ε Eq. 5-1 
where: 
 𝑥, 𝑦 and 𝑧 design the user position 
 ∆𝑡 is the offset between the receiver clock and GNSS system time 
 𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖 and 𝑧𝑖 design the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ satellite position 
 𝜀 is the pseudorange error 
In the nominal case, it is assumed that the satellite is in direct view (LOS configuration). The main 
sources of error that affect the GNSS measurements in this case are errors related to the estimation of 
the location of the transmitting satellite, to the satellite clock prediction uncertainty, the propagation in 
the atmosphere (ionospheric delay, troposphere delay), hardware biases, and erroneous receiver 
synchronization due to the presence of multipath, interference and thermal noise. These error sources 
are assumed to be independent.  
In order to be conservative, each error is modelled as a zero-mean Gaussian distribution that 
overbounds the real error distribution: 
The ephemeris and satellite clock errors (εSat/Eph) are modelled by: 
 𝜀𝑆𝑎𝑡/𝐸𝑝ℎ~𝒩(0, 𝜎𝑐𝑙𝑘&𝑒𝑝ℎ
2 ) Eq. 5-2 
The error due to ionosphere (𝜀𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜) is modelled by: 
 𝜀𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜~𝒩(0, 𝜎𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜
2 ) Eq. 5-3 
The troposphere error (𝜀𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜) is modelled by: 
 𝜀𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜~𝒩(0, 𝜎𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜
2 ) Eq. 5-4 
The error due to thermal noise (𝜀𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒) is modelled by: 
 𝜀𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒~𝒩(0, 𝜎𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒
2 ) Eq. 5-5 
The multipath error (𝜀𝑚𝑝) is modelled by: 
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 𝜀𝑚𝑝~𝒩(0, 𝜎𝑚𝑝
2 ) Eq. 5-6 
The total nominal error is the sum of each independent error.  
 𝜀 = 𝜀𝑆𝑎𝑡/𝐸𝑝ℎ + 𝜀𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜 + 𝜀𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜 + 𝜀𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒 + 𝜀𝑚𝑝 Eq. 5-7 
The distribution of the sum of independent Gaussian distribution is normally distributed: 
 𝜀~𝒩(0, 𝜎𝑃𝑆𝑅
2 ) Eq. 5-8 
with:  
 𝜎𝑃𝑆𝑅 = 𝜎𝑐𝑙𝑘&𝑒𝑝ℎ
2 + 𝜎𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜
2 + 𝜎𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜
2 + 𝜎𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒
2 + 𝜎𝑚𝑝
2  Eq. 5-9 
Apart from multipath, the error models standardized for civil aviation can be used in our case of study. 
These models have been validated for civil aviation which is associated to an integrity risk of 10
-7
. 
According to chapter 2, the integrity risk corresponding to system or sub-systems proposed in this 
Thesis for train control and ETC are higher than that value (after equal allocation to both subsystems 
for train control). Thus the civil aviation models can be used.  
5.1.1.1.1 Satellite Clock and Ephemeris error 
The satellite clock and ephemeris error is different for each GNSS and depends on the system 
infrastructure and maturity.  
GPS:  
The User Range Accuracy (URA) that represents the standard deviation of the range component of 
GPS satellite clock correction and ephemeris error is broadcast in the GPS navigation message. A 
nominal URA value of 3.9 meters can be found in [Have, 2003] for the GPS constellation (in 2003). 
Since then, it is stated in [Walter et al., 2013 that the most common GPS URA is 2.4 m in the sense of 
lowest possible value. However, this value is expected to decrease with the current modernization 
program of GPS. As a consequence, a value of 0.85 m is taken as a reference in [Salos et al., 2010], 
since this value is equal to the value used by Galileo.  
These results are summarized by: 
 𝜎𝑐𝑙𝑘&𝑒𝑝ℎ = {
2.4 m in current GPS
0.85 m in advanced modernization stage
 Eq. 5-10 
Galileo:  
In Galileo, the Signal In Space Accuracy (SISA) is the standard deviation of a centered Gaussian 
distribution that overbounds the signal in space errors. The SISA bounds ephemeris and satellite clock 
errors. Values are specified for the SISA in nominal mode in [ESA, 2005]:  
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 𝜎𝑐𝑙𝑘&𝑒𝑝ℎ = 0.85 𝑚 Eq. 5-11 
GLONASS:  
According to [Walter et al., 2013], the most common GLONASS URA is 4 m.  
 𝜎𝑐𝑙𝑘&𝑒𝑝ℎ = 4 m Eq. 5-12 
5.1.1.1.2 Ionosphere residual error 
The ionosphere is an atmosphere layer that contains partially ionised medium. The GNSS signals 
refraction on the ionosphere varies with its frequency, as a squared inverse relation. The ionosphere 
results in a code delay ∆ (in m) and a phase advance of the same magnitude and opposite sign. The 
expression of the carrier phase delay neglecting higher order is given by: 
 ∆=
40.28
𝑓2
1016𝑆𝑇𝐸𝐶 Eq. 5-13 
where: 
 𝑓 is the frequency of the carrier in Hz 
 𝑆𝑇𝐸𝐶  (Slant Total Electron Content) represents the electron density integrated along the 
ionospheric path of the signal in TECU (10
16 
e
-
/m²). 
The ionospheric delay can be corrected by different techniques: 
 Using the information provided by the GNSS itself: Klobuchar model used in GPS, NeQuick 
model used in Galileo,  
 Using the information provided by another system complementary to GNSS, such as SBAS 
corrections,  
 Using a GNSS dual frequency receiver which is able by itself to remove the first order 
ionospheric error.  
5.1.1.1.2.1 Single frequency 
Single frequency GPS correction: 
The broadcasted GPS data contains the parameter to calculate ionospheric corrections based on 
Klobuchar model. The correction by Klobuchar removes about 50% of the ionospheric delay on 
average. The residual model for the ionosphere corrections when applying Klobuchar corrections is 
detailed in [Salos, 2012]. The residual standard deviation that bounds the ionosphere error is the 
following: 
 𝜎𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜 = {
𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥(0.2∆𝐾𝑙,𝑉 , 9) 0° ≤ |𝜙𝑚| < 20°
𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥(0.2∆𝐾𝑙,𝑉 , 4.5) 20° ≤ |𝜙𝑚| ≤ 55°
𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥(0.2∆𝐾𝑙,𝑉 , 6) 55° < |𝜙𝑚|
 Eq. 5-14 
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where 
 𝐹 represents the mapping function used in the Klobuchar corrections 
 ∆𝐾𝑙,𝑉 is the verical ionospheric delay estimated with the Klobuchar model 
 𝜙𝑚 is the geomagnetic latitude 
The geomagnetic latitude (𝜙𝑚) can be obtained from the geographic latitude (𝜙) and the longitude (𝜆) 
with [Klobuchar, 1987]: 
 sin(𝜙𝑚) = sin(𝜙) sin(78.3°) + cos(𝜙) cos(78.3°) Eq. 5-15 
The mapping function used in the Klobuchar corrections is given by: 
 𝐹 = 1 + 16 (0.53 −
𝛼
180
)
3
 Eq. 5-16 
where 𝛼 represents the elevation of the satellite (in degrees) 
The vertical ionospheric delay estimated ( ∆𝐾𝑙,𝑉 ) with the Klobuchar model is related to the 
ionospheric delay calculated with the Klobuchar model (𝑇𝐾𝑙) with: 
 ∆𝐾𝑙,𝑉= 𝑐𝑇𝐾𝑙,𝑣 =
𝑐𝑇𝐾𝑙
𝐹
 Eq. 5-17 
It is shown in [Salos, 2012], that between 1994 and 2010, the 0.2∆𝐾𝑙,𝑉 term has never exceeded the 
constant terms in the expression of the maximum. Thus the model can be simplified into: 
 𝜎𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜 = {
9𝐹 0 ≤ |𝜙𝑚| < 20°
4.5𝐹 20° ≤ |𝜙𝑚| ≤ 55°
6𝐹 55° < |𝜙𝑚|
 Eq. 5-18 
Single-frequency Galileo corrections: 
The Galileo OS signals broadcasts the parameters to estimate the ionospheric delay with the more 
recent NeQuick model. NeQuick is assumed to correct 70% of the ionospheric delay when applied to 
E1, E5a and E5b frequencies. Civil aviation does not provide any ionospheric residual error model for 
single Galileo receivers. A model is proposed and justified for the NeQuick residual ionosphere error 
in [Salos, 2012]. The model is the following: 
 𝜎𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜 =
{
 
 
40.3
𝑓2
0.3.104. 𝐹. 𝑉𝑇𝐸𝐶 𝑖𝑓 𝐹. 𝑉𝑇𝐸𝐶 ≥ 66.7
40.3
𝑓2
. 104. 20 𝑖𝑓 𝐹. 𝑉𝑇𝐸𝐶 < 66.7
 Eq. 5-19 
where: 
 𝑓 is the frequency of the carrier (MHz) 
 𝑉𝑇𝐸𝐶 is the Vertical Total Electron Content 
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A second model independent of time is proposed in [Salos, 2012]: 
 𝜎𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜 = 𝐹𝜎𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜,𝑣 Eq. 5-20 
where 𝜎𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜,𝑣 is function of the geomagnetic latitude, given in Table 8 Galileo E1.  
|𝜙𝑚| (°) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 75 
𝜎𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜,𝑣 (m) 7.4 7.6 7.6 7 6.7 4.7 4.2 4 3.8 
Table 8 𝜎𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜,𝑣 for Galileo E1 as in function of the geomagnetic latitude [Salos, 2012] 
However, there are currently uncertainties about the ability to bound the residual ionosphere error after 
application of the NeQuick corrections (especially for the tails).   
Single-frequency GLONASS corrections:  
GLONASS does not broadcast any ionosphere parameter. The Klobuchar and NeQuick can be used 
for GLONASS signals, but requires to be corrected by factors due to their frequency shifts. Klobuchar 
corrections are applied in this study. 
 𝜎𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜,𝑖 = (
𝑓𝐿1
𝑓𝑖
)
2
𝜎𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜,𝐿1 Eq. 5-21 
where 𝑓𝑖 is the frequency of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ GLONASS satellite. 
5.1.1.1.2.2 Dual frequency 
The use of signals coming from the same satellite at two different frequencies has the advantage to 
enable removing the first order ionospheric delay by combining both pseudoranges with the following 
expression: 
 𝜌𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜−𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 =
𝑓A
2
𝑓A
2 − 𝑓B
2 𝜌𝑓A −
𝑓B
2
𝑓A
2 − 𝑓B
2 𝜌𝑓B  Eq. 5-22 
where 𝜌𝑓𝐴  and 𝜌𝑓𝐵  are the pseudorange measured on the two frequencies 𝑓𝐴 and 𝑓B. 
Since the higher ionospheric delay orders are considered negligible for the targeted applications: 
 𝜎𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜 ≈ 0 m Eq. 5-23 
The counterpart of such an approach is that the process to remove the ionosphere delay also amplifies 
the noise and multipath error components that are not correlated on the two frequencies.  
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5.1.1.1.3 Troposphere residual error 
The troposphere induces an extra delay on the GNSS signal. This delay depends on the atmospheric 
conditions and receiver location. The user segment is responsible of estimating and correcting the 
tropospheric delay for each satellite in view. The residual error depends on the correction model used 
by the receiver. Assuming that the model used by the receiver is the one described in [RTCA, 2006], 
the residual error model is characterized by: 
 𝜎𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜 = 𝐹𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝜎𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜,𝑣 Eq. 5-24 
where: 
 𝜎𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜,𝑣 = 0.12 meters is  the vertical error standard deviation 
 𝐹𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜 is the mapping function varies with the elevation of the satellite 
 𝐹𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜 =
{
 
 
 
 
1.001
√0.002001 + sin2(𝛼)
𝑖𝑓 4° ≤ 𝛼 
1.001
√0.002001 + sin2(𝛼)
(1 + 0.015(4 − 𝜃)2) 𝑖𝑓 2° ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 4°
 Eq. 5-25 
This model was adopted for GPS L1 C/A and is assumed for GPS L5, Galileo E1, E5a and GLONASS 
L1. The tropospheric delay is not frequency dependent and thus cannot be removed by combinations 
of dual frequency measurements. The same model must be used for dual frequency receiver. 
5.1.1.1.4 Thermal noise 
The GNSS signal is affected by thermal noise which mostly depends on the front-end architecture and 
components according to the well-known Friis formula. This thermal noise will affect the ability of the 
receiver to get synchronized with the incoming signal, and will thus affect the pseudorange 
measurements. The variance of the synchronization error due to thermal noise depends upon a number 
of parameters including the modulation of the signal of interest and the key parameters of the receiver 
tracking loops (discriminator, correlation duration, equivalent loop bandwidth, early-late spacing). 
5.1.1.1.4.1 BPSK 
For a BPSK modulation, the expression of the code tracking error of a DLL using an EMLP 
discriminator with a BPSK modulation is given by [Van Dierendonck, 1996], [Van Dierendonck et al., 
1992], assuming an infinite front-end bandwidth: 
 𝜎𝜏
2 =
𝐵𝐿𝛿
2
𝐶
𝑁0
(1 +
2
(2 − 𝛿)
𝐶
𝑁0
𝑇𝑖 
) (𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑝2) Eq. 5-26 
where: 
 𝑇𝑖 is the accumulation time 
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 
𝐶
𝑁0
 is the ratio of the carrier power to the noise power spectral density in dB-Hz 
 𝐵𝐿 is the one-sided loop bandwidth of the loop filter in Hz 
 𝛿 is the DLL chip spacing 
Because GPS L1 C/A and GPS L5 and GLONASS L1 use a BPSK modulation, the above formula can 
be used. Galileo E5a is a side-lobe of an ALTBOC modulation, however it can be shown that it is well 
modeled as a BPSK modulation. As a consequence, the above expression can be used as well. 
Note that all the above signals do not use the same chipping rate, and thus this has to be taken into 
account when converting the above formula in m². 
5.1.1.1.4.2 BOC modulations 
The expression of the DLL error for EMLP has been extended to the case of other modulations in 
[Julien, 2005]:  
 𝜎𝜏
2 =
𝐵𝐿𝛿
2𝑠
𝐶
𝑁0
(1 +
2
(2 − 𝑠𝛿)
𝐶
𝑁0
𝑇𝑖 
) (𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑝2) Eq. 5-27 
where 𝑠 is the absolute value of the slope of the PRN code autocorrelation in the main peak, and in 
particular: 
 𝑠𝐵𝑂𝐶(1,1) = 3  
 𝑠𝐶𝐵𝑂𝐶(6,1,1/11,−) =
53+2√10
11
  
 𝑠𝐶𝐵𝑂𝐶(6,1,1/11,+) =
53−2√10
11
  
5.1.1.1.4.3 Dual frequency receivers 
The dual frequency receiver combines the pseudorange measurements from each frequency to form a 
composite measurement, with the expression given in Eq. 5-21. 
The error sources that affects 𝜌𝑓A  and 𝜌𝑓B  and are not correlated between both measurement such as 
noise and multipath are amplified [Salos, 2012], [Martineau, 2008]: 
 𝜎𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒,𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜−𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒
2 = (
𝑓A
2
𝑓A
2 − 𝑓B
2)
2
𝜎𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒,𝑓A
2 + (
𝑓B
2
𝑓A
2 − 𝑓B
2)
2
𝜎𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒,𝑓B
2  Eq. 5-28 
where 𝜎𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒,𝑓A
2  and 𝜎𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒,𝑓B
2  are the variance of the noise on the pseudoranges on the two frequencies 
𝑓𝐴 and 𝑓B. 
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5.1.1.1.5 Multipath 
The multipath models that are used in civil aviation are not suitable for terrestrial applications that 
does not operates in open sky conditions. It is necessary to characterize multipath error in urban 
environment for the cases of study. 
This section describes a way to calculate the contribution of the multipath to the nominal error model 
by a set of simulations based on a realistic urban channel model and a realistic GNSS tracking loop 
simulator. The first part describes the urban channel model and the tracking simulator. The way to 
connect and to validate the combination of both is then detailed. Then the parameters that are used for 
the simulations are detailed, as well as the results obtained. 
5.1.1.1.5.1 LMS channel model 
The Land Mobile Channel (LMS) model [Lehner and Steingass, 2005] which can be downloaded for 
free, is a generative wideband urban channel model based on a measurement campaign conducted in 
Munich (Germany) in 2002. Compared to a narrowband model such as the one developed in [Prieto-
Cerdeira et al., 2010], a wideband model a wideband model takes into account the time delays between 
the direct signal and the echoes. A wide-band model is preferred in here in order to realistically 
simulate the impact of echoes on the receivers tracking loops and therefore on the pseudorange 
measurements. The model simulates the signal received from a fixed satellite whose relative position 
to the user is characterized by its azimuth and its elevation. The LMS model simulates the channel for 
a vehicle moving along a street with predefined parameters. The model generates differently the direct 
satellite to receiver Line-of-Sight (LOS) and the multipath. The properties of the LOS are 
deterministically generated by simulating realistic physical phenomena. The diffraction of the LOS 
over the edges of the buildings, the shadowing induced by trees and the diffraction over lamp posts are 
considered. The echoes are statistically generated based on several distributions deduced from the 
measurement campaign. The number of reflections, the geometric distribution of the reflectors (from 
which the phase and delay are deduced), the power distribution of the echoes, their lifespan (space life 
duration) and the distribution of the time variation of their amplitude (fading) are used to generate the 
echoes. The model of the received signal sampled (at the channel sampling frequency) is: 
 𝑟(𝑘) = ∑ 𝛼𝑛(𝑘)𝑑 (𝑘𝑇𝑠,𝑐 − 𝜏𝑛(𝑘)) 𝑐 (𝑘𝑇𝑠,𝑐 − 𝜏𝑛(𝑘)) cos (𝜑𝑛(𝑘))
𝑁𝑚𝑝
𝑛=1
 Eq. 5-29 
where: 
 𝑇𝑠,𝑐 is the channel sampling period 
 𝛼𝑛 is the amplitude of each LOS and echoes 
 𝜏𝑛 is the delay of each LOS and echoes 
 𝜑𝑛 is the carrier phase of each LOS and echoes 
 𝑁𝑚𝑝 is number of echoes  
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A slight modification was added to the original LMS model in order to consider the dynamic of the 
mobile in the generation of the code delay. In the original model, the delay of the LOS is used as a 
reference for the multipath and thus remains null even when considering a moving vehicle. To model 
the impact of the dynamic on the delay, a delay variation corresponding to the true user/satellite 
dynamic was added to both the LOS and echo to LOS relative delay. This phenomenon is referred to 
as code Doppler which has the same origin as the carrier Doppler. The additional delay variation for 
two consecutive samples 𝑘 and 𝑘 + 1 is expressed by: 
 𝜏(𝑘 + 1) − 𝜏(𝑘) =
𝑣𝑟
𝑐
𝑇𝑠 Eq. 5-30 
where 𝑣𝑟 is the derivative of the distance between the receiver and the satellite. 
Moreover, the Doppler is not an explicit output of the channel model, even if it is used by the model 
for the phase generation. As a consequence, the echoes’ Doppler has been calculated differentiating 
their phase measurements on two consecutive epochs. 
5.1.1.1.5.2 GNSS tracking simulator 
A realistic GNSS receiver simulator, developed by ENAC and referred to as GeneIQ, uses the outputs 
of the LMS channel model, consisting of the times series containing the amplitude, code delay, carrier 
phase and Doppler of each LOS and reflections. This simulator is based on the modeling of the 
receiver correlator outputs which expression is given in Eq. 2-7. This expression is based on the 
assumption that the amplitude of the signal is constant during the correlation duration and that phase 
variation is linear during the correlation duration. In order not to invalidate this hypothesis, the 
correlator outputs can be obtained by summing several partial correlations. The partial correlation 
duration used in the following is thus in-line with the correlator output hypothesis. 
The correlation being a linear operation, the correlator outputs are obtained by summing the individual 
correlator associated to each component of the received signal. The expression of the In-phase and 
Quadra-phase partial correlator outputs are: 
𝐼𝑃(𝑘) =∑
𝛼𝑛(𝑘)
2
𝑑 (𝑘𝑇𝑠,𝑐 − 𝜏𝑛(𝑘))𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝜏𝑛(𝑘)
𝑁𝑚𝑝
𝑛=1
− ?̂?(𝑘))sinc (𝜋 (𝑓𝑛(𝑘) − 𝑓(𝑘))𝑇𝑠) cos (𝜑𝑛(𝑘) − ?̂?(𝑘)) 
Eq. 5-31 
 
𝑄𝑃(𝑘) = ∑
𝛼𝑛(𝑘)
2
𝑑 (𝑘𝑇𝑠,𝑐 − 𝜏𝑛(𝑘))𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝜏𝑛(𝑘)
𝑁𝑚𝑝
𝑛=1
− ?̂?(𝑘))sinc (𝜋 (𝑓𝑛(𝑘) − 𝑓(𝑘)) 𝑇𝑠) sin (𝜑𝑛(𝑘) − ?̂?(𝑘)) 
Eq. 5-32 
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where 𝑖 is the integration period index.  
Finally, the In-phase and Quadra phase outputs calculated by integration over 𝑇𝑠,𝑐 are accumulated 
over 𝑇𝑖 (it is assumed that 𝑇𝑖 is a multiple of 𝑇𝑠,𝑐).  
The validation of the LMS/Receiver coupling is presented in appendix C. 
5.1.1.1.5.3 Parameters used for the simulations  
Parameters for the channel generation: 
The first step consists in setting the parameters for the generation of the virtual street by the LMS. 
Even if the channel generated is a reproduction of a railtrack in urban environment, it is assumed that 
the model also applies to ETC in urban environment. A typical railway in downtown Toulouse +43° 
35' 58.04", +1° 27' 29.82", illustrated in Fig. 3, was taken as a reference and reproduced in the 
simulator. In urban area, the railway is several meters wide because of the proximity with train station. 
The rows of trees and housefronts are respectively placed at a distance of 12 and 22 meters from the 
center of the railway. 
 
Figure 17 Street model used for the channel generation 
The average height of the buildings was set to 15 m and the height of the antenna was set to 4.3 m 
which corresponds to the standard loading gauge for trains that carry passengers (GA, GB, GB1 as 
defined by UIC in [UIC Leaflet 506]. The typical mask angle of the buildings for this scenario is 26° 
for an azimuth of 90°. According to [Perez-Fontan et al., 2001], to represent the urban environment 
with a sufficient time resolution, the sampling frequency shall respect the relation: 
 𝑓𝑠 ≥
8𝑣
𝜆
 Eq. 5-33 
The velocity tested for the vehicle in urban area has been set to 20km/h, and therefore a 1 kHz 
sampling frequency that verifies the relation (for L1 and L5 frequencies) was chosen for the 
simulations. A low velocity is preferred to avoid the reflections to be filtered by the tracking loops due 
to the difference between their Doppler shift and the Doppler shift of the LOS. The satellite position 
relative to the user is set in terms of azimuth and elevation, and will vary in order to cover most of the 
possible scenarios and to characterize the pseudorange error as a function of the satellite elevation. 
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The satellite is located at eight different elevations (10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70 and 80°) and three 
different azimuths (0, 45 and 90°). As the topography of the street is symmetric, it is possible to limit 
the study at these three azimuths. The channel is generated and processed over 1 km for each satellite 
position.  
 
GNSS signals processed and receiver models: 
The receiver models simulated are those presented in 4.1.1.3 and 4.1.2.1 
 
Selection of the samples: 
The aim of this section is to determine the nominal standard deviation in a representative urban 
scenario due to the multipath. The nominal scenario for the multipath error only occurs when the 
receiver is actually tracking the signal, and when the pseudorange errors are only due to the multipath 
interference phenomenon. The samples corresponding to the transient state of the loops, when the 
local replica is not locked on the LOS dynamic shall be excluded. Moreover the subsequent samples 
corresponding to a loss of lock shall also be removed not to impact the standard deviation. The 
receiver can self-monitor the effectiveness of its tracking thanks to detectors discussed in [Van 
Dierendonck, 1996]. As a FLL is used to track the carrier, a 𝐶/𝑁0 estimator is preferred over a phase 
lock detector: 
 𝐶 𝑁0⁄̂ = 𝐴 − 1 + √𝐴(𝐴 − 1) Eq. 5-34 
where: 
 𝐴 =
[mean(𝐼𝑃
2 +𝑄𝑃
2)]2
var(𝐼𝑃
2 + 𝑄𝑃
2)
 Eq. 5-35 
In Eq. 5-35, the mean and variance are computed over 1 second. When the estimator is over a set 
threshold that has to be determined, it is decided that the signal is tracked and the samples shall be 
taken into account for the nominal standard deviation evaluation. The updating rate of the 𝐶/𝑁0 
estimation shall be sufficiently high to quickly detect any loss of lock but shall not be too low for 
computation issues. 0.1 second appears to be a good trade-off between sensitivity and complexity. If 
the estimated 𝐶/𝑁0 is over a set threshold, the latest 0.1 seconds of samples will be added to the 
“nominal case” vector by simple concatenation. 
5.1.1.1.5.4 Threshold determination for the 𝐶/𝑁0 estimator 
The nominal multipath error model has been calculated using the samples for which the GNSS 
receiver is tracking the signal. The 𝐶/𝑁0  estimator given in Eq. 5-34 has been used as tracking 
detector. This estimator can easily be implemented in an actual GNSS receiver. First, it is necessary to 
set the 𝐶/𝑁0 threshold at which the receiver is considered to be tracking, in presence of multipath 
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only. Considering four thresholds (20, 25, 30 and 35 dB-Hz), the distribution of the residual error 
obtained after the sample selection is studied for the specific case of the narrowband BPSK(1) 
receiver. For a satellite which azimuth is firstly 45° and then 90°, for each elevation, and each 
threshold, the residual samples have been concatenated. The mean pseudorange error is plotted in 
Figure 18. For elevations higher than 20°, the mean pseudorange error is sub-decimetric and does not 
vary with the 𝐶/𝑁0  threshold. For very low elevations (i.e. 20° and 10°), the distribution of the 
pseudorange error is not centered and its 95th percentile confidence interval is abnormally large as 
illustrated in Figure 19. The detector with a thresholds set to 30 and 35 dB-Hz effectively detect the 
loss of lock and exclude all the samples as illustrated in Figure 20. The detector with a threshold set to 
20 or 25 dB-Hz detects most of the biased samples, but 3% of the samples still remain not detected 
and are considered relevant. The magnitude of the bias is sufficiently important (several meters) to 
lead to a positioning failure and jeopardize the safety of the signaling system. It can be inferred from 
Figure 20 that setting the threshold to 35 dB-Hz is not advisable because it reduces the availability of 
the satellite to less than 80 % even when the signal is tracked and that the pseudorange error is 
centered and has 95th percentile confidence interval lower than 2 m. The 𝐶/𝑁0 mask is set to 30 dB-
Hz as it represents the best trade-off between the ability to detect a loss of lock and signal availability.  
 
Figure 18 Mean pseudorange error for the narrowband receiver processing BPSK(1) 
 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Elevation Angle (°)
M
e
a
n
 e
rr
o
r 
(m
)
 
 
C/N0 Threshold = 20 dB-Hz
C/N0 Threshold = 25 dB-Hz
C/N0 Threshold = 30 dB-Hz
C/N0 Threshold = 35 dB-Hz
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Elevation Angle (°)
9
5
th
 p
e
rc
e
n
ti
le
 (
m
)
 
 
C/N0 Threshold = 20 dB-Hz
C/N0 Threshold = 25 dB-Hz
C/N0 Threshold = 30 dB-Hz
C/N0 Threshold = 35 dB-Hz
 Chapter 5: Measurement models  
 
112 
Figure 19 95th percentile of the code pseudorange error for the narrowband receiver processing 
BPSK(1) 
 
Figure 20 Percentage of time at which the receiver is actually tracking the signal generated by the 
LMS simulator 
The case of the 0° azimuth is not taken into account for the threshold determination as the LOS is 
never obstructed and the receiver is tracking for the majority of the samples. The same approach has 
been followed for each modulation and multipath mitigation technique but is not detailed here. The 
same conclusion has been done for the other receivers and modulations.  
In Figure 20, it can be observed that the percentage of effective tracking for nonzero azimuths 
decreases with decreasing elevation and is negligible for satellite elevation angles of 10° and 20°. To 
explain this phenomenon, the Signal to Multipath amplitude Ratios (𝑆𝑀𝑅) histograms are plotted in 
Figure 21, Figure 22 and Figure 23 which respectively correspond to satellite elevations of 10°, 20° 
and 30°. The 𝑆𝑀𝑅 is defined as the ratio between the amplitude of the LOS and the amplitude of the 
strongest echo. The bi modality of the 𝑆𝑀𝑅 distribution is characteristic of the two configurations that 
occur. The mode corresponding to the low 𝑆𝑀𝑅 is the consequence of the reception of a combination 
of a NLOS and reflections. The mode corresponding to the high 𝑆𝑀𝑅  is the consequence of the 
reception of a LOS and reflections. The NLOS reception is characterized by very low or negative 𝑆𝑀𝑅 
which lead to losses of lock of the tracking loops. It can be inferred from Figure 21, Figure 22 and 
Figure 23 that the number of samples with very low or negative 𝑆𝑀𝑅  increases as the elevation 
decreases. Therefore the amount of samples that are over the 𝐶/𝑁0 mask increases with the elevation. 
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Figure 21 Signal to multipath amplitude ratio for a satellite elevation of 10° 
 
Figure 22 Signal to multipath amplitude ratio for a satellite elevation of 20° 
 
Figure 23 Signal to multipath amplitude ratio for a satellite elevation of 30° 
5.1.1.1.5.5 Overbounding 
The design of integrity monitoring algorithms requires the characterization of the actual error 
distribution by a known distribution. Integrity monitoring systems usually assume that the error 
follows a zero mean Gaussian distribution. The distribution of the raw multipath pseudorange error 
obtained by processing the LMS channel output is neither Gaussian nor centered. Thanks to the 𝐶/𝑁0 
based selection, with a threshold of 30 dB-Hz, the mean of the residual code error is sub-decimeter as 
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shown in Figure 18. The centered distribution still remains not Gaussian. The well-known Cumulative 
Distribution Function (CDF) overbounding technique described in [DeCleene, 2000] is used here. The 
CDF overbounding technique requires the distribution to be unimodal, centered, and symmetric. The 
unimodality was checked by watching the histograms of the observed pseudorange error. All three 
assumptions are fulfilled after the 𝐶/𝑁0 discrimination.  
5.1.1.1.5.6 Results 
For the simulations, the channel is generated once and each receiver’s architectures and signals are 
processed on the same channel. In real-life, the vehicle may not travel along a straight street such as 
what is generated in the LMS, but may face buildings when turning, or bridges, so that the satellites 
located in front of it can be masked. Therefore proposing a model in which the nominal multipath 
standard deviation is a function of the azimuth would not be relevant. For each simulated elevations, 
the pseudorange error from the range of possible azimuth shall be concatenated before the 
overbounding. The results of the CDF overbounding on the pseudorange error for the narrowband 
GPS L1 C/A and Galileo E1 OS receiver are given in Figure 24. It can be seen in Figure 24 that the 
multipath error model for BPSK(1) and BOC(1,1) is similar. For elevations lower than the mask angle 
of the buildings, the samples that are above the 𝐶/𝑁0 threshold are mainly those obtained for a null 
azimuth. For a null azimuth, the configuration is less favorable to multipath interference. The results 
of the CDF overbounding on the pseudorange error for the wideband GPS L1 C/A Galileo E1 OS 
receiver are given in Figure 25.  
Few samples with low elevation and nonzero azimuth are effectively tracked for the wideband CBOC 
receiver and the overbounding process leads to a higher nominal standard deviation (as shown in 
Figure 26).  
For elevations higher than or equal to 40°, the use of a wideband receiver instead of a narrowband one 
enable a significant reduction of the multipath error (𝜎𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ = 0.4 m instead of 0.7 for BPSK(1)).  
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Figure 24 Nominal multipath standard deviation for the narrowband receiver obtained after CDF 
overbounding 
 
Figure 25 Nominal multipath standard deviation for the wideband receiver obtained after CDF 
overbounding for the BPSK(1) and CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) modulation 
 
Figure 26 Nominal multipath standard deviation for the wideband receiver obtained after CDF 
overbounding for the BPSK(10) modulation 
The lifespan of an echo is generally characterized by a distribution of distance, typically less than 5 
meters for a car/train [Lehner and Steingass, 2005]. The higher is the velocity, the shorter (in terms of 
time) is the echo lifespan. With shorter echo lifespan, the multipath error has shorter correlation time 
and behaves like white noise. When distorting the correlation function, the multipath leads to a biased 
estimation of the delay. However, when affected by an echo with short lifespan, the DLL may not 
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converge to the maximum bias associated with the echo. Finally, the filtering by the carrier loop due to 
the Doppler shift of the echoes is all the more important as the velocity of the vehicle is high. The 
model that has been obtained for 20 km/h is thus conservative if applied to higher velocities. For very 
low velocities, the model used may not be valid for the same reasons.  
It can be inferred from the results of these simulations, that, by setting a relevant 𝐶/𝑁0 mask, all the 
NLOS can be detected (and excluded). This, combined with the fact that the vehicle is moving, 
explains why the contribution of the multipath interference error to the nominal model is low, even in 
urban environment (in simulations).  
However it shall be noticed, that, for very low velocities, the multipath error may reach values much 
higher than the proposed model. It would require significantly longer simulations to model such errors 
(and being representative). Moreover, the DLR model does not simulate any echoes that would be 
reflected on the vehicle. For a train, these echoes are likely to occur, and are not Doppler shifted 
compared to the direct signal as the vehicle has the same movement than the antenna.  
The multipath nominal model does not account for NLOS error at all. In real environment, NLOS 
higher than the 𝐶/𝑁0  mask may remain, which makes this error source dangerous for positioning 
based on GNSS in urban environment. 
5.1.1.1.6 Correlation time 
The errors described in the previous sections are time-correlated. The time-correlated errors are 
usually modelled with a first order Gauss-Markov process. The discrete first order Gauss-Markov 
process can be generated with: 
 𝜀(𝑘) = 𝑒
−
𝑇𝑠
𝑇𝑐𝜀(𝑘 − 1) + 𝑤(𝑘) Eq. 5-36 
where: 
 𝜀 is the value of the process  
 𝑇𝑠 is the sampling period 
 𝑇𝑐 is the correlation time of the process 
 𝑤 is the driven noise 
The driven noise variance is given by: 
 𝜎𝑤
2 = 𝜎𝜀
2 (1 − 𝑒
−
2𝑇𝑠
𝑇𝑐 ) Eq. 5-37 
As 𝜎𝜀 has been given earlier in the section, it is then necessary to determine the correlation time.  
The correlation of the pseudorange errors have been defined in [RTCA, 2006]: 
 𝑇𝑐,𝑐𝑙𝑘&𝑒𝑝ℎ is typically 3600 seconds according to [ICAO, 2009]  
 𝑇𝑐,𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜 is typically 1800 seconds according to [ICAO, 2009] 
 𝑇𝑐,𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜 is typically 1800 seconds according to [ICAO, 2009] 
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 𝑇𝑐,𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒 is equal to 1/𝐵𝐿,𝐷𝐿𝐿, which is equal to 1 second for the receivers modelled in chapter 
4 
 𝑇𝑐,𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ  depends on the velocity of the vehicle. 𝑇𝑐,𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ  is typically lower than 5 
seconds for a moving vehicle 
The correlation time of the total pseudorange error depends on the magnitude and the correlation time 
of each error source. For single frequency receivers, ionospheric errors, thermal noise and multipath 
are the largest error sources and impose the general correlation time. For dual frequency receivers, the 
magnitude of correlation time is a few seconds because the ionospheric error has been cancelled (and 
noise and multipath remains). 
5.1.2 Doppler error model 
The pseudorange rates measurements (Doppler multiplied by the wavelength) can be integrated as 
additional measurements in the tight coupling scheme: 
𝜌?̇? =
𝜕√(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑖)2 + (𝑦 − 𝑦𝑖)2 + (𝑧 − 𝑧𝑖)2
𝜕𝑡
+ 𝑐∆?̇? + ε𝜌𝑖̇  
(1) 
where ε𝜌𝑖̇  is the error on the pseudorange rate measurement, ε𝜌𝑖̇  is not separated into different error 
sources in this case. 
To model the Doppler in the simulations and to characterize their covariance in the EKF, the model 
proposed in [Carcanague, 2013] has been used. This model, given in Table 9 assesses the standard 
deviation of the Doppler measurements in urban and suburban environment as a function of the 
vehicle speed and the 𝐶/𝑁0. The model is valid for GPS L1 C/A, Galileo E1 OS and GLONASS L1 as 
they have approximately the same wavelength. No equivalent model has been found for L5 and E5a 
frequency. Even if the validity of this model for applications that requires integrity is not proven, 
Doppler measurements that are too far from their predicted value based on sensors will be excluded 
(as detailed in chapter 7), thus the impact of a wrong modelling Doppler error is reduced. 
 
Table 9 Weighting scheme based on estimated Doppler measurement standard deviation as a function 
of velocity and 𝐶/𝑁0 
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5.1.3 Other Sensors 
This section describes the nominal error models of the sensors that have been used to enhance GNSS 
for navigation in constrained environment. It includes the 6 axis IMU that is used for both cases of 
study, the track database used for train control and the wheel speed sensors used for ETC. These 
models have been used to simulate sensors data which have been used to validate the concepts and to 
weight the measurements from the sensors in the fusion algorithm. 
5.1.3.1 IMU 
The IMU used in the thesis is the LandMark 01 6 axis (MEMS) from Gladiator Technologies which is 
a medium cost inertial sensor, and therefore is adapted to the targeted applications. The specifications 
of this IMU are given in Table 10. 
Parameter Gyroscopes Accelerometers 
Bias (In Run Stability) 5°/hour 45 μg 
Angle/Velocity Random Walk 0.003°/sec/√Hz 0.09mg/√Hz 
Scale Factor Error ≤ 0.05% 
Table 10 IMU specifications [Landmark 01, datasheet] 
The gyroscope and accelerometer measurement models of reference assume the presence of white 
noise, a scale factor and a bias [El-Diasty and Pagiatakis, 2008]: 
 𝑥𝑜𝑢𝑡 = (1 + 𝑆𝐹𝑥)𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 + 𝛿𝑏𝑥 + 𝑛𝑥 Eq. 5-38 
where: 
 𝑥𝑜𝑢𝑡 is the sensor output  
 𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 is the true value (angular rate or specific force) 
 𝑆𝐹𝑥 is the scale factor error 
 𝛿𝑏𝑥 is the bias that varies with time 
 𝑛𝑥 is a white Gaussian random noise 
The specifications given in Table 10 have to be converted to define the model. The objective is here to 
determine the distributions of the bias and white noise. The general methodology to do so is given 
hereafter. Specific sections are then dedicated to apply the methodology to the gyroscopes and 
accelerometers. 
 The noise 𝑛𝑥 is characterized by its variance which can be derived from the specifications.  
 The bias instability which characterizes the time variations of 𝛿𝑏𝑥  can realistically be 
modelled by a flicker process [Strus et al., 2007] with the implementation provided by [Kasdin 
and Walter, 1992] or with a first order Gauss-Markov process. The first-order Gauss Markov 
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approach is preferred in this Thesis because it enables using the same model for the generation 
of the simulated sensor outputs and for the EKF equations design. In this case the variation of 
the bias can be modelled as: 
 𝛿𝑏𝑥
̇ = −
1
𝜏𝑏𝑥
𝛿𝑏𝑥 + 𝜂𝑏𝑥  Eq. 5-39 
where: 
 𝜏𝑏𝑥 is the correlation time for the process. 
 𝜂𝑏𝑥 is the driving noise of the process with a variance 𝜎𝑏𝑥 
The scale factor error is modelled by a constant equal to 0.05% in simulations. In the EKF it is 
characterized by a first-order Gauss Markov process with long correlation time (10000 s).  
5.1.3.1.1 Gyroscopes 
The specifications have to be converted to determine the error characteristics necessary to define the 
model. The objective is here to determine the distributions of the bias and white noise.  
The angular rate noisy measurements are integrated to estimate attitude. The integrated signal is 
affected by a zero-mean random walk error. The IMU manufacturers characterize the noise by the 
𝐴𝑅𝑊 value in the specifications, which must be converted into noise standard deviation.  
The value given as an 𝐴𝑅𝑊 in the datasheet is in fact a FFT noise density [IEEE Std 952-1997]: 
 𝐴𝑅𝑊(°/√ℎ) =
1
60
𝐹𝐹𝑇 [
(°)
ℎ
/√𝐻𝑧] Eq. 5-40 
which gives for the specification of Table 2, an 𝐴𝑅𝑊 of 0.18 °/√ℎ 
The correspondence between 𝐴𝑅𝑊 which characterize the integrated white noise and the standard 
deviation of the white noise given in [Woodman, 2007]: 
 𝜎𝑔[°/𝑠𝑒𝑐] = √
1
3600𝑇𝑠
𝐴𝑅𝑊(°/√ℎ) Eq. 5-41 
where: 
 𝑇𝑠  is the sampling frequency of the sensor set (100 Hz in simulations, 10 Hz on the real 
campaign) 
Finally 𝜎𝑔=0.03°/s for the gyroscopes. On 10 hours long data collections in which the IMU is fixed, 
the standard deviations of the gyroscopes on the three axes have been estimated to 0.037, 0.033 and 
0.036°/s which confirms the value obtained after conversions. The process correlation time (𝜏𝑏𝑔) is set 
to 100 s which is a typical value for MEMS sensors [Woodman, 2007].  
Finally, the variance of the driving noise of the first-order Gauss Markov process can be obtained with: 
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 𝜎𝑏𝑔[°/𝑠𝑒𝑐] = 𝜎𝑏𝑠𝑔
√1− 𝑒
−2
𝑇𝑠
𝜏𝑏 Eq. 5-42 
where: 
 𝜎𝑏𝑠𝑔 is the gyroscope bias stability (covariance of the process) given in Table 10 
The sampling period is negligible compare to the correlation time of the sensor. Thus, at the first order: 
 𝜎𝑏𝑔 = √
2
𝜏𝑏𝑔
𝜎𝑏𝑠𝑔 Eq. 5-43 
which gives 𝜎𝑏𝑔 = 2.10
−5 °/𝑠. 
5.1.3.1.2 Accelerometers 
The approach is exactly the same as for the gyroscopes. First we have to calculate the velocity random 
walk (𝑉𝑅𝑊) with: 
 𝑉𝑅𝑊[𝑚𝑠
−1/√ℎ] = 60𝐹𝐹𝑇[𝑚𝑠−2/√𝐻𝑧] Eq. 5-44 
which gives (from the specification of Table 10),  𝑉𝑅𝑊[°/√ℎ] = 0.053 𝑚𝑠−1/√ℎ . 
Then: 
 𝜎𝑎[𝑚/sec
2] = √
1
3600𝑇𝑠
𝑉𝑅𝑊(𝑚𝑠−1/√ℎ) Eq. 5-45 
Finally, the standard deviation of the accelerometer noise is 𝜎𝑎= 0.0088 ms
-2
. On the 10 hour data 
collection, the standard deviations of the three accelerometers have been measured to 0.0081, 0.0084 
and 0.0085 m/s
-2
 which confirms the theoretical value.  
Finally, the variance of the driven noise of the first-order Gauss Markov process can be obtained with 
(Eq. 5-37): 
 𝜎𝑏𝑎 = 6.2.10
−6 𝑚/𝑠2 Eq. 5-46 
5.1.3.2 Track Database 
The use of the train track data map is a way to take into account the fact that the motion of the train is 
limited to one axis, or equivalently one degree of freedom. In train control, it has been assumed that 
the railtrack on which the vehicle is located is known. In this work, it is assumed that the track 
database consists in a list of coordinates of track data points. These points can be close to each other 
(about 1.5 m [Euler et al., 1996]). Given 𝑖  the index of a train track data point, its coordinates 
(𝐸𝑖,, 𝑁𝑖 , 𝑈𝑖 ) in the ENU frame can be modeled as: 
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 𝐸𝑖 = 𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 + 𝛿𝐸𝑖 Eq. 5-47 
where: 
 𝐸𝑖 is the true coordinate of the track point in the ENU frame 
 𝛿𝐸𝑖 is the mapping error  
 𝛿𝐸𝑖~𝒩(0, 𝜎𝐸𝑖
2 ) 
The mapping can equivalently be done in the ECEF coordinate frame. 
In this Thesis, it is assumed that: 
 the errors on each axis are equally distributed and uncorrelated 
 the errors on each track point follow the same distribution 
 the distance between two consecutive train track data points will be denoted 𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝  and 
assumed constant.  
 a 3D standard deviation of 20 cm on the track data points is assumed. These types of 
accuracies can be reached with differential phase positioning combined with post-processing 
and other sensors such as LIDAR. 
5.1.3.3 Wheel Speed Sensors 
WSS are nowadays present on-board in most vehicles and are used by the anti-lock braking system 
(ABS). A WSS measures the along-track velocity of the vehicle by counting the frequency of the 
wheel revolution and multiplying it with the wheel circumference. If the practical wheel diameter 
differs from the nominal wheel diameter, the distance measured by odometer will introduce an error, 
which is proportional to the velocity, referred to as scale factor error. The WSS error model is then: 
 𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡 = (1 + 𝑆𝐹)𝑣𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 + 𝑛𝑣 Eq. 5-48 
where: 
 𝑆𝐹 is the scale factor error  
 𝑛𝑣 is the noise measurement on the sensor 
A constant scale factor error of 3% have been used as a reference. The variance of the noise 
measurement on the WSS is 0.1 m/s [Spangenberg, 2009.]. 
5.2 Faults 
The failures are errors that are not described by the nominal error models. GNSS and other sensors can 
provide faulty measurements, which can lead to position larger than the alert limit. The faults are 
generally characterized by their probability of occurrence and signatures (amplitude, time duration). 
The characterization of the faults is an important step that must be done prior to the definition of an 
integrity monitoring algorithm. 
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5.2.1 Failure sources of GNSS 
The GNSS faults can originate from several sources. It can be caused by satellite failure, abnormal 
ionosphere conditions, interference, or abnormally large local effects with respect to the nominal error 
model (this case is discussed in section 5.3). An exhaustive list of GNSS failure modes is given in 
[Bhatti, 2007]. Unfortunately, only the satellite fault has a probability of occurrence that is well 
characterized. The constellation faults are also introduced in this section.  
5.2.1.1 Satellite faults 
The GPS satellite fault which is referred to as Major Satellite Failure (MSF) is well characterized. This 
characterization can reasonably be applied to Galileo [Salos, 2012]. The MSF occurs when a healthy 
GPS satellite’s ranging signal (excluding atmospheric and local errors) exceed the SIS URE not-to-
exceed (NTE) tolerance. The NTE tolerance is defined as the maximum between 30 m and 4.42 times 
the transmitted URA. The probability of occurence such an event provided that no MSF was present at 
the start of the hour is specified by the SPS SiS integrity standard:  
 𝑃𝑀𝑆𝐹,ℎ = 10
−5 sat h⁄⁄  Eq. 5-49 
After the occurrence of such an event, the GNSS will detect and alert the user within 6 hours. Realistic 
Maximum alert delays are around 1 hour. Thus the probability that a satellite is faulty at an instant is 
equal to the probability the failure occurs during the previous hour: 
 𝑃𝑀𝑆𝐹(1ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟) = 10
−5 sat⁄  Eq. 5-50 
The probability that a position calculated with 𝑁𝑠𝑎𝑡 contains 𝑛 MSF is given by:  
 𝑃𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑛 𝑀𝑆𝐹 = (
𝑁𝑠𝑎𝑡
𝑛
)𝑃𝑀𝑆𝐹(1ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟)
𝑛(1 − 𝑃𝑀𝑆𝐹(1ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟))
𝑁𝑠𝑎𝑡−𝑛
 Eq. 5-51 
There is no GLONASS equivalent to GPS MSF in terms of standard characterization. In [Walter et al., 
2013], the fault is assumed to occur when the worst-case URE is greater than 50 m. This study 
assumes that the probability of exceedance of this threshold is 10
-4
 per satellite. The value is taken as a 
reference in the Thesis. Currently, the probability of occurrence of a fault that affects several satellites 
for GLONASS is not sufficiently low to be neglected (10
-4
 in [Walter et al., 2013]).  
In general, satellite faults are classified into steps and ramps. Step errors are usually simple to detect 
whereas slowly growing errors (SGE), also referred to as ramps are more complex and longer to 
detect.  
5.2.1.2 Constellation faults 
Constellation faults are the faults that may affect more than one satellite within a constellation at a 
given time. They can be caused by control segment or by a design flaw in the satellites (e.g. in [Walter 
et al., 2014]). Current RAIM algorithms assume that the probability of constellation fault is equal to 0 
for GPS (there is no evidence of such event in the past).  
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As Galileo is not yet operational, it is not possible to extrapolate the probability of constellation fault 
based on past observations.  
The probability of occurrence of constellation faults cannot be neglected for GLONASS because such 
event has already been observed on April 2, 2014 where bad ephemerides were uploaded to the 
satellites which broadcast these corrupted information for 11 hours. The same phenomenon appeared 
on April 15, 2014, with eight satellites going offline. It is stated in [Walter et al., 2014] that that “10-4 
is a reasonable starting place” for the probability of constellation fault for GLONASS.  
5.2.2 Sensors faults 
5.2.2.1 Inertial faults 
The proposed solutions integrate data from an IMU, wheel speed sensors or a track database. The fault 
modes of these sensors have to be addressed. An exhaustive list of inertial sensors failures sources, 
including MEMS, is given in [Bhatti, 2007]. The failure of the inertial sensors can result in no output, 
null reading, repeated readings or abnormally large errors with respect to the specifications [Groves, 
2013]. For inertial sensors, the only parameter related to failure occurrence that is given in the IMU 
datasheets is the Mean Time Between Failure (𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹). The probability of failure during 1 hour of 
operation is given by: 
 𝑃𝐹,𝐼𝑀𝑈 = 1 − 𝑒
−
1
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹 Eq. 5-52 
For the Landmark 01 IMU, the 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹 provided by the manufacturer is equal to 124334 hours. It 
corresponds to a probability of failure of 8.10
-6
 per hour. However the failure events considered in the 
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹 are not clearly defined. In particular, it remains unclear whether this value is the sum of the 
probability of any failure or whether it corresponds to the probability for the IMU not to be able to 
provide any measurement. From the safety point of view, it is much more hazardous to receive 
incorrect measurements than no measurement at all. As no a priori information on the probability of 
the IMU to provide non nominal measurements are known, 𝑃𝐹,𝐼𝑀𝑈 derived from Eq. 5-46 will be used 
as a reference.  
For train control, the integrity risk allocated to the IMU subsystem has to be lower than √𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 . With 
the redundant approach, the integrity risk of the subsystem is 10
-5.5
/h in the most demanding case. The 
risk allocated to the IMU will therefore be equal to or lower than 10
-5.5
/h. However, 10
-5.5
/h is lower 
than 𝑃𝐹,𝐼𝑀𝑈 calculated for the sensor. Thus, the integrity of the IMU measurements must be monitored.   
Lower grade IMU may be preferred for ETC for OBU costs considerations. Considerably shorter 
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹 and therefore larger 𝑃𝐹,𝐼𝑀𝑈 can be expected from these types of sensors. IMU integrity will 
also have to be monitored for ETC.  
It is proposed in chapter 8 to protect the system against IMU faults prior to their integration in the 
mechanization. Moreover, the sensor nominal errors are calibrated by the EKF, therefore, it can be 
assumed that they do not convert into failures after their integration in the mechanization.  
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5.2.2.2 Other sensors faults 
A fault in the track database can be manifested by an abnormally large position error on the track 
points or missing track points. For train control, in this thesis, the track database is assumed to be fault 
free.  
As for ETC, the failures of the wheel speed sensors are not investigated in this thesis. Even if the 
vehicles are equipped with two wheel speed sensors, the dependency between the failure events of 
both shall be addressed before designing any failure monitoring. A possible solution consists in 
monitoring the variations of the velocity measurements by the WSS with the IMU as these 
technologies are independent.  
5.3 Consideration of local effects 
When the vehicle operates in suburban or urban environments, it may be affected by measurement 
errors that are abnormally large with respect to the nominal error model that have been presented in 
section 5.1. This can be due to two phenomena, multipath interference and NLOS. 
5.3.1 Multipath interference 
Multipath interference refers to the configuration in which the GNSS signal received is the sum of the 
direct signal plus reflected or diffracted rays. The errors due to this phenomenon have been integrated 
in the nominal error model. However, multipath interference can result, at least theoretically (as shown 
in chapter 7), in measurement errors that are considerably larger than what was observed during the 
simulations conducted on the LMS channel model. Such event has to be considered in the design of 
the solution. It is either possible to protect against it by modifying the nominal error model to integrate 
these cases, or to rely on an algorithm such as the one presented in chapter 7.1 to detect such event. 
5.3.2 Non-Line-Of-Sight GNSS errors in urban environment 
If the satellite is masked, the receiver may track a NLOS. NLOS are always affected by positive biases 
with respect to the direct signal. In the simulations that have been conducted on the LMS channel 
model, it has been observed that the NLOS can be excluded by using a constant 𝐶/𝑁0 mask at 30 dB-
Hz. However, it may not be the case on real signals. The probability of occurrence of this type of event 
is unknown.  
The nominal error model that has been presented in section 5.1 is only valid for LOS signals. For open 
sky to light suburban environment, not considering the possibility of tracking a NLOS may be valid to 
a certain extent. However, in urban environment, the distribution of the error in the NLOS case must 
be characterized. Then, it will either be possible to include the NLOS case in the nominal error model 
by inflating it sufficiently (if its probability of occurrence is high) or to include these cases in the 
failure modes (if it has a low probability of occurrence) and to rely on additional algorithms to protect 
the system from these errors.   
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To characterize the NLOS error, a simple statistic model is firstly proposed. Then, a measurement 
campaign has been conducted in order to characterize the NLOS error more precisely in actual urban 
environment in downtown Toulouse. 
5.3.2.1 Statistic model 
NLOS error has been statistically modelled for ultra-wideband signals either by a uniform [Jia and 
Buehrer, 2010], Gaussian [Borras et al., 1998] or exponential distribution [Guvenc, 2007]. A 
deterministic model for the modelling of NLOS error has been proposed in [Betaille et al., 2013], 
where the street is modelled by an urban canyon of infinite length with geometric characteristics that 
are known thanks to database. In this section a statistical distribution of the NLOS error is proposed 
based on statistical characterization of the street topology.  
It is assumed that any GNSS signal tracked by the receiver is either: 
 a direct signal 
 a NLOS that is diffracted on the building edge 
 a NLOS reflected on the opposite building face 
 a NLOS reflected twice  
Thus: 
 𝑃(𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡) + 𝑃(𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) + 𝑃(1 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝑃(2 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = 1 Eq. 5-53 
These events are considered distinct, and the formula of total probability is be applied to the NLOS 
error cumulative distribution function and derived. The result is characteristic of a mixture density 
model for the NLOS error: 
 
𝑓(𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆) = 𝑃(𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡)𝑓(𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆|𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡) + 𝑃(𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑)𝑓(𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆|𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑)
+ 𝑃(1 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑓(𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆|1 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
+ 𝑃(2 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑓(𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆|2 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
Eq. 5-54 
where 𝑓( ) denotes the probability density function. 
To determine the value of the mixture, it is proposed to 
 Address the statistical models that will be used for the computation of the error distributions 
and the probability of occurrence of each event.  
 Second, compute the four error pdf that are involved in Eq. 5-54.  
 Third, determine the expressions of the four coefficients of the mixture.  
 Finally provide the results. 
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5.3.2.1.1 Statistic modelling 
The street is modelled as an urban canyon of infinite length. Let’s denote 𝐻𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 the height of the 
building which is located on the same side of the street as the GNSS satellite. The across street 
distances from the antenna to the buildings are denoted 𝐿1  and 𝐿2 . 𝐻𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔  and 𝐿  (𝐿1  and 𝐿2  are 
assumed to have same distribution) can be characterized statistically by their distributions. The log-
normal distribution is commonly used to describe buildings height or street width. Some statistics can 
be found in the literature about the height distribution of buildings. In [Saunders, 1991], statistics are 
given for the area covered by the city of Westminster, which corresponds to a total area of 29.5 km². 
[Parsons, 1992] provides the data in a typical suburban site (Guildford, Surrey).  Information on 
distributions of building height can be found in [Ratti et al., 2002] for several cities including 
Toulouse, London and Berlin based on urban Digital Elevation Models. The parameters detailed in 
[Ratti et al., 2002] are average building height and standard deviations: 
 London Toulouse Berlin 
𝐸[𝐻𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔] 13.6 m 15.3 m 18.6 m 
𝑠𝑡𝑑(𝐻𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) 5 m 6.1 m 4.3 m 
Table 11 Parameters of the real distribution of building heights for different cities 
It is then possible to deduce the corresponding location (𝜇𝐻𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) and scale (𝜎𝐻𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) parameters 
for the lognormal corresponding model. 
 𝜇𝐻𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑙𝑛
(
 
𝐸[𝐻𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔]
2
√𝑠𝑡𝑑(𝐻𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔)
2
+ 𝐸[𝐻𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔]
2
)
   Eq. 5-55 
 𝜎𝐻𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 = √𝑙𝑛 (
𝑠𝑡𝑑(𝐻𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔)
2
𝑚2
+ 1) Eq. 5-56 
For Toulouse downtown, it gives 𝜇𝐻𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 2.65 and 𝜎𝐻𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔  = 0.38.  
Street and railway width can also be highly variable, especially in urban and suburban areas. Again, 
the log-normal distribution appears to be the most reasonable choice for street width [Oestges et al., 
1999]. The case of train control is developed here. The same approach can be applied for ETC, and the 
distribution of 𝐿 will be different for each geo-object. 
For train control the objective is to characterize the minimum distance from the track to the buildings. 
In Toulouse, statistics were measured on google earth at a constant spatial frequency, in the area where 
the buildings are the closest to the railtrack (43°33'58.99"N, 1°29'35.88"E) to (43°36'33.33"N, 
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1°27'19.09"E) which corresponds to 6.16 km. Every 60 meters, for the two trailtracks that are the 
closest to the building, the distance to the closest building is measured. It corresponds to 
approximately 200 values. This distribution is conservative as the tracks in between the two that are 
surveyed have better visibility. The data distribution has been fitted with a lognormal distribution as 
illustrated in Figure 27. The parameters associated are 𝜇𝐿 = 2.9 and 𝜎𝐿 = 0.412. 
 
Figure 27 Distribution of the distance to the closest building 
5.3.2.1.2 Determination of the probability density functions in each configuration 
𝐻𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑎 represents the height at which the GNSS antenna is located, 𝜗 represents difference between 
the satellite azimuth and the street azimuth and 𝛼 represents the satellite elevation.  
If the direct signal is received, the NLOS error is null: 
 𝑓(𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆|𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡) = 0 Eq. 5-57 
If the received signal is diffracted, the expression of the pseudorange error is given by: 
 𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆|𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 =
√𝐿2 + (𝐻 −𝐻𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑎)2
|sin(𝜗)|
{1 − sin [𝛼 + atan (
𝐿
𝐻 − 𝐻𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑎
)]} Eq. 5-58 
This distribution is complex and it is not possible to characterize it well by usual distributions. Monte 
Carlo simulations have shown that the gamma distribution fits well this distribution, in particular the 
tails of the distribution as illustrated by Figure 28. 
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Figure 28 Probability density function for 𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆|𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 
The parameters of the Gamma fitting distribution for the example of Train control in Toulouse is given 
in appendix D. In the case where the NLOS is received after one reflection, the expression of the 
distribution is given by: 
 𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆|1 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 2𝐿sin(𝜗) cos(𝛼) Eq. 5-59 
This error follows a simple lognormal distribution because it is the product of a constant by a 
lognormal distribution: 
 𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆|1 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ~ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 −𝒩(𝜇𝐿 + ln(2sin(𝜗) cos(𝛼)) , 𝜎𝐿
2) Eq. 5-60 
If a NLOS is received after two reflections, the expression of the NLOS error is given by [Betaille et 
al., 2014]: 
 𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆|2 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 2(𝐿1 + 𝐿2)sin(𝜗) cos(𝛼) Eq. 5-61 
𝐿1 + 𝐿2  is the sum of two independent lognormal distributions. This distribution is used in many 
important communication problems. No exact closed form solution for the distribution is known. 
However there is a general agreement that a sum of independent lognormal random variable can be 
well approximated by another lognormal random variable. Thus: 
 𝐿1 + 𝐿2~𝑙𝑜𝑔 −𝒩(𝜇𝐿1+𝐿2 , 𝜎𝐿1+𝐿2
2 ) Eq. 5-62 
Different techniques exist to determine the parameters of the resultant lognormal distribution. Several 
method exists to determine these parameters and some are listed in [Beaulieu et al., 1995]. We use the 
Fenton-Wilkinson’s method [Fenton, 1960] as it provides a better estimate of the CDF tail than other 
techniques. The Fenton-Wilkinson’s estimation for the sum of two lognormal with the same scale and 
the same location gives (it is assumed that 𝐿1 and 𝐿2 have the same distribution): 
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 𝜎𝐿1+𝐿2
2 = ln (
1
2
𝑒𝜎𝐿
2
+
1
2
) Eq. 5-63 
 𝜇𝐿1+𝐿2 = ln(2e
𝜇𝐿) +
𝜎𝐿
2
2
−
𝜎𝑧
2
2
 Eq. 5-64 
 
Figure 29 Fitting 𝐿1 + 𝐿2 by lognormal distribution with Fenton-Wilkinson approximation 
Finally, the distribution of the pseudorange bias in this scenario is the following: 
 𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆|2 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛~ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 −𝒩(𝜇𝐿1+𝐿2 + 𝑙𝑛(2𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝜗) cos(𝛼)) , 𝜎𝐿1+𝐿2
2 ) Eq. 5-65 
The probability density functions of the NLOS errors in the four cases are well known because they 
are characterized in function of basic distributions.  
5.3.2.1.3 Probabilities of occurrence 
The next step is the characterization of the probabilities of occurrence of each configuration, i.e. the 
coefficients of the mixture. In [Betaille et al., 2014], the probabilities of occurrence of the reception of 
the direct signal, single reflected NLOS and double reflected NLOS are given as a function of the 
satellite elevation. This model of probabilities is characterized by two critical elevations, denoted 
𝛼𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 and 𝛼𝑟𝑒𝑓 here. 𝛼𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 corresponds to the elevation mask of the buildings in the direction of the 
satellite. If 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 , the direct signal is masked. If 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼𝑟𝑒𝑓 , the it is geometrically possible to 
receive twice reflected NLOS. The expressions of both critical elevations are: 
 𝛼𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 = atan |
 𝐻𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 −𝐻𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑎
𝐿
sin(𝜗)| Eq. 5-66 
 𝛼𝑟𝑒𝑓 = atan |
 𝐻𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 −𝐻𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑎
𝐿1 + 2𝐿2
sin(𝜗)| Eq. 5-67 
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The model proposed in [Betaille et al., 2014] is slightly modified here. Firstly we have added a 
scenario which is the reception of a diffracted signal. It has been assumed here that the probability to 
track NLOS given that the elevation 𝛼  is higher than the elevation of the building αdiff  is null. 
Moreover the probability to track the LOS given that the satellite is masked (𝛼 ≤ 𝛼𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓) is also null. 
Finally it is assumed that the probability of tracking a doubly reflected NLOS if 𝛼 > 𝛼𝑟𝑒𝑓 is null. The 
sum of the four probabilities has to be equal to 1 no matter the elevation. The model proposed is 
represented in Figure 30, and its expression is detailed in annex. 
 
Figure 30 Probabilities of occurrence of scenarios in urban environment 
In our statistical approach, αdiff and 𝛼𝑟𝑒𝑓 are random variables. Given the elevation of the satellite, the 
probability of occurrence of each scenario is in fact a random variable itself, which makes the model 
too complex. It is proposed to simplify it by replacing the probability of occurrence of each scenario 
by its expectation in the expression of the mixture (given the satellite elevation). It is then necessary to 
determine 𝐸[𝑃(𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡)] , 𝐸[𝑃(𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑)] , 𝐸[𝑃(1 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)]  and 𝐸[𝑃(2 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)] . These 
terms have been determined for the Toulouse case by Monte-Carlo simulations. The results are given 
in Figure 31 to Figure 34 to Y as a function of the azimuth and the elevation of the satellite. 
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Figure 31 𝐸[𝑃(𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡)] as a function of the 
elevation and azimuth 
 
Figure 32 Value of 𝐸[𝑃(𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑)] as a 
function of the elevation and azimuth 
 
Figure 33 Value of 𝐸[𝑃(1 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)] as a 
function of the elevation and azimuth 
 
Figure 34 Value of 𝐸[𝑃(2 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)] as a 
function of the elevation and azimuth 
5.3.2.1.4 Results 
Once each density of the mixture has been determined, and that each coefficient is known, the density 
of the NLOS error resulting of all the possible configurations can be modelled. The results are given 
for different values of azimuth in Figure 35 to Figure 38. The probability of large NLOS errors is 
essentially higher for low satellite elevations and for 𝜗 that are close to 90°. For high elevation (60°) 
the NLOS error is negligible.  
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Figure 35 Distribution of NLOS error for 𝜗 = 10° 
 
Figure 36 Distribution of NLOS error for 𝜗 = 30° 
 
Figure 37 Distribution of NLOS error for 𝜗 = 60° 
 
Figure 38 Distribution of NLOS error for 𝜗 = 90° 
As for the time correlation, the lifespan of NLOS is highly correlated to the receiver speed. The life 
distance distribution of the echoes for a urban car environment is given in [Lehner and Steingass, 
2005]. Most reflectors exist along a motion path that is shorter than 5 m. The train urban environment 
is assumed to behave the same way.  
5.3.2.1.5 Conclusions 
This model is very pessimistic because it does not take into account the fact that the signal has been 
effectively tracked, and that it is above the 𝐶/𝑁0 mask (if one is used). In the model, given a satellite 
elevation and azimuth, the probability of receiving a diffracted, once reflected and twice reflected 
NLOS is calculated in order to weight the terms of the mixture. Let’s take the example of the twice 
reflected NLOS. The Bayes theorem applied to our study case gives: 
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 𝑃(2 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠|𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑) =
𝑃(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑|2 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)
𝑃(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑)
𝑃(2 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) Eq. 5-68 
Thus the probability that shall be used in the model is 𝑃(2 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠|𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑)  instead of 
𝑃(2 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠). It is clear that 𝑃(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑|2 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) is much lower than 𝑃(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑), thus 
𝑃(2 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠|𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑) is much lower than 𝑃(2 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠).  
Quantizing 𝑃(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑|2 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) would be too complex. The statistic modelling approach may 
be used as an upper bound of the NLOS error distribution. A characterization based on real 
measurements is described in the next section. 
5.3.2.2 Model based on real data 
The objective of this sub-section is to refine the pseudorange error model in urban environment based 
on real measurements. In particular the NLOS error distribution is of particular interest in order to 
propose a more realistic model than the statistic model which is too conservative. The first part of the 
subsection is a description of the set up that has been used for the data collection. In particular the 
method to estimate the pseudorange error is detailed. The results of the campaign are detailed in the 
second part of the subsection.  
5.3.2.2.1 Description of the set-up 
The data collection was done on a test van owned by ENAC.  
The GNSS receiver used to collect the pseudorange measurements is a U-blox 6 GPS (L1 C/A) Engine 
Evaluation kit (Figure 39). The receiver is connected to a U-blox active GPS antenna (Figure 40) and 
to a computer with a USB link. The raw GPS L1 C/A measurements have been recorded with a 
sampling frequency of 1 Hz.  
The trajectory of reference is estimated with a SPAN system from NovAtel. The receiver is a ProPak6 
receiver that process GPS L1/L2. The SPAN system combines RTK with tactical grade IMU (UIMU-
LCI from Northrop-Grumman Litef GMBH). The IMU was set on the ground of the vehicle, aligned 
with the axis of the vehicle and with the SPAN antenna in order to reduce the lever arm error, even if 
it is estimated by the SPAN. 
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Figure 39 GNSS receiver and antenna used for 
the data collection 
 
Figure 40 The U-blox antenna (left) and the 
NovAtel SPAN antenna (right) 
 
Figure 41 Power supply for the set-up (battery 
and inverter) 
 
Figure 42 Picture of the set-up 
The data from a dual constellation U-blox GPS/GLONASS M8 evaluation kit have also been recorded 
as well as the data from the LandMark 01 IMU from Gladiator that has been proposed as a reference 
for the cases of study. This IMU has been synchronized with the dual constellation U-blox 
GPS/GLONASS receiver by connecting the PPS output of the receiver to it.  
5.3.2.2.2 Description of the trajectory 
The data collection was done on June, 17th 2015 in Toulouse. Two separated data collections have 
been made and the concatenation of both trajectories is 71 km long, and corresponds to 2h40 of data. 
The full trajectory is given in Figure 43.  
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Figure 43 Data collection in Toulouse 
The environments have been classified into three categories.  
 The beltway environment is characterized by high velocity and open sky conditions.  
 The suburban environment corresponds to areas when low buildings are presents around the 
receiver.  
 The dense urban environment corresponds to urban canyons and important building mask 
angles.  
In Table 12 and Table 13 these environment are respectively associated with green, yellow and red. 
The first trajectory lasted 1h25 approximately. It is a crossing of Toulouse represented in Table 12. 
After 12 minutes of suburban environment, the vehicle went through the city center during 38 minutes 
to do a loop in the most challenging canyons of the city, and then the vehicle drives through 37 
minutes of suburban environment. In the third part of the trajectory, the trajectory follows the tramway 
railtracks. It is a typical environment in which rail applications operates. However, trains do not 
operate in narrow urban canyons. 
Duration Trajectory Typical environment 
12 min 
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38 min 
  
37 min 
  
Table 12 Characterization of the first trajectory 
The second trajectory was started approximately 1 hour after the end of the first one. This trajectory 
lasts about 1h15. The vehicle crosses a succession of different environment, including beltways Table 
13.  
Duration Trajectory Typical environment 
4 min 
  
5 min 
  
17 min 
  
10 min 
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10 min 
  
8 min 
  
17 min 
  
Table 13 Characterization of the second trajectory 
5.3.2.2.3 Characterization of pseudorange errors 
The objective here is to characterize the pseudorange error in urban environment, and in particular the 
NLOS error. It is proposed to differentiate the raw measurements of the receiver with the 
pseudoranges from a reference station (TLIA in Toulouse) to cancel the correlated errors (ionosphere, 
troposphere and ephemeris) which is relevant because the baseline does not exceed 20 km during the 
collection. The data that corresponds to the date of collection were downloaded on the IGN website. 
The pseudorange error models of the on board receiver (𝑟𝑐𝑥) and the station of reference (𝑠𝑡𝑎) 
correspond to Eq. 5-1. The expression of the residuals after differentiating both measurements is: 
 
𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑥 − 𝜌𝑠𝑡𝑎 = 𝑑𝑟𝑐𝑥 − 𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑎 + 𝑐Δ𝑡𝑟𝑐𝑥 − 𝑐Δ𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎 + 𝜀𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒,𝑟𝑐𝑥 + 𝜀𝑚𝑝,𝑟𝑐𝑥 + 𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆,𝑟𝑐𝑥
− 𝜀𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒,𝑠𝑡𝑎 − 𝜀𝑚𝑝,𝑠𝑡𝑎 − 𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆,𝑠𝑡𝑎 
Eq. 5-69 
where 𝑑𝑟𝑐𝑥 and 𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑎 corresponds to the true geometric distance between each receiver and the satellite 
It is assumed that the station is in open sky conditions, thus 𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆,𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 is null.  
We have a good estimation of 𝑑𝑟𝑐𝑥 and 𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑎 as the location of the receiver is known with decimeter 
level accuracy (after lever arm correction) and the location of the reference station is known. Thus to 
have an estimation of the term 𝜀𝑚𝑝,𝑟𝑐𝑥 + 𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆,𝑟𝑐𝑥 + 𝜀𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒,𝑟𝑐𝑥 − 𝜀𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒,𝑠𝑡𝑎 − 𝜀𝑚𝑝,𝑠𝑡𝑎,  it is necessary 
to eliminate the clock offset 𝑐Δ𝑡𝑟𝑐𝑥/𝑠𝑡𝑎. The clock offset is the same for all pseudoranges differences. 
The first step consists in averaging all the differences from NLOS free satellites (50 °) in order to 
average the noise. By low pass filtering the array, it is possible to estimate the low pass components 
clock offset. The cut-off frequency selection must be high enough not to filter out the clock offset, but 
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low enough to filter out the noise and multipath terms. A first order butterworth filter with a cut off 
frequency of 0.1 Hz has been used to estimate 𝑐Δ𝑡𝑟𝑐𝑥/𝑠𝑡𝑎. After the corrections: 
 
𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑥 − 𝜌𝑠𝑡𝑎 − 𝑐Δ?̂?𝑟𝑐𝑥/𝑠𝑡𝑎 − ?̂?𝑟𝑐𝑥 + ?̂?𝑠𝑡𝑎
≅ 𝜀𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒,𝑟𝑐𝑥 + 𝜀𝑚𝑝,𝑟𝑐𝑥 + 𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆,𝑟𝑐𝑥 − 𝜀𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒,𝑠𝑡𝑎 − 𝜀𝑚𝑝,𝑠𝑡𝑎 
Eq. 5-70 
where 
 ?̂?𝑟𝑐𝑥 and ?̂?𝑠𝑡𝑎 are the estimated geometric ranges 
 𝑐Δ?̂?𝑟𝑐𝑥/𝑠𝑡𝑎 is the estimated clock offset 
The characterization of the pseudorange measurements can here be done according to 2 
methodologies: 
 The NLOS case is integrated in the nominal measurement model. For integrity purpose, it is 
then necessary to overbound the distribution of the LOS+NLOS case. This approach may not 
be rigorously adapted to the position computation algorithm (based on a Kalman filter) since it 
assumes that the measurement noises are white, which is not the case here. Anyways, for low 
elevations, the error is neither centered nor symmetric (and nor unimodal), thus, CDF 
overbounding cannot be applied to NLOS local errors. It is therefore not possible to 
overbound the CDF of the convolution of the pseudorange error sources with a centered 
normal distribution. However it is necessary to weight the measurements in the measurement 
noise covariance matrix (of the EKF here). A possible approach is to inflate empirically the 
nominal error model and to validate the behavior of the filter a posteriori. In this case the CDF 
overbound of the error distribution (that has been virtually centered) is used as the initial value 
prior to any inflation process. 
 In the second approach, the case of NLOS reception is not included in the nominal 
measurement model. In this case, a mixture density model is adopted. By modelling with a 
mixture, we do not consider the error as the sum of NLOS error plus other errors (which lead 
to convolutions), but we assume that when a NLOS is received, the error density has a 
different expression. The model has the following expression: 
 𝑓𝜀(𝑥) = 𝑃(𝐿𝑂𝑆)𝑓𝜀𝐿𝑂𝑆(𝑥) + 𝑃(𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆)𝑓𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆(𝑥) Eq. 5-71 
where 𝑃(𝐿𝑂𝑆) and 𝑃(𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆) are the probability of occurrence of LOS and NLOS receptions.  
It is then necessary to estimate both distributions. It can be assumed that the error in the LOS 
configurations is centered. We isolate the LOS component based on the knowledge that the 
NLOS error is characterized by a positive bias on the pseudorange. Therefore the negative 
errors are mainly due to LOS configurations (and short NLOS). It is possible to estimate the 
product 𝑃(𝐿𝑂𝑆)𝑓𝜀𝐿𝑂𝑆 with: 
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 𝑃(𝐿𝑂𝑆)𝑓𝜀𝐿𝑂𝑆(𝑥)
̂ = {
𝑝𝑑𝑓𝜀(𝑥) 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 = 0
𝐻[−𝑥]𝑝𝑑𝑓𝜀(𝑥) + 𝐻[𝑥]𝑝𝑑𝑓𝜀(−𝑥) 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒
 Eq. 5-72 
where 𝐻[ ] denote the Heaviside function. 
By subtracting the virtual LOS distribution, the remaining distribution is a good 
approximation of the error distribution contribution of the NLOS case. 
 𝑃(𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆)𝑓𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆(𝑥)
̂ = max[𝑓𝜀(𝑥) − 𝑃(𝐿𝑂𝑆)𝑓𝜀𝐿𝑂𝑆(𝑥)
̂ ,0] Eq. 5-73 
The norm of the whole mixture shall be one, and it is not the case due to the maximum 
operation (negative densities have been removed). A possible solution is to reduce the nominal 
region of the same negative area that have been removed by taking the maximum. Finally, the 
coefficients of the mixture are: 
 𝑃(𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆) = ∫ 𝑃(𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆)𝑓𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆(𝑥)
̂ 𝑑𝑥
+∞
−∞
 Eq. 5-74 
Then the reduced nominal model area expression is: 
 𝑃(𝐿𝑂𝑆) = 1 − 𝑃(𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆) < ∫ 𝑃(𝐿𝑂𝑆)𝑓𝜀𝐿𝑂𝑆(𝑥)
̂ 𝑑𝑥
+∞
−∞
 Eq. 5-75 
The NLOS density is given by: 
 𝑓𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆(𝑥) =
𝑃(𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆)𝑓𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆(𝑥)
̂
∫ 𝑃(𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆)𝑓𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆(𝑥)
̂ 𝑑𝑥
+∞
−∞
 Eq. 5-76 
The LOS density must fulfill: 
 𝑓𝜀𝐿𝑂𝑆(𝑥) =
𝑃(𝐿𝑂𝑆)𝑓𝜀𝐿𝑂𝑆(𝑥)
̂
∫ 𝑃(𝐿𝑂𝑆)𝑓𝜀𝐿𝑂𝑆(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
̂+∞
−∞
 Eq. 5-77 
It is then possible overbound 𝑓𝜀𝐿𝑂𝑆 and 𝑓𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆 separately. CDF overbounding can be used for 
𝑓𝜀𝐿𝑂𝑆, because it is, by construction, symmetric centered and unimodal. A distribution defined 
on ℝ+ can be used to overbound 𝑓𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆, i.e. a lognormal distribution. 
An alternative approach would consist in separating the distribution into two part based on a 
threshold. In this case, the left part of the mixture would essentially be LOS and short NLOS 
(reffered to as nominal). The right part would correspond to abnormal NLOS. 
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Figure 44 Principle of modelling 
5.3.2.2.4 Results 
The pseudorange error estimations have been concatenated by environment. The distribution functions 
are plotted in Figure 45, Figure 46 and Figure 47. These plots confirm that the statistic model is 
pessimistic, because the density of large pseudorange error due to NLOS is smaller. For low elevations 
(≤30°) in urban environment, the mixture density model makes sense as illustrated by Figure 47. The 
NLOS error component is lower for suburban and even negligible in the case of beltway except for 
elevations between 0 and 10°. For high elevations (> 40°), the errors due to NLOS are negligible in the 
three configurations. 
 
Figure 45 Pseudorange error due to local effects in beltway environment 
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Figure 46 Pseudorange error due to local effects in suburban environment 
 
Figure 47 Pseudorange error due to local effects in urban environment 
To define a nominal error model that includes NLOS error, it is necessary to overbound the 
pseudorange error distribution. In beltways, for elevations equal to or higher than 30°, in suburban 
areas, for elevations equal to or higher than 40° and in urban for elevations higher than 50° the 
distribution is symmetric, unimodal and its mean is less than 0.1 m. Thus for these elevation, the CDF 
overbounding method can be used. For low elevations, CDF overbounding is used as an initial value 
before any inflation. The results are summarized in Table 14. It is important to keep in mind that the 
model proposed is not rigorously valid for critical terrestrial applications as the number of samples is 
not sufficient with respect to the integrity risks. To be rigorously valid, the error model must also be 
representative of different cities which is not the case here. Moreover the noise and multipath error is 
included in the local effect contribution, which varies in function of the receiver, the modulations and 
the antenna. 
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Elevation 
(°) 
Beltway Suburban Urban 
𝜎𝑜 𝑛𝑠 𝜎𝑜 𝑛𝑠 𝜎𝑜 𝑛𝑠 
0-10 8.4 592 17 6038 30.3 537 
10-20 4.9 675 16.5 11828 19.3 3255 
20-30 4.2 727 16.2 6773 17 4459 
30-40 2.2 1744 13.6 6557 15.6 2395 
40-50 1.4 397 5.6 4705 7 2110 
50-60 - 0 3.4 1456 3,1 967 
60-70 1.2 418 1.6 3825 2.7 1448 
70-80 1 1045 1.5 8979 2.6 3795 
80-90 - 0 - 0 - 0 
Table 14 Proposed weighting scheme for pseudorange errors due to local effects (including NLOS) 
The second approach consists in excluding the NLOS error from the nominal model. The nominal 
mode and the NLOS lobe are processed independently. The nominal lobe is CDF overbounded, and 
the NLOS mode is fitted with a lognormal distribution. The lognormal is a good candidate because its 
support is positive and has an appropriate shape. The results are given in Table 15. By construction, 
the nominal error models have been reduced. The results also show important probabilities of NLOS 
reception for low elevations, especially in urban environment. However, in most cases, the high 
probability is due to the asymmetry of the main lobe (except for very low elevations in urban 
canyons). For high elevation when the probability associated to NLOS is small (for 40-50° in beltways 
for example), the magnitude of the NLOS errors are short. 
Elevation 
(°) 
Beltway Suburban Urban 
𝜎𝐿𝑂𝑆 𝜎𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆 𝜇𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆 𝑃(𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆) 𝜎𝐿𝑂𝑆 𝜎𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆 𝜇𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆 𝑃(𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆) 𝜎𝐿𝑂𝑆 𝜎𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆 𝜇𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆 𝑃(𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆) 
0-10 5.8 0.7 2.5 0.10 4.3 1.1 1.9 0.35 4.7 0.6 3 0.70 
10-20 3.3 0.6 1 0.3 4.5 1.3 1.1 0.4 5.0 0.9 2.3 0.52 
20-30 1.9 0.7 0.2 0.33 3.9 1.1 1.6 0.3 4.7 1 1.9 0.45 
30-40 1.6 0.6 1.7 0.02 5.3 0.7 2.3 0.1 5.7 1 1.8 0.45 
40-50 1.0 0.7 0 0.04 2.1 0.3 0.7 0.05 1.6 1.1 0.3 0.28 
50-60 - - - - 1.0 0.6 0 0.1 2.1 1 0 0.11 
60-70 1 0.5 0 0.02 1.4 0.6 0 0.1 1.5 1 0 0.09 
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70-80 0.9 0 0 0 1.0 0 0 0 2.5 0 0 0 
80-90 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Table 15 Proposed mixture model for LOS and NLOS 
In this case the probability of failure associated to the NLOS fault mode is the product of the 
probability of tracking a NLOS multiplied by the probability of failure provided that a NLOS is 
tracked. 
5.3.3 Discussions 
In urban environment, it has been proven that the pseudorange errors due to local effects (in particular 
NLOS) can reach more than 100 meters for elevations up to 40°. An approach to deal with NLOS 
errors for critical applications could consists in including these errors in the failure modes in the 
design of the integrity monitoring algorithm. In this case, the integrity monitoring algorithm has to 
protect against abnormally large NLOS. According to the statistic model and the results on real data, 
the probability of occurrence of large NLOS error is too high to rely on the integrity monitoring 
algorithm to protect from NLOS. Indeed, the integrity monitoring algorithm would have to deal with 
simultaneous failure which would make its design complex and leads to reduced availability. In dual 
constellation (ETC) the probability of occurrence of simultaneous NLOS would be even higher, and 
may require to design an integrity monitoring algorithms able to detect 3 or more faulty measurements 
simultaneously. This approach does not appear realistic, thus, two more realistic approaches are 
proposed and will be detailed in section 0.  
First approach: inclusion of local effects in the nominal model: 
The pseudorange error distribution models that have been estimated can be used, after using an 
appropriate overbounding technique, either to add an extra term to the nominal error model in urban 
environment or to inflate the covariance matrix by an empirical factor. However including NLOS error 
in the nominal model may increase too much the covariance matrix of the GNSS measurements, and 
thus would lead to large magnitudes for confidence radiuses (reducing the availability). This approach 
is feasible provided that the NLOS error is characterized with enough certainty.  
Second approach: detection and exclusion of abnormal local effects prior to the integrity monitoring 
algorithm 
The second approach consists in protecting the receiver against the NLOS prior to the integrity 
monitoring algorithm. The NLOS detection is feasible by using 3D city models [Obst et al., 2012], use 
of a fisheye camera [Meguro et al., 2009] located on the roof of the vehicle, by using antenna array to 
estimate angle of arrival [Keshvadi et al., 2011] or by applying elevation and 𝐶/𝑁0 masks. It has been 
shown in Figure 46 and Figure 47 that large NLOS biases has occurred for elevation up to 40° in 
urban and suburban environments. The feasibility of applying such masks elevation mask will be 
discussed in chapter 7.   
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We then investigate the correlation between the pseudorange error and the 𝐶/𝑁0. All the pseudorange 
errors have been concatenated and have been plotted as a function of the 𝐶/𝑁0 in Figure 48. It can be 
inferred from Figure 48 that, unlike what has shown the simulations, applying a 𝐶/𝑁0 mask at 30 dB-
Hz is not sufficient to protect against dangerous NLOS events. However, applying a higher mask (≥40 
dB-Hz) could be sufficient. 
 
Figure 48 Pseudorange error as a function of the 𝐶/𝑁0 for 2h40 of data in Toulouse 
Intuitively, one would be tempted to monitor the time evolution of 𝐶/𝑁0 to detect this sort of outliers. 
Intuitively, the 𝐶/𝑁0 should drop suddenly due to signal attenuation when a NLOS is tracked. The 
evolution of this metric as estimated by the mass market receiver used in the data collection (U-blox 6) 
is illustrated in for GPS L1 C/A on 100 seconds of the measurement campaign which corresponds to a 
period of time in dense urban . The satellite has an elevation of 40° during the period plotted. The 
fluctuations of the metric are chaotic and 5 to 10 dB-Hz drops occurs frequently between 60 and 100 
second due to local effects. The 𝐶/𝑁0 variations over time (in Figure 49) can be compared with the 
norm of the residuals of the EKF that are coarse estimation of the pseudorange error by the EKF (in 
Figure 50).  
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Figure 49 𝐶/𝑁0 estimation in Toulouse downtown for GPS L1 C/A for Satellite 15, elevation of 40° 
 
Figure 50 EKF residuals in Toulouse downtown for GPS L1 C/A for Satellite 15, elevation of 40° 
Thus the detection of NLOS with 𝐶/𝑁0 variation monitoring does not seem feasible.  
To be used for critical applications, a NLOS exclusion technique shall be associated to a probability of 
miss exclusion (𝑃𝑀𝐷,𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟). For techniques such as fisheye camera based detection, the missed 
detection of NLOS can be caused by wrong attitude estimation, artefacts in the images and failure in 
image processing (due to clouds for instance). It is not feasible to associate a reliable 𝑃𝑀𝐷,𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
to such detection method.  
Anyway excluding all NLOS may degrade the accuracy in urban environment because some NLOS 
are affected by negligible biases, and excluding them may degrade the quality of the geometry. 
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5.4 Conclusions 
The nominal error models of all the sensors that will be used by the proposed solutions have been 
firstly presented. The faults have been defined as errors that are not represented by the nominal error 
distributions. For GNSS, the satellite fault is the only event which is well characterized in term of 
magnitude and probability of occurrence. However, in suburban and urban environment, the local 
effects can also result in large measurement errors. These errors have been modelled statistically and 
observed on real measurement. Two approaches are then proposed to deal with local effects. The first 
approach consists in inflating the nominal error model so that it covers those large errors which are 
frequent. The second approach consists in selecting the measurements based on different indicators 
such as 𝐶/𝑁0 or elevation, in order to exclude these errors. Therefore, the local errors will not be 
included in the GNSS failure modes (which is more suitable these errors are frequent).  
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6 DESIGN OF THE FUSION 
ALGORITHM 
This chapter describes the architecture of the hybridized solutions for the train control and ETC. For 
train control, a dual system approach has been proposed in chapter 4 for which both subsystems have 
the same integration algorithms. For ETC, a unique system using two constellations has been 
proposed.  
The use of additional sensors to augment the GNSS is proposed to enhance the performances of the 
positioning system terms of accuracy, integrity, availability (in case of GNSS outage or urban 
canyons), and continuity. Subsection 6.1 describes the principle of the EKF based fusion algorithm. 
The two architectures proposed are first validated by means of realistic simulations in subsection 6.2. 
Indeed it is possible to model the sensors by generating ideal outputs to which we add the error models 
that have been described in section 5.1. This approach also enables to coarsely assess the performance 
of our system in the open sky configuration.  
The behaviors of the proposed solutions are tested on the real data campaign conducted in Toulouse 
and described in section 5.3.2.2. The accuracy improvement obtained by enhancing the solution with 
additional measurement from motion constraints and the additional sensors is looked at. 
6.1 Design of the hybridization filter 
The section firstly describes the basic principle of standard and extended Kalman Filters, and then 
derived the theoretical expression of the elements that are involved in the fusion algorithm.  
6.1.1 Kalman Filter 
The Kalman Filter [Kalman, 1960] is a recursive algorithm which estimates the states of a dynamic 
system based on noisy observations. The Kalman Filter uses a priori knowledge of the statistical and 
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deterministic properties of the system to obtain optimal estimations. It is a Bayesian estimation 
technique that aims at minimizing a risk function: the mean square error (MSE). The model of the KF 
is described by two equations that are defined as the process model and the measurement model. The 
process model describes the temporal variations of the states over time and the observation model 
describes the relation between the measurements and the states. Unlike the Least-Square algorithm 
which estimation is only based on the measurements of the current epochs, Kalman filter estimation 
involves the state prediction, which is calculated from previous epochs. Thus Kalman filter introduces 
an additional correlation in time of the error in the states’ estimations.  
As an introduction, let us assume that the process and measurements models are linear. In a 
continuous-time Kalman filter, the time variations of the states are assumed to verify the following 
model: 
 ?̇?(𝑡) = 𝐹(𝑡)𝑥(𝑡) + 𝑤(𝑡) Eq. 6-1 
where 
 𝑥(𝑡) is the state vector  
 𝐹(𝑡) is the system dynamic matrix  
 𝑤(𝑡) is the process driving noise, its covariance matrix is denoted 𝑄(𝑡) 
It is assumed that the measurements can be related to the states with the following expression: 
 𝑧(𝑡) = 𝐻(𝑡)𝑥(𝑡) + 𝜂(𝑡) Eq. 6-2 
where: 
 𝑧(𝑡) is the measurement (or observation) vector 
 𝐻(𝑡) is the observation matrix 
 𝜂(𝑡) is the measurement noise, its covariance matrix is denoted 𝑅(𝑡) 
The discretized form of the Kalman Filter can be obtained by applying Taylor expansions to the two 
models. Let’s denote 𝑇𝑠 the sampling period of the filter, the process model becomes: 
 𝑥𝑘+1 = 𝐹𝑘𝑥𝑘 +𝑤𝑘 Eq. 6-3 
where: 
 𝑥𝑘 = 𝑥(𝑘𝑇𝑠) 
 𝐹𝑘 = 𝑒
𝐹(𝑡)𝑇𝑠 ≅ 𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑡)𝑇𝑠 at the first order 
 𝑤𝑘+1  is the process noise which covariance matrix is denoted 𝑄𝑘 , at the first order  
𝑄𝑘 = 𝑄(𝑡)𝑇𝑠 
The discrete Kalman Filter measurement model corresponds to: 
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 𝑧𝑘 = 𝐻𝑘𝑥𝑘 + 𝜂𝑘 Eq. 6-4 
where: 
 𝑧𝑘 = 𝑧(𝑘𝑇𝑠) 
 𝐻𝑘 = 𝐻(𝑘𝑇𝑠)  
 𝜂𝑘 is the measurement noise which covariance matrix is 𝑅𝑘 = 𝑅(𝑘𝑇𝑠) 
The Kalman filter algorithm is generally separated into two steps that are computed recursively.  
The first step which is called prediction consists in predicting the state (𝑥𝑘+1|𝑘) and the state error 
covariance (𝑃𝑘+1|𝑘) based on the previous state (𝑥𝑘|𝑘) and error covariance (𝑃𝑘|𝑘) with the following 
equations: 
 𝑥𝑘+1|𝑘 = 𝐹𝑘?̂?𝑘|𝑘 Eq. 6-5 
 𝑃𝑘+1|𝑘 = 𝐹𝑘𝑃𝑘|𝑘𝐹𝑘
𝑇 + 𝑄𝑘 Eq. 6-6 
The Kalman Gain is then computed with: 
 𝐾𝑘+1|𝑘+1 = 𝑃𝑘+1|𝑘𝐻𝑘+1
𝑇 (𝐻𝑘+1𝑃𝑘+1|𝑘𝐻𝑘+1
𝑇 + 𝑅𝑘+1)
−1
 Eq. 6-7 
The second step is called update, it consists in updating the state (𝑥𝑘+1|𝑘+1) and the error estimation 
covariance matrix (𝑃𝑘+1|𝑘+1) a posteriori with 
 𝑥𝑘+1|𝑘+1 = 𝑥𝑘+1|𝑘 + 𝐾𝑘+1(𝑧𝑘+1 −𝐻𝑘+1?̂?𝑘+1|𝑘) Eq. 6-8 
 𝑃𝑘+1|𝑘+1 = 𝑃𝑘+1|𝑘 −𝐾𝑘+1𝐻𝑘+1𝑃𝑘+1|𝑘 Eq. 6-9 
6.1.2 Extension to the non-linear case: Extended Kalman Filter 
The EKF is an extension of the Kalman Filter adapted to the case of non-linear system model. The 
discrete EKF state model is described by the following equations: 
 𝑥𝑘+1 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑘) + 𝑤𝑘 Eq. 6-10 
and  
 𝑧𝑘 = ℎ(𝑥𝑘) + 𝑣𝑘 Eq. 6-11 
As in the linear Kalman Filter, the EKF consists in calculating the prediction with: 
 𝑥𝑘+1|𝑘 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑘|𝑘) Eq. 6-12 
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 𝑃𝑘+1|𝑘 = 𝐹𝑘𝑃𝑘|𝑘𝐹𝑘
𝑇 + 𝑄𝑘 Eq. 6-13 
where: 
 𝐹𝑘 =
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑥
|
𝑥𝑘|𝑘
 is the Jacobian of the state transition function (𝑓). 
The Kalman Gain is calculated with: 
 𝐾𝑘+1|𝑘+1 = 𝑃𝑘+1|𝑘𝐻𝑘+1
𝑇 (𝐻𝑘+1𝑃𝑘+1|𝑘𝐻𝑘+1
𝑇 + 𝑅𝑘+1)
−1
 Eq. 6-14 
where: 
 𝐻𝑘+1 =
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑥
|
?̂?𝑘+1|𝑘
 is the Jacobian matrix of the observation function (ℎ). 
Finally, the update of the states and their associated covariance matrix is calculated with: 
 𝑥𝑘+1|𝑘+1 = 𝑥𝑘+1|𝑘 + 𝐾𝑘+1[𝑧𝑘+1 − ℎ(𝑥𝑘+1|𝑘)] Eq. 6-15 
 𝑃𝑘+1|𝑘+1 = 𝑃𝑘+1|𝑘 −𝐾𝑘+1𝐻𝑘+1𝑃𝑘+1|𝑘 Eq. 6-16 
For fusion between GNSS and inertial measurements, the state vector usually includes the inertial 
position errors. In tight coupling the observations consists in the differences between the predicted 
pseudoranges and the observed pseudoranges. The relation between position error and pseudorange 
errors are non-linear. Moreover, the predicted position is estimated from IMU with the mechanization 
step which is a non-linear operation. Therefore it is necessary to use either a linearized Kalman filter 
or an EKF. A closed-loop architecture has been used in this work because of the quality of the inertial 
sensors. Thus, the fusion between GNSS and other sensors is done by means of an extended Kalman 
filter because the only position that are available to linearized the models arounds are 𝑥𝑘|𝑘  and 
𝑥𝑘+1|𝑘+1. 
6.1.3 Design of the basic fusion algorithm  
It has been proposed to fuse GNSS and INS for the train control and ETC cases of study. The IMU 
measurements are processed with a 3D quaternion-based mechanization for both applications. It is 
proven in [Syed et al., 2007] that even if not cost effective, full-sensor configuration with 3D 
mechanization performs the best in terms of drift (compared to IMU with less than 6 sensors). This 
section describes the basic EKF that is common to both applications. Then, the ways to improve the 
performances of the EKF by simple means such as the inclusion of pseudorange rate measurements or 
the use of motion constraints are investigated. Finally, the filter is augmented to integrate data from 
additional sensors for the two applications in 6.1.5 and 6.1.6.  
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6.1.3.1 State vector 
When fusing GNSS and INS, the state vector integrates the position, velocity, attitude and inertial 
sensors bias errors. For medium to low grade sensors such as those that are used in this thesis, the 
scale factor errors on the inertial measurement must be estimated as it may not be negligible. Even if 
not investigated in this thesis, it is also possible to include sensor misalignment in the state vector. 
Finally, in tight coupling, the GNSS clock bias and clock drift errors shall be estimated to predict 
pseudoranges. Thus, they must be included in the state vector. In this thesis, an error state EKF is 
used, thus the state vector (and measurements) are preceded by the term 𝛿.   
In summary, the state vector (𝛿𝑥) is defined here as : 
 𝛿𝑥 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝛿𝑃
𝛿𝑉
𝛿𝜙
𝛿𝑏𝑎
𝛿𝑏𝑔
𝛿𝑆𝑎
𝛿𝑆𝑔
𝛿(𝑐∆𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡)
𝛿(𝑐∆𝑡𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑡) ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Eq. 6-17 
where: 
 𝛿𝑃 = [
𝛿𝑃𝐸
𝛿𝑃𝑁
𝛿𝑃𝑈
] is the position error vector in the East, North, Up (ENU) navigation frame 
 𝛿𝑉 = [
𝛿𝑉𝐸
𝛿𝑉𝑁
𝛿𝑉𝑈
] is the velocity error in the ENU navigation frame 
 𝛿𝜙 = [
𝛿𝜃
𝛿𝛾
𝛿𝜓
] are the errors in the estimation of the attitude angles (pitch, roll, yaw) 
 𝛿𝑏𝑎 = [
𝛿𝑏𝑎𝑥
𝛿𝑏𝑎𝑦
𝛿𝑏𝑎𝑧
] are the errors on the accelerometer biases 
 𝛿𝑏𝑔 = [
𝛿𝑏𝑔𝑥
𝛿𝑏𝑔𝑦
𝛿𝑏𝑔𝑧
] are the errors on the gyroscope biases 
 𝛿𝑆𝑎 = [
𝛿𝑆𝑎𝑥
𝛿𝑆𝑎𝑦
𝛿𝑆𝑎𝑧
] are the errors on the accelerometers scale factors 
 𝛿𝑆𝑔 = [
𝛿𝑆𝑔𝑥
𝛿𝑆𝑔𝑦
𝛿𝑆𝑔𝑧
] are the errors on the gyroscopes scale factors 
 𝛿(𝑐∆𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡) is the GNSS receiver clock offset.  
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 𝛿(𝑐∆𝑡𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑡) is the GNSS receiver clock drift 
This basic state vector is used for single constellation GNSS and INS fusion. The extension to dual-
constellations receiver is detailed in 6.1.6. 
6.1.3.2 Process model 
The next step consists in defining the model that describes the dynamic of the system. The 𝐹 matrix is 
obtained by applying the perturbation method [Shin, 2001] to each state. The methodology used is 
derived from [Angrisano, 2010] and [Shin, 2001].  
 𝐹 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐹𝑃𝑃 𝐹𝑃𝑉 𝐹𝑃𝜙 03×3 03×3 03×3 03×3 03×1 03×1
𝐹𝑉𝑃 𝐹𝑉𝑉 𝐹𝑉𝜙 ?̂?𝑏
𝑛 03×3 ?̂?𝑏
𝑛𝑓𝑏 03×3 03×1 03×1
𝐹𝜙𝑃 𝐹𝜙𝑉 𝐹𝜙𝜙 03×3 −?̂?𝑏
𝑛 03×3 −?̂?𝑏
𝑛𝜔𝑏 03×1 03×1
03×3 03×3 03×3 𝛽𝑏𝑎 03×3 03×3 03×3 03×1 03×1
03×3 03×3 03×3 03×3 𝛽𝑏𝑔 03×3 03×3 03×1 03×1
03×3 03×3 03×3 03×3 03×3 𝛽𝑠𝑎 03×3 03×1 03×1
03×3 03×3 03×3 03×3 03×3 03×3 𝛽𝑠𝑔 03×1 03×1
01×3 01×3 01×3 01×3 01×3 01×3 01×3 0 1
01×3 01×3 01×3 01×3 01×3 01×3 01×3 0 0 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Eq. 6-18 
where: 
 𝐹𝑃𝑃 = [
𝑉𝑈
𝑁+ℎ
−
𝑉𝑁 sin(𝜑)
𝑀+ℎ
𝑉𝐸 tan(𝜑)
𝑀+ℎ
−𝑉𝐸
𝑁+ℎ
0
𝑉𝑈
𝑀+ℎ
−𝑉𝑁
𝑀+ℎ
0 0 0
] 
 𝐹𝑃𝑉 = 𝐼3×3 
 𝐹𝑃𝜙 = 03×3 
 𝐹𝑉𝑃 =
[
 
 
 
 
 0
2𝜔𝑖𝑒
𝑛 𝑉𝑈 sin(𝜑)
𝑀+ℎ
+
𝑉𝐸𝑉𝑁
(𝑀+ℎ)(𝑁+ℎ)cos2(𝜑)
𝑉𝐸𝑉𝑈−𝑉𝐸𝑉𝑁 tan(𝜑)
(𝑁+ℎ)2
0
−2𝜔𝑖𝑒
𝑛 𝑉𝐸 cos(𝜑)
𝑀+ℎ
−
𝑉𝐸
2
(𝑀+ℎ)(𝑁+ℎ)cos2(𝜑)
𝑉𝑁𝑉𝑈
(𝑀+ℎ)2
+
𝑉𝐸
2 tan(𝜑)
(𝑁+ℎ)2
0
−2𝜔𝑖𝑒
𝑛 𝑉𝐸 sin(𝜑)
𝑀+ℎ
−𝑉𝐸
2
(𝑁+ℎ)2
−
𝑉𝑁
2
(𝑀+ℎ)2
+
2𝑔
𝑅+ℎ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝐹𝑉𝑉 =
[
 
 
 
 
𝑉𝑁 tan(𝜑)
𝑁+ℎ
−
𝑉𝑈
𝑁+ℎ
2𝜔𝑖𝑒
𝑛 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝜑) +
𝑉𝐸 𝑡𝑎𝑛(𝜑)
𝑁+ℎ
−2𝜔𝑖𝑒
𝑛 cos(𝜑) −
𝑉𝐸
𝑁+ℎ
−2𝜔𝑖𝑒
𝑛 sin(𝜑) −
2𝑉𝐸 tan(𝜑)
𝑁+ℎ
−
𝑉𝑈
𝑀+ℎ
−
𝑉𝑁
𝑀+ℎ
2𝜔𝑖𝑒
𝑛 cos(𝜑) +
2𝑉𝐸
𝑁+ℎ
𝑉𝑁
𝑀+ℎ
0 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 𝐹𝑉𝜙 = (𝑓
𝑏 ×) = [
0 𝑓𝑈 −𝑓𝑁
−𝑓𝑈 0 𝑓𝐸
𝑓𝑁 −𝑓𝐸 0
] 
 𝐹𝜙𝑃 =
[
 
 
 
 0 0
𝑉𝑁
(𝑀+ℎ)2
0 −
𝜔𝑖𝑒
𝑛 sin(𝜑)
𝑀+ℎ
−
𝑉𝐸
(𝑁+ℎ)2
0
𝜔𝑖𝑒
𝑛 cos(𝜑)
𝑀+ℎ
+
𝑉𝐸
(𝑀+ℎ)(𝑁+ℎ)cos2(𝜑)
−
𝑉𝐸 tan(𝜑)
(𝑁+ℎ)2 ]
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 𝐹𝜙𝑉 =
[
 
 
 
 0 −
1
𝑀+ℎ
0
1
𝑁+ℎ
0 0
tan(𝜑)
𝑁+ℎ
0 0]
 
 
 
 
 
 𝐹𝜙𝜙 =
[
 
 
 
 0 𝜔𝑖𝑒
𝑛 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝜑) +
𝑉𝐸tan(𝜑)
𝑁+ℎ
−𝜔𝑖𝑒
𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝜑) −
𝑉𝐸
𝑁+ℎ
−𝜔𝑖𝑒
𝑛 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝜑) −
𝑉𝐸𝑡𝑎𝑛(𝜑)
𝑁+ℎ
0 −
𝑉𝑁
𝑀+ℎ
𝜔𝑖𝑒
𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝜑) −
𝑉𝐸
𝑁+ℎ
𝑉𝑁
𝑀+ℎ
0 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 𝛽𝑏𝑎 = diag
[
 
 
 
 
 −
1
𝜏𝑏𝑎𝑥
−
1
𝜏𝑏𝑎𝑦
−
1
𝜏𝑏𝑎𝑧]
 
 
 
 
 
, 𝛽𝑏𝑔 = diag
[
 
 
 
 
 −
1
𝜏𝑏𝑔𝑥
−
1
𝜏𝑏𝑔𝑦
−
1
𝜏𝑏𝑔𝑧]
 
 
 
 
 
, 𝛽𝑆𝑎 = diag
[
 
 
 
 
 −
1
𝜏𝑆𝑎𝑥
−
1
𝜏𝑆𝑎𝑦
−
1
𝜏𝑆𝑎𝑧]
 
 
 
 
 
, 𝛽𝑆𝑔 = diag
[
 
 
 
 
 −
1
𝜏𝑆𝑔𝑥
−
1
𝜏𝑆𝑔𝑦
−
1
𝜏𝑆𝑔𝑧]
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐹 must be discretized to obtain 𝐹𝑘. Then, the process noise covariance matrix (𝑄) is given by: 
 𝑄 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑞𝑃 03×3 03×3 03×3 03×3 03×3 03×3 03×1 03×1
03×3 𝑞𝑉 03×3 03×3 03×3 03×30 03×3 03×1 03×1
03×3 03×3 𝑞𝜙 03×3 03×3 03×3 03×3 03×1 03×1
03×3 03×3 03×3 𝑞𝑏𝑎 03×3 03×3 03×3 03×1 03×1
03×3 03×3 03×3 03×3 𝑞𝑏𝑔 03×3 03×3 03×1 03×1
03×3 03×3 03×3 03×3 03×3 𝑞𝑠𝑎 03×3 03×1 03×1
03×3 03×3 03×3 03×3 03×3 03×3 𝑞𝑠𝑔 03×1 03×1
01×3 01×3 01×3 01×3 01×3 01×3 01×3 𝑞𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡 0
01×3 01×3 01×3 01×3 01×3 01×3 01×3 0 𝑞𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑡]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Eq. 6-19 
The process noise for the position error states is caused by implementation and rounded errors 
[Vezinet, 2014]. The diagonal term of its covariance matrix 𝑞𝑃  are set to 10
-11 
in this work. The 
process noise on the velocity and attitude error states is respectively due to the accelerometer and 
gyroscope noises which values are given in chapter 5:  
 𝑞𝑉 = ?̂?𝑏
𝑛diag [
𝜎𝑎𝑥
2
𝜎𝑎𝑦
2
𝜎𝑎𝑧
2
] (?̂?𝑏
𝑛)
𝑇
, 𝑞𝜙 = ?̂?𝑏
𝑛diag [
𝜎𝑔𝑥
2
𝜎𝑔𝑦
2
𝜎𝑔𝑧
2
] (?̂?𝑏
𝑛)
𝑇
 Eq. 6-20 
The process noises of the inertial sensor biases and scale factors error corresponds to the driven noise 
of the first order Gauss Markov processes that model the bias stability of the sensors (given in chapter 
5).  
 𝑞𝑏𝑎 = diag
[
 
 
 
𝜎𝑏𝑎𝑥
2
𝜎𝑏𝑎𝑦
2
𝜎𝑏𝑎𝑧
2
]
 
 
 
, 𝑞𝑏𝑔 = diag
[
 
 
 
𝜎𝑏𝑔𝑥
2
𝜎𝑏𝑔𝑦
2
𝜎𝑏𝑔𝑧
2
]
 
 
 
, 𝑞𝑠𝑎 = diag
[
 
 
 
𝜎𝑆𝑎𝑥
2
𝜎𝑆𝑎𝑦
2
𝜎𝑆𝑎𝑧
2
]
 
 
 
, 𝑞𝑠𝑔 = diag
[
 
 
 
𝜎𝑆𝑏𝑥
2
𝜎𝑆𝑏𝑦
2
𝜎𝑆𝑏𝑧
2
]
 
 
 
 Eq. 6-21 
The 𝑄 matrix must be discretized with: 
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 𝑄𝑘 = 𝑄𝑇𝑠 Eq. 6-22 
6.1.3.3 Measurement model 
To simplify notations, the index 𝑘  is removed in the measurement model. In tight coupling, the 
measurements are the pseudorange errors which are observed by subtracting the INS-based 
pseudoranges (𝜌𝐼𝑁𝑆,𝑖) to the measured pseudoranges (𝜌𝐺𝑁𝑆𝑆,𝑖): 
 𝛿𝑧 = [
𝜌𝐺𝑁𝑆𝑆,1 − 𝜌𝐼𝑁𝑆,1
⋮
𝜌𝐺𝑁𝑆𝑆,𝑛 − 𝜌𝐼𝑁𝑆,𝑛
] Eq. 6-23 
Let us denote 𝐸 , 𝑁  and 𝑈  the coordinates of the mechanization output and, 𝐸𝑠,𝑖 , 𝑁𝑠,𝑖  and 𝑈𝑠,𝑖  the 
coordinates of the 𝑖th satellite in the navigation frame. The INS based pseudoranges are calculated 
based on the predicted position of the vehicle and clock bias.  
 𝜌𝐼𝑁𝑆,𝑖 = 𝑑0,𝑖 + 𝑐∆𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡 Eq. 6-24 
with: 
 𝑑0,𝑖 = √(𝐸𝑠,𝑖 − 𝐸)
2
+ (𝑁𝑠,𝑖 −𝑁)
2
+ (𝑈𝑠,𝑖 − 𝑈)
2
 
On real implementation, the lever arm between the IMU and the GNSS receiver antenna has to be 
taken into account. Let us assume that the lever arm has been measured in the body frame during the 
installation of the system. It can be converted into the navigation frame by using the DCM. Finally it is 
possible to add the lever arm vector to the position estimated at the mechanization output in the INS-
based predicted pseudorange. Therefore, the INS-based pseudorange is estimated at the antenna 
position.  
The observation matrix of the filter is:  
 𝐻 = [
𝐻𝐸,1 𝐻𝑁,1 𝐻𝑈,1 0 … 1 0
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
𝐻𝐸,𝑁 𝐻𝑁,𝑁 𝐻𝑈,𝑁 0 … 1 0
] Eq. 6-25 
where: 
 𝐻𝐸,𝑖 =
𝐸−𝐸𝑠
𝑑0,𝑖
 
 𝐻𝑁,𝑖 =
𝑁−𝑁𝑠
𝑑0,𝑖
 
 𝐻𝑈,𝑖 =
𝑈−𝑈𝑠
𝑑0,𝑖
 
The expression of the observation matrix is obtained by differentiating the pseudorange measurement 
around the mechanization output.  
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In tight coupling, the measurement errors are due to the GNSS pseudorange errors which have been 
fully characterized in chapter 5. In Kalman filtering it is assumed that the measurement noise are 
centered and uncorrelated in time. It is proven in given in chapter 5, that the measurement errors are 
correlated in time (local effects or ionosphere for example). For local effects it has been proposed in 
given in chapter 5 to exclude dangerous local effects or to inflate the covariance matrix. However, the 
atmospheric errors (troposphere only for dual-frequency receivers) and ephemeris errors may remain. 
Two approaches are proposed in [Gleason and Gebre-Egziabher, 2009] to deal with this issue.  
 The first approach consists in augmenting the state vector with extra states that account for the 
correlated errors. However, in urban environment this method may not be feasible because the 
satellites are frequently unavailable due to masking. Moreover it may lead to observability 
issues when the number of satellite in view is low. However, state augmentation enables to 
produce valid integrity bounds if the time correlated errors are well estimated. 
 The second approach when using low cost sensors consists in inflating the noise covariance 
matrix according to [Gleason and Gebre-Egziabher, 2009]. This approach which is similar to 
the proposed technique to deal with local effect from an integrity point of view is preferred 
here. It is assumed that the inflation of the variance due to the overbounding of the 
measurement errors’ CDF is sufficient (except for local effects). 
Finally, the measurement noise covariance matrix 𝑅𝑘 is given by: 
 𝑅 = [
𝜎𝜌,1
2 0 0
0 ⋱ 0
0 0 𝜎𝜌,𝑁
2
] Eq. 6-26 
where: 
 𝜎𝜌,𝑖
2  is the variance of the pseudorange error measured with respect to the 𝑖 th satellite. The 
models used in this thesis are detailed in chapter 5. 
6.1.4 Improving the solution 
The accuracy of the solution can be improved by simple means that consist in adding measurements to 
the Kalman filter. Firstly, it is possible to use GNSS Doppler measurements that are available in most 
receivers. This is explained in section 6.1.4.1. It is also possible to take advantage of the a priori 
knowledge of the vehicle dynamics by using motion constraints referred to as Non-Holonomic 
Constraints in the cases of study. The Non-Holonomic Constraints are discussed in section 6.1.4.2. 
Finally it is possible to reduce the position error drift when the vehicle is motionless by implementing 
Zero Velocity Update as detailed in section 6.1.4.3.  
6.1.4.1 Inclusion of Doppler measurements 
Mass market receivers estimate Doppler frequency (FLL outputs). The Doppler frequency (∆𝑓𝑖) is 
proportional to the satellite to receiver radial velocity ?̇?𝐺𝑁𝑆𝑆,1 (called pseudorange rate): 
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 ?̇?𝐺𝑁𝑆𝑆,𝑖 = −𝜆𝑖∆𝑓𝑖 Eq. 6-27 
where 𝜆𝑖 is the wavelength of the carrier frequency of the 𝑖
th
 satellite. 
Doppler measurements are quite robust and available, even in difficult environements. It is then 
possible to augment the measurement model of the Kalman filter to include pseudorange rates in order 
to improve the velocity estimation. The measurement model is thus augmented with 𝛿𝑧𝑃𝑅𝑅  which 
expression is: 
 𝛿𝑧𝑃𝑅𝑅 = [
?̇?𝐺𝑁𝑆𝑆,1 − ?̇?𝐼𝑁𝑆,1
⋮
?̇?𝐺𝑁𝑆𝑆,𝑁 − ?̇?𝐼𝑁𝑆,𝑁
] Eq. 6-28 
where ?̇?𝐼𝑁𝑆,1 is calculated with :  
 ?̇?𝐺𝑁𝑆𝑆,𝑖 = ?̇?0,𝑖 + 𝑐∆𝑡𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑡 Eq. 6-29 
with : 
?̇?0,𝑖 = (𝐸 − 𝐸𝑠,𝑖)(𝑉𝐸 − 𝑉𝐸𝑠,𝑖) + (𝑁 − 𝑁𝑠,𝑖)(𝑉𝑁 − 𝑉𝑁𝑠,𝑖) + (𝑈 − 𝑈𝑠,𝑖) (𝑉𝑈 − 𝑉𝑈𝑠,𝑖) 
Eq. 6-30 
where :  
 𝑉𝐸𝑠,𝑖 , 𝑉𝑁𝑠,𝑖  and 𝑉𝑈𝑠,𝑖  are the satellite velocities. These velocities are obtained thanks to the 
ephemeris. 
 𝑉𝐸, 𝑉𝑁 and 𝑉𝑈 are the velocities estimated by the mechanization in the navigation frame.  
The observation matrix must be augmented to relate these measurements to the Kalman filter sate 
vector: 
 
𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑅
= [
𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑅,𝐸,1 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑅,𝑁,1 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑅,𝑈,1 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑅,𝑉𝐸,1 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑅,𝑉𝑁,1 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑅,𝑉𝑈,1 0 … 1
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑅,𝐸,𝑁 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑅,𝑁,𝑁 𝐻′𝑃𝑅𝑅,𝑈,𝑁 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑅,𝑉𝐸,𝑁 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑅,𝑉𝑁,𝑁 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑅,𝑉𝑈,𝑁 0 … 1
] 
Eq. 6-31 
with: 
 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑅,𝐸,𝑖 =
𝑉𝐸−𝑉𝐸𝑠,𝑖
𝑑0,𝑖
−
(𝐸−𝐸𝑠,𝑖)?̇?0,𝑖
𝑑0,𝑖
2  
 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑅,𝑁,𝑖 =
𝑉𝑁−𝑉𝑁𝑠,𝑖
𝑑0,𝑖
−
(𝑁−𝑁𝑠,𝑖)?̇?0,𝑖
𝑑0,𝑖
2  
 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑅,𝑈,𝑖 =
𝑉𝑈−𝑉𝑈𝑠,𝑖
𝑑0,𝑖
−
(𝑈−𝑈𝑠,𝑖)?̇?0,𝑖
𝑑0,𝑖
2  
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 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑅,𝑉𝐸,𝑖 =
𝐸−𝐸𝑠,𝑖
𝑑0,𝑖
 
 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑅,𝑉𝑁,𝑖 =
𝑁−𝑁𝑠,𝑖
𝑑0,𝑖
 
 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑅,𝑉𝑈,𝑖 =
𝑈−𝑈𝑠,𝑖
𝑑0,𝑖
 
The 𝑅 matrix must be augmented to include the pseudorange rate error covariance matrix (𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑅).  
 𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑅 = [
𝜎?̇?,1
2 0 0
0 ⋱ 0
0 0 𝜎?̇?,𝑁
2
] Eq. 6-32 
The weighting scheme for 𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑅 is described in 5.1.2. It is assumed here that GNSS receiver range and 
range rate errors are uncorrelated. 
6.1.4.2 Non-Holonomic Constraints 
Under ideal condition, terrestrial vehicles motion is straightforward. Therefore, the velocity in the 
across track plane is negligible. This information can be used as additional velocity measurements in 
the filter called Non-Holonomic Constraints (NHC). This hypothesis does not hold if the vehicle is 
sliding in the across track direction (which may occur during loss of grip) or if the vehicle is jumping. 
This situation may occur for car. On the other hand, trains are constrained by the railtracks which 
reinforce the relevance of this assumption. The NHC are given in the body frame. Let’s denote 𝑉𝑏 the 
velocity vector at the output of the mechanization expressed in the body frame. 𝑉𝑏 can be obtained by 
rotating (with the DCM ?̂?𝑛
𝑏) the velocity vector expressed in the navigation frame. The measurements 
associated with the NHC are the following: 
 𝛿𝑧𝑁𝐻𝐶 = [
−𝑉𝑥
𝑏
−𝑉𝑧
𝑏] Eq. 6-33 
The corresponding measurement matrix is given by: 
 
𝐻𝑁𝐻𝐶
= [
01×3 −?̂?11 −?̂?12 −?̂?13 ?̂?12𝑉𝑈 − ?̂?13𝑉𝑁 ?̂?13𝑉𝐸 − ?̂?11𝑉𝑈 ?̂?11𝑉𝑁 − ?̂?12𝑉𝐸 01×14
01×3 −?̂?31 −?̂?32 −?̂?33 ?̂?32𝑉𝑈 − ?̂?33𝑉𝑁 ?̂?33𝑉𝐸 − ?̂?31𝑉𝑈 ?̂?31𝑉𝑁 − ?̂?32𝑉𝐸 01×14
] 
Eq. 6-34 
where ?̂?𝑖𝑖 corresponds to the term at the 𝑖
th
 line and 𝑖th column of the DCM ?̂?𝑛
𝑏. 
The measurement noise covariance matrix corresponding to the NHC is adjusted empirically in order 
to account for the uncertainty into the vehicle motion.  
NHC are usually included to limit the heading drift during GNSS outages. Even in tight coupling 
approach, this configuration may occur in tunnels. In this study, the constraints are also included when 
there is no GNSS outage.  
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6.1.4.3 Zero Velocity Update 
Zero Velocity Update (ZVU or ZUPT) consists in detecting the periods of time during which the 
vehicle is motionless. It is then interesting to feed this information to the filter to limit the drift of the 
solution. It is thus necessary to define a test to detect immobility. To do so, it is possible to define a 
velocity threshold, under which the vehicle is assumed to be stationary. The threshold can be chosen 
by correlating the velocity estimation with the epochs at which the vehicle is known to be motionless 
during a calibration campaign. The test variable is the updated velocity estimation. It is not feasible to 
define a test based on the acceleration as this parameter can be negligible when the vehicle has a 
uniform motion. The stationarity can also be detected by means of an odometer. If the immobility is 
detected, a new measurement is added, similarly to the NHC (but with a zero along-track velocity): 
 𝛿𝑧𝑍𝑈𝑃𝑇 = [
−𝑉𝑥
𝑏
−𝑉𝑦
𝑏
−𝑉𝑧
𝑏
] Eq. 6-35 
The corresponding measurement matrix is given by: 
𝐻𝑍𝑈𝑃𝑇
= [
01×3 −?̂?11 −?̂?12 −?̂?13 ?̂?12𝑉𝑈 − ?̂?13𝑉𝑁 ?̂?13𝑉𝐸 − ?̂?11𝑉𝑈 ?̂?11𝑉𝑁 − ?̂?12𝑉𝐸 01×14
01×3 −?̂?21 −?̂?22 −?̂?23 ?̂?22𝑉𝑈 − ?̂?23𝑉𝑁 ?̂?23𝑉𝐸 − ?̂?21𝑉𝑈 ?̂?21𝑉𝑁 − ?̂?22𝑉𝐸 01×14
01×3 −?̂?31 −?̂?32 −?̂?33 ?̂?32𝑉𝑈 − ?̂?33𝑉𝑁 ?̂?33𝑉𝐸 − ?̂?31𝑉𝑈 ?̂?31𝑉𝑁 − ?̂?32𝑉𝐸 01×14
] 
Eq. 6-36 
The measurement noise covariance matrix corresponding to the ZUPT is adjusted empirically in this 
work to account for possible small lateral sliding. 
6.1.4.4 Zero Angular Rate Update 
The Zero Angular Rate Update (ZARU) can be applied to several configuration of IMU including full 
IMU [Groves, 2013]. This motion constraint consists in assuming that when the angular rate should be 
null when the vehicle is detected as in stationary mode. Like for ZUPT, the odometer can be used to 
detect the stationarity. For the full IMU, the ZARU measurement is given by: 
 𝛿𝑧𝑍𝐴𝑅𝑈 = [
−𝜔𝑥
𝑏
−𝜔𝑦
𝑏
−𝜔𝑧
𝑏
] Eq. 6-37 
The measurement matrix corresponding to the ZARU constraints is given by: 
 𝐻𝑍𝐴𝑅𝑈 = [03×3 03×3 03×3 03×3 −I3×3 0] Eq. 6-38 
Finally the measurement noise covariance is driven by the vibration and other disturbances. Moreover, 
the yaw axis is less affected by disturbances than the other two axes [Groves, 2013]. This phenomenon 
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must be taken into account in the weighting of these measurements. In this thesis, the ZARU 
measurements are used simultaneously with the ZUPT measurements. 
6.1.5 Train control 
As already discussed, the proposed train control positioning system is based on two redundant 
subsystems that use single constellation receivers. If four constellations are available, the sub-filters 
shall be modified to process two constellations each. The way to modify the filter for integration of 
two GNSS is detailed in subsection 6.1.6.  
The track on which the train is located is assumed to be determined by means of radiobeacons located 
at strategic points (i.e. after intersections) in the proposed solution. Once the railtrack is known, it is 
possible to take advantage of this information to add a motion constraint and improve the positioning 
in the along-track dimension as well as the velocity estimation. The track database measurement (and 
error) model has been detailed in chapter 5. The model used, which is the same as in [Zheng et al., 
2009] is a sequence of track data points, with a separation (𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝) that is typically 1.5 meters and on 
which the accuracy is negligible compared to the accuracy targeted by our solution. The proposed 
approach can be divided into two steps. 
 As proposed in prior art [Zheng et al., 2009] (for GNSS only), it is first necessary to determine 
the two track data points between which the vehicle is the most likely to be.  
 The position of the two track points can then be integrated in the EKF as new measurements. 
6.1.5.1 Determination of the two track data points within which the train is located 
An algorithm using the velocity estimated by the GNSS sensor to determine the prior and next track 
points is given in [Zheng et al., 2009]. It is proposed here to also take advantage of the IMU to select 
the two points. The method consists in finding the two points A and B that minimize the distance of the 
train track to the predicted position. As this optimization process can be demanding in terms of 
calculation for long tracks, it is necessary to restrain the potential candidates. To do so it would for 
instance be possible to limit the search based on the previous segment and on the estimation of the 
distance travelled. The proposed algorithm is summarized as the solution to a simple minimization 
problem. 
The two points that are around the last position fix are supposed to be known (converted from ECEF 
to the navigation frame) and denoted 𝐴(𝑘) and 𝐵(𝑘). Let’s denote the last updated position ?̂?𝑘|𝑘 and 
the predicted position at the mechanization output ?̂?𝑘+1|𝑘. It is firstly proposed to determine the a 
priori travelled distance based on INS: 
 𝑑𝑙 = ‖?̂?𝑘+1|𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘|𝑘‖ Eq. 6-39 
Then it is necessary to pre select the potential candidates for 𝐴(𝑘 + 1) and 𝐵(𝑘 + 1) to limit the 
computation burden for the minimization problem. Let’s denote 𝑃𝑀𝐴𝑃 the bijection between the map 
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point index (𝑙) and its coordinates. Let’s denote 𝑙𝑘,𝐴 and 𝑙𝑘,𝐵  the indexes of the points of the map 
which corresponds 𝐴(𝑘) and 𝐵(𝑘).  
The range of potential index candidates is limited to the interval:  
 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 = [𝑙𝑘,𝐴 − ⌊
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝
⌋ − 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛   ;   𝑙𝑘,𝐵 + 1 + ⌊
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝
⌋ +𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛] Eq. 6-40 
where 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 is an integer that must be high enough not to exclude the true track data points on 
which the vehicle is located and short enough to limit the computation burden. It is all the more 
necessary to work with restrained intervals to avoid wrong track points selection that might occur in 
case of balloon loop or spiral loops. Indeed, at “intersection” an ambiguity can occur at the 
overlapping region.  
 
Figure 51 Spiral viaduct near Brusio, Switzerland [bahnbilder.ch] 
This interval assumes that the direction of the motion is unknown. It is possible to reduce the size of 
the interval by a factor of two by determining the direction of the motion (by computing the sign of the 
dot product between the velocity and the trajectory).  
The final step is to select 𝑙𝑘+1 and 𝑙𝑘+1 + 1 as the two indexes that minimize the Euclidian distance 
between their corresponding coordinates and the coordinates of the predicted position.  
 {
𝑙𝑘+1,𝐴 = min
𝑙∈𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙
‖𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑝(𝑙) − ?̂?𝑘+1|𝑘‖
𝑙𝑘+1,𝐵 = min
𝑙∈𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙−{𝑙𝑘+1,𝐴}
‖𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑝(𝑙) − ?̂?𝑘+1|𝑘‖
 Eq. 6-41 
𝐴(𝑘 + 1)  and 𝐵(𝑘 + 1) are the coordinates of the two track data points of reference around the 
predicted position. The coordinates of these two points are used to augment the filter.  
6.1.5.2 Integration of the track measurements into the Kalman Filter 
Firstly it can be assumed that the train is located on the segment that links both points. The concept 
consists in adding a measurement in the measurement model that represents the Euclidean distance 
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between the position predicted by the mechanization and the segment 𝐴(𝑘 + 1)𝐵(𝑘 + 1). The vehicle 
position is assumed to be on this segment. Thus, the following measurement can be added: 
 𝛿𝑧𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝 = [0 − 𝑑 (?̂?𝑘+1|𝑘, 𝐴(𝑘 + 1)𝐵(𝑘 + 1))] Eq. 6-42 
where 𝑑 refers to the Euclidean distance. 
The distance is geometrically determined with the following expression: 
 𝑑 (?̂?𝑘+1|𝑘, 𝐴(𝑘 + 1)𝐵(𝑘 + 1)) =
𝜅
‖𝐴(𝑘 + 1)𝐵(𝑘 + 1)‖
 Eq. 6-43 
where: 
 𝜅 = √
[(𝑁 − 𝑁𝐴)(𝑈𝐵 − 𝑈𝐴) − (𝑈 − 𝑈𝐴)(𝑁𝐵 −𝑁𝐴)]2 +
[(𝑈 − 𝑈𝐴)(𝐸𝐵 − 𝐸𝐴) − (𝐸 − 𝐸𝐴)(𝑈𝐵 − 𝑈𝐴)]2 +
[(𝐸 − 𝐸𝐴)(𝑁𝐵 −𝑁𝐴) − (𝑁 − 𝑁𝐴)(𝐸𝐵 − 𝐸𝐴)]2
 
 𝐴(𝑘 + 1) = [
𝐸𝐴
𝑁𝐴
𝑈𝐴
], 𝐵(𝑘 + 1) = [
𝐸𝐵
𝑁𝐵
𝑈𝐵
] 
It is then necessary to relate this measurement to the state vector. The distance to 𝐴(𝑘 + 1)𝐵(𝑘 + 1) 
expression is linearized around ?̂?𝑘+1|𝑘. The observation matrix line corresponding to the distance to 
the track segment is given by:  
 𝐻𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝 = [
𝐻𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝,𝐸 𝐻𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝,𝑁 𝐻𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝,𝑈 0 … 0] Eq. 6-44 
with : 
 𝐻𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝,𝐸 =
(𝑈𝐵 − 𝑈𝐴)[(𝑈 − 𝑈𝐴)(𝐸𝐵 − 𝐸𝐴) − (𝐸 − 𝐸𝐴)(𝑈𝐵 −𝑈𝐴)]
−(𝑁𝐵 −𝑁𝐴)[(𝐸 − 𝐸𝐴)(𝑁𝐵 −𝑁𝐴) − (𝑁 − 𝑁𝐴)(𝐸𝐵 − 𝐸𝐴)]
𝜅‖𝐴(𝑘 + 1)𝐵(𝑘 + 1)‖
 
Eq. 6-45 
 
𝐻𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝,𝑁 =
(𝐸𝐵 − 𝐸𝐴)[(𝐸 − 𝐸𝐴)(𝑁𝐵 −𝑁𝐴) − (𝑁 − 𝑁𝐴)(𝐸𝐵 − 𝐸𝐴)]
−(𝑈𝐵 − 𝑈𝐴)[(𝑁 − 𝑁𝐴)(𝑈𝐵 − 𝑈𝐴) − (𝑈 − 𝑈𝐴)(𝑁𝐵 −𝑁𝐴)]
𝜅‖𝐴(𝑘 + 1)𝐵(𝑘 + 1)‖
 
Eq. 6-46 
 
𝐻𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝,𝑈 =
(𝑁𝐵 −𝑁𝐴)[(𝑁 − 𝑁𝐴)(𝑈𝐵 −𝑈𝐴) − (𝑈 − 𝑈𝐴)(𝑁𝐵 −𝑁𝐴)]
−(𝐸𝐵 − 𝐸𝐴)[(𝑈 − 𝑈𝐴)(𝐸𝐵 − 𝐸𝐴) − (𝐸 − 𝐸𝐴)(𝑈𝐵 − 𝑈𝐴)]
𝜅‖𝐴(𝑘 + 1)𝐵(𝑘 + 1)‖
 
Eq. 6-47 
However, the uncertainties on the coordinates of 𝐴(𝑘 + 1)  and 𝐵(𝑘 + 1)  must be considered to 
improve the measurement model. The measurement noise covariance term that model this error is thus 
adjusted empirically.  
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An additional way to integrate the knowledge of the prior and next track points consists in using them 
to generate a heading information . The map heading information is given by:  
 𝜓𝑚𝑎𝑝 = atan (
𝐸𝐵 − 𝐸𝐴
𝑁𝐵 − 𝑁𝐴
) Eq. 6-48 
The measurement added is then : 
 𝛿𝑧𝜓𝑚𝑎𝑝 = [𝜓𝑚𝑎𝑝 − ?̂?𝑘+1|𝑘] Eq. 6-49 
The observation matrix 𝐻 is augmented with the line corresponding to the new observation, which 
contains only zero except the term corresponding to the heading error state: 
 {
𝐻𝜓𝑚𝑎𝑝[𝑖] = 1 if 𝑖 = 9 
𝐻𝜓𝑚𝑎𝑝[𝑖] = 0 else        
 Eq. 6-50 
The standard deviation of the error on the heading information is related to the standard deviation of 
the mapping error 𝜎𝑚𝑎𝑝 and the average distance between the two consecutive points 𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝 by the 
following expression (which proof is in appendix E): 
 𝜎𝜓𝑚𝑎𝑝 = √2
𝜎𝑚𝑎𝑝
𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝
 Eq. 6-51 
This expression can be used to weight the track heading information in the 𝑅 matrix. 
6.1.6 ETC 
The solution proposed for ETC is based on a dual constellation receiver. To process two 
constellations, the filter must be modified to estimate the clock bias and clock drift of the second 
system. In this thesis, two states accounting for the clock offset and the clock drift of the second 
constellation are added to the state vector. An alternative proposed in [Angrisano, 2010], (but not used 
in this thesis), assumes that the time difference between the two constellations (GPS and GLONASS) 
is very stable and that its drift is zero. Thus only one state is added to estimate the intersystem bias.  
When adding a second constellation (e.g. Galileo), the pseudorange (and pseudorange rate) 
measurements are integrated in the same way as in the single constellation case except the lines of the 
observation matrix that contain ones for the Galileo clock offset (and drift). 
It is also proposed to integrate wheel speed sensor measurements in the ETC solution. WSSs provide 
an along-track velocity information. It is also possible to get an estimate of the yaw rate by 
differentiating the velocity measurements of two WSSs (on the left and right of the vehicle). The 
velocity gradient between the two wheels can be related to the yaw rate by geometry considerations.  
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This information has not been integrated in the proposed solution and is a potential improvement. 
Thus the WSS measurement (𝑉𝑊𝑆𝑆
𝑏 ) is limited to a velocity information in this thesis.  
 𝛿𝑧𝑊𝑆𝑆 = [
0 − 𝑉𝑥
𝑏
𝑉𝑊𝑆𝑆
𝑏 − 𝑉𝑦
𝑏
0 − 𝑉𝑧
𝑏
] Eq. 6-52 
Note that this measurement model includes the NHC, it assumes that the vehicle is moving 
straightforward. The WSS error model, described in chapter 5, includes a scale factor error partially 
due to the variations of the wheels diameter due to temperature and pressure variations. This scale 
factor error has to be estimated. The state vector is augmented with the WSS scale factor error 
(𝛿𝑆𝑊𝑆𝑆).  
The corresponding observation matrix is given by: 
𝐻𝑊𝑆𝑆 = [
01×3 −?̂?11 −?̂?12 −?̂?13 ?̂?12𝑉𝑈 − ?̂?13𝑉𝑁 ?̂?13𝑉𝐸 − ?̂?11𝑉𝑈 ?̂?11𝑉𝑁 − ?̂?12𝑉𝐸 0 … 𝑉𝑥
𝑏
01×3 −?̂?21 −?̂?22 −?̂?23 ?̂?22𝑉𝑈 − ?̂?23𝑉𝑁 ?̂?23𝑉𝐸 − ?̂?21𝑉𝑈 ?̂?21𝑉𝑁 − ?̂?22𝑉𝐸 0 … 𝑉𝑦
𝑏
01×3 −?̂?31 −?̂?32 −?̂?33 ?̂?32𝑉𝑈 − ?̂?33𝑉𝑁 ?̂?33𝑉𝐸 − ?̂?31𝑉𝑈 ?̂?31𝑉𝑁 − ?̂?32𝑉𝐸 0 … 𝑉𝑧
𝑏
] 
Eq. 
6-5
3 
where the last column corresponds to the scale factor error state. 
The dynamic evolution of 𝛿𝑆𝑊𝑆𝑆 has to be modelled to define the corresponding line in the 𝐹 matrix 
and in the 𝑄 matrix. The scale factor error can be modelled by a first order Gauss-Markov process. 
Thus, the 𝐹 matrix is augmented with a line that contains −1 𝜏𝑆𝑊𝑆𝑆⁄  at the column corresponding to 
𝛿𝑆𝑊𝑆𝑆. The 𝑄 matrix is augmented to account for the driven noise of the WSS scale factor error. This 
two magnitudes as well as the WSS measurement noise variance that must be included in the 𝑅 matrix 
has to be determined with real WSS measurements.  
6.2 Validation and performance assessment on simulated data 
The objective of this section is to validate with simulations the EKF configurations that have been 
proposed and implemented during this thesis as well as to assess the performance gains that can be 
obtained by adding measurements (constraints and sensors) to the solution.  
6.2.1 Parameters of the simulations 
The simulator developed during this thesis takes a pre-defined trajectory and an along track velocity 
profile as an input. It generates ideal sensors measurements from this information, to which are added 
the realistic error models that have been described in chapter 5. The ideal measurements are generated 
as described:  
 Provided an actual GPS almanac (giving the satellite position), the simulator generates ideal 
ranges. The clock offset is modelled as a linear function here and added to the true range to 
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form the simulated pseudorange. Multi constellation receivers (which may be used for ETC) 
are not simulated in this section.  
 The simulator generates the ideal IMU measurements using the technique described in [Zhang 
et al., 2012], which is equivalent to a reverse mechanization based on Euler angles.  
 For the train control application, the track points are generated by sampling the trajectory of 
reference with a constant step (𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝).   
 For ETC, the wheel speed sensor ideal measurements corresponds to the velocity entered in 
the velocity profile. The use of dual constellations that has been proposed for ETC is not 
simulated in this section.  
This simplified model does not simulate the lever arm between the sensors. In this section, the 
trajectory of reference which is given in Figure 52 is a portion of the tramway line number 3 in 
Montpellier France provided by Egis. Smoother trajectories that are less challenging for the navigation 
system can be expected for real trains on high velocity lines. This trajectory is also used to model the 
trajectory for ETC.  
 
Figure 52 Portion of the tramway line number 3 in Montpellier, France 
The parameters for the simulation are summarized here: 
 The sampling frequency of the GPS receiver is set to 5 Hz 
 The sampling frequency of the IMU is set to 100 Hz. 
 The length of the trajectory is 14 km. 
 The along track velocity is set to a constant value of 80 km/h 
 The constellation that is used is taken from an actual GPS almanac (Yuma format) and given 
in Figure 2.  
 The pseudorange error models of GPS are used here. The single (L1 C/A) and dual frequency 
(L1 C/A, L5) models presented in section 5.1.1.1 have been tested. The noise component of 
the pseudorange error model depends of the estimated 𝐶/𝑁0. It is assumed that the 𝐶/𝑁0 are 
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30 dB-Hz which corresponds to the mask used in chapter 5. This hypothesis is conservative 
and very pessimistic.  
 
 
Figure 53 Skyplot of the constellation used for the simulations 
6.2.2 Results: GPS/INS  
A first set of simulations has been conducted to validate the basic architecture which integrates the 
GPS measurements (pseudoranges and pseudorange rates) and the data from the IMU. The criterion 
used for the validation of the tuning of the EKF is the 3𝜎 estimation of the error on the state estimation 
that has to bound the actual error with a sufficient probability (higher than 99%). The results in terms 
of position, velocity and attitude estimation errors are plotted in Figure 54, Figure 55, Figure 56 for the 
EKF with two different configurations of GPS receiver. The left column corresponds to the integration 
with a single frequency GPS L1 C/A receiver whereas the right column uses data from a dual 
frequency GPS L1 C/A and L5 receiver. In both cases the pseudorange rates have been integrated into 
the solution. It can be seen that, in both cases the velocity and attitude errors are well centered and 
bounded by the three sigma state error standard deviation estimation. The position error is within the 
bounds but not perfectly centered, especially when using a single frequency receiver. Indeed it slowly 
varies due to the correlated errors on the pseudorange measurements (essentially ionosphere). Much 
longer simulation time would be necessary for the position error to be centered because the errors are 
correlated over 1800 seconds or more. This phenomenon is less visible for the dual frequency receiver 
because the ionosphere error which is the major source of correlated component in the measurement 
error has been removed. In the results presented in Figure 54, Figure 55, Figure 56 the inflation factor 
used on the pseudorange and pseudorange rate measurement covariance matrixes is equal to 2.  
 03060
 0
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Figure 54 Position errors in the navigation frame, single frequency L1 C/A GPS receiver (left)  
or dual frequency L1 C/A and L5 receiver (right) and IMU 
 
  
Figure 55 Velocity errors in the navigation frame, single frequency L1 C/A GPS receiver (left)  
or dual frequency L1 C/A and L5 receiver (right) and IMU 
 
  
Figure 56 Attitude errors, single frequency L1 C/A GPS receiver (left)  
or dual frequency L1 C/A and L5 receiver (right) and IMU  
The performances of different schemes in terms of position accuracy and error root mean square 
(RMS) are summarized in Table 16. It includes the use of single and dual frequency models (L5 has 
been preferred over L2C because L2C is not interoperable with Galileo). ZUPT has not been tested as 
the vehicle does not stop during the trajectory of reference. The accuracies are given in the horizontal 
plane, without differentiating into along-track and across-track direction at first. This is because the 
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GNSS/INS basic architecture is used for both train control and ETC and that, except for train stations 
or corridors in train control, the requirements are expressed in terms of horizontal accuracies.  
Firstly, the use of a dual frequency receiver has improved the RMS and accuracy in all direction. 
Larger improvement can be expected in real condition because the  𝐶/𝑁0  values have been 
conservatively set to 30 dB-Hz for all the satellites in simulations and the noise level is increased in 
the iono-free measurements. The integration of the IMU has improved the horizontal accuracy and 
RMS with respect to the GPS only solution (with simple least square estimation). This is due to the 
smoothing effect of the filter. Errors which have a short correlation time (multipath and thermal noise) 
have been partially filtered out. The benefit of the integration of the IMU is therefore higher in the 
dual-frequency configuration, where the dominant sources of error have short correlation time. 
Table 16 shows that the integration of pseudorange rates improves accuracy as well as introduction of 
non-holonomic constraints. NHC has essentially improved the vertical accuracy. It can be inferred 
from these simulations, that even in simulations, the basic solution cannot fulfill the accuracy 
requirements for track determination in train control. Indeed in the best configuration, the 2.3 m 
accuracy corresponds to a across-track accuracy of 1.6 m and an along-track of 1.9 m whereas the 
requirement is 0.7 m in the across-track direction. It reinforces the choice of keeping the radiobeacons 
at intersections for track selectivity.  
Sensors L1 C/A L5 PRR NHC 
RMS/Accuracy 95% (m) 
Horizontal Vertical 
GPS (LS)      8.1/11.0 14.1/21.3 
GPS (LS)       6.6/10.4 11.7/19.1 
GPS/INS      4.2/6.6 3.1/5.3 
GPS/INS       4.0/6.3 2.9/5.0 
GPS/INS        4.1/6.3 2.0/3.6 
GPS/INS       1.6/2.8 1.3/2.8 
GPS/INS        1.2/2.4 1.2/2.5 
GPS/INS         1.2/2.3 0.5/1.2 
Table 16  Position accuracy performances of the different configurations 
The right estimation of inertial biases and scale factors errors can be investigated by simulations 
whereas it cannot in real data because the true parameters are unknown (no values of reference). 
Constant biases are added to the accelerometers and gyroscope measurements. These constant terms 
model the so called turn on bias phenomena that is due to variation in the initial conditions and 
physical properties of the IMU. The gyroscope and accelerometer biases are well estimated by the 
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EKF as illustrated in Figure 57 and Figure 58. For a better visibility, the 3𝜎 bounds have been centered 
on the true bias value so that it can be seen that the filter converges to it. The estimation of the scale 
factor is not investigated in this set of simulations. In particular, the observability of the scale factor 
error states requires accelerations and rotation rates whereas only constant velocities have been 
simulated.  
 
Figure 57 Accelerometer biases estimation 
 
Figure 58 Gyroscopes biases estimation 
6.2.3 Results: integration of the track database 
In this subsection, the track database is integrated into the solution. Here, the database measurements 
are used to update the KF with the same frequency rate as the GNSS. However, it is possible to use 
map measurements to correct mechanization output with a higher rate. The position, velocity and 
attitude errors of the solution with integration of the track database are given in Figure 59, Figure 60 
and Figure 61. The left column presents the estimation error of the EKF that uses the single frequency 
GPS receiver whereas in the right column, the errors of the dual frequency receiver are plotted. In 
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these simulations, the map distance noise covariance has been set to 10 cm
2
. Again the estimation 
errors are centered and within the three sigma covariance of the state estimation. It is important to 
notice that the integration of the track database did not lead to any biases on the state estimation. 
Moreover, it can be observed that the velocity and heading estimations have been improved, and the 
corresponding covariance estimates are lower than before the integration of the map.  
  
Figure 59 Position errors in the navigation frame, single frequency L1 C/A GPS receiver (left)  
or dual frequency L1 C/A and L5 receiver (right), IMU and track database 
  
Figure 60 Velocity errors in the navigation frame, single frequency L1 C/A GPS receiver (left)  
or dual frequency L1 C/A and L5 receiver (right), IMU and track database 
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Figure 61 Attitude errors, single frequency L1 C/A GPS receiver (left) or dual frequency  
L1 C/A and L5 receiver (right), IMU and track database 
The position accuracy of several possible configurations that integrates the track data are summarized 
in Table 17. The vertical accuracy is not given in Table 17 even if it has been highly improved due to 
the track database vertical constraint. Even if it performs a good across track accuracy due to the 
“projection” on the track, this solution cannot be used for track selectivity. Sub-meter along track 
accuracies can be reached when integrating pseudorange rates measurements to the dual frequency 
solution. The requirements presented in chapter 3.2 for train control in terms of along-track accuracy 
(6 m in the most stringent cases) are fulfilled by the subsystem in this configuration. The integration of 
the track database slightly improve the along track positioning by improving the velocity and heading 
estimation. 
Sensors L1 C/A L5 PRR NHC 
RMS/Accuracy 95% (m) 
Along-track Across-track 
GPS/INS/Map      2.9/5.8 0.2/0.4 
GPS/INS/Map       1.5/3.0 0.2/0.4 
GPS/INS/Map        1.4/2.8 0.2/0.4 
GPS/INS/Map       1.0/2.1 0.1/0.3 
GPS/INS/Map        0.7/1.5 0.2/0.3 
GPS/INS/Map         0.5/0.9 0.1/0.2 
Table 17 Position accuracy performances of the different configurations which include track database 
measurements 
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6.2.4 Results: integration of the wheel speed sensors 
It has been proposed to integrate the WSS measurements in the navigation filter for ETC application. 
The additional along-track velocity information is integrated in the measurements and the filter is 
modified as detailed in section 6.1.6. This table does not include NHC as they are implicitly contained 
in the odometer measurement model. It can be seen that the inclusion of wheel speed sensors has 
improved the horizontal accuracy by improving the velocity estimation. For single frequency L1 C/A 
receiver, without PRR, the horizontal accuracy has been improved by approximately 1 m. The 
horizontal accuracies obtained in this section with all the configurations are sufficient for the ETC 
application as detailed in Table 18.  
Sensors L1 C/A L5 PRR 
RMS/Accuracy 95% 
(m) 
Horizontal 
GPS/INS/WSS     3.1/5.4 
GPS/INS/WSS      2.8/4.9 
GPS/INS/WSS      1.6/2.8 
GPS/INS/WSS       1.1/2.1 
Table 18 Position accuracy and error RMS of the different possible configurations with WSS 
6.2.5 Conclusions 
In all configuration, the position, velocity and attitude errors are centered and within the three sigma 
bounds in simulations. Therefore the implementation of the filter and its tuning are correct. However, 
it has been seen that the measurement covariance has to be inflated when using the single frequency 
receiver because the measurement white noise assumption does not hold. The accuracy improvement 
is higher when using the dual frequency receiver due to smoothing of uncorrelated errors. Moreover, it 
has been observed that inertial biases have been estimated well in this set of simulations.  
The inclusion of additional measurements such as PRR or NHC has improved the position accuracy in 
this set of simulations. This is essentially the results of the improvement of the velocity and heading 
estimation. The integration of the track database did not lead to any instability of the filter or to biased 
state estimation. It enable to improve the velocity and attitude estimation (thanks to the yaw heading) 
and to slightly improve the along track accuracy thanks to it. The WSS also slightly improves the 
horizontal accuracy by providing a precise along-track velocity measurement as long as the attitude is 
well estimated. 
It has been possible to validate the filter behavior and in particular the bias estimation can only be 
tested in simulations.  However, the performances obtained in this section have a limited scope 
because the satellites have constant 𝐶/𝑁0 , the satellites are assumed to be in view. Moreover the 
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duration of the simulations are too short with respect to the correlation time of the ionosphere, 
troposphere and clock and ephemeris errors to obtain significant results, especially for the single 
frequency receiver. For dual frequency receivers, the major contributions are the uncorrelated errors 
which are partly filtered out by the EKF.  
It is proposed in next section to assess the performances of the solution on the real data campaign 
conducted in Toulouse and described in section 5.3.2.2.  
6.3 Performance assessment on real data 
This section assesses the performances of the solutions in terms of position error RMS and accuracy 
using the test campaign presented in in section 5.3.2.2. Firstly, the performances of the basic common 
architecture are discussed. Finally, the solutions proposed for train control and ETC are studied as in 
the simulation case. In particular, the gain obtained by integrating a second constellation (GLONASS) 
into the solution for ETC is investigated. The receivers used are a U-blox 6 (GPS L1 C/A) and U-blox 
8 (GPS L1 C/A and GLONASS L1). Only the performances of single frequency receivers have been 
tested on real signals in this Thesis.  
6.3.1 Reference 
The reference in terms of position, velocity and attitude has been estimated with a NovAtel SPAN 
system, described in section 5.3.2.2. The parameters of reference which are measured by the SPAN are 
affected by a measurement error. It is possible to assess the error done by neglecting the SPAN error 
by simple assumptions. Let’s assume that the errors on the state estimations by the EKF (𝑥 − 𝑥) and 
the SPAN (𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝑥) are centered Gaussian. The state error follows a centered Gaussian distribution:  
 𝑥 − 𝑥 ~ 𝒩 (0, 𝜎?̂?−?̂?𝑟𝑒𝑓
2 + 𝜎𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑓−𝑥
2 + 2cov(?̂? − 𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑓 , 𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝑥)) Eq. 6-54 
The covariance term is unknown and cannot be determined without knowing 𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝑥 . Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality enables to bound the covariance with: 
 cov(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑓 , 𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝑥) < 𝜎𝑥−?̂?𝑟𝑒𝑓𝜎?̂?𝑟𝑒𝑓−𝑥 Eq. 6-55 
Therefore the standard deviation of the state error is lower than the sum of the standard deviation of 
the difference between the measurement (𝜎?̂?−?̂?𝑟𝑒𝑓) and the reference plus the standard deviation of the 
state of reference (𝜎𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑓−𝑥). An estimation of the SPAN error standard deviation is calculated in 
inertial explorer. For position error on the measurement campaign described in section 5.3.2.2, the 
SPAN error standard deviation (𝜎𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑓−𝑥) is plotted in Figure 62. In the period of time that corresponds 
to suburban environment, this value is below 15 cm. For both cases of study, 𝜎?̂?−?̂?𝑟𝑒𝑓 has a magnitude 
of several meters. Thus, the inaccuracy of the reference can be neglected in suburban environment. In 
dense urban environment, the inaccuracy of the SPAN on the horizontal east and north coordinates can 
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reach 50 cm due to masking and poor geometry. However, 𝜎?̂?−?̂?𝑟𝑒𝑓 is typically around 5 meters, thus 
neglecting 𝜎?̂?𝑟𝑒𝑓−𝑥 makes sense. Rigorously speaking, these uncertainties should be taken into account 
in the representation of the state errors in urban environment. 
 
Figure 62 Standard deviation of the position error on the trajectory of reference as estimated by the 
SPAN system with inertial explorer 
For the attitude estimation, the standard deviation of the error on the heading of reference is lower than 
0.015° whereas the pitch and roll accuracy are 0.002°. The velocity accuracy is less than 0.01 m/s in 
suburban environment and up to 0.05 m/s in dense urban environment due to the degraded 
pseudorange rate measurements.  
6.3.2 Results: GPS/INS 
This section presents the accuracy performances of the basic architectures which integrate the 
measurements from the GPS receiver and the IMU. The tuning used in this section is the same than the 
one used in the simulations. The methods to improve the accuracy have been gradually added so that 
the improvement they provide can be quantized. The accuracies are given separately for the suburban 
and urban environments in Table 19. The statistics are given on approximately 2700 samples for 
suburban and 2300 for urban environment. The data collection has been conducted on June 30
th
, 2015. 
The number of GPS satellites in view as a function of time is plotted in Figure 63. Its CDF is also 
given for both suburban and urban environments.  
 In suburban environment, the number of GPS satellites tracked is higher than 7 more than 
90% of the time. A few exceptions have been encountered when crossing bridges on the 
motorway at 4655 seconds (3 satellites tracked, at 43°39'20.12"N, 1°21'52.43"E).  
 In the environments characterized as dense urban, the number of satellite tracked is much 
lower on average due to building masks. 50% of the samples in urban environment are 
associated with 5 satellites in view or less. 10% of the time less than 4 satellites are in view 
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which lead to poor GPS position availability. This reinforces the benefit of using tight 
coupling instead of loose coupling in harsh environment. 
  
Figure 63 Number of GPS satellites being tracked as 
a function of time 
 Figure 64 CDF of GPS satellites being tracked as a 
function of the environment 
The mechanization has been initialized with a position and attitude that are different from the 
reference to check the ability of the filter to converge quickly. The samples corresponding to the 
convergence period of the filter (50 seconds) has not been included in the accuracy statistics. In these 
tests, a 5° elevation mask angle has been applied as well as a 30 dB-Hz 𝐶/𝑁0 mask.  
Position RMS and accuracies are given in Table 19. According to Table 19, the coupling with the IMU 
measurements has improved the accuracy significantly in both the horizontal and vertical direction for 
all environments. These improvements are the result of the EKF filtering combined with the fact that 
accuracy of standalone GNSS given in Table 19 are obtained with a standard least square algorithm 
that equally weight every measurements which is not the case of the EKF. The coupling with the IMU 
with EKF enables to fulfill sub-decameter horizontal accuracy in suburban environment. The 
integration of PRR measurements has significantly improved the accuracy in all environments by 
improving the velocity estimation. Abnormally large PRR measurements have been excluded with a 
simple innovations check (which principle is detailed in chapter 7).  
The NHC are given in the body frame. They are converted into the navigation frame by rotation, i.e. 
multiplication by the estimated DCM. The accuracy of these measurements is driven by the quality of 
the attitude estimation. Typically, when the vehicle is turning, the error on the predicted DCM is likely 
to increase which will lead to erroneous measurements (after conversion). However, for trains that 
have slow dynamics in terms of attitude, the attitude estimation is likely to be accurate. A simple test 
is used to detect yaw stationarity based on the z axis gyroscope output. The threshold has been set to 
0.006 °/s. When the yaw rate is lower than this threshold, the NHC are added to the measurement 
model, with a typical covariance of 0.001 m/s on each axis. The integration of NHC essentially 
improves vertical accuracy (due to the vertical velocity constraint component) which is of limited 
interest for most terrestrial applications that only have horizontal requirements such as ETC and train 
control. The same observations have been done on simulated data. Moreover, the horizontal accuracy 
has been slightly improved by adding NHC measurements.  
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The stationarity detection test variable (to trigger the ZUPT/ZARU) is the horizontal velocity as 
estimated by the EKF. The detection threshold is set to a value of 0.1 m.s
-1
. This value has been 
derived empirically, by observing the horizontal velocity distribution when the velocity of reference is 
zero as depicted in Figure 65. The benefit of using ZUPT in the solution is limited because with PRR 
and NHC measurements, the velocity estimation is already very accurate as detailed in appendix F. 
The ZUPT constraint is a velocity measurement therefore it has no benefit on a solution which already 
estimates the velocity accurately. The ZARU mainly improves the gyro biases estimation and limits 
the attitude drift during stationary periods. Overall, in terms of position accuracy, these two constraints 
have slightly improved the performances of the solution in suburban environment. 
It has to be mentioned here that no consistency checking method, or adaptive weighting scheme was 
used to reject outliers or minimize their impact. These outliers are mainly due to NLOS or large 
multipath errors. It is particularly visible when the vehicle operates in dense urban environment 
(between 700 and 3000 seconds). From an integrity monitoring point of view, these errors are 
dangerous because they are not well characterized by the error covariance estimated by the filter. 
The same conclusion on the feasibility of using the proposed solution for track selectivity as the one 
given during the simulation test can be provided: the horizontal 95% accuracy is at best (for GPS/INS 
with PRR and all the constraints) 4.6 meters in suburban environment according to Table 19. Given in 
train control metrics, in this case, it corresponds to an along-track accuracy of 3.5 m and an across-
track accuracy of 3.6 m. It is not sufficient for track selection as it is not sub-meter. For an 
autonomous (infrastructure free) selectivity, it would be necessary to use centimeter level positioning 
techniques based on carrier phase observables such as Precise Point Positioning algorithms (and 
precise corrections), or add a map matching algorithm (which integrity is complex to monitor).  
Sensors PRR NHC 
ZUPT 
ZARU 
RMS/Accuracy 95% (m) 
Horizontal Vertical 
Suburban Urban Suburban Urban 
GPS (LS)    14.0/21.6 23.4/44.3 22.3/45.8 31.3/71.2 
GPS/INS    4.2/8.1 14.8/31.2 6.9/13.2 17.7/36.6 
GPS/INS     2.5/4.7 10.3/20.3 7.7/13.4 18.5/35.6 
GPS/INS      2.5/4.6 8.9/19.0 6.9/12.3 15.1/28.1 
GPS/INS       2.5/4.6 8.4/17.8 6.9/12.4 14.9/25.7 
Table 19 Position accuracy performances of the different configurations combining GPS and the IMU 
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Figure 65 Selection of the Threshold for the detection of the stationarity to apply the ZUPT and ZARU 
constraints 
Equivalently to what has been plotted for the simulations, position, velocity and attitude error 
estimation are represented with the estimated 3𝜎 variance as estimated by the filter in Figure 66, 
Figure 67 and Figure 68. These figures correspond to the configuration augmented with the PRR. For 
simplicity other configurations have not been plotted. The behavior of the errors is similar to what 
have been observed in simulations. However, the position error sometimes exceeds the 3𝜎 covariance, 
especially on the vertical axis in urban environment. Anyway, the velocity and heading estimation 
error are well characterized by the covariance as estimated by the EKF. In narrow urban canyons in 
which the vehicle is operating between 1300 and 2200 seconds, the reduction of the number of 
measurements available lead to an increase of the error covariance estimated by the filter, especially 
for the position and velocity errors. 
The epochs at which the vehicle is stopped are characterized by a slowly growing heading error 
covariance. This can be simply explained by the fact that the measurements (especially GPS 
pseudoranges and pseudorange rates) do not provide any information about the attitude when the 
vehicle is fixed. In particular the yaw is not observable when the vehicle is stationary.  
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Figure 66 Position errors in the navigation frame, single frequency L1 C/A GPS receiver and IMU on 
real data 
 
 
 
Figure 67 Velocity errors in the navigation frame, single frequency L1 C/A GPS receiver and IMU on 
real data 
 
 
Figure 68 Attitude errors, single frequency L1 C/A GPS receiver and IMU on real data 
6.3.3 Results: integration of the track database for train control 
The architecture tested is composed of two subsystems. One subsystem is based on GPS and the 
second one is based on a second constellation. In this thesis, for the tests on real data, GLONASS has 
been used as a second constellation. The two subsytems are independently processed. The ionosphere 
delay has been corrected with Klobuchar model on the GLONASS measurements. It must not be done 
for an actual implementation of the solution that aims at using dual frequency receivers to remove 
ionosphere bias in order to avoid common mode failure. The number of GLONASS satellites being 
tracked is plotted in function of time in Figure 69, and its CDF is plotted in function of the 
environment of the vehicle in Figure 70. The elevation mask angle has been set to 5°. It can be 
inferred from figure that the number of GLONASS satellites being tracked in suburban environment is 
at least 8, 90% of the time. In urban environment this number has been higher than or equal to 5 more 
than 99% of the time. The number of satellite traked in urban environment is higher for GLONASS 
than for GPS in urban environment.  
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Figure 69 Number of GLONASS satellites being 
tracked as a function of time 
Figure 70 CDF of GLONASS satellites being 
tracked as a function of the environment 
It appears that the receiver is more sensitive with respect to GLONASS signals than GPS signals in 
urban environment in the sense that it tracks weaker signals. Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 71, SV 
with very low 𝐶/𝑁0  (lower than 25 dB-Hz) are not tracked frequently on GPS compared to 
GLONASS. It is arguable that these degraded measurements improve the positioning, especially in 
case of critical applications.  
 
Figure 71 Histogram of 𝐶/𝑁0 in urban environment for GPS and GLONASS 
The EKF that integrates GLONASS has the same design as the one that use GPS. The weighting 
scheme used for the GLONASS measurements is the one that has been presented in chapter 5 
(different URA and thermal noise error model used with respect to the GPS weighting scheme). The 
performances presented here have been obtained by using the measurements from the same IMU. 
However, a real implementation requires independent devices. For each system, the track database has 
been generated as the true trajectory which has been sampled with a spatial step of 1.5 m. The error 
model described in chapter 5 has been added to the track points. Each system has its own track points. 
The performances of the combination of both is not given in this section because, as detailed in 
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chapter 4, the combined position solution involve the 𝐻𝑃𝐿 of the subsystems which at not determined 
at this stage. As in simulations, the results are given in terms of along-track and across-track accuracy.  
Sensors PRR NHC 
ZUPT/
ZARU 
RMS/Accuracy 95% (m) 
Along-track Across-track 
Suburban Urban Suburban Urban 
GPS/INS/Map    2.8/5.2 5.6/12.5 0.2/0.4 0.7/0.8 
GPS/INS/Map     2.3/4.3 4.4/8.1 0.1/0.2 0.4/0.6 
GPS/INS/Map      2.3/4.3 4.6/9.2 0.1/0.2 0.6/1.1 
GPS/INS/Map       1.8/3.6 4.1/8.3 0.1/0.2 0.4/1.1 
GLO/INS/Map    2.7/5.8 9.3/18.2 0.2/0.4 0.8/0.9 
GLO/INS/Map     2.7/5.8 9.0/17.9 0.2/0.3 0.6/1.2 
GLO/INS/Map      2.7/5.8 9.0/17.9 0.1/0.3 0.6/1.1 
GLO/INS/Map       2.2/5.0 8.1/16.0 0.1/0.2 0.5/1.0 
Table 20 Position accuracy performances of the different configurations combining GPS or 
GLONASS, the IMU and the track database 
The filter that integrates GLONASS measurements shows worse accuracy performances in dense 
urban environment. A possible explanation to this observation is that GLONASS L1 uses a BPSK(0.5) 
modulation, for which the multipath sensitivity is higher than for BPSK(1) used in GPS L1 C/A. Thus 
it is less robust to multipath error. Moreover, more satellites with high 𝐶/𝑁0 are visible for GPS as 
depicted in Figure 71. 
Again, the right behavior of the filter is monitored by comparing the 3𝜎 of the state estimation and the 
error. The results are plotted in Figure 72 to Figure 77  for the two EKF that use GPS L1 C/A and 
GLONASS L1 measurements. For both filters, the state estimation error fulfills the criterion except in 
a few epochs in urban environment. It is visible between 750 and 800 seconds on the north component 
of the position error for the GPS based EKF (encircled in black in Figure 72). This observation is 
characteristic of an incorrect modelling of the measurement error. This issue is addressed in chapter 7.  
A direct consequence of applying the 1D constraint is the removal of the vertical error. The horizontal 
velocity error and its estimated variance have been reduced by integrating the track base in the 
solution.  
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Figure 72 Position error, single frequency GPS L1 
C/A receiver, IMU and track database on real data 
Figure 73 Position error, GLONASS L1 receiver, 
IMU and track database on real data 
 
 
Figure 74 Velocity error, single frequency GPS L1 
C/A receiver, IMU and track database on real data 
Figure 75 Velocity error, GLONASS L1 receiver, 
IMU and track database on real data 
  
Figure 76 Attitude error, single frequency GPS L1 
C/A receiver, IMU and track database on real data 
Figure 77 Attitude error, GLONASS L1 receiver, 
IMU and track database on real data 
Essentially, the integration of the track in the solution has improved the heading and velocity 
estimation, and thus the along-track position estimation. The benefit of the integration of the track 
database cannot be observed directly from the comparison of the two tables as they are not in the same 
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references. However, it has been observed that the along-track position improvement is remarkable in 
urban environment. At best the GPS/INS configuration performs a 13 m along-track accuracy (it 
corresponds to a horizontal accuracy of 17.8 in Table 19) in urban environment whereas 8.3 meters 
have been performed when integrating the track database. 
The benefit of the map is the most visible in the case of degraded constellation (i.e. less than 4 
satellites), which occurs frequently in narrow urban canyons for single GNSS receiver. To verify this 
assertion, on the GPS based EKF, GPS Code and Doppler measurements have been removed on 
purpose in a portion of suburban environment (150 seconds). All satellites have been removed except 
SV 12 and SV 13, which elevations are 50° and 17°. The results in terms of horizontal error are plotted 
in Figure 78. It can be seen that the drift and the uncertainty on the estimated position are both 
improved by integrating the track base information. The horizontal error after integration of the map 
does not exceed 10 meters during the partial GPS outage whereas it reaches more than 50 meters 
without map. The integration of the map is equivalent to restrain the motion to one dimension. Thus 2 
satellites are necessary to determine the along-track position and the clock bias. Moreover, in urban 
canyons, the satellites that are the least likely to be masked are those which are in the axis of the street. 
The satellites that are in the axis of the street are those which drive the along-track positioning 
accuracy. 
 
Figure 78 Position error after exclusion of all GPS satellites except SV 12 and SV 13 (from 50 to 200 
seconds).  
As only 2 satellites are theoretically required for the positioning with integration of the track database, 
it is suitable to apply very restrictive criterions for the inclusion of the measurements in the position 
calculation. It is feasible to apply, for instance, a 40 dB-Hz 𝐶/𝑁0 mask and a 50° elevation mask on 
the measurements, even when processing measurement from one constellation only. Doing so, it is 
possible to remove most NLOS signals at the cost of higher error covariance (and therefore will lead 
to higher 𝐻𝑃𝐿). 
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6.3.4 Results: dual constellation based architecture and introduction of WSS for 
electronic toll collection 
For ETC, the architecture of the solution proposed has been detailed in chapter 4. The GPS/INS EKF 
has been modified to process both GPS and GLONASS simultaneously. Essentially, the state vector 
has been augmented with the GLONASS clock bias and clock drift. The accuracy of the 
GPS/GLONASS/INS EKF is given in Table 21. The benefit of adding PRR and constraints to the 
initial solution has also been investigated in term of horizontal position accuracy.  
Most current automotive vehicles contain WSS. Therefore, the integration of WSS in the solution has 
been tested. Unfortunately, we had no access to these measurements in the framework of the thesis. 
The WSS measurements have thus been simulated from the velocity of reference to which white noise 
and scale factor errors have been added according to the model given in chapter 5. The results are 
given in Table 21. The NHC are always selected in the table when using WSS because they are 
contained in the WSS measurement model.  
Table 21 shows that the use of a dual constellation receiver improves significantly the accuracy in 
urban environment (from 44 to 26 m). Moreover, as more satellites are in view, it is possible to apply 
restrictive 𝐶/𝑁0 and elevation masks to remove the measurements that are likely to be dangerous from 
an integrity point of view (essentially NLOS). The use of the pseudorange rates has significantly 
improved the accuracy in all directions urban environment as observed in the previous configurations 
and on simulations. The use of WSS slightly improves the horizontal accuracy in urban environment. 
It has to be mentioned that the accuracy in the sense of the 95% percent confidence interval does not 
fully represents the whole performances of the solution and may not reflect the improvement provided 
by additional sensors or constraints. Indeed, it has been observed by investigating the error distribution 
that the WSS reduces the maximum error in urban and suburban environments whereas the 
improvement on the accuracy/RMS is not significant. WSS have particular interest in case of long 
GNSS outages such as in tunnels. To prove it, a complete GNSS outage has been simulated by 
removing all GNSS measurements during 50 seconds when the vehicle was driving in suburban 
environment. This has been done on the GPS/GLONASS/INS fusion scheme which processes 
pseudorange rates. The results in terms of horizontal errors are given in Figure 79. In both 
configurations (with and without WSS), it can be observed that the horizontal error slowly drift as well 
as the estimated standard deviation estimated by the filter. However, the magnitude of the error drift 
has been reduced significantly (from 150 to 20 m) under dead reckoning mode by integrating the WSS 
measurement. 
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Figure 79 Horizontal position error after exclusion of all GPS and GLONASS satellites during 50 s 
(50 to 100 s)  
 
Finally, the configuration that includes the WSS and the constraints provides the best position 
estimation, especially in urban environment.  
Sensors PRR NHC 
ZUPT 
ZARU 
RMS/Accuracy 95% (m) 
Horizontal Vertical 
Suburban Urban Suburban Urban 
GPS/GLO (LS)    12.0/19.5 13.5/27.6 24.6/45.6 32.8/71.5 
GPS/GLO/INS    3.7/6.0 8.3/16.5 9.8/17.6 17.1/33.1 
GPS/GLO/INS     3.4/5.3 6.8/11.2 9.5/14.3 17.0/30.0 
GPS/GLO/INS      3.1/5.1 6.7/12.3 8.2/13.7 12.0/21.2 
GPS/GLO/INS       2.9/4.9 6.5/12.0 7.4/11.4 12.1/20.8 
GPS/GLO/INS/
WSS 
    3.9/6.1 6.5/12.4 7.7/10.8 11.9/18.9 
GPS/GLO/INS/
WSS 
     2.8/4.6 6.3/10.1 7.2/10.4 12.5/19.0 
GPS/GLO/INS/
WSS 
      2.8/4.7 6.8/11.7 7.1/10.2 12.6/19.3 
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Table 21 Position accuracy performances of the different configurations combining GPS, GLONASS, 
the IMU and WSS 
As the WSS has been simulated, the scale factor error is known. The WSS scale factor error as 
estimated by the EKF is compared to the constant value that has been simulated. The results are given 
in Figure 80 for the configuration that integrates PRR measurement. After a transient state that lasted 
approximately 300 seconds, the WSS 3% scale factor error is well estimated by the EKF. The residual 
error is centered and within the 3𝜎 bounds. For a real odometer, the WSS scale factor error is expected 
to vary with time due to slips and slide as well as variation of the diameter of the wheels due to 
pressure and temperature variations. In that case, the correlation time that is involved in the state 
transition matrix shall be adjusted as well as the covariance of the WSS scale factor driven noise. 
 
Figure 80 Estimation of WSS scale factor error 
6.4 Conclusions 
A GNSS/INS fusion algorithm based on EKF has been fully designed in section 6.1. From a common 
architecture, different possible ways to improve the navigation thanks to additional measurements and 
dynamic constraints have been proposed. Moreover, the algorithm has been adapted to Train control 
by integrating a map and to ETC by integrating two constellations and WSS. Then, for each 
application, different configurations of sensors and measurements can be used.  
The fusion algorithms have then been validated and their performances have been assessed with 
simple realistic simulations in 6.2.  
 Simulations have shown that, with nominal measurements errors, for train control, no solution 
is able to fulfill the across track sub meter accuracy requirement.  
However, the different configurations tested perform along-track accuracies that are lower 
than the 6.6 meters requirement associated to the most stringent operations for train control.  
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 Simulations have shown that even by integrating a single constellation, the solutions that uses 
PRR measurements have a better accuracy than the 5.1 m requirement (the most stringent 
case).  
Therefore the solutions that are proposed are relevant with respect to the requirements. It was then 
necessary to test them on real data.  
Thus, the fusion algorithms have then been tested on real data in Toulouse downtown and suburbs. 
The basic GPS/IMU architecture which is the part that is common to both train control and ETC 
architecture has been tested first. As observed in the simulations, on real data, the EKF improves the 
position accuracy in the horizontal and vertical plane and smooth the estimated trajectory. It has also 
been observed that, in most cases, the improvement obtained by using motion constraints is not 
significant. Therefore these measurements will not be used in the next sections.  
For train control, the conclusions of this analysis are the following: 
 It has been showed that even the most accurate GPS/IMU configuration is not able to perform 
sufficient across track accuracy for track selectivity in train control in any environment.  
 The use of the track database has mainly improved accuracy in the across track direction, 
however, in dense urban, this motion constraint has been shown to improve the accuracy. It 
has also been proven that the EKF does not diverge, even with only two satellites in view if 
the track base is integrated. This is of particular interest for applying restrictive masks for the 
satellite selection and protect against local effects, which from the integrity monitoring is 
crucial.  
 In suburban environment, the 6.6 meter along-track accuracy requirement is fulfilled for both 
GPS and GLONASS based EKF. The solution is not accurate enough for navigation in train 
stations and corridor in urban environment. 
For ETC, the conclusions of this analysis are the following: 
 The accuracies performed in suburban environments are lower than the worst case 5.1 m 
requirement for most configurations.  
 The simultaneous processing of the two constellations has shown significant improvements in 
dense urban area (from 17 m at best, to 10 m horizontal accuracy). It is sufficient to fulfill the 
less stringent requirements.  
 The integration of WSS has shown low benefit in terms of horizontal accuracy. 
 The principal benefit of using WSS is to limit the error drift in case of long GNSS outage. 
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7 SELECTION OF THE GNSS 
MEASUREMENTS 
The objective of this chapter is to define a set of metrics and tests in order to select the 
measurements that will be integrated in the navigation algorithm. This selection process aims at 
removing from the PVT calculation the measurements that are unreliable in order to assist the 
integrity monitoring algorithm upstream so that it can focus on other types of failures. It has 
already been stated in Chapter 5 that the multipath interference phenomenon and the tracking of 
NLOS signals are the two sources of failures intrinsic to the urban/suburban environments 
(interference and other threats are not being investigated in the thesis).  
Multipath is a phenomenon that affects radio-wave propagation in urban environment. It originates 
from the interaction of a travelling radio-frequency signal with urban objects present between the 
emitting and receiving antenna such as buildings, lamp poles or vehicles. These interactions can be 
reflection and diffusion by surfaces or diffraction by edges. For the GNSS case, when the direct 
signal (LOS) is received as well as well as multipath, the autocorrelation function is distorted 
which generates a bias on the estimation of the code delay by the DLL. The bias on the pseudo-
range measurements in turn transforms into an error in the position domain, and may lead to 
positioning failures. It is therefore proposed to detect and then exclude or underweight the 
measurements that are affected by large non nominal multipath errors. In this chapter, the way to 
detect abnormally biased measurements due to multipath is investigated. In particular, a simple 
approach to design a multipath detection module based on the principle of detection of non-
nominal distortions of the correlator function is proposed in section 7.1. 
However, the tracking of a NLOS signal may not result in an abnormal distortion of the correlation 
function. Therefore, such an event may not be detected by monitoring the correlation function. It is 
necessary to detect this phenomenon by other means. It can be done by applying elevation/azimuth 
and/or 𝐶/𝑁0  masks as well as cross checking the GNSS measurements with the measurements 
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predicted using the sensors that are available on board (Kalman filter innovation monitoring). The 
ways to protect the system against biased measurements due to the tracking of NLOS signals is 
detailed in section 0.  
7.1 Detection of measurements affected by abnormally large errors 
due to multipath  
The contribution of multipath to the nominal error model has been characterized by simulations in 
chapter 5. For the different models of receivers and modulations, the error distribution has been 
CDF-overbounded by a zero-mean normal distribution which variance does not exceed 2 m, even 
for the very low elevations. This is due to the filtering effect by the carrier tracking loop (because 
the echoes have different Doppler frequencies than the direct signal) combined with the short 
lifespan of the echoes because on the simulations that have been conducted on the LMS channel, 
the vehicle is assumed to be moving at 20 km/h. However, larger errors due to multipath may occur 
in real urban environment, for instance when the vehicle is driving at lower velocities. In this case, 
the multipath error distribution may not be well represented by this nominal error model. It is either 
necessary to inflate the nominal model or to detect and exclude the measurements that are not 
covered by this model.  
To prove that such errors are theoretically possible, let us investigate the multipath error envelope. 
The multipath error envelope is obtained by assuming that the signal is affected by one reflection, 
with a fixed attenuation, in phase or antiphase compared to the LOS. If the LOS and the echo are 
not in phase or antiphase, the magnitude of the resulting measurement error will be lower. 
Assuming the worst possible configuration, the amplitude of the specular echo is equal to the 
amplitude of the signal of reference. The multipath error envelopes for the two models of receiver 
presented in section 4.1 processing GPS L1 C/A and Galileo E1 OS are plotted in Figure 81 and 
Figure 82. For the narrowband receiver, the theoretical maximum tracking error is 73.2 m for L1 
C/A and 55.0 m for E1 OS. For the wideband receiver model with narrow Early-Late spacing, the 
theoretical maximum tracking error is 15.1 m for L1 C/A and 18.3 for E1 OS. Therefore, such 
biases due to multipath, which are theoretically possible, are a threat for the integrity of the 
solution. They are all the more dangerous in case of degraded constellation conditions that occur in 
urban environment (because an impact of a measurement bias has a larger impact on the position 
error). Moreover, in Kalman filtering, the measurement errors are assumed to be centered which is 
an invalid assumption in such case. Additionally, at low velocities, the multipath errors are not 
smoothed by the EKF. Moreover it induces other problems related to the position computation 
based on Kalman filtering: 
 the measurement errors are assumed to be centered which is an invalid assumption in such 
case.  
 at low velocities, the multipath errors are not smoothed by the EKF.  
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 several large multipath errors could theoretically occur simultaneously on several 
measurements, especially when using dual constellation receivers such as proposed for 
ETC or for quad constellation based train control system 
 
Figure 81 Code multipath envelope for the narrowband receiver model processing GPS L1 C/A and 
Galileo E1 OS 
 
Figure 82 Code multipath envelope for the narrowband receiver model processing GPS L1 C/A and 
Galileo E1 OS 
The approach detailed in this section consists in detecting the abnormally distorted measurements 
(in the LOS + NLOS configuration) and inform the integrity monitoring algorithm about their 
status. The aim is to measure the distortion of the correlation function due to multipath to detect 
abnormal measurement and exclude them prior to the integrity monitoring module. The techniques 
used to measure the distortion due to multipath are inspired from the research done for the 
detection of evil waveforms (EWF) which are anomalies on the transmitted GNSS signals [Phelts, 
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2001]. Inspired from this approach, [Irsigler and Hein, 2005] proposed a technique to detect the 
presence of multipath by using these EWF monitors.  
The approach is that of a classical hypothesis testing. A set of two hypotheses to test is defined: 
 𝐻0: no multipath is present 
 𝐻1: presence of multipath 
Distortion metrics which are linear combinations of correlator outputs are used as test variables to 
detect multipath-induced distortions. In this thesis existing metrics and a new metric are investigated. 
A new rigorous approach to calculate the decision thresholds under 𝐻0 and to adjust the Probability of 
False Alarm (𝑃𝐹𝐴) is proposed and compared to the prior art.  
The 𝑃𝐹𝐴 is defined as: 
 𝑃𝐹𝐴 = 𝑃(𝐻1|𝐻0) Eq. 7-1 
The theoretical concept of multipath sensitivity under 𝐻1 and associated to a value of Probability of 
Missed Detection (𝑃𝑀𝐷) is defined and discussed in this thesis. 
The 𝑃𝑀𝐷 is defined as: 
 𝑃𝑀𝐷 = 𝑃(𝐻0|𝐻1) Eq. 7-2 
Then, the performances of the detection tests are assessed on time series generated by an urban 
channel model processed by a realistic GNSS receiver simulator.  
7.1.1 Existing and proposed detection metrics 
The proposed test metrics are linear combinations of correlator outputs which enable to analyze the 
distortion of the correlation function used by the DLL (and thus to generate the code pseudorange 
measurements). Usual metrics are detailed in the literature and the two that perform the best according 
to prior art [Irsigler and Hein, 2005] for multipath detection are the so-called simple ratio and 
differential ratio metrics.  
Existing metrics are coherent and therefore can only be used when the carrier is tracked by a Phase 
Lock Loop (PLL). In urban environments, the tracking of the carrier phase by a PLL is less robust than 
the tracking of the carrier frequency by a Frequency Locked Loop (FLL). However, tracking only the 
frequency does not allow to have a carrier phase lock and thus results in an erroneous phase 
estimation. If this bias is close to π/2 for instance, the useful signal at the in-phase correlator output is 
dominated by thermal noise and computing the coherent metrics becomes meaningless. A non-
coherent metrics is thus proposed in this thesis because it is compatible with the use of a FLL. The 
drawback of non-coherent metrics is the difficulty to accurately characterize their distribution. 
Coherent metrics will be studied in section 7.1.2, while non-coherent metrics will be studied in section 
7.1.3.  
Let us denote 𝐼𝑋  and 𝑄𝑋  the in-phase and quadrature-phase correlator outputs located in X on the 
correlation function. The expressions of the metric of references are detailed in Table 22.  
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Type of test Expression 
Simple Ratio Tests (𝑀1) 
𝐼𝑋
𝐼𝑌
 
Differential Ratio Tests (𝑀2) 
𝐼𝑋 − 𝐼𝑌
𝐼𝑍
 
Non Coherent Simple Ratio Tests (𝑀3) 
𝐼𝑋
2 + 𝑄𝑋
2
𝐼𝑌
2 + 𝑄𝑌
2 
Table 22 Metrics of interest used in this thesis 
Note: The A Posteriori Multipath Estimator (APME) [Sleewaegen and Boon, 2001], which has been 
patented by Septentrio is an open loop multipath estimation technique used for multipath mitigation 
and designed for GPS L1 C/A. The expression of the APME multipath error (𝑀𝑃) estimator is given 
by: 
 𝑀𝑃 = −0.42𝜆𝑐 (1 −
𝛾+2𝐼𝐿2
𝛾0𝐼𝑃
1
1 − 𝑑
) Eq. 7-3 
where: 
 0.42 is an empirical likelihood factor  
 𝐼𝐿2  is an additional “very late” correlator output (delayed by 𝑑  chips with respect to the 
prompt) 
 𝛾+2 and 𝛾0 are corrections terms that accounts for the rounding of the correlation peak due to 
the filtering of the incoming signal by the front-end (the way to compute these parameters is 
not ).  
This multipath estimator is equivalent to simple ratio metric ( 𝐼𝐿2/𝐼𝑃 ), which is centered (its 
expectation in the nominal case is equal to 𝛾0(1 − 𝑑)/𝛾2) and multiplied by a likelihood factor. Good 
multipath detection performance can be expected for such a metric as it is able to estimate correctly 
the multipath error according to [Sleewaegen and Boon, 2001].  
7.1.2 Determination of the detection thresholds for coherent metrics 
In this chapter, it is assumed that 𝐻0 holds which means that the receiver is only affected by thermal 
noise. The general correlator output model at the 𝑘 th integration index when assuming a linear 
variation of the phase tracking error during the integration interval has been given in Eq. 2-9. In this 
chapter, the tracking is assumed to be sufficiently precise to neglect the code tracking error (𝜏 − ?̂?), the 
phase tracking error (𝜃 − 𝜃 ) and the frequency tracking error (𝑓 − 𝑓 ) in the nominal case (i.e. 
Multipath free). The phase tracking error can only be neglected if the carrier is tracked by a PLL. The 
data are also not considered in the model as they have no impact when the correlator outputs are 
normalized by another correlator output corresponding to the same integration index, as it will be the 
case here. The simplified correlator output model becomes: 
 Chapter 7: Selection of the GNSS measurements  
 
195 
 𝐼𝑋(𝑘) = √
𝐶
2
𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋) + 𝑛𝑋(𝑘) Eq. 7-4 
Therefore the normalized correlator output distribution is such that 𝐼𝑋~𝒩(𝜇𝑋,, 𝜎𝑋
2) with: 
 𝜇𝑋 = √2𝐶 𝑁0⁄ 𝑇𝑖𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋) 
 𝜎𝑋
2 = 1 
 The covariance between two correlator outputs in 𝑋 and 𝑌 is 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑌) = 𝐸[𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑌] =
𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑌 − 𝑋) [Irsigler and Hein, 2005] and [Sleewaegen and Boon, 2001] 
The objective is now to establish the thresholds on the metric so that the receiver decide whether it is 
under 𝐻0  or 𝐻1 . In this subsection we study two different methods for the determination of the 
thresholds. 
7.1.2.1 Threshold determination assuming that the metric is Gaussian 
The first method which is the one proposed in [Irsigler and Hein, 2005] assumes that the metrics 
(Simple Ratio Tests and Differential Ratio Tests) follow Gaussian distributions. Let’s denote 𝑀 an 
arbitrary metric among the coherent ones, it is assumed that 𝑀~𝒩(𝜇𝑀 , 𝜎𝑀
2 ). Therefore the interval of 
confidence for the metrics is the interval [𝜇𝑀 −𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝𝜎𝑀;  𝜇𝑀 +𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝𝜎𝑀] where 𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝 is an expansion 
factor that can be adjusted according to the desired 𝑃𝐹𝐴. The relation between this factor and the 𝑃𝐹𝐴 
can be obtained with standard tables of Gaussian tails. For instance, 𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝  = 2 corresponds to an 
expected 𝑃𝐹𝐴 of 0.0455. The ratio of two Gaussian random variables asymptotically tends towards a 
Gaussian distribution when 𝜇𝑀/𝜎𝑀 tends towards infinity. This assumption may be relevant in the 
operating conditions of [Irsigler and Hein, 2005] because in this article the integration time is 
sufficiently high (“1000 ms”) and the simulated 𝐶 𝑁0⁄  values are high (40/45 dB-Hz). In a standard 
GNSS receiver however, the integration time is much shorter (20 ms for GPS L1 C/A at best with data 
bit synchronization assumed). Moreover 𝐶 𝑁0⁄  values can be lower than the range of value tested in 
the prior art in a challenging environment, which is relevant to the application of interest. As a 
consequence, the distribution of the metrics has to be revisited for the present case. For each coherent 
metric, the bounds of the confidence interval are given hereafter, and the calculations to obtain them 
are given in appendix G. 
For the Simple Ratio Tests (𝑀1), at the first order, the expression of the expectation and the standard 
deviation are given by: 
 𝐸[𝑀1] =
𝜇𝑋
𝜇𝑌
 Eq. 7-5 
 𝑠𝑡𝑑(𝑀1) =
𝜇𝑋
𝜇𝑌
√(
𝜎𝑋
2
𝜇𝑋
2 +
𝜎𝑌
2
𝜇𝑌
2 − 2
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑌
𝜇𝑋𝜇𝑌
 ) Eq. 7-6 
For the Differential Ratio Tests (𝑀2), the expression of the expectation and standard deviation are 
given by: 
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 E[𝑀2] =
𝜇𝑋 − 𝜇𝑌
𝜇𝑍
 Eq. 7-7 
 std(𝑀2) = (
𝜇𝑋 − 𝜇𝑌
𝜇𝑍
)√
𝜎𝑍
2
𝜇𝑍
2 +
𝜎𝑋
2 + 𝜎𝑌
2 − 2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑌
(𝜇𝑋 − 𝜇𝑌)2
+ 2
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑍𝑋 − 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑍𝑌
𝜇𝑍(𝜇𝑋 − 𝜇𝑌)
 Eq. 7-8 
7.1.2.2 Threshold determination without assuming that the metric is Gaussian 
The approach which is proposed in this thesis does not assume any Gaussianity aspect of the metric 
(the correlator outputs are still considered Gaussian). It can thus be applied to receivers using standard 
integration time and for signals with low 𝐶/𝑁0. 
The Geary-Hinkley transformation [Geary, 1930] [Hinkley, 1969] makes it possible to form a new 
random variable that is Gaussian when applied to a ratio of two correlated non central Gaussian 
variables. If 𝐼𝑋~𝒩(𝜇𝑋 , 𝜎𝑋
2) and 𝐼𝑌~𝒩(𝜇𝑌, 𝜎𝑌
2) with a covariance 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑌 , then the expression of the 
Geary-Hinkley transform applied to 𝑀1 =
𝐼𝑋
𝐼𝑌
 is the following: 
 𝑇 =
𝜇𝑌𝑀1 − 𝜇𝑋
√𝜎𝑌
2𝑀1
2 − 2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑌𝑀1 + 𝜎𝑋
2
 Eq. 7-9 
where 𝑇~𝒩(0,1) provided that the denominator inside de square root operator is unlikely to reach 
negative values.  
The next step for the threshold determination is to set the desired 𝑃𝐹𝐴 on the transformed variable 𝑇. 
Let 𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝 be the expansion factor that corresponds to the expected 𝑃𝐹𝐴, the thresholds for 𝑀1 are the 
roots of the associated second degree equation. For every metrics and the thresholds obtained are 
given hereafter.  
For the Simple Ratio Tests (𝑀1), the expression of the lower bound (𝐿𝐵) and the upper bound (𝑈𝐵) of 
the metric’s distribution are given by: 
𝐿𝐵 =
−(−2𝜇𝑋𝜇𝑌 + 2𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝
2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑌) − √(−2𝜇𝑋𝜇𝑌 + 2𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑌)
2
− 4(𝜇𝑌
2 −𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝2𝜎𝑌
2)(𝜇𝑋
2 −𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝2𝜎𝑋
2)
2(𝜇𝑌
2 −𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝2𝜎𝑌
2)
  
𝑈𝐵 =
−(−2𝜇𝑋𝜇𝑌 + 2𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝
2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑌) + √(−2𝜇𝑋𝜇𝑌 + 2𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑌)
2
− 4(𝜇𝑌
2 −𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝2𝜎𝑌
2)(𝜇𝑋
2 −𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝2𝜎𝑋
2)
2(𝜇𝑌
2 −𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝2𝜎𝑌
2)
 Eq. 7-10 
For the Differential Ratio Tests (𝑀2), the expression of the lower and upper bounds of the metrics can 
be deduced from the expressions of Eq. 7-10. To do so, it is necessary to substitute the index 𝑋 by the 
index 𝑁, and 𝑌 by the index 𝑍 (the third point on the correlation function) in the general expression of 
Eq. 7-10 where : 
 𝜇𝑁 = 𝜇𝑋 − 𝜇𝑌 Eq. 7-11 
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 𝜎𝑁 = √𝜎𝑋
2 + 𝜎𝑋
2 − 2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑌 Eq. 7-12 
 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑁,𝑍 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑍 − 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑌𝑍 Eq. 7-13 
The validity of the thresholds provided above is directly derived from the validity of the Geary-
Hinkley transformation which is defined by 𝜇𝑌 ≥ 𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝𝜎𝑌 . By replacing 𝜇𝑌  and 𝜎𝑌  by their 
expressions, the domain of validity corresponds to: 
 
 𝐶 𝑁0⁄ ≥
1
2𝑇𝑖
(
𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑌)
)
2
 Eq. 7-14 
Eq. 7-14 shows that the validity domain of the threshold depends upon the correlation function used to 
track the signal. It will thus be affected by the signal modulation. Indeed the slope of the correlation 
function is higher for BOC or CBOC signals than for a BPSK(1).  This means that the range of 
relevant locations for the correlator at the denominator is thinner than for BPSK. This intuitive 
assumption is well illustrated by the domain of validity of the bounds given in Eq. 7-14. In Figure 83, 
the lower bound of the validity domain in term of 𝐶 𝑁0⁄  is given as a function of the correlator 
location for the three modulations with an infinite receiver’s front-end bandwidth. The expansion 
factor is set to a typical value of 3𝜎 which corresponds to a 𝑃𝐹𝐴 of 0.0027. The operational range of 
𝐶 𝑁0⁄  constrains the choice for the monitoring correlators. In urban environment where a typical value 
for the 𝐶 𝑁0⁄  mask is 30 dB-Hz (as shown in 5.1.1.1.5) to select the robust measurement in a multi-
GNSS system, for an expansion factor of 3, the allowed values of 𝑌 for BPSK is [-0.5, 0.5] whereas it 
is [-0.17, 0.17] for BOC(1,1) and CBOC(6,1,1/11). 
 
Figure 83 Locations allowed for the correlator used for the normalization of the metric correspond to 
the area above the curve 
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As the detectors studied in this thesis are likely to be implemented on standard receivers that only 
process three correlators outputs (prompt, early and late), this will limit the amount of possible 
combination to form the metric. The validity domain of the BOC imposes the condition of a chip 
spacing for the DLL lower than 0.34 to normalize the test by either the early or the late correlator 
output. 
7.1.2.3 Improvement brought by the non-Gaussian approach 
The performances of the thresholds based on the Gaussianity and non-Gaussainity assumptions are 
compared on a typical case of study in which the receiver processes GPS L1 C/A and Galileo E1 OS. 
The RF front-end bandwidth is assumed infinite for simplicity. Three correlator outputs are simulated 
according to the model presented in Eq. 7-4, in 𝑋 = 0, 𝑌 = 0.25 and 𝑍 = 0.125. The correlation 
duration is set to 20 ms. The thresholds are calculated with gausianity assumption and with the 
proposed method for a typical range of operating 𝐶 𝑁0⁄  for an expansion factor of 3. The observed 𝑃𝐹𝐴 
is plotted in Figure 84  for 𝑀1 and in Figure 85 for 𝑀2 on GPS L1 C/A signals. 
 
Figure 84 Comparaison between the expected 𝑃𝐹𝐴 (0.0228) and the observed 𝑃𝐹𝐴 for 𝑀1 
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Figure 85 Comparaison between the expected 𝑃𝐹𝐴 (0.0228) and the observed 𝑃𝐹𝐴 for 𝑀2 
It can be noticed that the Gaussianity of the metric distribution increases with the 𝐶 𝑁0⁄  as the 
observed 𝑃𝐹𝐴 converge to the expected 𝑃𝐹𝐴,. The proposed thresholds enable to set the right 𝑃𝐹𝐴, even 
for low 𝐶 𝑁0⁄ . This observation would be all the more characteristic for lower integration times 
(typically 1 ms).  
7.1.3 Determination of the detection thresholds for non-coherent metrics 
For non-coherent metrics, it is now required to use the quadrature-phase correlator outputs that are 
modelled by: 
 𝑄𝑋(𝑘) = √
𝐶
2
𝑑(𝑘)𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋) sin(𝜀𝜑) + 𝑛𝑋(𝑘) Eq. 7-15 
The determination of the thresholds for the non-coherent metric (𝑀3) requires the knowledge of its 
distribution. The term 𝐼𝑋
2 + 𝑄𝑋
2 follows a chi-square distribution with 2 degrees of freedom and a non-
centrality parameter 2𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝐶 𝑁0⁄ 𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋). This result is classically used to form tests in the acquisition 
step of the receiver. The ratio of two uncorrelated non-central 𝜒2  distributed variables follows a 
doubly non-central F-distribution [Bulgren, 1971], [Scheffé, 1959], with known parameters. Few 
works discusses the doubly non-central F-distribution, and a way to approximate this distribution is 
given in [Paolella, 2007]. To test the approximation, 𝐼𝑋, 𝑄𝑋, 𝐼𝑌 and 𝑄𝑌 are generated without taking 
into account their correlation. Under these assumptions: 
 𝑀3~𝐹(2,2,2𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐶/𝑁0𝐾𝑐𝑐
2 (𝑋), 2𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐶/𝑁0𝐾𝑐𝑐
2 (𝑌)) Eq. 7-16 
where 𝐹 denotes the doubly noncentral 𝐹-distribution.  
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Eq. 7-16 has been validated by simulations. However, when considering the correlation between 𝑋 and 
𝑌 correlator outputs, the distribution of the non-coherent metric becomes unknown and different from 
the basic doubly non central F-distribution. In particular, it has been observed by simulations that the 
non-centrality parameters do not correctly describe the function. Simulations have shown that the 
distribution of 𝑀3  (with consideration of the correlation between 𝑋  and 𝑌 ) can be coarsely 
approximated by a different doubly noncentral 𝐹-distribution: 
 𝑀3~𝐹 (2,2, 2𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐶/𝑁0
𝐾𝑐𝑐
2 (𝑋)
𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋 − 𝑌)
, 2𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐶/𝑁0
𝐾𝑐𝑐
2 (𝑌)
𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋 − 𝑌)
) Eq. 7-17 
The result is given in Figure 86 for different values of 𝐶/𝑁0 with 𝑋 = 0 and 𝑌 = 0.25 chip. The PDF of 
the empirical approximation coarsely fit the actual distribution even when the 𝐶/𝑁0 value and the 𝑋 
and 𝑌 locations are varying.  
 
Figure 86 Approximation of the non-coherent metric probability density function with doubly non 
central F distribution 
Due to the fact that this distribution is difficult to handle, the best approach consists in calculating the 
thresholds by simulation. Therefore, for non-coherent metrics, the thresholds are computed 
numerically. The interval of non-detection is symmetric and centered on the mean of the metric. The 
lack of knowledge about the distribution of the metric is the main drawback related to the use of non-
coherent metrics. 
7.1.4 Sensitivity of the Detection Metrics 
In this subsection, the signal is assumed to be affected by one unique reflection in phase with the 
direct signal, which is one hypothesis generally assumed for the characterization of multipath 
mitigation techniques (multipath envelope) although it is not at all representative from the urban 
conditions with a mobile user. However, it is interesting to first test our detection metric in a simple 
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case. The non-coherent metrics are not studied in this section due to the lack of knowledge of their 
distributions. The model of the correlator output thus becomes: 
 𝐼𝑋,𝑀𝑃(𝑘) = √
𝐶
2
𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋) +
1
√𝑆𝑀𝑅
√
𝐶
2
𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋 − 𝜏) + 𝑛𝑋(𝑘) Eq. 7-18 
where: 
 𝜏 is the relative delay of the reflection with respect to the direct signal 
 𝑆𝑀𝑅 is the signal to multipath power ratio 
The Gaussian model can be used here with: 
 𝜇𝑋,𝑀𝑃 = 𝜇𝑋 +√
2𝐶 𝑁0⁄ 𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝑅
𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋 − 𝜏) = 𝜇𝑋 + 𝛼𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋 − 𝜏) Eq. 7-19 
The sensitivity is defined as the maximum Signal to Multipath Ratio (SMR) at which the test is 
successful providing a given allowable probability of missed detection (PMD). In this subsection it is 
assumed that the multipath delay τ is a parameter. Figure 87 illustrates the two scenarios that can 
occur and can lead to a missed detection. The PMD corresponds to the area (in red) in between the 
thresholds that were set under the H0 hypothesis. 
 
Figure 87 Possible scenarios that can lead to a missed detection 
The metric affected by multipath has a new distribution, which is unknown. However the multipath 
only affects the mean of the metric of both numerator and denominator. The calculation of the 
sensitivity starts from the following statement on the metric: 
 Configuration 1: 
 𝑈𝐵∃𝑀𝑃 = 𝐿𝐵∄𝑀𝑃 Eq. 7-20 
No 
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 Configuration 2: 
 𝐿𝐵∃𝑀𝑃 = 𝑈𝐵∄𝑀𝑃  Eq. 7-21 
Where 𝐿𝐵∄𝑀𝑃  and 𝑈𝐵∄𝑀𝑃  are respectively the lower bound and upper bound determined in the 
multipath free scenario to set the 𝑃𝐹𝐴. 𝐿𝐵∃𝑀𝑃 and  𝑈𝐵∃𝑀𝑃 are respectively the lower and upper bound 
in the presence a multipath. 
The analytic expressions of 𝑈𝐵∃𝑀𝑃 and 𝐿𝐵∃𝑀𝑃 are obtained using the Geary-Hinkley transformation, 
by introducing a new expansion factor 𝑚𝑚𝑑 in order to set the 𝑃𝑀𝐷. Particular caution must be taken 
when setting the 𝑃𝑀𝐷 because as illustrated in Figure 87 the missed detection probability is only due to 
one of the two Gaussian tail (either left or right). Therefore in order to impose 𝑃𝑀𝐷𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, the expansion 
factor 𝑚𝑀𝐷 shall be chosen so that it performs 𝑃𝑀𝐷𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡 = 2𝑃𝑀𝐷𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 .  
Then, Configuration 1 is assumed in order to calculate the minimum 𝑆𝑀𝑅, which is obtained by 
solving the second order equation given in Eq. 7-23. The validity of the Scenario must be checked 
afterwards with the following possible indicator: 
 𝜂 = sign(𝐸[𝑚|∃𝑀𝑃(𝑆𝑀𝑅, 𝜏) ] − E[𝑚|∄𝑀𝑃]) Eq. 7-22 
 If 𝜂 is positive, Configuration 1 is valid.  
 If 𝜂 is negative, Configuration 1 is not valid and the 𝑆𝑀𝑅 shall be calculated for Configuration 2 
with the corresponding equation 
For the Simple Ratio Test metric, the sensitivity is obtained by calculating the minimum root (denoted 
𝛼1) of the following second order polynomial form: 
Configuration 1: 
𝛼2{[𝑈𝐵∄𝑀𝑃𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑌 − 𝜏)]
2 − 2𝑈𝐵∄𝑀𝑃𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑌 − 𝜏)𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋 − 𝜏) + 𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋 − 𝜏)
2}
+ 𝛼{2𝑈𝐵∄𝑀𝑃
2𝜇𝑌𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑌 − 𝜏) − 2𝑈𝐵∄𝑀𝑃[𝜇𝑋𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑌 − 𝜏) + 𝜇𝑌𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋 − 𝜏)]
+ 2𝜇𝑋𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋 − 𝜏)} + 𝑈𝐵∄𝑀𝑃
2(𝜇𝑌
2 −𝑚𝑀𝐷
2 𝜎𝑌
2) + 2𝑈𝐵∄𝑀𝑃(−𝜇𝑋𝜇𝑌 +𝑚𝑀𝐷
2 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑌)
+ 𝜇𝑋
2 −𝑚𝑀𝐷
2 𝜎𝑋
2 = 0 
Eq. 7-23 
Configuration 2: 
𝛼2{[𝐿𝐵∄𝑀𝑃𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑌 − 𝜏)]
2 − 2𝐿𝐵∄𝑀𝑃𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑌 − 𝜏)𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋 − 𝜏) + 𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋 − 𝜏)
2}
+ 𝛼{2𝐿𝐵∄𝑀𝑃
2𝜇𝑌𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑌 − 𝜏) − 2𝐿𝐵∄𝑀𝑃[𝜇𝑋𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑌 − 𝜏) + 𝜇𝑌𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋 − 𝜏)]
+ 2𝜇𝑋𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋 − 𝜏)} + 𝐿𝐵∄𝑀𝑃
2(𝜇𝑌
2 −𝑚𝑀𝐷
2 𝜎𝑌
2) + 2𝐿𝐵∄𝑀𝑃(−𝜇𝑋𝜇𝑌 +𝑚𝑀𝐷
2 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑥𝑦)
+ 𝜇𝑋
2 −𝑚𝑀𝐷
2 𝜎𝑋
2 = 0 
Eq. 7-24 
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Then the 𝑆𝑀𝑅 is deduced with: 
 𝑆𝑀𝑅 = 
2𝐶 𝑁0⁄ 𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝛼12
 Eq. 7-25 
For the differential ratio test, the sensitivity is obtained with the same calculation, by substituting 𝑋 by 
𝑁, and 𝑌 by 𝑍 in the polynomial expression. 
The sensitivity shall be taken into account in the design of the quality monitoring indicator concept. 
The way to calculate and interpret the sensitivity is given in this study through a realistic example. The 
𝐶 𝑁0⁄  is set to 40 dB-Hz, and the metric of interest is 𝑀1, with 𝑋 = 0.25 and 𝑌 = 0. The delay of the 
multipath is arbitrarily set to 0.5 chip. The signal of interest is in this example BPSK(1). This example 
is also used to validate the results obtained by simulations. The reverse process is done as a validation, 
where the multipath amplitude is set to the value of the sensitivity for the corresponding 𝑃𝐹𝐴. Random 
draw of the metric value affected to multipath are performed, the 𝑃𝑀𝐷  is then estimated as the 
proportion undetected samples. It can be inferred from Table 5 that the correspondence between the 
𝑃𝑀𝐷  and the sensitivity is well characterized by the theoretical expressions according to the green 
cells. This table of sensitivity could have been translated into a table of maximum pseudorange error. 
Indeed, as an example, for a conventional DLL using a narrow correlator to track the GPS L1 C/A 
signal, the rule of thumb for the envelope of the pseudorange multipath error is: 
 
 𝜀𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ =
1
√𝑆𝑀𝑅
𝑑
2
 Eq. 7-26 
where 𝑑 is the chip spacing between the early and late correlators of the DLL.  
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Table 23 The white cells represents the sensitivity of the test (maximum SMR for which the detection 
is successful given the 𝑃𝑀𝐷) on GPS L1 C/A for 𝑀1 with an infinite front end bandwidth. The green 
cells represent the observed 𝑃𝑀𝐷. 
For low 𝑃𝐹𝐴 associated with low 𝑃𝑀𝐷, the efficiency of the test in term of sensitivity is low (at best 
10.7 dB corresponds to a worst case 21.4 m error with the narrowband receiver multipath envelope 
processing BPSK(1)). To improve it, an intuitive idea is to narrow the distribution of the multipath-
free metric. Multipath has long correlation times compared to the thermal noise which is memoryless 
(white). Multipath deterministically results in a translation of the distribution of the metric.  
To narrow the distribution, it is either possible to low-pass filter the correlator outputs that are 
combined to form the metric, or to low pass filter the metric. The smoothing of the correlator outputs 
is preferred as the new thresholds can easily be calculated when using the proposed approach. 
Moreover, the filtered denominator is less likely to be null after this filtering step which enableS the 
extension of the domain of validity of the metrics. On the other hand, if the Gaussianity assumption 
has been used it is more practical to filter the metric instead. The problem relative to such a smoothing 
is the data term in the correlator output that can be +1 or -1. If an external mean is available to get the 
data message, it is possible to multiply each correlator by the corresponding sign of the data bit which 
is known. An alternative is to take the absolute value of each correlator outputs. This step changes the 
distribution of the correlator output which must then be modelled by a folded normal distribution. This 
distribution can still be approximated by a Gaussian provided that the correlators are unlikely to take 
negative values. This condition is fulfilled if all the correlators used to form the metric are under the 
conditions of  Eq. 7-14. The general model of correlator output becomes: 
 𝜇𝑋 = √2
𝐶 𝑁0⁄
𝐵𝑙
𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋) 
𝜎𝑋 = 1 
Eq. 7-27 
where 𝐵𝑙 is the double-sided equivalent noise bandwidth of the low pass filter. For a noise equivalent 
bandwidth of 5Hz, the sensitivity is given in Table 24. 
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2.87e-7 
13.9 dB 12.6 dB 11.5 dB 10.4 dB 
2.1e-7 1.9e-7 2.3e-7 2.2e-7 
Table 24 The white cells represents the sensitivity of the test (maximum SMR for which the detection 
is successful given the 𝑃𝑀𝐷)  on GPS L1 C/A for M1 with infinite front end BW with smoothing of the 
correlator. The green cells represent the observed 𝑃𝑀𝐷. 
The gain in term of sensitivity obtained by smoothing the correlator outputs with a 5 Hz equivalent 
noise bandwidth low pass filter is approximately 11 dB in the studied scenario at best (at best 21.3 dB 
corresponds to 6.3 m error with the narrowband receiver multipath envelope processing BPSK(1)). 
The domain of validity is also increased thanks to the smoothing of the correlator used for the 
normalization assuming that the navigation message is known (if the absolute value is calculated, then 
(6) shall be used): 
 𝐶 𝑁0⁄ ≥
𝐵𝑙
2
(
𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑌)
)
2
 Eq. 7-28 
 
Figure 88 Allowed locations for the correlator used for the normalization of the metric after low pass 
filtering (5Hz) 
7.1.5 Performance assessment on urban channel model 
The aim of this section is to assess the performances of a test based on the multipath detection metrics 
to limit the filter out of abnormal pseudoranges measurement in urban environment. The approach 
consists in coupling the wideband Land Mobile Satellite (LMS) Channel developed by the German 
Aerospace Center (DLR) and geneIQ as detailed in section 5.1.1.1.5. However, we chose to 
reformulate the test so that it is adapted to urban environment. Indeed in urban environment the 
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receiver is almost always affected by multipath and therefore always under 𝐻1. The new formulation is 
based on the definition of a maximum tolerable error (𝑀𝑇𝐸).  
The new hypotheses to test become: 
 𝐻0′: the pseudorange error is lower than the 𝑀𝑇𝐸 
 𝐻1′: the pseudorange error is higher than the 𝑀𝑇𝐸 
The approach proposed initially, consists in setting the threshold on the metrics to fulfill a 𝑃𝐹𝐴. The 
approach chosen in this section is different. Here, the 𝑀𝑇𝐸 is set to a value (e.g. 5 meters), then the 
𝑃𝑀𝐷 and 𝑃𝐹𝐴 are evaluated. 
7.1.5.1 Simple ratio metric 
As detailed in chapter 5 the implementation of a raw test metrics leads to poor performance in term of 
sensitivity. This can be illustrated by simulations on the LMS tracked by geneIQ. The channels for 
satellite elevations of 40, 50, 60, 70, 80° and satellite azimuths of 45 and 90° are concatenated. The 
LOS is not shadowed for these elevations. Each channel is 1 km long, and the velocity of the vehicle is 
set to 20 km/h. Thermal noise is added to the correlators assuming a 𝐶 𝑁0⁄  set to 40 dB-Hz.  
The simulated receiver is the wideband GPS L1 C/A receiver introduced in 4.1.2.1.2 In such a 
standard receiver, the available correlator outputs are located at -0.25, 0 and 0.25 chips on the 
correlation function. A simple ratio test with 𝑋 = 0.25 and 𝑌 = 0 is used for multipath-induced error 
monitoring. Figure 89 illustrates the lack of correlation between the raw value of the metric and the 
code pseudorange error. The correlation coefficient between the two variables is - 0.19. Errors up to 8 
meters are not detected.  
To improve the performance, the correlator outputs are low-pass filtered with a rectangular low-pass 
filter with 3Hz noise equivalent bandwidth. The narrowness of the low-pass filter bandwidth is limited 
by the coherence time of the multipath, which in turn depends on the dynamic of the vehicle. The 
metric formed after filtering is shifted by a constant delay that maximizes the correlation between the 
metric and the code pseudorange error (e.g. 0.16 seconds for 3 Hz filtering). Figure 90 illustrates the 
existing correlation between the value of the metric and the code pseudorange error. The scatter is 
characteristic of two correlated variables. The magnitude of the coefficient of correlation between both 
variables is improved to - 0.53.  
For a fixed maximum tolerable error and 𝑃𝐹𝐴 (𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝 =  2), the 𝑃𝑀𝐷 has decreased according to Figure 
90. It reflects an improvement in sensitivity. Largest code errors are located in the right bottom region 
in Figure 90, which corresponds to a successful detection of abnormal error.  
Table 25 contains the 𝑃𝐹𝐴 and 𝑃𝑀𝐷 as functions of the expansion factor chosen to set the thresholds. 
Firstly, Table 25 shows that the observed 𝑃𝐹𝐴 in urban environment is lower than the expected 𝑃𝐹𝐴. In 
presence of several reflections and due to their impact on tracking loops, the distribution of the metric 
is different. New thresholds could be derived from these simulations to force the 𝑃𝐹𝐴 to the expected 
value, based on gaussianity assumption and by measuring the standard deviation of the metric. 
However, the validity of these thresholds would rely on too many hypotheses such as the satellite 
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elevation, the loop bandwidths, the chip spacing and the vehicle dynamic to name a few. Table 25 also 
illustrates the major improvement that can be obtained by smoothing the correlator outputs. Indeed for 
every expansion factor, the 𝑃𝐹𝐴 and 𝑃𝑀𝐷 are lower after low pass filtering.  
Anyway, in this set of simulations, the magnitudes of the pseudorange errors are not large enough to 
be detected when setting a low 𝑃𝐹𝐴 (e.g. 𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝 =  3).  
 
Figure 89 Correlation between code pseudorange error and value of the raw simple ratio metric (𝑀1) 
for BPSK 
 
Figure 90 Correlation between code pseudorange error and value of the simple ratio metric (𝑀1) after 
smoothing the correlator outputs for BPSK 
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𝑃𝑀𝐷 w/ filtering 0.52 0.52 0.30 0.17 0.090 
Table 25 Performances of the test based on the simple ratio test 
The best 𝑃𝑀𝐷  presented in Table 25 after filtering is 9% which appears to be too high for such a 
detection algorithm. The 𝑀𝑇𝐸  associated to this 𝑃𝑀𝐷  is equal to 5 meters. This magnitude is not 
sufficiently high with respect to the noise level to be detected with very low 𝑃𝑀𝐷. The algorithm has 
been designed to detect errors that can lead to positioning failures (much larger than 5 meters), and it 
is expected to detect them with significantly lower 𝑃𝑀𝐷.  
7.1.5.2 Performance comparison with 𝐶 𝑁0⁄  estimator 
A conventional way for the receivers to monitor the signal quality is to estimate the 𝐶 𝑁0⁄ . The 
objective is here to compare the ability of the 𝐶 𝑁0⁄ estimation to detect error with high magnitude 
with the ability of a test based on the distortion metrics.  
The 𝐶 𝑁0⁄  estimator used hereafter is the one described in chapter 5, where the expectation and the 
variance terms are estimated over 1 second. We firstly compare the behavior of this estimator in 
presence of a 40 dB-Hz noise, with and without multipath.  
 
Figure 91 Estimation of 𝐶 𝑁0⁄  with true 𝐶 𝑁0⁄  set to 40dB-Hz 
The quality of the 𝐶 𝑁0⁄  estimation is degraded by the presence of multipath according to Figure 91. 
The 𝐶 𝑁0⁄  is used for the determination of the detection threshold of the metric (in the expression of 
their mean). A suitable solution consists in smoothing the 𝐶 𝑁0⁄  estimate over longer duration (several 
minutes).  
Moreover, it has already been proven that the Signal to Noise Ratio (𝑆𝑁𝑅) error is correlated (and in 
phase) with the multipath delay error [Sleewaegen, 1997]. This phenomenon can be illustrated through 
the simulation platform by processing the LMS output without adding any thermal noise. The shape of 
the scatter in Figure 92 shows that the highest multipath error occurs for low estimated 𝐶 𝑁0⁄ . It is 
therefore relevant to define a monitoring algorithm based on this detector and it is then necessary to 
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set the lower bound for the detector. A typical value is 30 dB-Hz because it is a good trade-off 
between NLOS exclusion and availability. The efficiency of this monitoring approach is assessed on 
the LMS assuming a received signal with a 𝐶/𝑁0 of 40 dB-Hz. The code pseudorange error is plotted 
as a function of the estimated 𝐶 𝑁0⁄  in Figure 93. Table 26 summarizes the performance of the 𝐶 𝑁0⁄  
based detection test for several threshold candidates.   
It can be shown by comparing Table 26 to Table 25 that the 𝑆𝑁𝑅 monitoring technique outperforms 
the test based on the raw metric monitoring. For instance, for a 𝑃𝐹𝐴 of 0.019, the 𝑆𝑁𝑅 monitoring has 
a 𝑃𝑀𝐷 of 47% whereas the raw metric performs a 𝑃𝑀𝐷 of 88%.  
However, the 𝑆𝑁𝑅 monitoring is outperformed by the monitoring of the smoothed metric. Indeed, for 
an expansion factor of 1.4, the 𝑃𝐹𝐴 of the metric based monitor was 6.3%, and the 𝑃𝑀𝐷  associated was 
9%. For an 𝑆𝑁𝑅 threshold of 32 dB-Hz, the 𝑃𝐹𝐴 of the 𝑆𝑁𝑅 monitor is equal to 8.3% and its 𝑃𝑀𝐷 is 
equal to 33% which is significantly higher (for an even higher 𝑃𝐹𝐴). 
 
Figure 92 Correlation between code pseudorange error and estimated 𝐶/𝑁0 with multipath only for 
BPSK 
 
Figure 93 Correlation between code pseudorange error and estimated 𝐶/𝑁0 with multipath and 
thermal noise (40 dB-Hz) for BPSK 
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𝐶/𝑁0 (dB-Hz) 
threshold 
28 29 30 31 32 
𝑃𝐹𝐴 0.0036 0.0089 0.019 0.043 0.083 
𝑃𝑀𝐷 0.93 0.90 0.47 0.43 0.33 
Table 26 Performance of the 𝑆𝑁𝑅 monitoring 
The test based on the simple ratio metric outperforms, after filtering, the test based on the 𝐶/𝑁0 in 
terms of 𝑃𝐹𝐴 and 𝑃𝑀𝐷.  
7.1.5.3 Other metrics 
The same simulations were conducted for a differential ratio and non-coherent simple ratio. The 
differential ratio was formed by using 𝑋 = 0.25 𝑌 = − 0.25 and 𝑍 = 0. This metric characterizes 
well the asymmetry of the correlation function. The correlation coefficient between the code error and 
this metric is 0.64 which is higher than the simple ratio metric. Table 27 summarizes the performance 
of this detector. No major improvement is obtained for the differential ratio compared to the simple 
ratio metric. Moreover the comparison in term of performance is difficult as the observed 𝑃𝐹𝐴 are not 
the same for both tests.  
 
Figure 94 Correlation between code pseudorange error and differential ratio metric (𝑀2) 
 
Theoretical 𝑃𝐹𝐴 0.027 0.046 0.072 0.11 0.16 
𝑃𝐹𝐴 0.007 0.012 0.023 0.040 0.069 
𝑃𝑀𝐷 0.36 0.30 0.24 0.091 0.0 
Table 27 𝑃𝐹𝐴 and 𝑃𝑀𝐷 performed by monitoring the differential ratio metric 
Finally a simple ratio non coherent test metric was implemented on the model of narrowband receiver, 
but the 3
rd
 order PLL is replaced by a second order FLL with a 5 Hz loop bandwidth. The estimation 
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of the frequency error is based on the non-coherent differential arctangent discriminator. The metric is 
formed with 𝑋 = 0.25 and 𝑌 =  0. The detection thresholds were determined a priori by simulating 
correlator output affected by thermal noise only. The results obtained in term of 𝑃𝐹𝐴 and 𝑃𝑀𝐷  are 
given in Table 10. Overall the performances of 𝑀3 ratio are similar to the performances of 𝑀1 and 𝑀2. 
It is therefore possible to implement a metric based test to detect the presence of multipath in a 
receiver using a FLL. 
 
Figure 95 Correlation between code pseudorange error and non-coherent simple ratio metric (𝑀3) 
 
Theoretical 𝑃𝐹𝐴 0.027 0.046 0.072 0.11 0.16 
𝑃𝐹𝐴 0.002 0.0054 0.012 0.025 0.047 
𝑃𝑀𝐷 0.63 0.52 0.3 0.2 0.18 
Table 28 𝑃𝐹𝐴 and 𝑃𝑀𝐷 performed by monitoring the non coherente simple ratio metric 
 
7.1.5.4 BOC(1,1) signal 
The simple ratio metric is tested with a BOC(1,1) modulation with 𝑋 = 0.25 and 𝑌 = 0. The location 
of Y is chosen in the validity domain according to Figure 1. Firstly, it can be inferred from Figure 11 
that the magnitude of the pseudorange errors is lower for the BOC(1,1) modulation than BPSK. The 
maximum error does not reach 5 meters for BOC(1,1), therefore the maximum tolerable error is 
reduced to 3.5 meters. Table 29 shows that the metric is able to detect large errors even for BOC(1,1). 
Again, the errors observed do not have a sufficient amplitude to assess the performances for very low 
𝑃𝐹𝐴. 
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Figure 96 Correlation between code pseudorange error and simple ratio metric for BOC(1,1) 
modulation 
 
Theoretical 𝑃𝐹𝐴 0.027 0.046 0.072 0.11 0.16 
𝑃𝐹𝐴 0.013 0.023 0.036 0.059 0.092 
𝑃𝑀𝐷 0.32 0.18 0.054 0.036 0.018 
Table 29 Performances of the simple ratio metric for BOC(1,1) 
7.1.6 Conclusion 
This section discusses the theoretical and simulated performance of a detection test based on 
correlation function distortion metrics. A new rigorous approach for the setting of the detection 
threshold is proposed. These thresholds enable to set the 𝑃𝐹𝐴 with a wider domain of validity. The 
sensitivity of the test is defined as the minimum 𝑆𝑀𝑅 at which the test is able to detect the multipath 
with a fixed 𝑃𝑀𝐷. It is then possible to theoretically assess the performances of the test metrics. It was 
proven in the chapter that a detector formed with the raw correlator outputs presents poor 
performances in term of sensitivity. However, smoothing either the correlator outputs or the metric 
enables narrowing the confidence interval and therefore significantly improves the sensitivity of the 
test.  
Finally the performances of the detector were assessed by simulation on a Land Mobile Satellite 
channel simulator coupled with a realistic GNSS receiver simulator. The correlation between the raw 
metric and the actual pseudorange error is low and therefore as expected the performances of such test 
are low. The smoothing of the correlator outputs highly improves the sensitivity of the test provided 
that the bandwidth of the smoothing filter is sufficiently high not to filter out the dynamic of the 
multipath. Similar performances were obtained for other existing and proposed metrics and other 
signals. 
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The performances of these tests were compared with a multipath detector based on the 𝑆𝑁𝑅 
estimation. Even if the 𝑆𝑁𝑅 estimation shows promising detection abilities, the test based on filtered 
correlator outputs is more efficient to detect abnormally large code error.  
Finally, the test performed based on the LMS channel model did not allow generating code error with 
amplitude of several tenth of meter when the received signal is the sum of a LOS signal and 
reflections. This phenomenon is essentially due to the fact that the vehicle was moving at 20 km/h. 
Thus, the probability the lifespan of the reflections does not exceed a few seconds and the echoes are 
filtered by the carrier loop because of the difference of Doppler frequency between the direct signal 
and the reflections. 
Future works shall be conducted to test the multipath monitoring indicators on actual measurements in 
urban environment. The ability of the test to detect multipath error with large magnitude thus remains 
to be tested.  
7.2 Protection against NLOS errors and residual large multipath errors 
Unlike multipath interference, there is generally no abnormal distortion of the correlation function 
when the receiver is tracking a reflected/diffracted ray. Thus the biased measurements must be 
detected by other means that are investigated hereafter.  
A first possible way to protect the solution from integrating NLOS signals is to apply masks on the 
measurements. As train control and ETC solutions are based on different receivers and sensors they 
are studied separately in section 7.2.1 and section 7.2.2.  
The second approach that is studied consists in taking advantage of the onboard sensors to detect 
inconsistency in the measurements. This technique used to detect and reject outliers is studied in 
section 7.2.3.  
The results which are presented in this section are obtained by processing the real measurements that 
were collected in downtown Toulouse and surrounding. The corresponding data collection has been 
presented in section 5.3.2.2.  
7.2.1 Application of masks in train control 
The use of a track database has two main interests. Firstly it enables to estimate the position with 
degraded constellation as seen in chapter 6 (only two satellites are required for 1D positioning). It is 
therefore possible to apply masks that are very restrictive. The second interest is that it enables to store 
additional information into the map. It is of particular interest to inform the receiver to the 
environment in which it is operating. It can be used to coarsely adapt the mask with the surrounding 
environment, and thus, not to apply a conservative mask even in good conditions (open sky).  
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7.2.1.1 Elevation masks in train control 
7.2.1.1.1 Constant elevation masks 
It has been showed in chapter 5 that, with an appropriate elevation mask, it is possible to get rid of the 
NLOS phenomenon. The criterion used in chapter 5 for the selection of a mask has been based on the 
shape of the pseudorange error distribution function, and on the presence of outliers and large tails. It 
has been showed in chapter 5 that in beltways, which are typical open-sky conditions, an elevation 
mask of 10° is sufficient to remove measurements which distribution are heavily tailed. For 
constrained environments (suburban and urban), the problem is more complex as pseudorange errors 
from satellites with up to 30° of elevation have been observed to be following heavily tailed 
distributions. The objective is here to study the opportunity of using different values of elevation 
masks and their impact on accuracy improvement/degradation and availability. 
This section firstly assesses the improvement/degradation of the statistics on the error in the position 
domain (RMS and 95
th
 percentile) obtained after rejecting measurements which elevations are lower 
than the elevation mask. Six different solutions have been tested: 
 A solution that uses GPS pseudorange measurements and the measurements from the 6 axis 
IMU. 
 A solution that uses GPS pseudorange and pseudorange rate measurements and the 
measurements from the 6 axis IMU. 
 A solution that integrates GPS pseudorange and pseudorange rate measurements, the 
measurements from the 6 axis IMU and a track database. 
 A solution that uses GLONASS pseudorange measurements and the measurements from the 6 
axis IMU. 
 A solution that uses GLONASS pseudorange and pseudorange rate measurements and the 
measurements from the 6 axis IMU. 
 A solution that uses GLONASS pseudorange and pseudorange rate measurements, the 
measurements from the 6 axis IMU and a track database. 
Different elevation masks were tested (from 0 to 25°). The results are summarized in Table 30 for the 
GPS based solutions and Table 31 for the GLONASS based solutions. Suburban and urban 
environments are presented separately because these two environments are different from the building 
mask angle point of view. The columns that correspond to the best performances in terms of position 
error are highlighted in green. 
 
 
 
  Elevation threshold (°), suburban Elevation threshold (°), urban 
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  5 10 15 20 25 0 5 10 15 20 25 0 
GPS(PR)/INS 
RMS along (m) 3.0 2.8 5.3 7.8 11.1 3.2 8.3 8.1 7.9 11.9 15.2 8.0 
95th along (m) 6.1 5.3 11.3 13.4 14.0 6.4 16.4 15.4 16.4 24.1 30.6 15.5 
RMS across (m) 4.0 3.1 4.5 5.1 6.3 4.0 9.0 8.6 8.4 8.8 12.3 9.1 
95th across (m) 8.1 5.9 9.7 10.8 11.6 8.5 18.5 19.0 17.9 17.1 19.6 17.9 
GPS(PR and 
PRR)/INS 
RMS along (m) 1.9 1.8 3.9 6.4 9.1 1.9 6.0 6.8 7.3 8.6 12.7 5.7 
95th along (m) 4.1 3.4 9.0 10.8 12.2 4.0 12.3 12.6 13.7 16.4 28.6 12.1 
RMS across (m) 2.3 1.8 3.1 4.1 5.2 2.3 6.5 7.1 6.9 7.0 9.1 5.8 
95th across (m) 5.0 4.4 6.6 8.5 8.9 5.1 14.0 15.5 15.1 15.7 16.0 12.6 
GPS(PR and 
PRR)/INS/track 
database  
RMS along (m) 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.8 4.2 10.9 5.4 4.1 4.7 4.5 
95th along (m) 3.6 2.8 3.3 3.5 3.9 3.9 7.5 12.8 11.4 7.7 9.2 8.3 
RMS across (m) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.8 3.5 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.1 
95th across (m) 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.8 2.1 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.8 
Table 30 Impact of an elevation mask on the position error for the train control solutions based on 
GPS 
  Elevation threshold (°), suburban Elevation threshold (°), urban 
  5 10 15 20 25 0 5 10 15 20 25 0 
GLONASS/INS 
RMS along (m) 3.2 3.5 3.4 4.4 17.9 3.7 9.0 8.8 9.0 10.5 21.3 9.6 
95th along (m) 6.2 6.5 6.4 8.7 50.8 7.1 17.5 16.8 17.9 21.2 49.6 21.9 
RMS across (m) 3.7 4.2 4.2 5.1 13.6 5.3 8.1 7.6 8.0 7.8 8.5 8.1 
95th across (m) 7.0 7.7 7.6 9.8 34.4 8.6 17.3 16.3 17.4 17.0 18.5 17.4 
GLONASS 
(Doppler)/INS 
RMS along (m) 3.0 3.5 3.4 4.5 16.3 3.4 8.1 7.9 7.6 9.4 21.1 8.2 
95th along (m) 5.8 6.8 7.8 8.9 46.6 6.3 17.1 17.4 14.7 16.0 51.6 16.7 
RMS across (m) 3.4 3.8 3.8 4.9 12.1 4.4 6.7 6.5 7.3 6.5 6.9 6.7 
95th across (m) 5.9 6.8 6.8 9.7 27.7 7.9 12.4 12.2 14.4 13.7 13.9 12.8 
GLONASS/INS/tr
ack database  
RMS along (m) 2.6 3.0 3.1 3.8 4.7 2.8 9.2 9.2 9.2 11.6 13.6 9.5 
95th along (m) 5.5 6.1 6.5 7.8 9.9 6.0 17.1 17.0 16.9 21.1 33.8 17.7 
RMS across (m) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 1.2 0.3 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.0 
95th across (m) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.5 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.1 
Table 31 Impact of an elevation mask on the position error for the train control solutions based on 
GLONASS 
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Table 30 and Table 31 both shows that applying large elevation masks (20 or 25°) is not beneficial as 
it highly increases the along and across track error RMS and 95
th
 percentile by degrading the quality of 
the geometry. As an example applying a 25° elevation mask on a GPS/INS based solution that only 
integrates the pseudoranges approximately increases the RMS and the accuracy of the solution by a 
factor 2 in the along-track direction. This property is also observed on the GLONASS based solution, 
where applying a 25° elevation mask also increases both the RMS and accuracy in the along-track 
direction by a factor 2. The elevation mask that performed the best in the different configuration tested 
is in the range that goes from 0° to 15°. A 10° elevation mask presents good performances in all 
configurations. However, from an integrity monitoring point of view, this mask does not fully protect 
against NLOS.  
Table 30 and Table 31 also demonstrate the benefit of using the database in train control when it 
comes to the selection of the measurements. When applying restrictive elevation masks (e.g. 25°) the 
accuracy of the solution that integrates the map is slightly degraded whereas, with the same mask, the 
accuracy of the solutions that do not integrate the map are much more degraded (for GPS and 
GLONASS based solutions).  
Applying an elevation mask raises the issue of the availability of the system with such a mask (even if 
only 2 satellites are required). The feasibility of applying such a mask has been investigated by 
simulating the GPS satellite positions during 14 days (starting the 16 November 2015) with a sampling 
period of 1 hour, from the Yuma almanacs. The GPS constellation consists of 30 healthy satellites 
during the tests. The distribution of the number of the satellite in view has been studied for different 
position of the user (across Europe), that form a grid of latitude between 25° and 80° with a step of 5° 
and a longitude between -20° and 45° with a step of 5°. Different elevation masks have been applied, 
at respectively 10°, 20°, 30° and 40°. It is necessary to have at least 2 satellites in view for positioning 
with the track database, and thus 3 satellites must be tracked for fault detection. 4 satellites and 5 
satellites are required for positioning in respectively 2D and 3D with fault detection. Thus, the 
percentage of time at which the number of satellites available is higher than 3, 4 and 5 satellites is 
given for the four masks in Figure 97 to Figure 100. The results obtained are not authoritative but they 
give feasibility information. It can be inferred from Figure 97 that a 10° elevation mask is suitable for 
the GPS based subsystem for the train control application as the visibility of 3, 4 and 5 satellites is 
equal to 100%. Figure 98 shows that it is suitable to apply a 20° elevation mask in urban environment 
as there are 3 satellites in view at least 100% of the time. However, applying a mask of 30° to 40° does 
not seem feasible according to Figure 99 and Figure 100
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Figure 97 Percentage of time with more than 3 (left), 4 (center) and 5 (right) GPS satellites, satellite mask angle of 10° 
 
 
   
 
Figure 98 Percentage of time with more than 3 (left), 4 (center) and 5 (right) GPS satellites, satellite mask angle of 20° 
  
   
 
Figure 99 Percentage of time with more than 3 (left), 4 (center) and 5 (right) GPS satellites, satellite mask angle of 30° 
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Figure 100 Percentage of time with more than 3 (left), 4 (center) and 5 (right)  GPS satellites, satellite mask angle of 40° 
 
 
7.2.1.1.2 Adaptative elevation masks 
It is possible to take advantage of the repeatability of the trajectory in the case of a train. Indeed, the 
main sources of masking for a train in urban environment are the buildings on both sides of the 
railroad. It is possible to map the masks of the buildings and store them in the track database. This 
mapping can be done by using a fisheye camera in daily clear sky condition, and improved by post 
processing and/or with a LIDAR. The camera must be located at the same exact height as the GNSS 
antenna. The mask database must be updated regularly. It has to be kept in mind that this step must be 
done independently for the two track database (for redundancy). An important geometry improvement 
is expected with respect to masks with constant elevation.  
Moreover, compared to a fisheye based NLOS rejection: 
 the efficiency of this method is not dependent on the quality of the attitude determination.  
 the trains do not have to be equipped with fisheye cameras (cost reductions) 
 no image processing have to be done in real time  
 the system is not sensitive to night or cloud conditions.  
7.2.1.2 𝐶/𝑁0 masks in train control 
The possibility of detecting NLOS signals based on 𝐶/𝑁0 has been widely investigated in prior art. 
[Carcanague, 2013] has stated that non direct signals can be tracked with 𝐶/𝑁0 of up to 40 dB-Hz in 
urban environment and at maximum 34 dB-Hz in beltways and rural roads. This analysis has been 
based on a characterization of the mean and standard deviation of the error, but not on the shape of the 
distribution and the presence of outliers. The simulations conducted in chapter 5 have shown that a 30 
dB-Hz 𝐶/𝑁0 mask is sufficient to remove all samples that corresponds to the tracking of a NLOS. This 
simulation result appears to be very optimistic with respect to the observations done in [Carcanague, 
2013]. This is mainly due to the fact that the receiver modelled in the simulation generally loses lock 
when the LOS is not present.  
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Similar to what has been done for the elevation mask, this section assesses the 
improvement/degradation of the statistics on the error in the position domain obtained after rejecting 
measurements which 𝐶/𝑁0  are lower than a set threshold. The six same candidates in terms of 
architectures have been tested and the results are given in Table 32 and Table 33.
  𝐶/𝑁0 thresholds (dB-Hz), suburban 𝐶/𝑁0 thresholds (dB-Hz), urban 
  30 32.5 35 37.5 40 - 30 32.5 35 37.5 40 - 
GPS(PR)/INS 
RMS along (m) 3.0 2.7 2.9 3.2 4.1 3.2 10.2 13.8 12.2 14.3 21.7 8.0 
95th along (m) 5.5 5.0 5.1 6.0 8.9 6.4 23.4 25.6 25.9 33.7 46.8 15.5 
RMS across (m) 3.1 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.9 4.0 13.9 23.7 17.8 18.8 36.5 9.1 
95th across (m) 6.4 4.9 4.9 5.7 6.2 8.5 26.2 39.6 38.7 41.6 63.0 17.9 
GPS(PR&PRR) 
/INS 
RMS along (m) 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.6 1.9 7.1 10.1 11.0 13.8 19.5 5.7 
95th along (m) 3.6 3.3 3.6 3.9 5.1 4.0 13.7 16.9 16.2 21.9 24.3 12.1 
RMS across (m) 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.8 2.3 8.2 13.9 15.2 21.7 30.2 5.8 
95th across (m) 3.6 2.9 2.6 2.8 3.2 5.1 14.6 21.9 18.9 36.0 34.5 12.6 
GPS(PR&PRR) 
/INS/track 
database  
RMS along (m) 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 4.1 3.9 3.7 5.4 7.4 4.5 
95th along (m) 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.9 8.6 8.0 6.5 8.2 10.0 8.3 
RMS across (m) 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 1.0 0.9 1.2 4.3 4.4 1.1 
95th across (m) 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.8 1.4 1.9 0.8 
Table 32 Impact of a 𝐶/𝑁0 mask on the position error for the train control solutions based on GPS 
  𝐶/𝑁0 thresholds (dB-Hz), suburban 𝐶/𝑁0 thresholds (dB-Hz), urban 
  30 32.5 35 37.5 40 - 30 32.5 35 37.5 40 - 
GLONASS(PR)/
INS 
RMS along (m) 3.5 3.5 3.6 4.3 4.4 3.7 9.7 11.2 12.0 15.8 17.6 9.6 
95th along (m) 6.5 6.3 6.4 8.2 9.2 7.1 23.1 25.6 30.8 36.7 43.9 21.9 
RMS across (m) 4.8 3.7 4.0 4.8 4.0 5.3 8.3 11.4 13.9 24.8 31.5 8.1 
95th across (m) 6.7 6.3 6.4 7.0 7.0 8.6 17.8 23.7 26.7 59.7 78.9 17.4 
GLONASS 
(PR&PRR)/INS 
RMS along (m) 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.7 3.9 3.4 7.4 10.0 10.3 11.1 14.1 8.2 
95th along (m) 6.0 6.2 6.4 7.0 7.6 6.3 14.7 20.5 21.7 21.5 28.9 16.7 
RMS across (m) 4.0 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.3 4.4 6.4 17.5 10.0 14.0 20.2 6.7 
95th across (m) 6.4 5.8 6.1 6.5 6.1 7.9 12.3 17.4 22.8 33.3 54.0 12.8 
GLONASS  
(PR&PRR)/INS 
/track database  
RMS along (m) 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.1 2.8 8.8 9.3 8.4 8.0 8.2 9.5 
95th along (m) 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.5 6.8 6.0 18.5 21.1 19.4 16.7 16.9 17.7 
RMS across (m) 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 1.0 1.8 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 
95th across (m) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.5 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.1 
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Table 33 Impact of a 𝐶/𝑁0 mask on the position error for the train control solutions based on 
GLONASS 
Table 32 and Table 33 shows that applying high 𝐶/𝑁0 masks (up to 40 dB-Hz) is feasible in suburban 
environment (for both GPS and GLONASS based solutions) as it does not lead to important 
deterioration in the position error statistics. However, in urban environment, applying such mask is 
only feasible for the solution that integrates the track database. Indeed, for the other solutions, the 
accuracy degradation is important. As an illustration, the accuracy in the along-track direction goes 
from 18 to 63 meters (line 4 in Table 32) when applying the 40 dB-Hz mask for GPS/INS without 
Doppler, whereas it is only goes from 8.3 to 10 meters (line 10 in Table 32) when the track database is 
integrated. Here again, it shows that the use of the map enables a stronger selection of the GNSS 
measurements.  
7.2.1.3 Conclusions 
To exclude NLOS from the solution, it has been proposed to select the measurements according to 
their elevations (signals from satellites with low elevations are likely to be NLOS), and/or their 
estimated 𝐶/𝑁0. Tests on real data have confirmed that the integration of the track database in the 
solution enables an increased selectivity on the measurements which is of particular interest for the 
integrity of the solution (because faulty prone measurements can be excluded). The two approaches 
proposed for the selection of the measurements are the following: 
 If the masks of the buildings are stored in the track database, the NLOS signals can be fully 
rejected by comparing the satellites elevation and azimuth to this mask. Unfortunately, this 
approach could not be tested in this thesis. 
 An alternative approach consists in applying constant elevation and 𝐶/𝑁0  masks. The 
constellations simulated have shown that it is not suitable to apply a constant elevation masks 
higher than 20°, even when integrating the map. A 10° constant elevation mask has been 
chosen as it does not degrade the position accuracy. This mask is sufficient to protect against 
NLOS in beltways/open sky conditions (section 5.3.2.2). However, it has been proven in 
section 5.3.2.2  that from 10° to 40°, non-direct signals can still be tracked in suburban and 
urban environment. The solution proposed is to select the satellites with a threshold of 40 dB-
Hz for both GPS and GLONASS. The horizontal errors on the position estimated by the 
solutions that integrates the track database before and after the measurement selection are 
represented in Figure 101 (GPS based solution) and Figure 102 (GLONASS based solution). 
In both cases, the selection of the measurements has reduced the position error, especially 
when the vehicle is operating in dense urban area (from 700 to 3000 seconds).  
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Figure 101 Impact of elevation and 𝐶/𝑁0 filtering on the along track error, train control 
(GPS/INS/Track database) 
 
Figure 102 Impact of elevation and 𝐶/𝑁0 filtering on the alongtrack error, train control 
(GLONASS/INS/Track database) 
7.2.2 Application of masks in ETC 
7.2.2.1 Elevation masks in ETC 
The solution proposed for ETC integrates the measurements from a dual constellation receiver and an 
odometer. Unlike the track database, the odometer does not enable to navigate with only two satellites 
in view but only limits the drift of the inertial solution in coasting. However, the processing of 
measurements from two constellations increases the number of satellites in view and enables a 
restrictive selection of the measurements that are being integrated in the navigation filter.  
The same inferences that have been done on the error distribution in the case of train control can be 
applied to ETC. In rural environment, a 10° elevation mask has been proven to be sufficient to exclude 
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the non-nominal errors due to the tracking of non-direct signals. In suburban to dense urban 
environment, an elevation mask of 30 to 40° is necessary to neglect this phenomenon. ).  
This section assesses the improvement/degradation of the statistics on the error in the position domain 
obtained after rejecting measurements which elevations are lower than the elevation mask. Three 
different solutions have been tested for ETC: 
 A solution that integrates GPS and GLONASS pseudorange measurements and the 
measurements from the 6 axis IMU. 
 A solution that integrates GPS and GLONASS pseudorange and pseudorange rate 
measurements and the measurements from the 6 axis IMU. 
 A solution that integrates GPS and GLONASS pseudorange and pseudorange rate 
measurements, the measurements from the 6 axis IMU and a simulated WSS 
 
  Elevation mask, suburban Elevation mask, urban 
  5 10 15 20 25 0 5 10 15 20 25 0 
GPS/GLO 
(PR)/INS 
RMS horizontal(m) 4.6 4.5 4.7 4.9 5.7 5.0 9.6 9.6 9.9 10.9 12.2 9.6 
95th horizontal(m) 8.3 8.6 8.3 8.4 9.1 8.9 18.4 19.0 19.3 21.9 26.1 18.1 
GPS/GLO 
(PR & PRR) 
/INS 
RMS horizontal(m) 3.8 3.9 4.2 4.4 5.3 4.2 8.8 8.8 8.4 8.9 10.1 8.6 
95th horizontal(m) 6.8 6.9 7.2 7.4 8.7 7.2 14.3 14.6 14.8 5.6 18.3 14.3 
GPS/GLO 
(PR & PRR) 
/INS/WSS 
RMS horizontal(m) 3.4 3.6 3.6 4.2 6.0 3.7 8.1 8.3 8.1 8.4 9.6 8.0 
95th horizontal(m) 5.1 5.5 5.5 6.2 9.8 5.9 13.1 13.4 13.6 14.5 16.8 12.9 
Table 34 Impact of an elevation mask on the position error for the ETC solutions based on GPS and 
GLONASS 
The feasibility of applying these masks has been investigated by simulating the GPS and 
Galileo satellite positions during 14 days with a sampling period of 5 minutes (assuming a 
constellation of 27 Galileo satellites). The percentages of time with more than 3, 4 and 5 
satellites in view are represented for elevation masks of 30° and 40°. The case of 3 satellites in 
view is presented here from as an informal perspective because ETC system cannot operate and 
ensure integrity with only 3 satellites. Processing two frequencies simultaneously enables to 
have 5 satellites in view 100% of the time even with a mask angle of 30° (or lower).  
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Figure 103 Percentage of time with more than 3 (left), 4 (center) and 5 (right) GPS/Galileo satellites, satellite mask angle of 30° 
  
   
 
Figure 104 Percentage of time with more than 3, 4 and 5 GPS/Galileo satellites, satellite mask angle of 40° 
 
 
7.2.2.2 𝐶/𝑁0 mask in ETC 
The conclusions that have been made for the 𝐶/𝑁0 masks in the case of train control can also be 
applied to ETC. The error statistics after applying different 𝐶/𝑁0 masks are presented in Table 
35. The use of a dual constellation receiver in ETC enables to apply large 𝐶/𝑁0 masks (up to 40 
dB-Hz) without degrading the accuracy of the solution. In the solution preferred for ETC, which 
integrates Doppler measurements and WSS, the application of such a mask has even improved 
the horizontal accuracy from 12.9 to 8.8 m.  
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  𝐶/𝑁0 thresholds (dB-Hz), suburban 𝐶/𝑁0 thresholds (dB-Hz), urban 
  30 32.5 35 37.5 40 0 30 32.5 35 37.5 40 0 
GPS/GLO 
(PR)/INS 
RMS horizontal(m) 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.8 4.2 5.0 8.4 8.0 8.1 8.4 10.0 9.6 
95th horizontal(m) 6.1 5.8 5.8 5.9 6.5 8.9 16.7 15.6 15.4 16.7 22.0 18.1 
GPS/GLO 
(PR & 
PRR)/INS 
RMS horizontal(m) 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 4.2 6.9 6.7 7.0 7.6 8.5 8.6 
95th horizontal(m) 5.4 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.4 7.2 11.2 9.8 10.0 12.8 14.6 14.3 
GPS/GLO 
(PR & PRR) 
/INS/WSS 
RMS horizontal(m) 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.9 3.7 6.3 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.9 8.0 
95th horizontal(m) 4.8 4.7 4.8 5.2 5.5 5.9 10.1 9.1 8.6 8.8 8.8 12.9 
Table 35 Impact of a 𝐶/𝑁0 mask on the position error for the ETC solutions based on GPS and 
GLONASS 
7.2.2.3 Conclusions 
Tests on real data have confirmed that the integration of two constellations in the solution enables an 
increased selectivity on the measurements which is of particular interest for the integrity of the 
solution (because faulty prone measurements can be excluded). The approach proposed for the 
selection of the measurements consists in setting an elevation mask of 10°. The satellites which 
elevations are higher than 10° are integrated in the solution if their estimated 𝐶/𝑁0 is higher than 40 
dB-Hz. The improvement obtained with this selection scheme is visible in Figure 105 for the solution 
that integrates the WSS. The benefit of the selection is particularly visible in urban environment (from 
700 to 300 seconds). The maximum error value has been reduced from more than 20 meters to 12 
meters.  
 
Figure 105 Impact of elevation and 𝐶/𝑁0 filtering, ETC (GPS/GLONASS/INS/WSS) 
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7.2.3 Innovation monitoring 
The Kalman filter innovation is an indicator of the consistency of the actual measurements and the 
measurements predicated by states estimates. In tight coupling, it is then possible to detect and exclude 
pseudorange measurements that are too different from the predicted measurements based on the 
measurements from non GNSS sensors. The approach is that of a classical hypothesis testing. A set of 
two hypotheses to test is defined: 
 𝐻0: the measurement is nominal 
 𝐻1: the measurement is abnormal 
The principle of the test is discussed in the next paragraph. 
7.2.3.1 Principle of innovation monitoring 
In tight coupling, the monitoring of the EKF innovation is done in the pseudorange domain and 
enables to detect several simultaneous biased pseudoranges. In a closed loop architecture, the 
predicted error state vector is set to zero. Thus the KF innovation expression is given by: 
 𝑟𝑘 = 𝜌𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘,𝐼𝑁𝑆 Eq. 7-29 
where ?̂?𝑘,𝐼𝑁𝑆 is the predicted pseudorange calculated with the position estimated by the mechanization, 
the satellite position, and the predicted satellite clock error.  
When the signal is direct and not affected by NLOS (i.e. under 𝐻0 ),, the normalized innovation 
follows a zero-mean normal distribution: 
 
𝑟𝑘(𝑖)
√𝑉𝑘(𝑖, 𝑖)
~𝒩(0,1) Eq. 7-30 
where 𝑉𝑘 is the covariance of the innovation that can be estimated with : 
  𝑉𝑘 = 𝐻𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐻𝑘
𝑇 + 𝑅𝑘 Eq. 7-31 
where 𝐻𝑘  is the measurement Jacobian matrix, 𝑃𝑘  is the error covariance estimation and 𝑅𝑘  is the 
noise measurement covariance matrix. The normalized innovation represents the test statistic.  
Assuming an abrupt change due the DLL getting locked on a NLOS (i.e. under 𝐻1), the innovation 
distribution is shifted and centered on the NLOS error (𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆) which is the difference between the true 
distance from the receiver to the satellite and the trajectory of the signal: 
 
𝑟𝑘(𝑖)
√𝑉𝑘(𝑖, 𝑖)
~𝒩(
𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆
√𝑉𝑘(𝑖, 𝑖)
, 1) Eq. 7-32 
It is possible to improve the sensitivity of the test by accumulating the innovation over time to average 
the noise over a sliding window. Let’s denote 𝑁  the size of the window used for averaging the 
innovation, the test 𝑇𝑘(𝑖) is: 
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 𝑇𝑘(𝑖) =
1
𝑁
∑
𝑟𝑘(𝑖)
√𝑉𝑘(𝑖, 𝑖)
𝑘
𝑖=𝑘−𝑁+1
 Eq. 7-33 
where 𝑇𝑘(𝑖)~𝒩(0,1/√𝑁) in the nominal case and 𝑇𝑘(𝑖)~𝒩(𝜀𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆, 1/√𝑁) in the non-nominal case. 
This averaging will increase the detection time. Doing so, a biased measurement can be detected after 
it has already corrupted the filter. This method can be referred to as innovation sequence monitoring. 
The best approach in this case is then to “replay” the scenario without the detected “faulty” 
measurement after the detection. In fact, the innovation will not stay constant, and if it does, it means 
that the anomaly is not affecting the state estimate. 
The detection threshold for the test 𝑇𝑘 is set by fixing the values of 𝑃𝐹𝐴. Then, for a fixed 𝑃𝑀𝐷, the 
corresponding minimum detectable biases are deduced. An alternative approach consists in fixing the 
𝑃𝑀𝐷  and the minimum detectable biases to set the threshold. In this case the 𝑃𝐹𝐴  is deduced and 
therefore varies with time. 
This test is also able to detect residual error due to abnormally large error in the LOS configuration 
due to multipath that would have been miss-detected by the prior test. Innovation monitoring is 
preferred over post-update residual monitoring method because it excludes the measurement prior to 
its integration in the solution. Anyway, in the proposed solution, any other NLOS exclusion technique 
can be used provided that it is possible to quantize the probability of occurrence of undetected 
dangerous NLOS.  
An example of distribution of the EKF residuals observed on the measurement campaign conducted in 
Toulouse is given in Figure 106. The filter used for this plot integrates GPS and GLONASS PR and 
PRR measurements (no additional sensor). According to Figure 106, in suburban environment, the 
normalized innovation is approximately centered and normally distributed. However, the gaussianity 
of the distribution is not verified in urban environment. Figure 106 also shows that the standard 
deviation of the innovation has a true variance which is lower than its estimated covariance. This is a 
consequence of setting the measurement noise covariance with covariances of distributions that 
overbound the actual distribution.  
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Figure 106 Distribution of pseudorange residuals for satellite 22 (elevation ≅ 20°) 
7.2.3.2 Innovation filtering for train control solution 
Checking the KF innovation enables to detect the measurements that are not consistent (essentially 
residual NLOS at this stage). In this section, the detection threshold has been set as a constant (𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝) 
multiplied by the standard deviation of the innovation √𝑉𝑘(𝑖, 𝑖) as estimated by the KF. Different 
values of mexp have been tested. Results have showed that the best performances are obtained for 
values of mexp  that are between 1 and 2 (depending on the sensors integrated). It theoretically 
corresponds to a large 𝑃𝐹𝐴 but the normalized innovation has a variance that is significantly lower than 
1. Therefore, the alarm rate is in fact much lower. Finally, the improvement obtained by rejecting 
inconsistent measurements is represented by Figure 107 and Figure 108 for solutions respectively 
based on GPS and GLONASS. This rejection method mitigates most large errors in urban 
environment without degrading the accuracy in suburban environment where the geometry of the 
constellation is much better.  
 
Figure 107 Impact of innovation filtering on position error, train control (GPS/INS/track database), 
𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝=1.5 
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Figure 108 Impact of innovation filtering on position error, train control (GLONASS/INS/track 
database), 𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝 =2 
7.2.3.3 Innovation filtering for ETC solution 
The benefit of applying an innovation based selection scheme in the ETC solution is illustrated by 
Figure 109. The error reduction is essentially visible in urban environment.  This technique is slightly 
less effective than the 𝐶/𝑁0 and elevation based selection on average (e.g. between 1500 and 1700 
seconds). Between 2500 and 2700 seconds, innovation filtering outperforms the other selection.  
 
Figure 109 Impact of innovation filtering on position error, ETC (GPS/GLONASS/INS/WSS), 
mexp =1.5 
7.3 Conclusion 
This chapter describes a cascaded approach to improve the reliability of the navigation system 
when the vehicle operates in constrained environment: multipath and tracking of non-direct signals. 
The measurements which are affected by strong multipath shall be detected and excluded from the 
solution by monitoring the shape of the correlation function. An approach to design a detection test 
at the signal processing level has been proposed. A new way to analytically derive the decision 
threshold has been proposed as well as the concept of sensitivity of the test. The multipath 
detectors have been tested on realistic simulations and they showed promising performances even 
if no sufficiently large multipath error has been observed. They have not been tested on real data as 
the GNSS receivers used in the thesis does not provide simple access to the correlator output. Thus, 
these monitor are not tested in the following sections.  
However, non-direct signals may not be detected by monitoring the shape of the correlation 
function. It has been proposed to filter out such measurements by applying elevation and stringent 
𝐶/𝑁0  masks to the measurements as well as innovation filtering. The selection of the masks and 
threshold is complex as it is a trade-off between integrity, availability and accuracy. However, for 
rail applications, precise elevation/azimuth masks can be stored in the database to get rid of NLOS 
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failures. After this final measurement selection, it is assumed that the measurements provided to the 
hybridization filter and to the integrity monitoring algorithm are not biased due to multipath or 
NLOS. The measurement selection schemes have been cascaded and the results in terms of position 
error are plotted in Figure 110, Figure 112 and Figure 114. The number of satellites selected 
associated are given inFigure 111, Figure 113 and Figure 115. Apart the fact that the error has been 
reduced on average, these plots shows that large errors (up to 40 m in single constellations 
configurations) remains in the harshest urban canyon conditions, and so, even after selection of the 
measurements due to the poor quality of the geometry and the low number of satellites with good 
indicators.  
If the integrity monitoring algorithm is designed correctly, at the corresponding epochs, the 
protection levels must be larger than the position errors. It can already be inferred from these 
results that the system will shows limited availability and continuity in dense urban environment 
for the stringent operations. As a consequence, it might be necessary to complement the navigation 
platform by a specific dedicated infrastructure in some areas where the proposed platform does not 
perform sufficiently well. 
 
Figure 110 Reduction of the positioning error with cascaded testing, train control (GPS/INS/track 
database) 
 
Figure 111 Number of satellite selected, train control (GPS/INS/track database) 
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Figure 112 Reduction of the positioning error with cascaded testing, train control 
(GLONASS/INS/track database) 
 
Figure 113 Number of satellite selected, train control (GLONASS/INS/track database) 
 
Figure 114 Reduction of the positioning error with innovation filtering, ETC 
(GPS/GLONASS/INS/WSS), 𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝 =2 
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Figure 115 Number of satellite selected, ETC (GPS/GLONASS/INS/track database) 
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8 MONITORING THE INTEGRITY 
OF THE HYBRIDIZED 
SOLUTIONS 
Integrity monitoring for critical terrestrial applications in urban environment has encountered a 
growing interest over the past ten years. Most existing studies focus on liability critical applications, 
and in particular on ETC. Two examples of algorithms that have been developed for that purpose are: 
 the Isotropy Based Protection Level (IBPL) method [Cosmen-Schortmann et al., 2008] which 
has been developed by GMV. IBPL is a snapshot algorithm that computes a protection level 
from the norm of the LS/WLS residual vector. It is not a fault detection algorithm as it does 
not reject measurements but only provides bounds of the position error.  
 A WLSR RAIM with a variable 𝑃𝐹𝐴 has been developed in [Salos, 2012] for ETC applications 
in urban environment. This algorithm protects the receiver against major service failures and 
assumes that the local effects such as NLOS have been rejected by the receiver thanks to prior 
steps, which are assumed but not detailed.  
As it was seen along the previous chapters of this thesis, the main challenges for the monitoring of the 
integrity of the position estimation in urban environment are the local effects which can lead to 
measurements affected by large biases, associated with unknown probabilities of occurrence. In this 
chapter, architectures and algorithms are proposed for monitoring the integrity of the applications of 
interest (train control and ETC). This chapter is constructed in the following way: 
 In section 8.1, the system integrity risk is allocated between the different sources of failure at 
the sensors level for both applications 
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 In section 8.2, the integrity risk allocated to the GNSS sensor is divided between the different 
sources of failures in the GNSS measurements. The choice of the augmentation system that is 
preferred for monitoring the integrity of the solution is also discussed. 
 In section 8.3, the design of the integrity monitoring algorithm is discussed. Two different 
algorithms are proposed. The results obtained for the solutions proposed for train control and 
ETC on the real measurement campaign described in section 5.3.2.2 are presented.  
 SQM and innovation monitoring tests presented in chapter 7 are able to detect outliers in the 
range domain. A way to link the thresholds for these tests to the integrity concepts (𝐻𝐴𝐿 and 
integrity risk) is studied in section 8.4. A method to adjust these thresholds in real time is 
proposed. 
 In section 8.6, the monitoring of the integrity of the IMU measurement is discussed. Results 
are presented for different threat models on simulated data.  
8.1 Allocation of the integrity risk between the sources of failure at 
the sensor level 
Prior to the design of any integrity monitoring algorithm, it is necessary to allocate the integrity risk 
between the different sensors and threats. For both train control and ETC, it has been chosen to 
allocate the whole risk to the GNSS sensor. It is assumed that, with adapted algorithms, the other 
sensors can reach a sufficient level of reliability to be considered fault free with respect to the GNSS 
sensor. It is assumed that the probabilities of failure of these sensors are at least 10 times lower than 
the total integrity risk. The way to monitor the integrity of the IMU measurements so that it fulfills this 
condition is discussed in section 8.6. Regarding the other sensors: 
 For train control, it can be reasonably expected that the integrity of the track database (which 
can be monitored with advanced post processing techniques, augmentation systems, etc.) is 
significantly higher than the integrity level expected for the navigation system to be reached in 
real time.  
 For ETC, it is assumed that the integrity of the WSS measurements is monitored by dedicated 
algorithms (not investigated in this thesis). 
The fault trees for the train control and ETC are given in Figure 116 and Figure 117. The positioning 
failure is  
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Figure 116 Allocation of the integrity risk: train control 
 
 
Figure 117 Allocation of the integrity risk: ETC 
8.2 Allocation of the GNSS integrity risk and Selection of the 
augmentation system 
In this section, the risk dedicated to GNSS is allocated between the different failure sources. Then, the 
choice of the augmentation system to monitor integrity is discussed. 
8.2.1 Risk allocation between the sources of GNSS failures 
The integrity risk of the GNSS sensor is allocated between the satellite faults, the failure due to 
abnormal measurement errors (due to the receiver’s surrounding environment) and the failure under 
rare normal conditions.  
 In this thesis, the probability of failure due to local effects are neglected in the GNSS fault tree: 
the NLOS and multipath-induced failures are rejected based on techniques detailed in chapter 7  
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 The other sources of failure such as interference, jamming, spoofing or failure of the hardware 
components of the receiver are assumed detected by other means.  
The total allowed integrity risk is then equally allocated between the fault-free and the satellite fault 
modes (as in conventional RAIM [Navipedia, ARAIM]). Another possible approach would have been 
to allocate a significantly lower integrity risk (1% in [Lee et al., 2005]) to the fault-free case compared 
to the satellite fault. 
 
Figure 118 Allocation of the integrity risk for the ETC 
8.2.2 Protection against failures of SiS 
Range errors from a faulty satellite may not be bounded, and can last up to several hours. Moreover, 
the probability of occurrence of such satellite failures is well characterized as detailed in chapter 5. 
Several types of GNSS augmentation can allow the detection of satellite failures in-line with civil 
aviation requirements: GBAS, SBAS and ABAS. Let us analyze the opportunity to use one of these: 
 It has been chosen not to use an augmentation system based on local infrastructure (GBAS 
like) because the main motivation for the use of GNSS in terrestrial application is to get rid of 
local infrastructures.  
 SBAS provide information to a wide area that can protect the user from failures due to SiS. 
However, the architectures proposed in the Thesis do not use SBAS for fault detection for 
several reasons: 
o it requires such an augmentation system to be available in the area of operation. For train 
control, it is stated in [ERTMS factsheet 7] that ERTMS aims at being deployed widely 
outside Europe and that ERTMS investments outside Europe represent more than 45% of 
the global ERTMS investment worldwide (e.g. New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, Chile or 
Argentina). Some of these countries are not within any SBAS coverage. The same 
argument can be used for GNSS-based ETC. 
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o For train control, the TTA of EGNOS/WAAS is 6 seconds. It is too large compared to the 
operational TTA requirement for ETCS (1 second, according to chapter 3). 
o The SBAS satellites can be located at low elevation angles because they have a 
geostationary orbit. This can cause signal masking and thus unavailability in urban 
canyons. This issue can be solved by using, for instance, the EDAS SiSNeT Service which 
uses internet as a complementary transmission link of EGNOS messages. However, the 
reliability of the data link must be assessed. It is also necessary to characterize the TTA 
when using such a link.  
o Even if SBAS evolution tends to augment dual frequency, multi-constellation GNSS, 
current SBAS systems only augment GPS L1 signals. 
o Finally, even after removal by other methods, residual abnormally large errors due to local 
effects may remain. These failures cannot be detected by SBAS that only monitors SiS. 
 ABAS appears to be the augmentation system that is the most suitable for the two applications 
studied. It is the only realistic way to fulfill the 1 s TTA requirement for train control. To 
implement ABAS in the present cases, it is either possible to use a RAIM algorithm if the 
position is estimated with GNSS only, or an AAIM if additional sensors are added into the 
solution. As sensors have been integrated in the proposed solutions (in a tight architecture), an 
AAIM algorithm is to be used here. Once isolated, the faulty satellite is removed from the 
solution until its status is updated to healthy again. Therefore, the 𝑃𝐹𝐴  associated with this 
algorithm is of particular concern.  
8.2.3 Considerations of local effects  
The local effects can results in pseudorange errors of several tenths of meters which can then convert 
into large position errors. Two methods have been introduced in chapter 5 order to deal with these 
local effects: 
 The first approach consists in adding different layers to exclude the GNSS measurements that 
are likely to be affected by large errors due to local effects prior to their integration in the 
navigation filter. In this approach, which has been studied in chapter 7, it is assumed that after 
rejection of the measurements by the different algorithms or masks used, the probability of 
failures due to local effect can be neglected.  
 The second approach is to inflate the measurement nominal error model so that it covers the 
errors due to local effects with a sufficiently high probability (in this case the corresponding 
failure sources must be removed from the integrity tree as they are considered as nominal). In 
the context of this thesis, land vehicles can operate in a large variety of environments 
including open sky, suburban and urban environments. As the GNSS measurement errors 
distributions are highly correlated with the receiver surrounding environment, this approach 
calls for an adaptation of the measurement weighting scheme in the EKF to the environment in 
which the vehicle is operating: 
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o In open sky conditions, the weighting scheme accounts for the fact that all the 
satellites are in view (except those which elevations are lower than 10°).  
o In urban canyons, the 𝑅  matrix must be inflated enough so that 𝐻𝑃𝐿0  bounds the 
position error with a sufficient probability. Different ways to inflate the measurement 
noise covariance are possible. 
This approach has three main drawbacks. The first one is that it requires a sufficient 
characterization of the measurement errors (in terms of tails of distributions), and thus requires 
a very large amount of data. The second drawback is that this method is expected to produce 
large protection levels in constrained environment and therefore to provide low system 
availability. Finally, it requires the system to be informed about the environment in which it is 
operating in real time (this could be provided through the map information). 
For both approaches, the integrity monitoring algorithm is designed to protect against satellite failures 
(even if it may have to detect residual failures due to local effects).   
8.3 Integrity monitoring algorithm, principles and results 
The integrity monitoring algorithm has to calculate 𝐻𝑃𝐿 as well as to generate an alarm if the position 
error exceeds the 𝐻𝑃𝐿. As discussed, it is either assumed that the measurements with large errors due 
to local effects have been either rejected by the measurement selection module (if considered non 
nominal) or that they are covered by the (inflated) measurement nominal error model. Thus, the 
integrity monitoring algorithm has to protect the system against satellite failures which have a 
probability of occurrence that is characterized a priori (based on past observations).  
8.3.1 Discussions on the algorithm and its parameters 
The probability of satellite failure is assumed equal to 10
-5
/sat/h for GPS (this value is extrapolated for 
Galileo) and 10
-4
/sat/h for GLONASS [Walter et al., 2014]. The satellite failures are considered as 
independent events for GPS so that the probability of occurrence of simultaneous satellite failures for 
GPS is estimated with Eq. 5-51.  
 Assuming (at maximum) 10 GPS satellites in view, based on this formula, the probability of 
having one faulty satellite is equal to 10
-4
/h, and the probability of having 2 simultaneous 
faulty satellites is equal to 4.5.10
-9
/h. The probability of simultaneous GPS failure is thus 
negligible with respect to the integrity risk for train control (for the GPS based solution), 
which is 10
-5.5
/h at minimum. These results have been extrapolated to Galileo as in [Salos, 
2012]. As for GLONASS, the probability of having one faulty satellite (over 10 visible 
satellites) is equal to 10
-3
/sat/h. If the satellite failures are considered as independent, the 
probability of 2 simultaneous satellite faults among 10 GLONASS satellites is equal to 4.5.10
-
7
/h which is also negligible with respect to the integrity risk for train control.  
 For the dual constellation solution that is used in ETC, if the solution integrates 10 GPS 
satellites and 10 Galileo satellites, the probability of having 1 faulty satellite is equal to 2.10
-
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4
/h and the probability of having 2 faulty satellites is equal to 1.9.10
-8
/h. This event is not 
taken into account because its probability of occurrence is negligible with respect to the 
integrity risk for ETC (higher than 10
-5
/h). If 10 GPS and 10 GLONASS satellites are used, 
the probability of having 1 faulty satellite (either GPS or GLONASS) is given by: 
 𝑃(1 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠) ≅ (
𝑁𝐺𝑃𝑆
1
)𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝐺𝑃𝑆 + (
𝑁𝐺𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆
1
)𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝐺𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆 Eq. 8-1 
This probability is equal to 1.1.10
-3
/h. 
The probability of having 2 faulty satellites simultaneously is equal to the sum of the 
probability of having two simultaneous faulty GPS, two faulty GLONASS or one faulty GPS 
and one faulty GLONASS satellites, can be calculated with: 
 
𝑃(2 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠)
≅ (
𝑁𝐺𝑃𝑆
2
)𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝐺𝑃𝑆
2 + (
𝑁𝐺𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆
2
)𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝐺𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆
2
+ (
𝑁𝐺𝑃𝑆
1
) (
𝑁𝐺𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆
1
)𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝐺𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝐺𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆 
Eq. 8-2 
The probability of occurrence of two simultaneous satellite failures is equal to 5.5.10
-7
/h. 
Again, this value is negligible with respect to the integrity risk.  
Note: constellation faults have been introduced in 5.2.1.2. The integrity monitoring algorithm 
is not designed to protect against such event. Indeed, the actual solutions are meant to 
integrate GPS (for which such event has not been observed) and Galileo (for which the 
probability of occurrence of such event is unknown). Moreover, it can reasonably be assumed 
that the innovation monitoring tests will detect such event.  
Thus, the integrity monitoring algorithm only has to protect against single satellite faults which have 
an assumed known probability of occurrence (denoted 𝑃𝑓).  
The design of the autonomous integrity monitoring algorithm (RAIM or AAIM) requires the 
knowledge of a 𝑃𝐹𝐴 to set the detection threshold and a 𝑃𝑀𝐷.  
 The 𝑃𝑀𝐷 of the integrity monitoring algorithm is related to the integrity risk, and has to verify: 
 𝑃𝑀𝐷 ≤
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡,𝒇
𝑃𝑓
 Eq. 8-3 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡,𝒇 is the integrity risk allocated to the fault mode characterized by a probability of 
occurrence 𝑃𝑓. Half of the total integrity risk has been allocated to the satellite failure.  
 The 𝑃𝐹𝐴  required for the FDE algorithm can be determined by allocating the continuity 
budget. Such a study has not been conducted as there are uncertainties about the continuity 
requirements for both applications (in particular for ETC where no continuity requirements 
has been derived). Therefore, in this thesis the targeted 𝑃𝐹𝐴 is considered as a parameter for 
which different realistic values will be tested.  
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The type of AAIM algorithm to be implemented to monitor the integrity of the solution had to be 
selected among the three possible existing candidates which are AIME, MSS and GLR. These 
algorithms have been introduced in chapter 2. Even if AIME provides smaller 𝐻𝑃𝐿 , there is no 
rigorous way to confirm the detection ability based on theory according to [Lee and O’Laughlin, 2000]. 
Therefore, very extensive simulations (or real tests) should be used to validate the concept. As a 
consequence, in this thesis it has been preferred to implement a Solution Separation Method. Even if it 
provides larger 𝐻𝑃𝐿 in comparison with AIME, Solution Separation thresholds and 𝐻𝑃𝐿 formulas 
guarantee on an analytical basis the probability of detection regardless of the type of failure [Lee and 
O’Laughlin, 2000], thus no simulations are necessary. The same inference can be done about GLR. 
Thus, a solution separation algorithm is implemented in order to protect against residual failures and 
for the calculation of the protection levels. The solution separation is a snapshot algorithm that was 
initially developed in [Brenner, 1995]. It can be used in an open-loop or closed-loop scheme [Escher et 
al., 2002]. Its ability to detect ramp failures has been proven in [Escher et al., 2002].  
Note: It is possible to reject a faulty satellite affected by a fault with a “jump signature” during the 
innovation monitoring test described in section 7.2.3. In this case, the measurement may be integrated 
again in the fault free solution after a sufficiently large distance has been travelled if the innovation 
monitoring test considers the measurement as nominal. If the innovation test is still positive after a 
sufficient travelled distance, it can be inferred that the measurement was not faulty due to local effects. 
It shall then be considered as a faulty satellite and excluded for a sufficient duration. On the other hand, 
the innovation monitoring algorithm may not be able to isolate SGE that will make the corrected INS 
position drifts. This is because the KF adapt to and incorporate any slowly varying drift as a natural 
dynamic state (position error state or velocity error state). For this reason, a slowly growing error (0.2 
m/s or smaller) may drag off the solution and easily escape detection [Lee and O’Laughlin, 2000]. It 
could have been possible to add tests based on observation of the GPS measurements over longer 
periods such as in AIME. However, the proposed solutions rely on the MSS to detect such failures 
because it is ensured to detect the SGE once it has reached a sufficiently large value.   
8.3.2 Principle 
Two integrity monitoring algorithms which rely on solution separation principle are tested in this 
thesis and described in this section. The principle of the solution separation consists in running a bank 
of 𝑁 KF in parallel that each excludes one different satellite. If the separation between any of the KF 
solution and the main filter exceeds a threshold, a fault is detected.  
8.3.2.1 Principle of the generic solution separation monitoring algorithm 
An adaptation of the original solution separation method which is proposed in [Young and McGraw, 
2003] is implemented here. Initially, this algorithm was designed for an open-loop hybridization 
scheme. In a closed loop scheme, the closed-loop corrections are fed back from the main filter only. 
The sub filters are operating in open loop (their error state estimate is not reset). The principle of the 
algorithm (for fault detection) is presented in Figure 119. The fault isolation function can be 
performed by means of sub-sub filters and their separation with the corresponding parent sub-filters is 
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compared to an exclusion threshold or by other means as proposed in [Young and McGraw, 2003]. 
This thesis limits to fault detection without investigating isolation. Moreover, as we are operating in a 
closed loop scheme, it is necessary to run backup EKF (each excluding one satellite) and their 
corresponding mechanization with the corresponding closed-loop corrections. Indeed in case of SGE, 
once the fault is detected, it has already corrupted the main mechanization. Therefore once the faulty 
satellite is determined, the fault-free corresponding backup mechanization and EKF must be used as 
the main filter and to reinitialize the other subfilters (after exclusion). This process ensures continuity 
and availability. An alternative approach would consist in reinitializing the filters after exclusion. 
 
Figure 119 Principle of the solution separation algorithm in a closed loop scheme 
8.3.2.1.1 Failure Detector 
Let’s denote 𝛽𝑗(𝑘) the separation between the horizontal position error as estimated by the main filter 
(𝛿𝑥0
ℎ) and the 𝑗th sub filter (𝛿𝑥𝑗
ℎ):  
 𝛽𝑗(𝑘) = 𝛿𝑥0
ℎ(𝑘) − 𝛿𝑥𝑗
ℎ(𝑘) Eq. 8-4 
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The covariance of the separation can be estimated by implementing a covariance propagator as 
detailed in [Escher, 2003]. However, it is proven in [Young and McGraw, 2003] that the covariance of 
the separation (𝐵𝑗) can be estimated by: 
 𝐵𝑗(𝑘) = 𝑃𝑗
ℎ(𝑘|𝑘) − 𝑃0
ℎ(𝑘|𝑘) Eq. 8-5 
where 𝑃0
ℎ and 𝑃𝑗
ℎ are the covariance of the position error in the local tangent plane of respectively the 
main and the 𝑗th sub filter (estimated by the KF). 
The normalized solution separation test statistic is formed as: 
 𝜆𝑗(𝑘) = 𝛽𝑗
𝑇(𝑘)𝐵𝑗
#(𝑘)𝛽𝑗(𝑘) Eq. 8-6 
where ( )#  denotes the Moore-Penrose generalized inverse. It is also possible to work with the 
unnormalized test 𝛽𝑗 as done in [Brenner, 1995]. 
The test statistic √𝜆𝑗(𝑘) can be used instead of 𝜆𝑗(𝑘) as the relation between these two magnitudes is 
monotonic (in this case the threshold must be adapted). The test statistics √𝜆𝑗(𝑘) are compared to a 
detection threshold √𝜆, and a fault is declared if any of the statistics exceed the threshold.  
{
 
 𝐻0 no failure ∀ 𝑗 ∈ {1,𝑁}, √𝜆𝑗(𝑘) < √𝜆
𝐻1 failure detected ∃ 𝑗 ∈ {1,𝑁}, √𝜆𝑗(𝑘) ≥ √𝜆
 
The detection threshold √𝜆 is determined by fixing the 𝑃𝐹𝐴 under the fault free assumption (under 𝐻0). 
As any of the several filters can cause a false alert, the detector, thresholds needs to be determined 
from 𝑃𝐹𝐴/𝑁.  
In this case, the distributions of the horizontal position error of the two considered filters are 
Gaussians and centered, therefore the separation 𝛽𝑗(𝑘) follow a bi-dimensional centered Gaussian 
(with a known 2x2 covariance matrix 𝐵𝑗). It is shown in [Young and McGraw, 2003] that the test 
variable 𝜆𝑗(𝑘) follows a chi-square distribution with two degrees of freedom. Equivalently, √𝜆𝑗(𝑘) 
follows a Rayleigh distribution with a parameter of 1. 
8.3.2.1.2 Protection Level Computation 
The horizontal protection level is calculated with: 
 𝐻𝑃𝐿 = max(𝐻𝑃𝐿𝐻0 , 𝐻𝑃𝐿𝐻1) Eq. 8-7 
where 𝐻𝑃𝐿𝐻0 is associated to the rare normal fault-free hypothesis and 𝐻𝑃𝐿𝐻1  is associated to the 
fault-in-progress hypothesis.  
8.3.2.1.2.1 HPL based on the rare normal Fault-Free hypothesis 
Under 𝐻0, the position error of the main filter follows a bi dimensional centered Gaussian distribution 
which covariance is 𝑃0
ℎ(𝑘|𝑘). 𝐻𝑃𝐿𝐻0 is calculated with: 
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 𝐻𝑃𝐿𝐻0 = 𝐾𝑓𝑓𝜎1,𝑃0 Eq. 8-8 
where: 
 𝜎1,𝑃0 is the maximum eigenvalue of the 2×2 covariance matrix 𝑃0
ℎ(𝑘|𝑘) 
 𝐾𝑓𝑓  can be determined with the circular error probable (CEP) tables [Hoover, 1984] as a 
function of 1 − 𝑃𝐻0(the fault-free probability of integrity) and √𝜎1,𝑃0 𝜎2,𝑃0⁄  
With the integrity risk allocation presented in 8.2.1 the rare normal performance probability is 
𝑃𝐻0 =
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
 per sample (assuming a 1 hour correlation time for the ionosphere in case of single 
frequency receiver). 
8.3.2.1.2.2 HPL based on the fault-in-progress hypothesis 
The following notation is introduced to facilitate the mathematic derivation: 
 𝑅(𝜔, 𝑃𝑀𝐷) is the radius such that 𝑃(‖𝜔‖ > 𝑅(𝜔, 𝑃𝑀𝐷)) = 𝑃𝑀𝐷 Eq. 8-9 
 𝑅(𝜔,𝑚, 𝑃𝑀𝐷) is the radius such that 𝑃(‖𝑚 + 𝜔‖ > 𝑅(𝜔,𝑚, 𝑃𝑀𝐷)) = 𝑃𝑀𝐷 Eq. 8-10 
 
Under 𝐻1, the position error of the main filter is biased, let’s denote 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠0 this horizontal bias and 𝜔0 
the noise vector which is zero mean (and Gaussian). The position error of the main filter is given by:  
 𝛿𝑥0
ℎ(𝑘) = 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠0(𝑘) + 𝜔0(𝑘) Eq. 8-11 
The ideal horizontal position error bound, denoted 𝛼𝐻 can be written as: 
 𝛼𝐻 = ‖𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠0(𝑘)‖ + 𝑅(𝜔0(𝑘), 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠0(𝑘), 𝑃𝑀𝐷) Eq. 8-12 
Since 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠0 is unknown it shall be estimated.  
It can be done by introducing the separation vector 𝛽𝑗, which is equal to (because the 𝑗
th
 subfilter is 
unbiased): 
 𝛽𝑗(𝑘) = 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠0(𝑘) + 𝜔0(𝑘) − 𝜔𝑗(𝑘) = 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠0(𝑘) + 𝜔′𝑗(𝑘) Eq. 8-13 
where  𝜔𝑗(𝑘) is the noise vector of the 𝑗th sub filter and 𝜔′𝑗(𝑘) is the component of 𝜔𝑗 independent of 
𝜔0.  
Eq. 8-12 can be re-arranged as: 
 
𝛼𝐻 = ‖𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠0(𝑘)‖ + 𝑅(𝜔′𝑗(𝑘), 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠0(𝑘), 𝑃𝑀𝐷) + 𝑅(𝜔0(𝑘), 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠0(𝑘), 𝑃𝑀𝐷)
− 𝑅(𝜔′𝑗(𝑘), 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠0(𝑘), 𝑃𝑀𝐷) 
Eq. 8-14 
The first two terms at the right side of Eq. 8-14 are due to bias and uncorrelated noise. They can be 
estimated with 𝛽𝑗. The last two terms are due to the noises 𝜔0(𝑘) and 𝜔′𝑗(𝑘).  
 
Horizontal position error due to bias and uncorrelated noise  
The objective is here to bound the term ‖𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠0(𝑘)‖ + 𝑅(𝜔′𝑗(𝑘), 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠0(𝑘), 𝑃𝑀𝐷).  
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It can be shown that, with an orthonormal rotation, 𝜆𝑗 is noncentral chi-squared distributed. Let us 
denote 𝑃𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 the non-centrality parameter which makes the probability of the noise to be inside the 
detection threshold equal to 𝑃𝑀𝐷 . Any bias vector with a magnitude greater than 𝑃𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠  will be 
detected with a (1-𝑃𝑀𝐷) probability. This bias must then be converted from the test domain to the 
horizontal position domain (the corresponding bias is denoted 𝛾𝑃𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑘)).  
Let us denote 𝑌𝑗(𝑘) the normalized solution separation vector given by: 
 𝑌𝑗(𝑘) = 𝑆𝑗
−
1
2(𝑘)𝑉𝑗
𝑇(𝑘)𝛾𝑃𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑘) Eq. 8-15 
where 𝑉𝑗(𝑘) and 𝑆𝑗(𝑘) are from the eigenvalue decomposition of 𝐵𝑗(𝑘): 
 𝐵𝑗(𝑘) = 𝑉𝑗(𝑘)𝑆𝑗(𝑘)𝑉𝑗
𝑇(𝑘) Eq. 8-16 
The norm of 𝑌𝑗(𝑘) is bounded by 𝑃𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠.  
The norm of 𝛾𝑃𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑘) can be expressed using Eq. 8-15 as: 
 ‖𝛾𝑃𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑘)‖ = √𝛾𝑃𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑘)𝑇𝛾𝑃𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑘) = √𝑌𝑗
𝑇(𝑘)𝑆𝑗(𝑘)𝑌𝑗(𝑘) Eq. 8-17 
Moreover, 𝑆𝑗(𝑘) is diagonal and thus ‖𝛾𝑃𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑘)‖ is bounded by:  
 ‖𝛾𝑃𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑘)‖ ≤ 𝑃𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠√𝜎1,𝐵𝑗(𝑘) = 𝐻𝑃𝐸𝐵𝑗 Eq. 8-18 
where 𝜎1,𝐵𝑗(𝑘) is the largest eigenvalue of 𝐵𝑗(𝑘). 
𝐻𝑃𝐸𝐵𝑗 bounds the horizontal position error due to bias and uncorrelated noise with a probability of 
missed detection 𝑃𝑀𝐷: 
 𝐻𝑃𝐸𝐵𝑗 ≥ ‖𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠0(𝑘)‖ + 𝑅(𝜔′𝑗(𝑘), 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠0(𝑘), 𝑃𝑀𝐷) Eq. 8-19 
 
Horizontal position error due to noise only  
It is shown in [Young and McGraw, 2003] that Eq. 8-14 can be written: 
 𝛼𝐻 ≤ 𝐻𝑃𝐸𝐵𝑗 + 𝑅(𝜔𝑗(𝑘), 𝑃𝑀𝐷) − 𝑅(𝜔′𝑗(𝑘), 𝑃𝑀𝐷) Eq. 8-20 
𝐻𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑃𝑗 and 𝐻𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐵𝑗 are the terms that corresponds to the horizontal position errors due to noise only. 
They can be determined with: 
 𝐻𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑃𝑗 = 𝑅(𝜔𝑗(𝑘), 𝑃𝑀𝐷) = 𝐾𝐶𝐸𝑃,𝑃𝑗𝜎1,𝑃𝑗 Eq. 8-21 
 𝐻𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐵𝑗 = 𝑅(𝜔′𝑗(𝑘), 𝑃𝑀𝐷) = 𝐾𝐶𝐸𝑃,𝐵𝑗𝜎1,𝐵𝑗 Eq. 8-22 
where: 
 𝜎1,𝑃𝑗, 𝜎1,𝐵𝑗 are the maximum eigenvalues of the matrix 𝑃𝑗
ℎ(𝑘|𝑘) and 𝐵𝑗
ℎ(𝑘|𝑘) 
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 𝐾𝐶𝐸𝑃,𝑃𝑗 and 𝐾𝐶𝐸𝑃,𝐵𝑗 are the coefficients of the circular error probable table associated to 𝑃𝑀𝐷 
and respectively √𝜎1,𝑃𝑗 𝜎2,𝑃𝑗⁄  and √𝜎1,𝐵𝑗 𝜎2,𝐵𝑗⁄   
Finally, the total estimated horizontal position error bound for the 𝑗th sub-filter is computed as: 
 𝐻𝑃𝐸𝑗 = 𝐻𝑃𝐸𝐵𝑗 +𝐻𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑃𝑗 −𝐻𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐵𝑗 Eq. 8-23 
And 𝐻𝑃𝐿𝐻1is calculated with: 
 𝐻𝑃𝐿𝐻1 = max𝑗
(𝐻𝑃𝐸𝑗) Eq. 8-24 
8.3.2.2 Solution separation based on independent mechanizations 
The implemented fusion algorithm operates in a closed loop scheme. The inertial error estimate (biases 
and mechanization errors) are thus fed back to the INS. In this configuration, the impact of a ramp 
fault affecting any pseudorange is problematic because the detection can only be done after the onset 
of the ramp. Prior to the detection, the mechanization and the sensors measurements are corrected with 
biases and errors estimated by the main filter. This correction is calculated by integrating a slowly 
drifting satellite. The solution separation method that has been discussed earlier assumes that the 
subfilter position estimation is nominal after its own update. It may still be the case as the 
mechanization output is corrected by a fault-free set of satellites. However, the validity of this 
assumption has not been addressed in the literature as the AAIM algorithms have been developed for 
civil aviation which operates in open-loop. It then remain unclear whether the 𝐻𝑃𝐿 bounds the true 
error with a sufficiently high probability between the onset of the SGE and its detection. The SGE are 
all the more pernicious in the proposed solution as the innovation is monitored to remove outliers 
characterized by steps, frequent in urban environment. The slow drift of the INS output could lead to 
false exclusion of several healthy measurements by the innovation monitoring test. In this section, a 
solution separation version adapted to the closed-loop case is proposed. In this version, the 𝐻𝑃𝐿 
computed are sure to contain the true position error with a sufficient probability, even between the 
occurrence of a SGE type failure and its detection, in closed-loop. This method which is based on 
conservative assumptions leads to large protection levels. 
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Figure 120 Algorithm proposed for solution separation in a closed loop scheme 
The proposed algorithm is also based on the solution separation approach. However, unlike the 
solution separation algorithm presented in section 8.3.2.1, in the proposed solution, 𝑁 mechanizations 
are run in parallel. 𝑁 EKF are used to correct the 𝑁 mechanizations, each excluding one satellite. 
Therefore even in case of SGE, it is ensured that one of the sub filters is fault-free as it completely 
excludes the faulty-satellite (and its mechanization is not affected).  
Note that it is assumed here that the covariance of the position error due to noise only is well estimated 
by the main filter, even when a SGE has affected one of the measurements (it is assumed that the SGE 
leads to horizontal position bias). This assumption must also be valid for the 𝐻𝑃𝐿  to bound the 
position error (prior to the detection) in case of SGE for a basic solution separation in an open loop 
scheme. 
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8.3.2.2.1 Test statistic 
The test statistic is the separation between the positions solutions after the corrections estimated by the 
full-filter and the sub-filter to respectively the main and sub mechanization: 
 𝛽𝑗(𝑘) = 𝑥0
ℎ(𝑘) − 𝑥𝑗
ℎ(𝑘) Eq. 8-25 
It is not possible to apply Eq. 8-5 to estimate the covariance of the separation because it is not valid in 
this case. Indeed, the proof of the formula (in [Young and McGraw, 2003]) assumes that the 
mechanization outputs are the same for the two filters, and that the matrices (observation and 
propagation) are linearized around the same position. The linearization points are not the same in this 
case (different mechanization). Moreover, the covariance propagator described in [Escher, 2003] 
cannot be applied here to estimate these covariances for the same reason. Unfortunately, no simple 
solution has been found to derive the covariance of the separation in this thesis. Therefore, we 
investigate a very conservative way to assess this covariance. Let us denote: 
 𝑥0
ℎ(𝑘) = [
𝐸0
𝑁0
] and 𝑥𝑗
ℎ(𝑘) = [
𝐸𝑗
𝑁𝑗
] Eq. 8-26 
And the associated state error covariance: 
 𝑃0(𝑘|𝑘) = [
𝜎𝐸0
2 𝜎𝐸0𝑁0
𝜎𝐸0𝑁0 𝜎𝑁0
2 ] and 𝑃𝑗(𝑘|𝑘) = [
𝜎𝐸𝑗
2 𝜎𝐸𝑗𝑁𝑗
𝜎𝐸𝑗𝑁𝑗 𝜎𝑁𝑗
2 ] Eq. 8-27 
Without any assumptions, it is possible to write: 
𝐵𝑗(𝑘) = 
[
𝜎𝐸0
2 + 𝜎𝐸𝑗
2 − 2𝜌𝐸0𝐸𝑗𝜎𝐸0𝜎𝐸𝑗 𝜎𝐸0𝑁0 + 𝜎𝐸𝑗𝑁𝑗 − 2𝜌𝐸0𝑁𝑗𝜎𝐸0𝜎𝑁𝑗 − 2𝜌𝑁0𝐸𝑗𝜎𝑁0𝜎𝐸𝑗
𝜎𝐸0𝑁0 + 𝜎𝐸𝑗𝑁𝑗 − 2𝜌𝐸0𝑁𝑗𝜎𝐸0𝜎𝑁𝑗 − 2𝜌𝑁0𝐸𝑗𝜎𝑁0𝜎𝐸𝑗 𝜎𝑁0
2 + 𝜎𝑁𝑗
2 − 2𝜌𝑁0𝑁𝑗𝜎𝑁0𝜎𝑁𝑗
] 
Eq. 
8-28 
where 𝜌𝐸0𝐸𝑗 represents the correlation between the two terms in index (the two coordinates 𝐸0 and 𝐸𝑗). 
These correlation terms can only take value within the interval [-1,1]. This is an application of the 
Cauchy–Schwarz inequality equation. The solution separation vector is a bi-dimensional random 
variable following a Gaussian distribution in the fault-free case. The components of the separation 
vector are not independent because the covariance 𝐵𝑗(𝑘) may not be diagonal. However, this matrix is 
semi positive definite, therefore it is diagonalizable and its eigenvalues are all positive or null. If the 
test was in one dimension, it is intuitive that the worst case for the detection (and therefore the highest 
𝑃𝐿) corresponds to the case where the noises on the two positions have a correlation value of -1. Here 
the problem can be formulated into a maximization problem with constraints. The cost function to 
maximize in this case is the maximum eigenvalue of 𝐵𝑗(𝑘). In particular, for a 2×2 matrix, this 
maximum eigenvalue (𝜎1,𝐵𝑗) can be simply calculated with by: 
 𝜎1,𝐵𝑗(𝑘) =
𝑇𝑟
2
+ √
𝑇𝑟2
4
− 𝐷𝑒𝑡 Eq. 8-29 
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where: 
 𝑇𝑟 is the trace of 𝐵𝑗(𝑘) 
 𝐷𝑒𝑡 is determinant of 𝐵𝑗(𝑘) 
Simulations have shown that the maximum value for 𝜎1,𝐵𝑗(𝑘) is always reached for all the correlation 
parameters equal to -1 (the cost function is decreasing with respect to each correlation parameter). 
Thus the covariance of the separator can conservatively be considered equal to: 
 
𝐵𝑗(𝑘) = 
[
𝜎𝐸0
2 + 𝜎𝐸𝑗
2 + 2𝜎𝐸0𝜎𝐸𝑗 𝜎𝐸0𝑁0 + 𝜎𝐸𝑗𝑁𝑗 + 2𝜎𝐸0𝜎𝑁𝑗 + 2𝜎𝑁0𝜎𝐸𝑗
𝜎𝐸0𝑁0 + 𝜎𝐸𝑗𝑁𝑗 + 2𝜎𝐸0𝜎𝑁𝑗 + 2𝜎𝑁0𝜎𝐸𝑗 𝜎𝑁0
2 + 𝜎𝑁𝑗
2 + 2𝜎𝑁0𝜎𝑁𝑗
] 
Eq. 8-30 
In the nominal case, the separation follows a bi dimensional Gaussian centered distribution. The 
normalized solution separation test statistic is formed as: 
 𝜆𝑗(𝑘) = 𝛽𝑗
𝑇(𝑘)𝐵𝑗
#(𝑘)𝛽𝑗(𝑘) Eq. 8-31 
As in the conventional solution separation algorithm, the test statistics √λj(k) are compared to a 
detection threshold √λ, and a fault is declared if the any of the statistics exceed the threshold. The 
detection threshold √λ is determined by fixing the PFA  in the fault free case (under H0). The test 
variable λj(k) follows a chi-square distribution with two degrees of freedom. Equivalently, √λj(k) 
follows a Rayleigh distribution with a parameter of 1. 
8.3.2.2.2 Protection levels 
The derivation of the protection level is the same as for the algorithm detailed in section 8.3.2.1, where 
the expression of 𝐵𝑗(𝑘) has been changed.  
8.3.3 Availability results on the data set conducted in downtown Toulouse 
The two autonomous integrity monitoring algorithms have been implemented on the different 
hybridization solutions presented in chapter 6. Their behaviors have been tested using the data 
collection presented in section 5.3.2.2 in suburban and urban environment. During this data collection, 
no satellite failure had occurred, therefore 𝐻0  holds. It must then be proven that the 𝐻𝑃𝐿  are 
sufficiently large to bound the position error when no alarm is generated. If an alarm is raised during 
the campaign, it is a false alarm. Finally, the objective is to check the availability of the integrity 
monitoring algorithm and the distribution of the 𝐻𝑃𝐿 for the different solutions proposed. To fully 
validate that the solution has a probability of misleading information that is lower than or equal to the 
allowed integrity risk, significantly longer campaigns would be necessary. Unfortunately, the amount 
of data collected and processed is not sufficient. Moreover, unlike civil aviation, for terrestrial 
applications, it is not possible to predict the performances of the integrity monitoring algorithm 
because the satellites in view/masked cannot be anticipated as well as multipath error amplitude or 
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NLOS reception. The results presented in this section are obtained for solutions that integrate the 
GNSS pseudorange rates because it has been shown in chapter 6 that processing these measurements 
highly increases the accuracy of the solution, especially in constrained environment. For each subfilter 
of the integrity monitoring algorithm, the pseudorange rate measurement from the excluded satellite is 
also excluded. 
8.3.3.1 Results: Train control 
The proposed parameters for the design of the integrity algorithm in the case of train control are 
summarized in Table 36. These parameters are defined assuming that there is only one satellite failure 
at a time, and with at maximum 10 satellites in view. For GLONASS, the probability of satellite 
failure has been set to 10
-4
/sat/h. The integrity risk allocated to each GNSS is 10
-5.5
/h. As no continuity 
requirement was found for this application, different false detection rate has been tested.  
 GPS based solution GLONASS based solution 
Total integrity risk (/h) 10
-5.5
 10
-5.5
 
Missed detection probability  0.5.10
-1.5
 0.5.10
-2.5
 
Rare normal performance rate (/sample) 0.5.10
-5.5 
 0.5.10
-5.5 
 
False detection rate (/sample) 10
-4
/10
-5
/10
-6
 10
-4
/10
-5
/10
-6
 
Table 36  Summary of the parameters of the integrity monitoring algorithm for train control 
8.3.3.1.1 Approach based on the inflation of the noise measurement covariance matrix  
The first approach consists in inflating the measurement error covariance matrix sufficiently so that it 
covers the measurement errors due to the local effects. In this approach all the pseudorange 
measurements are incorporated for the Kalman filter update operation. In particular, the measurement 
selection process described in chapter 6 is not applied here (only a 30 dB-Hz 𝐶/𝑁0 mask is applied 
here). In this case, it is assumed that all the measurements are nominal (as no satellite failure occurs 
during the campaign). In this case the error on the position estimated by the filter is assumed Gaussian, 
centered, and with a variance that is estimated by the filter. To provide sufficient integrity, 𝐻𝑃𝐿𝐻0 
shall bound the position error with the corresponding rare normal required probability. The proposed 
criterion that is used here is that the error magnitude shall be lower than three times the standard 
deviation of the position error estimated by the KF for all the data collection. For the pseudorange 
measurements, the weighting scheme which has been derived in section 5.3.2.2.4 to account for the 
local effects has been used. In dense urban environment, it has been observed that the position error 
exceed the 3𝜎 bounds as estimated by the filter. It is proposed to inflate the noise standard deviation 
coefficients corresponding to the pseudorange (𝜎𝜌) and pseudorange rates (𝜎?̇?) measurements when 
the receiver is located in deep urban canyons by constant multiplying factors denoted 𝐾𝜌 and 𝐾?̇?. For 
the filters that integrates GPS and GLONASS, 𝐾𝜌 is set to 2 and 𝐾?̇? is set to 4. These coefficients have 
been determined empirically so that the criterion is fulfilled even in dense urban environment. For 
simplicity, the two EKF integrates the data from the same Landmark 01 IMU (but with independent 
mechanization). It shall not be the case for a true implementation of the proposed solution. 
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8.3.3.1.1.1 Standard solution separation algorithm 
The solution separation algorithm presented in section 8.3.2.1 is implemented on the train control 
solutions. The two sub solutions that integrates GPS and GLONASS have been combined according to 
the method presented in section 4.1.1.1. Firstly, the performances in terms of position errors 
characteristic (RMS and accuracy) of the combined system are assessed and compared to the 
performances of each sub systems. Indeed the position of the combination is directly dependent of the 
protection levels of both subsystems, for this reason it has not been possible to assess the performance 
of the combined solution in chapter 6. Therefore different 𝑃𝑀𝐷  and 𝑃𝐹𝐴  used in the design of the 
integrity monitoring algorithm will result in different accuracy performances. The accuracy 
performance obtained with a 𝑃𝑀𝐷 at 10
-1.5
 and a 𝑃𝐹𝐴 at 10
-4
 are presented as an example. The along-
track position error CDF is given in Figure 121. The performances of the two subsystems and the 
combined systems are compared in Table 37. The combined system outperforms the worst of the two 
subsystems for all the metrics. This result is compliant with the theoretical performances obtain by 
simple modelling in chapter 4. The combined solution is able to fulfill the along-track accuracy 
requirements (6.6 meter in the most stringent case) in order to be used in train control for all 
operations in suburban environment provided that the across track requirement is removed. In dense 
urban environment, the along-track accuracy of the combined system is sufficient to fulfil the 
requirements except for stations and corridors.  
 
Figure 121 Distribution of the position error of the two sub solutions and their combination after 
inflated weighting scheme in urban environment (𝑃𝐹𝐴 = 10
-4
) 
Along-track error EKF GPS EKF GLONASS Combination 
RMS (m) 
Suburban 2.8 2.5 2.7 
Urban 4.4 7.5 6.4 
Max (m) 
Suburban 7.7 7.3 6.9 
Urban 25.6 24.5 25.6 
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95% (m) 
Suburban 5.3 4.6 5.0 
Urban 8.9 16.1 14.7 
Table 37 Statistics on the position error of the two sub solutions and their combination after inflated 
weighting schemes 
For the two sub solutions as well as for the combined solution, the Stanford plots are given in 
appendix H. This representation consists in plotting the 2D histogram of the horizontal protection 
levels as a function of the horizontal error. A misleading information event does occur if the position 
error exceeds the protection level. These figures have confirmed that no Misleading Information 
occurred during the data collection for the three configurations. The distributions of 𝐻𝑃𝐿 for the three 
subsystems are given in Figure 122 for urban and suburban environments. The results are also given in 
terms of availability in Table 38 and Table 39 for the different 𝑃𝐹𝐴 that have been tested. The inflated 
weighting scheme combined with the poor geometry leads to considerably larger protection levels in 
urban environment compared to suburban which leads to poor availability of the solution (even for 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 125 m). In suburban, the availability is between 99% and 100% for a 𝐻𝐴𝐿 of 50 m. With a 𝑃𝐹𝐴 
of 10−4 the availability is sufficient for the navigation in some main and secondary lines as well and 
in all the regional and industrial lines (availability higher than the requirement). It must be kept in 
mind here that suburban environment conditions do not correspond to open-sky conditions. 
 
Figure 122 Distribution of the 𝐻𝑃𝐿 of the two sub solutions and their combination after inflated 
weighting scheme in urban environment (𝑃𝐹𝐴 = 10
-4
) 
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Suburban 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝐻𝐴𝐿=15 m 28.8 % 24.3 % 21.1% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿=25 m 80.6 % 76.4 % 72.0% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿=50 m 99.8 % 99.6 % 99.5% 
 
Urban 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝐻𝐴𝐿=25 m 2.9 % 2.5 % 2.0% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿=50 m 46.1 % 42.1 % 38.4% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿=125 m 93.7 % 92.1 % 91.0% 
 
Table 38 Statistics on availability in suburban 
environment with inflated weighting scheme 
Table 39 Statistics on availability in urban 
environment with inflated weighting scheme 
Note: No false alarm has been observed during the data collection.  
8.3.3.1.1.2 Solution separation based on sub mechanizations 
The solution separation based on independent mechanization has been implemented and tested on the 
same data set. In this case again, the combination of GPS and GLONASS outperforms the worst of the 
two solutions in terms of accuracy for every environments. It has been shown that the accuracy of the 
combined solution is 5 meters in suburban environment and 14.7 meters in suburban environment (it is 
identical to what has been obtained for the standard separation algorithm). The Stanford plots are 
given for the two sub solutions and the combined solution in appendix H. No HMI has been observed 
for any solution during the campaign. However, the protection levels calculated with this algorithm are 
significantly larger than the position error which is damaging for the availability. It is characteristic of 
an ineffective integrity monitoring algorithm.  
Note: The efficiency of an integrity monitoring algorithm for 𝐻𝑃𝐿 computation can be quantized by 
measuring the ratio 𝐻𝑃𝐸/𝐻𝑃𝐿 . This ratio shall be as high as possible and below one to ensure 
integrity.  
This is due to the very conservative bound that has been derived for the covariance of the separation 
vector (assuming anti correlated sub solutions).  The cumulative distributions of the 𝐻𝑃𝐿 for the three 
subsystems are given in Figure 123 for urban and suburban environments. This algorithm leads to poor 
availability because 𝐻𝑃𝐿  are too conservative. It is the case in suburban environment where the 
availability is lower than 85% for a 𝐻𝐴𝐿  of 50 m (Table 40). As illustrated in Table 41 urban 
environment, the inflation of the measurement covariance highly degrades the availability of the 
solution which is lower than 70%, even in sub urban environment.  
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Figure 123 Distribution of the 𝐻𝑃𝐿 of the two sub solutions and their combination after inflated 
weighting scheme in urban environment (approach based on separated mechanizations with 𝑃𝐹𝐴=10
-4
) 
Suburban 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 15 
m 
0% 0% 0% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 25 
m 
3.8% 1.8% 0.8% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 50 
m 
84.6% 79.8% 76.1% 
 
Urban 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 25 
m 
0% 0% 0% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 50 
m 
0% 0% 0% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 
125 m 
66.3% 62% 57% 
 
Table 40 Statistics on availability in suburban 
environment with inflated weighting scheme. 
(approach based on separated mechanizations) 
Table 41 Statistics on availability in urban 
environment with inflated weighting scheme. 
(approach based on separated mechanizations) 
8.3.3.1.2 Approach based on the selection of the GNSS measurements 
The second approach that is investigated consists in selecting the measurements prior to the integrity 
monitoring algorithm and excluding the measurements that are likely to be biased due to the 
environment of the user. In this case, the weighting scheme used to model the multipath error is based 
on the results obtained by simulations on the LMS and the noise error is modelled by its theoretical 
variance. The selection of the measurement is done according to the scheme that has been described in 
chapter 6 (except the multipath monitor that was not implemented on the mass market receiver used).  
8.3.3.1.2.1 Standard solution separation algorithm 
It can be seen in Figure 124 and Table 42 that the selection of the measurements has improved the 
accuracy of the solution in urban environment. As an illustration, the horizontal accuracy (95%) has 
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been reduced from 14.6 m to 10.9 m on the combined solution. However, the combined solution is still 
accurate enough for positioning in train station in urban environment due to the low accuracy of the 
GLONASS subsystem in this case. The accuracy requirements for the other operations are still 
fulfilled here.   
 
Figure 124 Distribution of the position error of the two sub solutions and their combination after 
innovation filtering in suburban and urban environments (𝑃𝐹𝐴 = 10
-4
) 
Along-track error EKF GPS EKF GLONASS Combination 
RMS 
Suburban 1.8 3.1 2.4 
Urban 5.4 8.0 4.8 
Max 
Suburban 8.3 8.2 8.3 
Urban 16.5 17.4 16.5 
95
th
% 
Suburban 3.6 6.8 5.2 
Urban 8.2 16.7 10.6 
Table 42  Statistics on the position error of the two sub solutions and their combination after 
measurement selection 
The Stanford plots in appendix H shows that no misleading information was observed during the data 
collection for the sub systems and the combined solution. It can be seen in Figure 125 that the 
protection levels have been highly reduced in urban environment by selecting the measurements 
because it enables to integrate only measurements with small error covariance. The availability of the 
integrity monitoring algorithm is given in Table 43 and Table 44. With this approach, the system has 
an availability of 100 % for a 𝐻𝐴𝐿 of 50 m in suburban environment for all the tested 𝑃𝐹𝐴. It is 
sufficient for most main and secondary lines, as well as regional and industrial lines. However, it is not 
sufficient for corridor lines and stations. Moreover, the availability in urban environment has been 
significantly improved, and reaches 99% for a 𝐻𝐴𝐿 of 125 m in urban environment. However, the 
tolerable unavailability associated to the 𝐻𝐴𝐿 of 125 m shall be slightly lower. However, the epochs 
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corresponding to the unavailability periods do not occurs in a typical rail environment (tramway tracks) 
but in a very narrow urban canyon which width is about 5 meters (43°35'57.70"N, 1°26'49.13"E). This 
street is not wide enough to be representative of a rail track in urban environment. 
 
Figure 125 Distribution of the 𝐻𝑃𝐿 of the two sub solutions and their combination after selection of 
the measurements in suburban and urban environments (𝑃𝐹𝐴 = 10
-4
) 
Suburban 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 15 
m 
6.1% 4.9% 3.0% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 25 
m 
63.4% 56.1% 51.3% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 50 
m 
100% 99.7% 99.4% 
 
Urban 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 25 
m 
24.0% 21.8% 19.4% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 50 
m 
76.1% 73.5% 71.1% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 
125 m 
99.0% 98.6% 98.3% 
 
Table 43 Statistics of availability in suburban 
environment with measurement selection 
Table 44  Statistics of availability in urban 
environment with measurement selection 
8.3.3.1.2.2 Solution separation using sub mechanizations 
The separation algorithm in which each sub filter corrects its own mechanization also performs large 
protection levels and thus low availability in urban and suburban environment. The measurement 
selection process has slightly reduced the size of 𝐻𝑃𝐿 in urban environment. This algorithm clearly 
performs insufficient availability in urban environment. In suburban environment, it shall be noticed 
that an availability of 100% is achieved for an 𝐻𝐴𝐿 of 100 m which appears sufficient for operating in 
low density lines.  
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Figure 126 Distribution of the 𝐻𝑃𝐿 of the two sub solutions and their combination after selection of 
the measurements in urban environment (approach based on separated mechanizations with 𝑃𝐹𝐴 = 10
-
4
) 
Suburban 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 15 
m 
0 % 0 % 0% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 25 
m 
5.4% 2.8% 1.3% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 50 
m 
85.0% 80.7% 77.8% 
 
Urban 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 25 
m 
0% 0% 0% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 50 
m 
3.2% 2.3% 1.9% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 
125 m 
79.8% 75.1% 71.2% 
 
Table 45 Statistics on availability in suburban 
environment with measurement selection. 
(approach based on separated mechanizations) 
Table 46 Statistics on availability in urban 
environment with measurement selection 
(approach based on separated mechanizations) 
8.3.3.2 Results: ETC 
To design the integrity monitoring algorithm, it is necessary to determine its parameters in term of 
𝑃𝑀𝐷  and 𝑃𝐹𝐴 . The parameters proposed for the design of the integrity algorithm for ETC are 
summarized in Table 47. It is assumed that there is one satellite failure at a time, and that, at 
maximum, 20 satellites are in view (10 for each constellation). For GLONASS, the probability of 
occurrence of a satellite fault is considered equal to 10
-4
/sat/h. In this case, the probability of 
occurrence of a satellite fault for the dual constellation system is equal to 1.1.10
-3
/sat/h. It has been 
stated in chapter 3 that the integrity risk requirements for GNSS to be used in ETC are not 
standardized. Therefore different GNSS integrity risk requirements can be derived depending of the 
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charging organism. Three typical values for the integrity risk requirement have been tested: 10
-4
/h, 10
-
5
/h and 10
-6
/h. It is assumed that lower integrity risks are associated with safety critical applications. 
Moreover, as no continuity requirement was found for this application, different false detection rate 
have been tested. 
 GPS/GLONASS based algorithm 
Total integrity risk (/h) 10
-4
 10
-5
 10
-6
 
Missed detection probability 0.045 0.0045 0.00045 
Rare normal performance rate (/sample) 0.5.10
-4
 0.5.10
-5
 0.5.10
-6
 
False detection rate (/sample) 10
-4
/10
-5
/10
-6
 10
-4
/10
-5
/10
-6
 10
-4
/10
-5
/10
-6
 
Table 47  Summary of the parameters of the integrity monitoring algorithm for ETC  
8.3.3.2.1 Approach based on the inflation of the noise measurement covariance matrix  
The weighting scheme which has been derived in chapter 5 to account for the local effects and the 
thermal noise has been used. It replaces the value derived by simulations with the LMS channel model 
for multipath and the theoretical standard deviation of the error due to thermal noise. The noise 
standard deviation coefficients corresponding to the pseudorange (𝜎𝜌) and pseudorange rates (𝜎?̇?) 
measurements have been inflated when the receiver is located in deep urban canyons by applying 
constant multiplying factors denoted 𝐾𝜌 and 𝐾?̇?. 𝐾𝜌 has been set to 2 and 𝐾?̇? is set to 4.  
8.3.3.2.1.1 Standard solution separation algorithm 
The integration of the measurements from the two constellations enables to significantly reduce the 
magnitude of the protection levels in both urban and suburban environment (and thus even if there is 
no accesss any map or track base). Table 48 shows that the solution that integrates GPS GLONASS, 
the IMU and the WSS, achieve a good availability (more than 99%) in suburban environment for an 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 of 25 m. It may not be sufficient in some situations where the distance between parallel roads can 
be as low as 15 m. However, in urban environment, the degradation of the geometry and the large 
measurement errors lead to higher 𝐻𝑃𝐿 (see Figure 127).  
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Figure 127 Distribution of the 𝐻𝑃𝐿 for ETC (𝑃𝐹𝐴 = 10
-4
) 
Suburban 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−4/h 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−5/h 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−6/h 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 15 m 99.4% 98.9% 98.5% 97.9% 97.6% 97.2% 96.2% 94.1% 91.9% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 25 m 100% 100% 99.9% 99.9% 99.8% 99.8% 99.8% 99.7% 99.7% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 50 m 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Table 48  Statistics of availability in suburban environment with measurement selection 
Urban 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−4/h 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−5/h 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−6/h 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 25 m 51.8% 48.2% 44.8% 36.8% 34.3% 32.6% 27.3% 24.9% 23.1% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 50 m 92.6% 91.3% 90.0% 87.7% 86.1% 84.5% 82.3% 80.4% 78.8% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 75 m 99.3% 99.0% 98.6% 98.2% 97.6% 97.1% 96.2% 94.9% 94.0% 
Table 49  Statistics of availability in urban environment with measurement selection 
8.3.3.2.1.2 Solution separation with parallel mechanizations 
The solution separation algorithm in which the subfilters are associated with different sub 
mechanization has been tested on the ETC solution. Again due to the conservative assumption on the 
covariance of the separator, the HPL are much higher than the standard solution separation algorithm. 
Anyway, the algorithm is able to fulfill suitable availability (99 to 100 %) in suburban environment if 
the alert limit is higher or equal to 50 m and the integrity risk set to 10
-4
 to 10
-5
/h (associated to a false 
alarm rate of 10
-4
 to 10
-5
). The availability in urban environment is very poor and not sufficient for an 
ETC. 
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Figure 128 Distribution of the 𝐻𝑃𝐿 for ETC (𝑃𝐹𝐴 = 10
-4
), solution separation using sub 
mechanizations for inflated measurement error model 
 
Suburban 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−4/h 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−5/h 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−6/h 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 15 m 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 25 m 14.8% 10.4% 6.6% 6.2% 2.6% 0% 8.0% 0% 0% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 50 m 100% 100% 99.7% 99.7% 98.4% 94.5% 97.1% 90.0% 79.4% 
Table 50 Statistics of availability in suburban environment with inflated measurement error model 
Urban 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−4/h 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−5/h 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−6/h 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 25 m 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 50 m 1.3% 9.0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 75 m 25.6% 16.3% 12.0% 11.6% 8.3% 5.5% 7.7% 3.6% 2.0% 
Table 51 Statistics of availability in urban environment with inflated measurement error model 
8.3.3.2.2 Approach based on the selection of the GNSS measurements 
The benefit of selecting the measurements prior to the integrity monitoring algorithm is investigated 
here. In this configuration, the weighting scheme used to model the multipath error is based on the 
results obtained by simulations on the LMS and the noise error is modelled by its theoretical variance. 
The scheme applied for the selection of the measurement is the one that has been described in chapter 
7 (except the multipath monitor that was not implemented on the mass market receiver used).  
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8.3.3.2.2.1 Standard solution separation algorithm 
Table 52 shows that the selection of the measurements has slightly improved the availability of the 
solution in urban environment (it is visible for an 𝐻𝐴𝐿 of 25 m). Higher improvement was expected 
due to the ability of the selection scheme to reduce the magnitude of the 𝐻𝑃𝐸 in the dual constellation 
approach. This is the result of the degradation of the geometry by excluding satellites with bad 
indicators. However, the drawback intrinsic to this approach is that the availability has been degraded 
in suburban environment.  
 
Figure 129 Distribution of the 𝐻𝑃𝐿 for ETC (𝑃𝐹𝐴 = 10
-4
) 
Suburban 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−4/h 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−5/h 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−6/h 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 15 m 98.4% 97.9% 96.9% 94.6% 92.8% 90.7% 88.8% 86.0% 83.7% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 25 m 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99.9% 99.9% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 50 m 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Table 52 Statistics of availability in suburban environment with measurement selection 
Urban 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−4/h 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−5/h 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−6/h 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 25 m 71.2% 68.9% 66.6% 64.3% 62.8% 61.4% 60.7% 59.3% 58.1% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 50 m 94.3% 93.5% 92.8% 91.7% 90.4% 89.3% 88.7% 87.3% 85.7% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 75 m 98.4% 98.1% 97.7% 97.4% 96.9% 96.4% 96.3% 95.7% 95.3% 
Table 53 Statistics of availability in urban environment with measurement selection 
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8.3.3.2.2.2 Solution separation algorithm based on sub mechanization 
Finally, the sub mechanization based solution separation algorithm has been tested on the fusion 
algorithm that integrates GPS, GLONASS, the IMU and the WSS with selection of the measurements. 
A significant reduction of the protection level CDF has been obtained with the selection in urban 
environment. As an example, for a 𝑃𝐹𝐴  of 10
-4
 associated with an integrity risk of 10
-4
/h, the 
availability associated with an 𝐻𝐴𝐿 of 75 meters has been improved from 25.6 to 88.6%.  
 
Figure 130 Distribution of the 𝐻𝑃𝐿 for ETC (𝑃𝐹𝐴 = 10
-4
) 
Suburban 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−4/h 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−5/h 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−6/h 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 15 m 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 25 m 67.9% 51.5% 34.9% 33.1% 22.2% 13.4% 18.3% 10.9% 6.9% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 50 m 100% 100% 99.9% 99.7% 99.5% 99.4% 99.4% 99.3% 99.3% 
Table 54 Statistics of availability in suburban environment with measurement selection, approach 
based on parallel mechanizations 
Urban 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−4/h 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−5/h 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 10
−6/h 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
= 10−6 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 25 m 11.4% 10.3% 8.2% 7.7% 4.2% 2.0% 3.3% 1.5% 0% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 50 m 61.4% 55.6% 50.7% 49.0% 45.7% 41.8% 44.2% 39.6% 35.4% 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 = 75 m 88.6% 85.9% 82.5% 78.9% 73.4% 69.7% 70.9% 68.2% 63.4% 
Table 55 Statistics of availability in urban environment with measurement selection, approach based 
on parallel mechanizations 
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8.3.4 Detection ability 
The ability of the two solution separation algorithms to detect a simulated satellite fault has been 
tested on real data. The solution that is used in this section uses GPS, GLONASS, the IMU of 
reference and the simulated WSS. The satellite failure is injected on GPS SV 15 (arbitrarily chosen), 
when the vehicle is driving in suburban environment. Different simulated satellite failures have been 
tested: 
 Step jumps with magnitudes of 30 m (typical of clock jumps), 100 m 
 Ramp failure with magnitudes of 0.1 m/s (as it may not be detected by monitoring the 
residuals), 0.5 m/s  
The failure is added at 300 seconds in the data collection.  
8.3.4.1 Standard solution separation algorithm 
The conventional solution separation algorithm has been tested at first. It is shown in Figure 131 and 
Figure 132 that the algorithm is able to detect the faults characterized by a jump signature (because the 
separation exceed the thresholds) before the 𝐻𝑃𝐸  exceeds the 𝐻𝑃𝐿 . There is no misleading 
information in these two cases. The detection took 10 second for a 30 m jump and 2 second for a 100 
m jump. The ability of the test to detect ramp failures is illustrated by Figure 133 and Figure 134. It 
can be inferred from Figure 133 that the ramp with a magnitude of 0.1 m/s is detected 140 seconds 
after having corrupted the measurement. Still, the 𝐻𝑃𝐿 bound the position error prior to the detection 
(the misleading information occurs 40 seconds after the alarm has been raised). The ramp with a 
magnitude of 0.5 m/s is detected after 40 seconds and at this time the 𝐻𝑃𝐸 has not exceed the 𝐻𝑃𝐿. 
Thus, the proposed adaptation of the solution separation algorithm to the closed loop scheme is 
relevant. 
 
  
Figure 131 Detection of a step with a  
magnitude of 30 m 
 
 Figure 132 Detection of a step with a  
magnitude of 100 m 
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Figure 133 Detection of a ramp failure with a magnitude  
of 0.1 m/s 
 
 Figure 134 Detection of a ramp failure with a magnitude  
of 0.5 m/s 
 
 
 
8.3.4.2 Solution separation based on parallel mechanizations 
The same study has been conducted on the solution separation algorithm that uses parallel 
mechanizations. As shown in Figure 135 and Figure 136, the integrity monitoring algorithm is able to 
detect the satellite failure before the 𝐻𝑃𝐸 exceeds the 𝐻𝑃𝐿 in case of step failure. However, as the 
covariance of the separator is much larger (because of the conservative assumption), the detection is 
significantly longer than for solution separation with subfilters on an open loop scheme. According to 
Figure 135, a 30 meter jump is detected 50 seconds after its onset. The detection does not exceed 10 
seconds for a jump of 100 m according to Figure 136. According to Figure 137 and Figure 138 the 
algorithm is also able to detect ramp failures. The 0.1 m/s ramp has been detected approximately 300 
seconds after its onset. It has been observed that the 𝐻𝑃𝐿 bounds the 𝐻𝑃𝐸 prior to the detection. The 
0.5 m/s ramp has been successfully detected after 75 seconds after its onset according to Figure 138. 
Thus the two solution separations algorithms are able to detect the satellite failures with jump and 
ramp signatures.  
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Figure 135 Detection of a step with a  
magnitude of 30 m, separated mechanizations 
 
 Figure 136 Detection of a step with a  
magnitude of 100 m, separated mechanizations 
 
 
  
Figure 137 Detection of a ramp failure with a magnitude  
of 0.1 m/s, separated mechanizations 
 
 Figure 138 Detection of a ramp failure with a magnitude  
of 0.5 m/s, separated mechanizations 
 
 
8.4 Improving the measurement selection by determining the 
maximum tolerable bias 
The multipath detector and innovation monitoring tests that have been presented in chapter 7 have 
been designed following a traditional approach which consists in setting their own 𝑃𝐹𝐴 to a fixed value 
in order to obtain a detection threshold. A minimum detectable measurement bias can then be deduced 
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An alternative approach investigated in this section consists in first computing the measurement biases 
that are dangerous for the navigation algorithm. Given this information, and knowing the the required 
𝑃𝑀𝐷 for the detector, it is then possible to set the thresholds for the considered tests. The 𝑃𝐹𝐴 is then 
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type of failure of interest (due to local effects) require the measurements to only be excluded for a 
short duration because local effects are known to be limited in space.  
8.4.1 Concept of critical biases 
Only the biases that can lead to a horizontal positioning failure need to be detected and excluded from 
the solution. The critical biases are defined as the smallest biases that will lead to a positioning failure 
with a given probability. This concept has been introduced in [Nikiforov, 2005] and is investigated in 
[Martineau, 2008] in the case of a WLSE position estimation algorithm. Its principle relies on the fact 
that small measurement biases are acceptable if, and only if, they do not lead to a probability of failure 
higher than the integrity risk. An illustration of the concept is given in Figure 139.  
 
Figure 139 Principle of the critical bias concept 
8.4.2 Computation of the critical bias in the single bias case 
The case of a single measurement bias is first investigated. Even if the origin of the bias is not 
discussed, the final objective is to apply this method to NLOS and multipath biases. According to 
[Martineau, 2008], the critical biases values for a given user position at a given moment are obtained 
by computing the smallest additional range bias 𝑏𝑖 (on satellite 𝑖) so that: 
 (1 − 𝑃𝑓)𝑃0(‖𝑋𝐻 − ?̂?𝐻‖ > 𝐻𝐴𝐿) + 𝑃𝑓𝑃𝑏𝑖(‖𝑋𝐻 − ?̂?𝐻‖ > 𝐻𝐴𝐿) = 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 Eq. 8-32 
where: 
 𝑃𝑓 is the probability of failure of one satellite 
 𝑃0 corresponds to the fault free case  
 𝑃𝑏𝑖 corresponds to probability of faulty case (a bias 𝑏𝑖 on pseudorange 𝑖) 
Note: 𝑃0 and 𝑃𝑏𝑖 are conditional probabilities.  
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The probability 𝑃𝐻0(‖𝑋𝐻 − ?̂?𝐻‖ > 𝐻𝐴𝐿)  in the fault-free mode can be overbounded in real time 
provided that the 𝐻𝐴𝐿 is known. Indeed, the position error follows a bi dimensional Gaussian centered 
distribution which covariance is estimated by the KF, and denoted 𝑃0(𝑘|𝑘).  
 𝑃𝐻0(‖𝑋𝐻 − ?̂?𝐻‖ > 𝐻𝐴𝐿) ≤ 𝑐𝑑𝑓ℛ(𝜎1,𝑃0)
(𝐻𝐴𝐿) Eq. 8-33 
If this probability is higher than 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡, the system is not available and thus the calculation of the critical 
bias does not make sense. This probability can be neglected with respect to 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 since, in this section, 
the nominal error model does not include large multipath and NLOS errors (which are part of failure 
mode).  In this case,  Eq. 8-32 can be simplified and becomes:  
 𝑃𝑏𝑖(‖𝑋𝐻 − ?̂?𝐻‖ > 𝐻𝐴𝐿) =
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑃𝑓
 Eq. 8-34 
The approach used in [Martineau, 2008] consists in calculating the theoretical expression of the 
probability for the horizontal position error to be higher than the 𝐻𝐴𝐿, provided the value of the bias. 
Then it is possible to find numerically the minimum bias that leads to a position error with a given 
probability step by step when a LS/WLS estimation algorithm is used. This process requires an 
important amount of calculation because it involves integrals that can only be determined numerically. 
A simple way to determine a lower bound of the critical bias, which can be calculated in real time is 
proposed hereafter. The formula obtained can be used when a Kalman filter is used for estimating the 
position. The equivalent results for a position estimation with a LS/WLS algorithm are detailed in 
appendix J.  
To determine the critical bias, it is necessary to characterize the distribution of the position error when 
a bias is present on one measurement. It has been proven in [Montloin, 2014] (proof given in appendix 
I), that for a KF, the estimation error verifies the following equation: 
 𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1 = 𝛢𝑘+1𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘 + 𝐾𝑘+1𝐸𝑘+1 + 𝐵𝑘+1𝑤𝑠𝑘+1 Eq. 8-35 
where: 
 𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘 is the error on the state estimate at instant 𝑘 
 𝐴𝑘+1 = (𝐼 − 𝐾𝑘+1𝐻𝑘+1)𝐹𝑘  
 𝐵𝑘+1 = (𝐼 − 𝐾𝑘+1𝐻𝑘+1)  
 𝐸𝑘+1 is the measurement error vector 
 𝑤𝑠𝑘+1 is the process noise 
The state estimation error at time 𝑘 + 1 is the sum of three terms which distributions are investigated. 
It is assumed that, at time 𝑘 the solution is fault-free, and that the filter is well implemented and tuned. 
In this case, the estimation error covariance is estimated by 𝑃𝑘|𝑘. It is therefore assumed that: 
 𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘~𝒩(0, 𝑃𝑘|𝑘  ) Eq. 8-36 
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The measurement error vector is assumed to be a multi-dimensional Gaussian vector. The 
measurement errors are centered except the 𝑖𝑡ℎ measurement. 
 𝐸𝑘+1~𝒩(𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠, 𝑅𝑘) Eq. 8-37 
where 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = [0 … 𝑏𝑖 … 0]
𝑇. 
The third term is the process noise, which is zero-mean normally distributed: 
 𝑤𝑠𝑘+1~𝒩(0, 𝑄𝑘+1) Eq. 8-38 
It is characterized by its covariance matrix 𝑄𝑘+1. 
The expression of the EKF error can be used to determine the critical bias. To do so, it is firstly 
necessary to determine the distribution of the horizontal error. The error in the horizontal plane is 
defined as: 
 ‖𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
𝐻 ‖ = √𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1,𝐸
2 + 𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1,𝑁
2  Eq. 8-39 
where 𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘,𝐸 and 𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘,𝑁 are respectively the east and north component of the position error. 
The errors on the east and north axis are the sum of centered normally distributed terms and 
deterministic term due to the measurement bias. Therefore the east and north position errors are 
normally distributed with a non-zero mean: 
 𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
𝐻 = 𝑏𝐻 + 𝑛𝐻 Eq. 8-40 
The parameters of the 2D normal distribution are given by: 
 𝐸[𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
𝐻 ] = 𝑏𝐻 = [
(𝐾𝑘+1)1,𝑖
(𝐾𝑘+1)2,𝑖
] 𝑏i Eq. 8-41 
with: 
 cov(𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
𝐻 ) = 𝐸[𝑛𝐻𝑛𝐻
𝑇 ] = [
[cov(𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
𝐻 )]
1,1
[cov(𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
𝐻 )]
1,2
[cov(𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
𝐻 )]
1,2
[cov(𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
𝐻 )]
2,2
] Eq. 8-42 
where the coefficients of the matrix are given by: 
[cov(𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
𝐻 )]
1,1
= 
∑∑{(𝐾𝑘+1)1,𝑗(𝐾𝑘+1)1,𝑙(𝑅𝑘+1)𝑗,𝑙 + (𝐴𝑘+1)1,𝑗(𝐴𝑘+1)1,𝑙(𝑃𝑘|𝑘)𝑗,𝑗  
𝑁
𝑙=1
𝑁
𝑗=1
+ (𝐵𝑘+1)1,𝑗(𝐵𝑘+1)1,𝑙(𝑄𝑘+1)𝑗,𝑙} 
Eq. 8-43 
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[𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
𝐻 )]
2,2
= 
∑∑{(𝐾𝑘+1)2,𝑗(𝐾𝑘+1)2,𝑙(𝑅𝑘+1)𝑗,𝑙 + (𝐴𝑘+1)2,𝑗(𝐴𝑘+1)2,𝑙(𝑃𝑘|𝑘)𝑗,𝑗  
𝑁
𝑙=1
𝑁
𝑗=1
+ (𝐵𝑘+1)2,𝑗(𝐵𝑘+1)2,𝑙(𝑄𝑘+1)𝑗,𝑙} 
Eq. 8-44 
[𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
𝐻 )]
1,2
= 
∑∑{(𝐾𝑘+1)1,𝑗(𝐾𝑘+1)2,𝑙(𝑅𝑘+1)𝑗,𝑙 + (𝐴𝑘+1)1,𝑗(𝐴𝑘+1)2,𝑙(𝑃𝑘|𝑘)𝑗,𝑗  
𝑁
𝑙=1
𝑁
𝑗=1
+ (𝐵𝑘+1)1,𝑗(𝐵𝑘+1)2,𝑙(𝑄𝑘+1)𝑗,𝑙} 
Eq. 8-45 
The two component of the horizontal error vector are correlated. Since cov(𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
𝐻 ) is a covariance 
matrix, it is positive semi-definite. Therefore it is diagonalizable and its eigenvalues are positive. The 
matrix of the eigenvectors denoted 𝑃⊥ is orthogonal. Let’s denote 𝐷𝐻 the eigenvalue decomposition of 
cov(𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
𝐻 ), it verifies:  
 𝑃⊥
𝑇 cov(𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
𝐻 )𝑃⊥  = 𝐷𝐻 Eq. 8-46 
Let’s multiply equation Eq. 8-40 by 𝑃⊥
𝑇 . The random errors on the two components are then 
uncorrelated. 
 𝐸 [𝑃⊥
T𝑛𝐻(𝑃⊥
T𝑛𝐻)
𝑇
] = 𝑃⊥
T𝐸[𝑛𝐻𝑛𝐻
𝑇 ]𝑃⊥ = 𝐷𝐻 Eq. 8-47 
Then the two components of the horizontal error are independent in this basis. Moreover, 𝑃⊥
𝑇𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
𝐻  
has the same norm as 𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
𝐻   because multiplying a vector by an orthogonal matrix keep the norm 
invariant. The bias after rotation (𝑏𝑖
′) is given by: 
 𝑏𝑖
′ = 𝑃⊥
T𝑏𝐻 = 𝒪𝑖𝑏𝑖 Eq. 8-48 
with : 
 𝒪𝑖 = 𝑃⊥
T [
(𝐾𝑘+1)1,𝑖
(𝐾𝑘+1)2,𝑖
] Eq. 8-49 
At this point, the distribution of the horizontal error in the rotated space is known: it is a 2D non 
central normally distributed vector which components are uncorrelated. The critical bias is the bias so 
that the probability for the norm of the horizontal error to exceed the 𝐻𝐴𝐿. If the two eigenvalues of 
cov(𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
𝐻 ) were the same, the norm of the horizontal error would follows a Rice distribution (or 
equivalently its square would follow a non-central chi-square distribution with two degrees of 
freedom). It is generally not the case. However, the probability of exceeding the 𝐻𝐴𝐿 for the bivariate 
distribution is lower than what it would be if the two normal distribution had the same variance (equal 
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to the maximum eigenvalue). Let’s denote 𝜎  the maximum diagonal term of 𝐷𝐻 . The following 
inequality can thus be written: 
 𝑃(‖𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
𝐻 ‖ ≥ 𝐻𝐴𝐿) = 𝑃(‖𝑃⊥
𝑇𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
𝐻 ‖ ≥ 𝐻𝐴𝐿) ≤ 𝑃 (𝜖 >
𝐻𝐴𝐿2
𝜎2
) Eq. 8-50 
where 𝜖 follows a non-central chi square distribution with 2 degrees of freedom and with a parameter 
of non-centrality (𝜆𝑏𝑖) which is equal to: 
 𝜆𝑏𝑖 =
[(𝒪𝑖1)
2
+ (𝒪𝑖2)
2
]
𝜎2
𝑏𝑖
2  Eq. 8-51 
The value of the non-centrality parameter 𝜆𝑏𝑖  is obtained from the probability of exceedance 
associated to the critical bias (𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡/𝑃𝑓) and the value of the “threshold” 𝐻𝐴𝐿
2/𝜎2. A two degrees of 
freedom non central chi-square table can be used to determine it. Finally, a lower bound of the critical 
bias (due to the inequality in Eq. 8-50) is given by: 
 𝑏𝑖 = √
𝜎2
(𝒪𝑖1)
2
+ (𝒪𝑖2)
2√𝜆𝑏𝑖 Eq. 8-52 
The calculation of 𝑏𝑖 can be done in real time as it only requires the calculation of the eigenvalue 
decomposition of a matrix and to find the non-centrality parameter in a table. The calculation of this 
bias requires the knowledge of the 𝐻𝐴𝐿, the integrity risk and the probability of occurrence of a 
critical bias (or higher).  
8.4.3 Impact of the lifespan of the bias 
The critical bias calculated is guaranteed not to make the norm of the horizontal position error exceed 
the 𝐻𝐴𝐿 after the KF update. However, it is not guaranteed for the subsequent epochs. The objective is 
here to characterize the distribution of the position error provided that an enduring bias has been 
injected into the measurements. It is still assumed that 𝑘 + 1 corresponds to the onset of the bias. 
Using the inductive relation Eq. 8-35, the error after 𝑛 iterations can be expressed by: 
 𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+𝑛 = (∏𝐴𝑘+𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
)𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘 +∑𝑆𝑗,𝑘 [𝐾𝑘+𝑗𝐸𝑘+𝑗 +𝐵𝑘+𝑗𝑤𝑠𝑘+𝑗]
𝑛
𝑗=1
 Eq. 8-53 
 𝑆𝑗,𝑘 =
{
 
 
𝐼 if 𝑗 = 𝑛
(∏ 𝐴𝑘+𝑙
𝑛
𝑙=𝑗+1
) else
 Eq. 8-54 
To simplify the problem, it is assumed that the measurement bias 𝑏𝑖 is constant over time. As the sum 
of normally distributed variables and deterministic biases, the estimation error 𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+𝑛  follows a 
bivariate normal distribution, which characteristics have to be determined. Firstly, its expectation is 
the result of the accumulation of the measurement biases: 
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 𝐸[𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+𝑛] =∑𝑆𝑗,𝑘𝐾𝑘+𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
 𝑏𝑖 Eq. 8-55 
The noise on the position estimation at time 𝑘  and the measurements and process noise of the 
subsequent epochs are assumed independent. The correlation in time of the measurements is not 
considered to simplify the model. Thus, the covariance of the error is driven by the measurement and 
process noises, as well as the initial uncertainty: 
cov(𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+𝑛) = (∏𝐴𝑘+𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
)𝑃𝑘|𝑘 (∏𝐴𝑘+𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
)
𝑇
+∑𝑆𝑗,𝑘[𝐾𝑘+𝑗𝑅𝑘+𝑗𝐾𝑘+𝑗
𝑇 + 𝐵𝑘+𝑗𝑄𝑘+𝑗𝐵𝑘+𝑗
𝑇 ]𝑆𝑗,𝑘
𝑇
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
Eq. 8-56 
It is therefore possible to determine the critical bias with the same method as in section 8.4.2. Its value 
is expected to increase as 𝑛 increases. Due to causality, it is not possible to determine the critical bias a 
priori because the matrixes which indexes exceed 𝑘 + 1 are unknown. Therefore, the determination of 
the critical biases can be done a posteriori. Therefore the detection and exclusion, if it requires the 
critical biases as input, could only be done after the contamination. It would require to replay the 
scenario after the exclusion. This sequential approach is not investigated here.  
However, it is expected that the biases with very short lifespans will be filtered out (smoothing effect) 
depending on the Kalman gain coefficients. It is typically the case for multipath or NLOS biases when 
the vehicle is driving with a velocity that is high compared to the lifespan of the bias. On the other 
hand, a persistent bias such as those generated by satellite failures is expected to make the filter 
converge to a biased position.  
Let us determine the asymptotical critical bias that would have an infinite lifespan. If it is assumed that 
the constellation is frozen, the matrixes are assumed to stay constant over time (the indexes are 
removed).  
The bias component is the sum of the terms of a geometric serie of matrices. The eigenvalues of 𝐴 
have a magnitude which is lower than 1, therefore the limit converges to: 
 𝐸[𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+∞] = lim𝑛→+∞
∑𝑆𝑗𝐾𝑏𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1
= (𝐼 − 𝐴)−1𝐾𝑏𝑖 Eq. 8-57 
If it is assumed that the vehicle is not moving, the components of 𝐹 that corresponds to the position 
error are equal to 𝐼. Thus, the bias component is equal to (𝐾𝐻)−1𝐾.  
An analogy can be done with the bias component obtained when a WLS (appendix J) estimation 
method is used, where 𝐾 substitute 𝐻𝑇𝑅−1. Simulations and tests on real data have shown that the 
following equality is valid:  
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 (𝐾𝐻)
−1𝐾 = (𝐻𝑇𝑅−1𝐻)+𝐻𝑇𝑅−1 Eq. 8-58 
where ( )+ denotes the Moore-Penrose pseudo inverse. 
This result shows that, asymptotically (in the sense of infinite lifespan), a deterministic bias on a 
pseudorange has the exact same impact on the position as estimated by a KF and by a WLS. 
Essentially, the benefit of using the KF is that the covariance of the position error is reduced with a KF 
and therefore the critical bias is lower.  
Then it is proposed to simplify cov(𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+𝑛). As the eigenvalues of 𝐴 have a magnitude which is 
lower than 1: 
 lim𝑛→+∞
(𝐴𝑛)𝑃𝑘|𝑘(𝐴
𝑛)𝑇 = 0 Eq. 8-59 
The last term is so that:  
 cov(𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+∞) =∑𝑆𝑗[𝐾𝑅𝐾
𝑇 + 𝐵𝑄𝐵𝑇]𝑆𝑗
𝑇
+∞
𝑗=1
 Eq. 8-60 
Simulations have shown that the eigenvalues of the cov(𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+𝑛
𝐻 ) matrix has a fast convergence 
toward cov(𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+∞).  
Note: the steady state covariance can also be obtained by solving the Lyapunov equation of the 
system. 
It is therefore possible to determine the critical bias with the same method as in section 8.4.2. As an 
illustration, the variation of the value of the critical bias as a function of its lifespan has been studied 
on a real example. The 𝐻𝐴𝐿 has been arbitrarily set to 50 m, and a fixed value of 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡/𝑃𝑓 of 10
−5 was 
selected. The results are plotted in Figure 140 and Figure 141 (zoomed). 
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Figure 140 Convergence of critical bias assuming a frozen constellation/vehicle scenario. 
 
Figure 141 Convergence of critical bias assuming a frozen constellation/vehicle scenario 
(Zoomed). 
Figure 140 shows that the critical bias actually converges toward the asymptotic critical bias 
(associated to the expressions Eq. 8-57 and Eq. 8-60). Figure 141 illustrates the fact that the filter is 
robust to biases which have a very short lifespan. It is characterized by an important decrease of the 
value of the critical bias in function of its lifespan. This is the illustration of the ability of the KF to 
filter out the measurement noise. Indeed a bias with a very short lifespans is equivalent to uncorrelated 
noise in this case. 
8.4.3.1.1 Multiple biases 
In urban environment, the probability of processing multiple simultaneously biased measurements 
may be too large with respect to the integrity risk to be neglected. Similar to what have been done for 
the determination of the critical bias in the case of a single bias, (multiple) critical biases have to be 
investigated. The multiple biases case is essentially a consequence of the biases generated by the 
environment close to the receiver. In this configuration, the measurement error vector bias component 
shall be rewritten: 
 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠 = [𝑏1 … 𝑏𝑛]
𝑇 Eq. 8-61 
It only impacts the expectation of the horizontal error. The decorrelation of the horizontal error 
components on the two axes requires a diagonalization step. The expectation in the rotated plane is 
obtained by applying the transfer matrix to the bias component. It gives the following result: 
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 E[𝑑𝛿𝑥k+1
H ] = 𝑃⊥
T
[
 
 
 
 
 ∑(𝐾k+1)1,i𝑏i
n
i=1
∑(𝐾𝑘+1)2,𝑖𝑏𝑖
n
i=1 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 Eq. 8-62 
The expectation of the horizontal position error is logically a function of the biases that affect each 
pseudorange. The critical 𝑏𝑖  would therefore form a surface in dimension 𝑛 . To simplify the 
calculations, we proposed to calculate a unique critical bias 𝑏0. The deterministic component of the 
measurement error is thus written: 
 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠 = 𝛿𝑏𝑏0 Eq. 8-63 
where 𝛿𝑏 is an array which components are zero, one or minus one. For biases due to the tracking of a 
NLOS, the measurement biases can only be positive (thus 𝛿𝑏 only contains zeros or ones). This term 
has been introduced because the largest horizontal error does not generally correspond to situations 
where the measurements are all biased. Anyway, 𝑏0 has to verify: 
𝑏0
2 ≤
𝜎2𝜆𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖
{∑ [(𝑃⊥
T)1,1(𝐾𝑘+1)1,𝑖 + (𝑃⊥
T)1,2(𝐾𝑘+1)2,𝑖](𝛿𝑏)𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 }
2
+ {∑ [(𝑃⊥
T)2,1(𝐾𝑘+1)1,𝑖 + (𝑃⊥
T)2,2(𝐾𝑘+1)2,𝑖](𝛿𝑏)𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 }
2 Eq. 8-64 
where: 
 𝜎2 corresponds to the maximum eigenvalue of cov(𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
𝐻 ) 
 𝜆𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖 is the non-centrality parameter associated to the 𝐻𝐴𝐿 and the probability of multiple 
failures  
Let’s denote 𝐽 this denominator, 
 
𝐽 = {∑[(𝑃⊥
T)
1,1
(𝐾𝑘+1)1,𝑖 + (𝑃⊥
T)
1,2
(𝐾𝑘+1)2,𝑖] (𝛿𝑏)𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
}
2
+ {∑[(𝑃⊥
T)
2,1
(𝐾𝑘+1)1,𝑖 + (𝑃⊥
T)
2,2
(𝐾𝑘+1)2,𝑖] (𝛿𝑏)𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
}
2
 
Eq. 8-65 
The minimum upper bound of the critical bias is obtained for the vector 𝛿𝑏  that maximizes the 
denominator of  Eq. 8-65: 
 𝑏𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙,𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖 = √
𝜎2𝜆𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖
max
𝛿𝑏
𝐽
 Eq. 8-66 
8.5 Use of critical biases for monitoring the measurements  
Eq. 8-34 which is used as a starting point to derive the calculation of the critical bias can be 
equivalently rewritten (in the single bias case for simplicity):  
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 𝑃(‖𝑋𝐻 − ?̂?𝐻‖ > 𝐻𝐴𝐿||𝑏| ≤ |𝑏𝑖|) =
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑃(|𝑏| ≤ |𝑏𝑖|)
 Eq. 8-67 
where 𝑏 represent a bias on pseudorange 𝑖.  
This equation involves the cumulative distribution function of the bias 𝑃(|𝑏| ≤ |𝑏𝑖|). Fortunately, the 
distribution of the measurement errors due to local effects has been established in chapter 5. In 
particular the CDF of the NLOS error has been characterized by simple modelling and on real data. 
These results can be used to determine the critical biases on each measurement. The methodology to 
do so is the following: 
 The first step consists in plotting the value of the critical bias as a function of the ratio 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑓⁄  
where 𝑃𝑓 is a parameter that varies from 0 to 1. 
 The second step consists in plotting the inverse CDF of the distribution of the bias magnitude 
(in 𝑃𝑓) as a function of 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑓⁄ .  
 As long as the curve that represents the critical bias is higher than the distribution of the bias, 
it means that the bias is not a threat for the application. It means that the probability for the 
bias to exceed the critical bias is lower than the integrity risk. This case is represented in 
Figure 142. 
 If the critical bias is lower than the distribution of the bias, it means that the source of bias is a 
threat for the integrity of the solution. It means that the probability for the bias to exceed the 
critical bias is higher than the integrity risk. The system must be protected against this bias.  
 The final critical bias that shall be considered is the intersection between the two curves (the 
minimum bias that must be detected). The intersection gives the probability of occurrence of a 
failure as well as the magnitude of the associated bias. This configuration is illustrated in 
Figure 143. The algorithm that aims at detecting such abnormal measurement must takes as 
inputs the magnitude of the bias and the probability of missed detection as 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡/𝑃𝑓. The most 
convenient approach is therefore not to set the 𝑃𝐹𝐴, but to deduce it.  
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Figure 142 Calculation of the critical bias. In this example, the source of the bias is not a threat for the 
integrity of the solution because: P(εNLOS > bias) = Pf is lower than the critical bias  
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Figure 143 Calculation of the critical bias 
The principle of this cascaded testing approach is summarized in Figure 144. In this case, if a 
measurement is excluded from the solution by the SQM or the innovation monitoring algorithm, it is 
necessary to update the values of the critical biases because the geometry has changed. The 
measurements selection process must then be reconducted with the new thresholds.  
 
Figure 144 Principle of cascaded testing approach with real time threshold monitoring 
8.5.1.1.1 Particularities of NLOS and multipath 
Unlike satellite failures, measurement biases that are due to local effects are correlated in space. It will 
be assumed that such a bias is due to the tracking of an echo (NLOS) or an echo contaminated signal 
(LOS + NLOS). The distribution of the lifespan of a reflection in urban environment has been assessed 
in [Lehner and Steingass, 2005] and is given in Figure 145 for car applications. 
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Figure 145 Distribution of the lifespan of an echo in urban environment for a car [Lehner and 
Steingass, 2005] 
It can be seen that most reflectors exist along a motion path that is below 5 m for a urban car channel. 
It will be assumed that this distribution is also valid for a train channel in urban environment. Thus, 
the lifespan of a reflector directly depends of the velocity of the vehicle [Steingass et al., 2009], and 
the sampling period of the GNSS receiver. The lifespan of an echo in terms of update in the KF is 
given by: 
 𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑥 = max(⌊
𝑙0
𝑇𝑠,𝐺𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑣
⌋ , 1) Eq. 8-68 
where: 
 𝑙0 is the lifespan of the echo, which is 5 m at maximum. 
 𝑇𝑠,𝐺𝑁𝑆𝑆 is the sampling period of the GNSS receiver. Typically, 1 Hz 
 𝑣 is the horizontal velocity of the vehicle 
It can be inferred from this result that a bias due to local effects will be integrated a higher amount of 
time if the sampling period of the receiver is high. It has been seen that biases with large lifespan are 
more likely to lead to positioning failures. Therefore it may seem that updating the KF with a low rate 
would lead to a more robust system with respect to local effects. In fact the problem is more complex 
because the critical bias also depends of the Kalman gain which in turns depends of the predicted 
estimate covariance. Between two GNSS updates, this covariance increases due to the process noises. 
The longer is the update period, the higher is the state error covariance. Thus the Kalman gain is lower 
for high update rate, and therefore the critical bias may not be lower for higher rate GNSS receivers. 
The lifespan of an echo is given in Figure 146 and Figure 147. The GNSS receiver that is used in this 
thesis is assumed to have a 1 Hz sampling rate. It will be assumed that the lifespan of the bias is equal 
to the lifespan of the echo. This can be assumed because the convergence time of the DLL is 
approximately 1/𝐵𝑙 where 𝐵𝑙 is the DLL loop bandwidth (typically 1 Hz), provided that the echo delay 
is within the discriminator linear area. In this case, except for very low velocities (lower than 10 
km/h), the biased measurements are only integrated in the filter once. It is assumed that the biased on 
the measurement return to a value of zero once its lifespan has been exceeded. This model can be 
improved by involving Markov chain to account for the fact that after an echo is tracked, another echo 
can be tracked instead of the direct signal for NLOS. 
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Figure 146 Distribution of the lifespan of 
an echo in urban environment in terms of 
KF updates for a 1 Hz GNSS receiver  
Figure 147 Distribution of the lifespan of 
an echo in urban environment in terms of 
KF updates for a 5 Hz GNSS receiver 
8.6 Monitoring integrity of the IMU measurements 
The integrity risk allowed by the requirements has been allocated to GNSS for both applications. 
Therefore, the probability of failure of the IMU must be negligible with respect to the integrity risk. It 
shall be at least one order of magnitude lower. From the Landmark 01 IMU 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹 specification, it has 
been stated in chapter 5 that the probability of failure of the IMU is 8.10
-6
 per hour. This value is taken 
as a reference even if the failure events considered in the 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹  are not clearly defined by the 
manufacturer. In particular, it remains unclear whether this value is the sum of the probability of any 
failure or whether it corresponds to the probability for the IMU not to be able to provide any 
measurement. Anyway, the probability of failure of the IMU is too large to be neglected, especially for 
the train control application (where the integrity risk is 10
-4.5
 to 10
-5.5
/h). The IMU is subject to 
hardware failures that can result in the absence of outputs, null outputs, or errors that are not covered 
by the nominal error model. It is stated in [Groves, 2013], that “achieving FDR, FDI, or FDE with 
inertial navigation requires redundant hardware”. The principle is to take advantage of the 
redundancy between the measurements to detect inconsistencies among them. Methods for FDI 
applied to redundant inertial measurement unit (RIMU), has been investigated in [Shim and Yang, 
2004], [Sturza, 1988], [Wilcox, 1972] [Skoogh and Lennartsson, 2006]. In a hybridized system, it is 
possible to detect and isolate faulty inertial sensors at different level.  
 The first approach is to use redundancy at system level. In this case, the GNSS is coupled with 
different INS individually. The fault detection is applied on the hybridized navigation 
solutions.  
 The second approach is to use redundancy at sensor level. In this case Fault detection can be 
processed either before or after the mechanization. As we are in a closed-loop scheme it will 
be done before corrections and thus before mechanization.  
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Integrity monitoring of an IMU can be done either by comparing the outputs of two or more 
conventional IMUs or by using redundant IMU which incorporate pairs of sensors. Even if using 
redundant IMUs that incorporate pairs of sensors is said to be more effective [Sturza, 1988], this 
approach is not preferred here because such devices are not mass market. FD based on RIMU requires 
at least 2 IMU, and FDI/FDE/FDR requires at least 3 IMU. Only the FD process is detailed in this 
section. Thus, in train control, 4 IMUs are necessary for FD and 6 for FDI. If the possibility to work 
with several IMU is feasible for train control because medium grade sensors have been selected, it 
may not be suitable for ETC for which the price of the OBU is a main constraint (alternative 
approaches have not been investigated in this thesis). It is assumed here that the probability of failure 
of two sensors at the same time is negligible. It has been stated in prior art that the cone-shape 
redundant IMU is the optimal configuration for FDI. However, it is assumed in the method detailed 
hereafter that the IMUs are mounted on the same support, sufficiently close to each other and in the 
same orientation. It is also assumed that the missed alignment between the sensors has been calibrated 
a priori. The differences between the outputs of the sensors from the two IMUs are formed: 
 𝑥𝑜𝑢𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑥𝑜𝑢𝑡,𝑗 = 𝛿𝑏𝑥,𝑖 − 𝛿𝑏𝑥,𝑗 + 𝑛𝑥,𝑖 − 𝑛𝑥,𝑗 Eq. 8-69 
Sensor failures can be detected by directly monitoring 𝑥𝑜𝑢𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑥𝑜𝑢𝑡,𝑗 . However, in this case, the 
sensitivity of the test may not be sufficient due to the uncalibrated biases component. To improve the 
sensitivity of the test, it is proposed to estimate the differential bias term component. If similar sensors 
are used, it is assumed that they have approximately the same correlation time (𝜏). Thus, the process 
model that characterize the differential bias term can be written: 
 𝛿𝑏𝑥,𝑖̇ − 𝛿𝑏𝑥,𝑗̇ = −
1
𝜏
(𝛿𝑏𝑥,𝑖 − 𝛿𝑏𝑥,𝑗) + 𝜂𝑥,𝑖 − 𝜂𝑥,𝑗 Eq. 8-70 
Kalman filtering can be used to estimate 𝛿𝑏𝑥,𝑖 − 𝛿𝑏𝑥,𝑗  and to improve the sensitivity of the fault 
detection algorithm. Then, a fault detection algorithm based on squared residuals is proposed here. 
Any fault in system dynamics can be detected by a change in the weighted sum of squared residual 
(𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑘) measurement. This test statistic is the squared representation of the test presented in chapter 
7: 
 𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑘 = ∑ 𝑟𝑖
𝑇𝑉𝑖
−1𝑟𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=𝑘−𝑁+1
 Eq. 8-71 
The window length 𝑁 has to be adjusted in accordance with the requirement for detection time and the 
false alarm. The two hypotheses to test are the following: 
{
𝐻0 no failure 𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑘 < 𝜆
𝐻1 failure detected 𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑘 ≥ 𝜆
 
The test variables are formed for each of the six measurements (3 accelerometers and 3 gyroscopes). 
In the nominal case, for any sensor, the 𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑘 is chi-squared distributed with 𝑁 degrees of freedom. 
The detection threshold 𝜆 is set to fulfill the required 𝑃𝐹𝐴. The 𝑃𝐹𝐴 per hour allocated to the full IMU 
shall be converted into a 𝑃𝐹𝐴 per sample. It is assumed that each samples are independent: 
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 𝑃𝐹𝐴(/𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒) = 𝑃𝐹𝐴(/ℎ)
𝑇𝑠
6 ∗ 3600
 Eq. 8-72 
where 𝑇𝑠𝐼𝑀𝑈 is the sampling period of the IMU. 
As no continuity risk analysis has been conducted, the 𝑃𝐹𝐴 allowed for the IMU is unknown for the 
two applications. To perform a 𝑃𝐹𝐴(/ℎ) of 10
−5/h for the whole 6 axis IMU, it is necessary to set 𝑃𝐹𝐴 
to 4.63.10−12 if the IMU is sampled at 100 Hz. 
8.6.1 Behavior of the test with respect to the different failure sources 
In this section, the behavior of the test in case of faulty sensor is investigated. The ability of the test to 
detect a faulty sensor is looked at, and its sensitivity is assessed. Four fault signatures are investigated: 
the failure to zero, the step failure, the ramp failure and the additional noise failure. 
8.6.1.1 Failure to zero 
In case of failure to zero, it is assumed that one of the two redundant sensors does not sense the 
motion. In this case the observation becomes: 
 𝑥𝑜𝑢𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑥𝑜𝑢𝑡,𝑗 = 𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒,𝑖 + 𝛿𝑏𝑥,𝑖 − 𝛿𝑏𝑥,𝑗 + 𝑛𝑥,𝑖 − 𝑛𝑥,𝑗 Eq. 8-73 
This fault mode can be identified by the fault detection algorithm if the measurement 𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒,𝑖  is 
varying. The innovation is thus biased: 
 𝑟𝑘,𝑓2𝑧~𝒩(𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒,𝑘 , 𝑉𝑘) Eq. 8-74 
If the axis of the sensor is motionless, 𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 = 0 and therefore this fault cannot be detected. However, 
the missed detection has no impact because nothing has to be measured.  
𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑘 follows a non-central 𝜒
2 random variable, with 𝑁 degrees of freedom, and a non-centrality 
parameter 𝜆𝑘,𝑓2𝑧 which is equal to: 
 𝜆𝑘,𝑓2𝑧 = ∑
𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒,𝑖
2
𝑉𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=𝑘−𝑁+1
 Eq. 8-75 
As an illustration, if it is assumed that the 𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒,𝑖  and 𝑉𝑖  are close to a constant over the sliding 
window,  
 𝜆𝑘,𝑓2𝑧 =
𝑁
𝑉
𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒
2  Eq. 8-76 
The probability of miss detection of the failure to zero is given by: 
 𝑃𝑀𝐷 = ∫ 𝑓𝜒2(𝜆𝑘,𝑓2𝑧𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝑁 )
(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝜆
0
 Eq. 8-77 
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𝑁 is known (e.g. 40) and the detection threshold 𝜆 is set to respect the 𝑃𝐹𝐴 (depends also of 𝑁), 𝑉 is 
also known in real time. Thus it is possible to determine the minimum 𝜆𝑘,𝑓2𝑧𝑚𝑖𝑛  that ensure the 
required 𝑃𝑀𝐷.  
 𝑥𝑑𝑒𝑡,𝑓2𝑧 = √𝜆𝑘,𝑓2𝑧𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑉
𝑁
 Eq. 8-78 
Simulations have been conducted to determine the typical sensitivity of this test. For a MEMS 
gyroscope that is contained in the Landmark 01 IMU, the 𝑃𝐹𝐴 of the test has been set to 4.63.10
-
12
/samples, with 𝑁 = 40 and 𝑉 = 5.013. 10−7.  
𝑃𝑀𝐷 𝑥𝑑𝑒𝑡,𝑓2𝑧 (°/s) 
10
-9
 0.115 
10
-6
 0.107 
10
-3
 0.096 
Table 56 Sensitivity of the test with respect to failures to zero for a MEMS gyroscope (Landmark 01)  
8.6.1.2 Step Failure 
If a step failure occurs, it is assumed that one of the two redundant sensors is affected by a sudden 
additional bias. The derivation of the sensitivity and its value is the same as for the failure to zero. The 
Kalman filter as well as the fault detection monitor have been implemented and tested by simulation. 
The case of two gyroscopes of the Landmark 01 is investigated. A bias of 0.1°/s has been added to one 
of the gyroscope measurement (at the 3000 sample). The test and the corresponding threshold are 
plotted in Figure 148. The failure detected after 15 filter updates (0.15 seconds). 
 
Figure 148 Detection of step failure by the WSSR monitoring algorithm (onset at the 3000 sample 
index) 
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Index of the sample
V
al
u
e 
o
f 
th
e 
te
st
 
 
WSSR test
Threshold
 Chapter 8: Monitoring the integrity of the hybridized solutions  
 
282 
8.6.1.3 Additional Noise 
If an additional noise type failure occurs, one of the two redundant sensors is affected by an additive 
non nominal noise term denoted 𝑛𝑎𝑛 . This noise term is assumed centered, Gaussian and with a 
standard deviation denoted 𝜎𝑎𝑛 (and uncorrelated with the measurement error). The distribution of the 
test variable becomes: 
 𝑟𝑘,𝑎𝑛~𝒩(0, 𝑉𝑘 + 𝜎𝑎𝑛
2 ) Eq. 8-79 
However, this is not a chi squared distribution because normalized by 𝑉 (instead of  𝜎𝑎𝑛
2 + 𝑉). If we 
assume that the additional noise is of constant variance and that 𝑉𝑘 is approximately constant over the 
sliding window: 
 𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑘,𝑎𝑛 =
𝑉 + 𝜎𝑎𝑛
2
𝑉
∑
𝑟𝑘,𝑎𝑛
2
𝑉 + 𝜎𝑎𝑛
2
𝑘
𝑖=𝑘−𝑁+1
 Eq. 8-80 
where:  
 ∑
𝑟𝑘,𝑎𝑛
2
𝑉 + 𝜎𝑎𝑛
2
𝑘
𝑖=𝑘−𝑁+1
~𝜒2(𝑁) Eq. 8-81 
Thus, the probability not to detect the fault is given by: 
 𝑃( ∑
𝑟𝑘,𝑎𝑛
2
𝑉 + 𝜎𝑑𝑒𝑡,𝑎𝑛
2
𝑘
𝑖=𝑘−𝑁+1
≤
𝑉
𝑉 + 𝜎𝑎𝑛
2 𝜆) = 𝑃𝑀𝐷 Eq. 8-82 
The sensitivity is given by: 
 𝜎𝑑𝑒𝑡,𝑎𝑛
2 = 𝑉 [
𝜆
𝑐𝑑𝑓𝜒2(𝑁)
−1 (𝑃𝑀𝐷)
− 1] Eq. 8-83 
The typical sensitivity of this test has been calculated for a MEMS gyroscope that is contained in the 
Landmark 01 IMU. The parameters are the same as those used in section 8.6.1.1. The results are given 
in Table 57. 
𝑃𝑀𝐷 𝜎𝑑𝑒𝑡,𝑎𝑛 (°/s) 
10
-9
 0.2 
10
-6
 0.16 
10
-3
 0.11 
Table 57 Sensitivity of the test with respect to the additional noise fault for a MEMS gyroscope 
(Landmark 01)  
An additional noise with a standard deviation of 0.2°/s has been added to one of the gyroscope 
measurement (at the 3000 sample). The test and the corresponding threshold are plotted in Figure 149. 
The failure detected after 5 filter update (0.05 seconds). 
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Figure 149 Detection of additional noise failure by the WSSR monitoring algorithm (onset at the 
3000 sample index) 
8.6.1.4 Ramp Failures 
A sensor affected by a ramp failure has its measurement biased. The bias is slowly growing, and its 
expression in continuous time can be written:  
 
𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑝(𝑡) = 0 if 𝑡 < 𝑡0 
𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑝(𝑡) = 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒(𝑡 − 𝑡0) if 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡0 
Eq. 8-84 
where 𝑡0 is the onset of the failure. 
If it is assumed that the ramp appears at the beginning of the sliding window, we have 𝑡0 = 𝑘 −𝑊 +
1. The 𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑅 is affected by a bias which varies with time. When summed over the sliding window, 
this bias becomes: 
 𝐸[𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑘] = ∑
[𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒(𝑖𝑇𝑠 − 𝑡0)]
2
𝑉(𝑘)
𝑘
𝑖=𝑘−𝑁+1
 Eq. 8-85 
If it is assumed that the innovation covariance is constant over the window 
𝐸[𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑘] ≈
𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒2𝑇𝑠𝐼𝑀𝑈
2
𝑉
∑ 𝑖2
𝑘
𝑖=𝑘−𝑁+1
=
𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒2𝑇𝑠
2
𝐼𝑀𝑈
𝑉
(𝑁 − 1)𝑁(2𝑁 − 1)
6
 Eq. 8-86 
Let us denote 𝜆𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑝  the non centrality parameter associated with 𝑃𝑀𝐷  (for a given 𝑃𝐹𝐴 ). The 
expression of the minimum detectable slope is given by: 
𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑡 = √
6𝑉𝜆
𝑇𝑠𝐼𝑀𝑈
2 (𝑁 − 1)𝑁(2𝑁 − 1)
 Eq. 8-87 
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The typical sensitivity of this test with respect to the ramp falures has been calculated for a MEMS 
gyroscope that is contained in the Landmark 01 IMU. The parameters are the same as those used in 
section 8.6.1.1. The results are given in Table 58. In particular it can be seen that only ramps with 
large slope can be detected fast. Moreover, very slowly errors may not be detectable because estimated 
in the bias. The ramp may not be distinguished from the bias. A solution may be to include a monitor 
on the difference of the measurement directly (without estimating the bias difference).  
𝑃𝑀𝐷 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑡 (°/s) 
10
-9
 0.5 
10
-6
 0.46 
10
-3
 0.42 
Table 58 Sensitivity of the test associated with a 𝑃𝑀𝐷 and 𝑃𝐹𝐴  
A ramp with a slope of 0.05°/s has been added to one of the gyroscope measurement (at the 3000 
sample). The test and the corresponding threshold are plotted in Figure 150. The failure detected after 
200 filter update (2 seconds).  
 
Figure 150 Detection of a ramp failure by the WSSR monitoring algorithm (onset at the 3000 
sample index) 
8.7 Conclusion 
This chapter aims at augmenting the solutions that have been developed for each application so that 
they are able to fulfil the corresponding integrity requirements. Firstly, the integrity risk available for 
the whole system has been allocated between the different sensors integrated in the solution. The 
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integrity risk allocated to GNSS has been divided into the fault free mode and the satellite fault. It is 
thus necessary either to integrate the multipath and NLOS error in the nominal error model by 
inflating it or to exclude the measurements that are affected by such bias. A solution separation 
integrity monitoring algorithm has been designed in order to monitor the integrity of the solution. An 
alternative algorithm relying on separated mechanization has been developed to ensure integrity even 
in case of ramp failures in a closed loop scheme. However, this algorithm showed poor availability 
performances due to the use of a too conservative covariance of the separation vector. A way to refine 
the covariance of the separation shall be find so that this algorithm is suitable. The performances of the 
two algorithms have been studied for train control. The two approaches proposed to take into account 
the errors due to the local effects have been compared. The approach based on the selection of the 
measurements, made possible by the use of additional sensor with tight coupling or information and 
constellations (for ETC), outperforms the method based on the inflation of the error model. Moreover, 
better performances can be expected by substituting GLONASS by Galileo in the tested solutions 
because of the lower URA, the BOC modulations that is less sensitive to multipath than BPSK(0.5), 
and the probability of satellite failure which is expected to be lower. Better performances can be 
expected in suburban and open sky condition by processing dual frequency.  
 For train control, the results have shown that it is feasible to expect an availability higher than 
99% in suburban environment associated to an alert limit of 50 meters. In dense urban 
environment, with measurement selection, it has been possible to reach an availability of 99% 
for an alert limit of 125 meters. It is important to underline the fact that this environment 
corresponds to narrow urban canyons which are unlikely to be met by a train. The solution 
proposed for train control could be improved by integrating four constellations instead of two, 
and combining two dual constellation based sub solutions. 
 For ETC, the results have shown that it is possible to perform availabilities higher than 99.5% 
in suburban environment for an alert limit of 25 m thanks to the use of two constellations 
simultaneously. In urban environment, an availability of 100% is obtained for an alert limit of 
100 m.  
The performances presented in the section have a limited scope and cannot be generalized because the 
dataset processed is not of sufficiently long. 
The monitoring of the Kalman innovation and the multipath monitor algorithms are designed to detect 
the measurements which are biased. A method to calculate the biases that are dangerous for the 
solution and to adjust the thresholds of these algorithms in real time has been studied. It has been 
showed that the sensitivity of the KF with a bias is highly correlated with its lifespan.  
Finally, a method to monitor the integrity of the IMU measurements has been studied. It sensitivity 
with respect to different fault signature has been investigated by simulations. 
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9 CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FUTURE WORK 
This chapter presents the conclusions from the research results obtain in the thesis and gives 
recommendations for future work. 
9.1 Conclusions 
The objective of this thesis was to propose, implement and assess the performance of different 
positioning solutions based on GNSS for critical applications which may operate in suburban and 
urban environments. The two applications that have been investigated in this thesis are train control 
and ETC.  
Firstly, the performance requirements that can be expected from a GNSS based positioning system to 
be used in these applications have been investigated. The study of existing art has proven that, 
currently, no standardized requirement exists.  
 Regarding train control, it has also been shown this application is more demanding in term of 
integrity risk (10
-11
/h), 𝑇𝑇𝐴 (1 s) and across track 𝐴𝐿 (2.5 m) requirements than civil aviation. 
Based on a priori knowledge of GNSS systems, it has been proposed not to rely on GNSS for 
the track selectivity as an 𝐴𝐿 of 2.5 meters does not seem currently feasible. Moreover, a 
solution based on redundant subsystems using different constellations (GPS and Galileo) has 
been proposed to reach the 10
-11
/h integrity level. 
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 Regarding ETC, the requirements are less challenging. They have to be derived from charging 
metrics that are given by the charging organism. It has been proposed to use a GPS/Galileo 
dual constellation receiver for this application.  
For train control and ETC it has been proposed to augment the GNSS with other sensors that are 
available on board. The hybridization scheme proposed is tight coupling as it is the most adapted to 
the navigation in harsh conditions. Both solutions integrate a 6 axis MEMS IMU, however different 
additional sensors were used for each application: 
 The architecture proposed for train control integrates the data from a map of the rail tracks, 
 the architecture proposed for ETC integrates WSS measurements. 
The error models of the different sensors of reference have been studied. They have been divided into 
nominal measurements and sensor faults. The nominal error models of the inertial sensors have been 
derived from the datasheet of the IMU. For the GNSS measurements, the civil aviation error models 
can be applied for both applications, except for multipath and NLOS-induced errors. For these 2 types 
of errors, models based on simulations conducted on an urban channel model coupled with a realistic 
tracking simulator were proposed. However, statistical modelling and tests based on real 
measurements showed that abnormally large pseudorange errors can result from multipath or NLOS. It 
was thus proposed to integrate these large errors  either as nominal errors (as they are frequent in 
urban environments) or as failure (which means that they must be detected in an efficient way).  
The data fusion algorithm, based on an Extended Kalman filtering has been fully described. The way 
to improve the accuracy of the solution by incorporating additional measurements (motion constraints) 
to the solution has been discussed. The way to integrate the aiding such as a track database (for train 
control) or WSS (for ETC) has also been presented. After a thorough validation, their performance 
were assessed based on simulations using a realistic error models and on a real data collection 
conducted in Toulouse and surroundings. As Galileo is not currently operational, GLONASS has been 
used as a second constellation instead. It has been observed that the solutions tested for train control 
and ETC are able to fulfill the most stringent accuracy requirements in suburban environments. 
However, it was not the case in dense urban environments. It has also been observed that the motion 
constraints only slightly improve the accuracy of the solutions. On the other hand the addition of the 
GNSS Doppler measurements have been shown to improve the accuracy of the proposed solutions.  
As mentioned earlier, one possibility was to consider the multipath- or NLOS-induced errors as 
measurement faults. In this case, a way to detect and exclude them prior to the integrity monitoring 
algorithm was investigated so that the integrity monitoring algorithm could concentrate on the 
detection of satellite failures.  
 To detect measurements that are biased due to multipath, it has been proposed to implement 
monitors on the correlation function. Rigorous ways to set the thresholds for such detectors 
have been proposed. Moreover, a way to theoretically assess the sensitivity of these tests in 
terms of multipath amplitude (and thus measurement error) has been proposed. It was shown 
that smoothing the detection metrics significantly improved the results. Simulations on a 
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realistic urban channel processed by the ENAC GNSS receiver simulator (GeneIQ) have 
shown that these metrics enable the detection of measurements errors that exceed 5 m with a 
𝑃𝑀𝐷 lower than 9% (lower 𝑃𝑀𝐷 are expected for larger errors).  
 NLOS exclusion methods were also investigated. The possibility to exclude measurements 
affected by NLOS signals by applying elevation or 𝐶/𝑁0 masks have been investigated.  
o To reject NLOS based on elevation mask, it has been shown that it is necessary to 
apply a 40° elevation mask in urban environment which is not feasible because of the 
satellite availability and the resulting degradation of the accuracy. It has thus been 
proposed to apply a 10° elevation mask as it is sufficient to protect against NLOS 
errors in open sky conditions.  
o In suburban and urban environments, it appeared more suitable to apply a 𝐶/𝑁0 mask. 
It has been observed that, above 40dB-Hz, the measurements are LOS (centered 
distribution without outlier). Applying such a 𝐶/𝑁0  mask did not degrade the 
performance of the solutions in single constellation (train control) approach when the 
track database was integrated and in dual constellation (ETC).  
 A monitoring of the KF innovations was added to the solution in order to protect against 
possible residual outliers. It enabled to detect simultaneous biased measurements. 
Finally, the measurement selection process has be shown to improve the accuracy of the solution.  
For train control and ETC, the total integrity risk allowed for the navigation solution has been fully 
allocated to the GNSS system, assuming that the measurements used from additional sensors could be 
considered as fault free (they thus have their own monitoring ensuring their allowed integrity risk). As 
an example, a way to monitor the integrity of the inertial measurement based on redundant hardware 
has been studied and the sensitivity of the test with respect to different types of failure has been 
assessed. The GNSS integrity risk was shared between the satellite failures events and the failures 
under nominal conditions, thus considering that large multipath- and NLOS-induced errors would be 
either part of the nominal case (inflation of the nominal error model) or detected and excluded. Two 
integrity monitoring algorithms based on the principle of normalized solution separation have been 
studied. Solution separation algorithms have been preferred over residual based algorithms as they 
were able to detect ramp failures (once it has grown sufficiently). The performances of the two 
algorithms have been assessed on real data. The approach based on the rejection of GNSS 
measurements and the inflation of the nominal error models lead to similar results in terms of 
availability (with a slight improvement in urban environment with the rejection approach).  The 
observations were the following: 
 For train control, the standard solution separation algorithm was able to perform an 
availability of 99 to 100% associated with an 𝐻𝐴𝐿 of 25 m in suburban environment. The 
solution separation algorithm based on separated mechanization has shown poor availability 
performances due to the over-conservative assumption on the covariance of the separation 
vector. In dense urban environment, at best, a 99% availability has been observed for an 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 of 125 m with the standard solution separation algorithm. However, the environments 
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that are characterized as “dense urban” in this thesis are very unlikely to be encountered by a 
train (deep and narrow urban canyons).  
The main problem raised is that the most stringent requirements are associated to areas such as 
train stations and corridors. However, train stations and corridors are the most likely to be 
located in urban environment where the accuracy and protection level size is higher due to 
local effects and poor geometry. An alternative solution thus consists in keeping the ground 
infrastructure (radio beacons) close to stations so that the GNSS is not used to monitor the 
train’s position in these sections.  
 For ETC, the standard solution separation algorithm was able to perform an availability of 99 
to 100% associated with an 𝐻𝐴𝐿 of 25 m in suburban environment. The solution separation 
algorithm based on separated mechanization performed an availability of 99 to 100% 
associated with an 𝐻𝐴𝐿 of 50 m. In very dense urban environment, it is not suitable to expect 
𝐻𝐴𝐿 less than 100 m with sufficient availabilities for both algorithms.  
Finally, a methodology to determine the maximum tolerable bias for a solution that integrates a KF 
has been proposed. This tolerable bias can be used to feed the innovation monitor and the multipath 
detection algorithms. It has been observed that the value of the critical bias will highly depend on its 
lifespan.  
9.2 Recommendations for future work 
There are still uncertainties on the requirements for GNSS to be used in train control (in the context of 
ETCS). A standardization process similar to what have been done for civil aviation shall be conducted 
in order to better define the needs and therefore be able to propose adapted solutions for this 
application.  
The use of Galileo instead of GLONASS and the use of dual frequency receivers instead of mono-
frequency receivers is expected to improve the accuracy and the availability of the solutions (in open 
sky to suburban environments). Other means of improvements are the use of a higher grade IMU 
(tactical grade), a multipath rejecting antenna (choke ring), an antenna array (for NLOS detection) or 
the integration of other sensors such as magnetometers (sensitive to interferences) or laser scanner.  
An alternative approach to what has been proposed in this thesis consists in not fusing the GNSS with 
dead reckoning sensors because it introduces correlation in time. Such approach also has the advantage 
of simplifying considerably the design of the integrity monitoring algorithm because a simple RAIM 
algorithm can be used. It would enable to predict the accuracy and availability performances in open-
sky conditions.  
For train control, it would be interesting to investigate the use of carrier phase positioning techniques 
such as PPP to try to reach the 2.5 meters across track 𝐴𝐿 requirements, although the reliability of such 
techniques might not be sufficient in urban environments (due to frequency of occurrence of cycle 
slips).   
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In the case of ETC, the measurements from the WSS were simulated in this thesis. Thus, the solution 
remains to be tested with the measurements from an actual WSS which is subject to varying scale 
factor errors and quantization errors. In order to improve the performances of the navigation system, it 
is not suitable to use a higher grade IMUs or a better antenna as the cost per OBU is critical.  
Finally, the characterization of NLOS error distribution in urban environment could be improved by 
using techniques to determine which measurement actually comes from masked satellites. 
Significantly longer measurement collection than what has been presented in the thesis will be 
necessary in order to better characterize the tails of the distributions. Moreover, the multipath detectors 
designed in section 7.1 remain to be implemented on real data.   
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Appendix A 
Dual constellation approach for train control: 
proof of concept 
 
The validity of the approach proposed in chapter 4 to relax the integrity risk for train control is proven 
hereafter. The notations used hereafter have been defined in section 4.1.1.2. Moreover, the confidence 
circles centered in 𝑥1, 𝑥2 and 𝑥12 which radiuses are 𝐻𝑃𝐿1, 𝐻𝑃𝐿2, 𝐻𝑃𝐿12 are denoted 𝒞1, 𝒞2 and 𝒞12.  
Let’s first prove that 𝒞1 ⊂ 𝒞12, as all expressions are symmetric, it will also prove that 𝒞2 ⊂ 𝒞12. Let’s 
denote 𝑥, the true position of the vehicle. It is assumed that 𝑥 ∈ 𝒞1, let’s prove that 𝑥 ∈ 𝒞12.  
In the first configuration, as 𝒞1 is included into or equal to 𝒞12, 𝑥 ∈ 𝒞12.  
In the second configuration, to prove that 𝑥 ∈ 𝒞12, one simply has to prove that the Euclidean distance 
between 𝑥12 and 𝑥 is lower than 𝐻𝑃𝐿12.  
 ‖?̂?12 − 𝑥‖ = ‖?̂?12 − 𝑥1 + 𝑥1 − 𝑥‖ ≤ ‖𝑥12 − 𝑥1‖ + ‖?̂?1 − 𝑥‖ Eq. A-1 
𝑥 ∈ 𝒞1 therefore: 
 ‖𝑥1 − 𝑥‖ ≤ 𝐻𝑃𝐿1 Eq. A-2 
Moreover by definition of 𝑥12: 
 ‖𝑥12 − 𝑥1‖ = ‖
1
2
(𝑥1 + 𝑥2 +
𝑥2 − 𝑥1
‖?̂?1 − 𝑥2‖
(𝐻𝑃𝐿2 −𝐻𝑃𝐿1)) − 𝑥1‖ Eq. A-3 
which leads to: 
 ‖𝑥12 − 𝑥1‖ =
1
2
‖
𝑥2 − 𝑥1
‖𝑥1 − 𝑥2‖
[‖?̂?1 − 𝑥2‖ + 𝐻𝑃𝐿2 −𝐻𝑃𝐿1]‖ Eq. A-4 
By simple properties of the Euclidian norm: 
 ‖𝑥12 − 𝑥1‖ =
1
2
‖𝑥2 − 𝑥1‖
‖𝑥1 − 𝑥2‖
|‖?̂?1 − 𝑥2‖ + 𝐻𝑃𝐿2 −𝐻𝑃𝐿1| Eq. A-5 
Thus :  
 ‖𝑥12 − 𝑥1‖ =
1
2
|‖𝑥1 − 𝑥2‖ + 𝐻𝑃𝐿2 −𝐻𝑃𝐿1| Eq. A-6 
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But this configuration is characterized by ‖𝑥1 − 𝑥2‖ > |𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2|, thus 
 ‖𝑥12 − 𝑥1‖ =
1
2
(‖𝑥1 − 𝑥2‖ + 𝐻𝑃𝐿2 −𝐻𝑃𝐿1) Eq. A-7 
Finally: 
 ‖𝑥12 − 𝑥‖ ≤
1
2
|‖𝑥1 − 𝑥2‖ + 𝐻𝑃𝐿2 −𝐻𝑃𝐿1| + 𝐻𝑃𝐿1 = 𝐻𝑃𝐿12 Eq. A-8 
Thus: 
 𝑥 ∈ 𝒞12 Eq. A-9 
Now that it has been proven that 𝒞1 ⊂ 𝒞12 and 𝒞2 ⊂ 𝒞12, it is necessary to prove that the probability 
for 𝑥 to be outside of 𝒞12 is the product of the probabilities to be outside of 𝒞1 and 𝒞2 . We have 
𝒞1 ⊂ 𝒞12 and 𝒞2 ⊂ 𝒞12, therefore: 
 𝒞1 ∪ 𝒞2 ⊂ 𝒞12 Eq. A-10 
Thus : 
 𝒞12 ⊂ 𝒞1̅̅ ̅ ∩ 𝒞2̅̅ ̅ Eq. A-11 
Moreover, the events 𝑥 ∈ 𝒞1̅̅ ̅  and 𝑥 ∈ 𝒞2̅̅ ̅  are independent as 𝒞1  and 𝒞2  are calculated from 
independent subsystems. Finally: 
 𝑃(𝑥 ∈ 𝒞12̅̅ ̅̅̅) ≤ 𝑃(𝑥 ∈ 𝒞1̅̅ ̅)𝑃(𝑥 ∈ 𝒞2̅̅ ̅) Eq. A-12 
The probability for the true position to be outside of both confidence intervals is the product of the 
probabilities for the true position to be outside each interval.  
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Appendix B 
Distribution of the protection levels in the 
second configuration for train control 
 
Following the same notations which have been defined in section 4.1.1.2, in the second configuration, 
‖𝑥1 − 𝑥2‖ > |𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2|. 
The Bayes formula gives: 
 
𝑃(𝐻𝑃𝐿12 ≤ 𝑢 | ‖?̂?1 − 𝑥2‖ > |𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2|)
=
𝑃(𝐻𝑃𝐿12 ≤ 𝑢 ∩ ‖?̂?1 − 𝑥2‖ > |𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2|)
𝑃(‖𝑥1 − 𝑥2‖ > |𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2|)
 
Eq. B-1 
Which can be written: 
 
𝑃(𝐻𝑃𝐿12 ≤ 𝑢 | ‖?̂?1 − 𝑥2‖ > |𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2|)
=
𝑃(|𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2| < ‖?̂?1 − 𝑥2‖ ≤ 2𝑢 − 𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2)
𝑃(‖𝑥1 − 𝑥2‖ > |𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2|)
 
Eq. B-2 
If 𝑢 <
|𝐻𝑃𝐿1−𝐻𝑃𝐿2|+𝐻𝑃𝐿2+𝐻𝑃𝐿1
2
,  
 𝑃(𝐻𝑃𝐿12 ≤ 𝑢 | ‖?̂?1 − 𝑥2‖ > |𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2|) = 0 Eq. B-3 
Else, 
 
𝑃(𝐻𝑃𝐿12 ≤ 𝑢 | ‖?̂?1 − 𝑥2‖ > |𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2|)
=
𝑐𝑑𝑓
ℛ(√𝜎1
2+𝜎2
2)
(2𝑢 − 𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2) − 𝑐𝑑𝑓
ℛ(√𝜎1
2+𝜎2
2)
(𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2)
1 − 𝑐𝑑𝑓
ℛ(√𝜎1
2+𝜎2
2)
(𝐻𝑃𝐿1 −𝐻𝑃𝐿2)
 
Eq. B-4 
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Appendix C 
Validation of the LMS/Receiver coupling 
 
The simulation platform, i.e. the combination of the LMS channel model followed by the GeneIQ 
receiver simulator, had to be validated. In the first validation step, the LOS component of the 
generated received signal has been isolated from the echoes and has been processed by the simulator. 
This allows to check the right generation of the dynamic of the LOS signal by comparing the behavior 
of the tracking loops with their theoretical behavior. In this case, the received signal has been 
simulated for a vehicle with a constant velocity and a fixed satellite position. When the satellite to 
receiver distance is linearly varying, it generates a constant Doppler shift on the carrier phase and code 
delay, which leads to a biased estimation of the delay and phase by first orders DLL and PLL. 
The code delay and carrier phase estimated by higher orders tracking loops are not biased due to a 
constant Doppler shift. This section describes the validation process for the DLL, the PLL and the 
FLL. The same method was used to validate the carrier tracking loops. The theoretical expression of 
the steady state error of a first order DLL is the following (in chips) [Van Dierendonck, 1996]: 
 𝐸∞,𝐷𝐿𝐿 =
∆𝑓𝑐
4𝐵𝐿,𝐷𝐿𝐿
=
𝑣0
4𝐵𝐿,𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑐𝑐
 Eq. C-1 
where: 
 𝑣0 is the radial speed of the receiver in m/s 
 𝐵𝐿,𝐷𝐿𝐿 is the one-sided loop bandwidth of the DLL loop filter in Hz 
 ∆𝑓𝑐 =
𝑣0
𝑐𝑇𝑐
 is the code Doppler in chips/s, 
 𝑇𝑐 is the chip duration in second 
The validation has been conducted on L1 C/A signal. In the chosen scenario, the velocity of the 
vehicle is set to 20 km/h. The satellite has an azimuth of 40° and an elevation of 50°.Thus the radial 
velocity is 𝑣0 = 20/3.6 cos(50) cos (45) = 2.525 ms
-1
. 𝑇𝑐 is 0.98.10
-6
 s for GPS L1 C/A. The loop 
bandwidth 𝐵𝐿,𝐷𝐿𝐿 is set to 1 Hz which is a typical value for a DLL in a GNSS receiver. Using Eq. C-1, 
we find a steady state error of 𝐸∞,𝐷𝐿𝐿 = 2.2.10
-3
 chips, which corresponds to the simulation results 
shown in Figure 151. 
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Figure 151 Steady state error of a first order DLL for a vehicle at a constant speed on the LMS 
A first order PLL was run on the same channel. Eq. C-1 applied to carrier tracking gives the PLL 
steady state error is the following: 
 𝐸∞,𝑃𝐿𝐿 = 2𝜋
𝑣0
4𝐵𝐿,𝑃𝐿𝐿𝜆
 Eq. C-2 
where: 
 𝜆 is the carrier wavelength (𝜆 = 0.19 m for L1 C/A) 
 𝐵𝐿,𝑃𝐿𝐿 is the one-sided loop bandwidth of the PLL loop filter in Hz (15 Hz in the simulations) 
The theoretical expression gives a steady state error of - 1.473 rad, which corresponds to the steady 
state value obtained in Figure 152.  
 
Figure 152 Steady state error of a first order PLL for a vehicle at a constant speed on the LMS 
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A second order FLL that tracks the Doppler shift is also tested on the channel. In this configuration, 
the estimation by the FLL is not affected by any steady state error. However the FLL shall track the 
Doppler frequency of the received signal. The Doppler frequency is given by: 
 𝑓𝑑𝑜𝑝 =
𝑣0
𝜆
 Eq. C-3 
In the chosen scenario, 𝑓𝑑𝑜𝑝 = −13.3 Hz which corresponds to the value observed in figure. 
 
Figure 153 Steady state error of a second order FLL for a vehicle at a constant speed on the LMS 
It can be inferred from this set of short simulations, that the correlator outputs are well generated from 
the LMS channel generator.  
The right consideration of the echoes also had to be tested. To check that the reflections are well 
processed in the receiver, the LOS was set to zero and the LOS characteristics were injected in the 
multipath generation module. The same validations process has been conducted again on the LOS 
treated as an echo.  
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Appendix D 
Parameters for the statistic NLOS error model 
 
In the case of a diffracted NLOS, the distribution of the pseudorange bias is approximated by a gamma 
distribution. The two parameters denoted 𝑘 and 𝜃 of the gamma distribution are given in Table 59 and 
Table 60 in function of the two parameters 𝜗 and 𝛼. 
𝜗 (°) 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
𝛼 (°) 
10 0,56 0,41 0,40 0,43 0,46 0,50 0,52 0,54 0,55 
20 1,23 0,63 0,52 0,47 0,45 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 
30 2,15 0,94 0,66 0,57 0,54 0,52 0,51 0,50 0,50 
40 2,98 1,45 0,91 0,70 0,61 0,57 0,55 0,55 0,54 
50 3,61 2,08 1,32 0,96 0,79 0,70 0,65 0,62 0,62 
60 4,07 2,71 1,88 1,4 1,13 0,97 0,88 0,83 0,82 
70 4,42 3,26 2,5 2 1,68 1,47 1,34 1,27 1,25 
80 4,7 3,72 3,07 2,63 2,33 2,13 2 1,93 1,91 
90 4,93 4,12 3,57 3,2 2,95 2,78 2,67 2,61 2,6 
Table 59 Parameters of the gamma fitting for bias due to diffraction 𝑘 
𝜗 (°) 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
𝛼 (°) 
10 1,26 1,34 2,23 2,95 3,41 3,69 3,85 3,93 3,96 
20 3,21 2,03 1,51 1,61 1,93 2,23 2,46 2,60 2,65 
30 4,91 3,97 2,92 2,19 1,84 1,71 1,69 1,69 1,70 
40 6,83 5,47 4,72 3,88 3,20 2,73 2,45 2,29 2,25 
50 9,15 6,57 5,89 5,33 4,77 4,30 3,96 3,76 3,69 
60 11,83 7,67 6,52 5,98 5,60 5,28 5,05 4,90 4,85 
70 14,76 8,92 7,07 6,20 5,70 5,38 5,18 5,07 5,03 
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80 17,85 10,29 7,77 6,50 5,75 5,27 4,98 4,82 4,77 
90 20,98 11,7 8,56 6,96 6,01 5,41 5,03 4,83 4,76 
Table 60 Parameters of the gamma fitting for bias due to diffraction 𝜃 
  
Appendices 
 
301 
Appendix E 
Track database heading measurement error 
covariance 
 
This appendix aims at calculating the covariance of the error associated to the heading measurement 
that can be derived from the track database. Let us assume that the two points of the map denoted A 
and B are so that their coordinates in the horizontal plane are affected by errors following uncorrelated 
bi dimensional centered Gaussian distributions.  
 
𝐸𝐴 = 𝐸𝐴,𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 + 𝛿𝐸𝐴
𝑁𝐴 = 𝑁𝐴,𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 + 𝛿𝑁𝐴
  
𝐸𝐵 = 𝐸𝐵,𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 + 𝛿𝐸𝐵
𝑁𝐵 = 𝑁𝐵,𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 + 𝛿𝑁𝐵
 
Eq. E-1 
with: 
 [
𝛿𝐸𝐴
𝛿𝑁𝐴
] ~𝒩(0, [
𝜎𝐸𝐴
2 0
0 𝜎𝑁𝐴
2 ]) and [
𝛿𝐸𝐵
𝛿𝑁𝐵
] ~𝒩(0, [
𝜎𝐸𝐵
2 0
0 𝜎𝑁𝐵
2 ]) Eq. E-2 
The objective is then to determine the standard deviation of 𝜓𝑀𝐴𝑃 where:  
 𝜓𝑚𝑎𝑝 = atan (
𝐸𝐵 − 𝐸𝐴
𝑁𝐵 −𝑁𝐴
) = atan(
𝐸𝐵,𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 − 𝐸𝐴,𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 + 𝛿𝐸𝐵 − 𝛿𝐸𝐴
𝑁𝐵,𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 −𝑁𝐴,𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 + 𝛿𝑁𝐵 − 𝛿𝑁𝐴
) Eq. E-3 
For simplification it has been assumed in section 5.1.3.2 that 𝜎𝐸𝐴
2 = 𝜎𝑁𝐴
2 = 𝜎𝐸𝐵
2 = 𝜎𝑁𝐵
2 = 𝜎𝑚𝑎𝑝
2 . In this 
particular case, the symmetry of the problem makes it possible to work with a value 𝜓𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 =
π
2
 for 
instance and then to generalize the result by symmetry. In this particulat case 𝐸𝐵,𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 − 𝐸𝐴,𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 = 0. If 
the movement is approximately plane, we have the distance between two consecutive points (𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝) 
which is equal to: 
 𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝 ≈ |𝑁𝐵,𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸 −𝑁𝐴,𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸| Eq. E-5 
But 𝑑 is a parameter of the map that is known and assumed constant. Thus: 
 𝜓𝑚𝑎𝑝 = atan(
𝛿𝐸𝐵 − 𝛿𝐸𝐴
𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝 + 𝛿𝑁𝐵 − 𝛿𝑁𝐴
) Eq. E-6 
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It is assumed that the mapping error is negligible with respect to the distance between two consecutive 
track points (𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝 ≫ 𝛿𝐸𝐵 − 𝛿𝐸𝐴). A first order Taylor serie expension of atan gives: 
 𝜓𝑚𝑎𝑝 ≅
𝛿𝐸𝐵 − 𝛿𝐸𝐴
𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝 + 𝛿𝑁𝐵 − 𝛿𝑁𝐴
≅
𝛿𝐸𝐵 − 𝛿𝐸𝐴
𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝
 Eq. E-7 
In this case: 
 𝜓𝑚𝑎𝑝 − 𝜓𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 = 𝜓𝑀𝐴𝑃 =
𝛿𝐸𝐵 − 𝛿𝐸𝐴
𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝
 Eq. E-8 
Thus: 
 𝜎𝜓𝑀𝐴𝑃 = √2
𝜎𝑚𝑎𝑝
𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑝
 Eq. E-9 
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Appendix F 
Quality of the velocity estimation 
 
This appendix gives the statistics of the error on the velocity estimation as done by the different 
architecture developed in the thesis. The thesis only has focused on the positioning error. However, the 
GNSS could also be used for these applications to improve the velocity estimation. This appendix, 
through Table 61, Table 62 and Table 63 provides the RMS of the velocity estimation error in the 
horizontal plane as estimated by the different filters tested.  
Sensors PRR NHC 
ZUPT 
ZARU 
Horizontal Velocity error RMS (ms
-1
) 
Suburban Urban 
GPS/INS    1.0 2.2 
GPS/INS     0.2 0.9 
GPS/INS      0.2 0.8 
GPS/INS       0.2 0.7 
Table 61 Quality of the velocity estimation for the different configurations combining GPS and the 
IMU 
Sensors PRR NHC 
ZUPT/
ZARU 
Horizontal Velocity error RMS (ms
-1
) 
Along-track Across-track 
Suburban Urban Suburban Urban 
GPS/INS/Map    0.6 1.2 0.3 0.4 
GPS/INS/Map     0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2 
GPS/INS/Map      0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 
GPS/INS/Map       0.1 0.4 0.1 0.3 
GLO/INS/Map    0.2 0.7 0.2 0.3 
GLO/INS/Map     0.2 0.5 0.2 0.3 
GLO/INS/Map      0.2 0.5 0.2 0.3 
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GLO/INS/Map       0.1 0.5 0.1 0.3 
Table 62 Quality of the velocity estimation for the different configurations combining GNSS, INS and 
the track database 
Sensors PRR NHC 
ZUPT 
ZARU 
Horizontal Velocity error RMS (ms
-1
) 
Horizontal 
Suburban Urban 
GPS/GLO/INS    0.9 1.2 
GPS/GLO/INS     0.3 0.6 
GPS/GLO/INS      0.2 0.4 
GPS/GLO/INS       0.2 0.3 
GPS/GLO/INS/WSS     0.6 0.3 
GPS/GLO/INS/WSS      0.2 0.2 
GPS/GLO/INS/WSS       0.2 0.3 
Table 63  Quality of the velocity estimation for the different configurations combining GPS, 
GLONASS, the IMU, and a simulated WSS. 
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Appendix G 
Determination of the thresholds and the 
sensitivity for the correlator distortion metrics 
This appendix provides the proofs for the formulas that are used in chapter 7 in order to set the 
thresholds for the multipath monitors.  
The first method assumes that the metrics follows Gaussian distribution. To fully characterize a 
Gaussian, it is necessary to determine its mean and standard deviation. If the calculation of the 
expectation of the metrics is trivial, the calculation of the standard deviations is more complex. The 
way to calculate the theoretical expression of these standard deviations is presented in section A.  
The second method does not make any gaussianity assumption on the metric. The way to derive the 
thresholds is given in section B.  
Finally, the way to calculate the sensitivity of the tests with respect to multipath is detailed in 
section C.  
The notations introduced in section 7.1 are used hereafter. 
A. Determination of detection thresholds with gaussianity 
assumption 
Simple ratio metric 
In order to calculate the standard deviation of the simple ratio metric, the first order development in 
Taylor series can be used. It gives: 
 
𝐼𝑋
𝐼𝑌
=
𝜇𝑋 + 𝑛𝑋
𝜇𝑌 + 𝑛𝑌
≈
𝜇𝑋 + 𝑛𝑋
𝜇𝑌
(1 −
𝑛𝑌
𝜇𝑌
+ (
𝑛𝑌
𝜇𝑌
)
2
) Eq. E-1 
At the second order (the zero means and higher order terms are not written): 
 𝐸 [
𝐼𝑋
2
𝐼𝑌
2] =
1
𝜇𝑌
2 𝐸 [𝜇𝑋
2 + 𝑛𝑋
2 − 4
𝜇𝑋
𝜇𝑌
𝑛𝑌𝑛𝑋 + 3
𝜇𝑋
2
𝜇𝑌
2 𝑛𝑌
2] Eq. E-2 
We also have: 
 𝐸 [
𝐼𝑋
𝐼𝑌
] =
𝜇𝑋
𝜇𝑌
−
1
𝜇𝑌
2 𝐸[𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑌] +
𝜇𝑋
𝜇𝑌
3 𝐸[𝑛𝑌
2] Eq. E-3 
Finally: 
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 𝜎
2 (
𝐼𝑋
𝐼𝑌
) = 𝐸 [
𝐼𝑋
2
𝐼𝑌
2] − 𝐸 [
𝐼𝑋
𝐼𝑌
]
2
 Eq. E-4 
Thus: 
 𝜎
2 (
𝐼𝑋
𝐼𝑌
) = (
𝜇𝑋
𝜇𝑌
)
2
(
𝜎2(𝑛𝑋)
𝜇𝑋
2 +
𝜎2(𝑛𝑌)
𝜇𝑌
2 − 2
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑌)
𝜇𝑋𝜇𝑌
 ) Eq. E-5 
 
Differential ratio metric 
In order to calculate the standard deviation of the differential ratio metric, the first order 
development in Taylor series gives: 
 
𝐼𝑋 − 𝐼𝑌
𝐼𝑍
= (
𝜇𝑋 + 𝑛𝑋 − 𝜇𝑌 − 𝑛𝑌
𝜇𝑍
)(1 −
𝑛𝑍
𝜇𝑍
+ (
𝑛𝑍
𝜇𝑍
)
2
) Eq. E-6 
Thus: 
 𝐸 [(
𝐼𝑋 − 𝐼𝑌
𝐼𝑍
)
2
] = 𝐸 [
𝐼𝑋
2
𝐼𝑍
2 +
𝐼𝑌
2
𝐼𝑍
2 − 2
𝐼𝑋𝐼𝑌
𝐼𝑍
2 ] Eq. E-7 
The previous results can be used: 
 𝐸 [
𝐼𝑋
2
𝐼𝑍
2] =
1
𝜇𝑍
2 𝐸 [𝜇𝑋
2 + 𝑛𝑋
2 − 4
𝜇𝑋
𝜇𝑍
𝑛𝑍𝑛𝑋 + 3
𝜇𝑋
2
𝜇𝑍
2 𝑛𝑍
2] Eq. E-8 
 𝐸 [
𝐼𝑌
2
𝐼𝑍
2] =
1
𝜇𝑍
2 𝐸 [𝜇𝑌
2 + 𝑛𝑌
2 − 4
𝜇𝑌
𝜇𝑍
𝑛𝑍𝑛𝑌 + 3
𝜇𝑌
2
𝜇𝑍
2 𝑛𝑍] Eq. E-9 
 𝐸 [
𝐼𝑋𝐼𝑌
𝐼𝑍
2 ] =
1
𝜇𝑍
2 𝐸 [𝜇𝑋𝜇𝑌 + 𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑌 − 2𝑛𝑍𝑛𝑌
𝜇𝑋
𝜇𝑍
− 2𝑛𝑍𝑛𝑋
𝜇𝑌
𝜇𝑍
+ 3𝑛𝑍
2
𝜇𝑋𝜇𝑌
𝜇𝑍
2 ] Eq. E-10 
Moreover 
 𝐸 [
𝐼𝑋 − 𝐼𝑌
𝐼𝑍
] =
1
𝜇𝑍
𝐸 [𝜇𝑋 − 𝜇𝑌 − 𝑛𝑍𝑛𝑋
1
𝜇𝑍
+ 𝑛𝑍𝑛𝑌
1
𝜇𝑍
+ 𝑛𝑍
2
𝜇𝑋 − 𝜇𝑌
𝜇𝑍
2 ] Eq. E-11 
The 4rth and 3rd order terms are not written: 
Appendices 
 
307 
𝐸 [
𝐼𝑋 − 𝐼𝑌
𝐼𝑍
]
2
=
1
𝜇𝑍
2 [(𝜇𝑋 − 𝜇𝑌)
2 + 𝐸[𝑛𝑍𝑛𝑌]
2
1
𝜇𝑍
+ 2
(𝜇𝑋 − 𝜇𝑌)
𝜇𝑍
(𝐸[𝑛𝑍𝑛𝑌] − 𝐸[𝑛𝑍𝑛𝑋])
+ 2𝐸[𝑛𝑍
2] 
(𝜇𝑋 − 𝜇𝑌)
2 
𝜇𝑍
2 ]   
Eq. E-12 
Then 
𝜎2 (
𝐼𝑋 − 𝐼𝑌
𝐼𝑍
) = 
1
𝜇𝑍
2 {𝜇𝑋
2 + 𝐸[𝑛𝑋
2] − 4
𝜇𝑋
𝜇𝑍
𝐸[𝑛𝑍𝑛𝑋] + 3
𝜇𝑋
2
𝜇𝑍
2 𝐸[𝑛𝑍
2] + 𝜇𝑌
2 + 𝐸[𝑛𝑌
2] − 4
𝜇𝑌
𝜇𝑍
𝐸[𝑛𝑍𝑛𝑌] + 3
𝜇𝑌
2
𝜇𝑍
2 𝐸[𝑛𝑍
2]
− 2 [𝜇𝑋𝜇𝑌 + 𝐸[𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑌] − 2𝐸[𝑛𝑍𝑛𝑌]
𝜇𝑋
𝜇𝑍
− 2𝐸[𝑛𝑍𝑛𝑋]
𝜇𝑌
𝜇𝑍
+ 3𝐸[𝑛𝑍
2]
𝜇𝑋𝜇𝑌
𝜇𝑍
2 ]
− [(𝜇𝑋 − 𝜇𝑌)
2 + 2
(𝜇𝑋 − 𝜇𝑌)
𝜇𝑍
(𝐸[𝑛𝑍𝑛𝑌] − 𝐸[𝑛𝑍𝑛𝑋]) + 2𝐸[𝑛𝑍
2] 
(𝜇𝑋 − 𝜇𝑌)
2 
𝜇𝑍
2 ]}  
Eq. E-13 
If 𝑋 and 𝑌 do not have the same value: 
𝜎2 (
𝐼𝑋 − 𝐼𝑌
𝐼𝑍
) = (
𝜇𝑋 − 𝜇𝑌
𝜇𝑍
)
2
[
𝜎2(𝑛𝑍)
𝜇𝑍
2 +
𝜎2(𝑛𝑋) + 𝜎
2(𝑛𝑌) − 2𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑌)
(𝜇𝑋 − 𝜇𝑌)2
+ 2(
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑛𝑍𝑛𝑋) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑛𝑍𝑛𝑌)
𝜇𝑍(𝜇𝑋 − 𝜇𝑌)
)] 
Eq. E-14 
 
B. Determination of detection thresholds without assuming the 
metric Gaussian 
In this section, the metric is not assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution.  
Simple ratio metric 
The expression of the Geary-Hinkley transform applied to 𝑀 =
𝐼𝑋
𝐼𝑌
 is the following: 
 |
𝜇𝑌𝑀− 𝜇𝑋
√𝜎𝑌
2𝑀2 − 2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑌𝑀+ 𝜎𝑋
2
| ≤ 𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝 Eq. E-15 
which is equivalent to  
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 𝑀
2(𝜇𝑌
2 −𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝
2𝜎𝑌
2) + 𝑀(−2𝜇𝑋𝜇𝑌 + 2𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝
2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑌) + 𝜇𝑋
2 −𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝
2𝜎𝑋
2 ≤ 0 Eq. E-16 
The expression is always positive except between the roots of the polynom then: 
𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 =
−(−2𝜇𝑋𝜇𝑌 + 2𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝
2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑌) −
√(−2𝜇𝑋𝜇𝑌 + 2𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑌)
2
− 4(𝜇𝑌
2 −𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝2𝜎𝑌
2)(𝜇𝑋
2 −𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝2𝜎𝑋
2)
2(𝜇𝑌
2 −𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝2𝜎𝑌
2)
 
Eq. E-17 
𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 =
−(−2𝜇𝑋𝜇𝑌 + 2𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝
2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑌) +
√(−2𝜇𝑋𝜇𝑌 + 2𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑌)
2
− 4(𝜇𝑌
2 −𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝2𝜎𝑌
2)(𝜇𝑋
2 −𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝2𝜎𝑌
2)
2(𝜇𝑌
2 −𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝2𝜎𝑌
2)
 
Eq. E-18 
Differential ratio metric 
The expression of the threshold for the differential metric is derived from the thresholds of the 
simple ratio test.  
C. Determination of the sensitivity 
Simple ratio metric 
The bounds of the biased distribution can be found the same way as they were found to set the 𝑃𝐹𝐴. 
Here the 𝑃𝐹𝐴  is replaced by the 𝑃𝑀𝐷 . The new distribution is bounded (with 𝑃𝑀𝐷 ) between 
𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑,𝑀𝑃  and 𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑,𝑀𝑃 . These can be obtained with the Geary-Hinkley 
transformation. 
 𝜇𝑋,𝑀𝑃 = 𝜇𝑋 + 𝛼𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋 − 𝜏) Eq. E-19 
 𝜇𝑌,𝑀𝑃 = 𝜇𝑌 + 𝛼𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑌 − 𝜏) Eq. E-20 
The bounds of the confidence interval of the metric affected by multipath become: 
𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑,𝑀𝑃 = 
−(−2𝜇𝑋,𝑀𝑃𝜇𝑌,𝑀𝑃 + 2𝑚𝑀𝐷
2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑌)
2(𝜇𝑌,𝑀𝑃
2 −𝑚𝑀𝐷2𝜎𝑌
2)
−
√
(2𝜇𝑋,𝑀𝑃𝜇𝑌,𝑀𝑃 − 2𝑚𝑀𝐷2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑌)
2
−
4(𝜇𝑌,𝑀𝑃
2 −𝑚𝑀𝐷2𝜎𝑌
2)(𝜇𝑋,𝑀𝑃
2 −𝑚𝑀𝐷2𝜎𝑋
2)
2(𝜇𝑌,𝑀𝑃
2 −𝑚𝑀𝐷2𝜎𝑌
2)
 
Eq. E-21 
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𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑,𝑀𝑃 = 
−(−2𝜇𝑋,𝑀𝑃𝜇𝑌,𝑀𝑃 + 2𝑚𝑀𝐷
2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑌)
2(𝜇𝑌,𝑀𝑃
2 −𝑚𝑀𝐷2𝜎𝑌
2)
+
√
(2𝜇𝑋,𝑀𝑃𝜇𝑌,𝑀𝑃 − 2𝑚𝑚𝑑2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑌)
2
−
4(𝜇𝑌,𝑀𝑃
2 −𝑚𝑀𝐷2𝜎𝑌
2)(𝜇𝑋,𝑀𝑃
2 −𝑚𝑀𝐷2𝜎𝑋
2)
2(𝜇𝑌,𝑀𝑃
2 −𝑚𝑀𝐷2𝜎𝑌
2)
 
Eq. E-22 
Then two configurations described in section 7.1.4 are possible. 
Configuration 1: 
 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑,𝑀𝑃 = 𝑈𝐵∄𝑀𝑃 Eq. E-23 
Where 𝑈𝐵∄𝑀𝑃 is the upper detection threshold set in order to set the 𝑃𝐹𝐴.  
Then: 
 
(−2𝜇𝑋,𝑀𝑃𝜇𝑌𝑀𝑃 + 2𝑚𝑀𝐷
2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑌)
2
− 4(𝜇𝑌,𝑀𝑃
2 −𝑚𝑀𝐷
2𝜎𝑌
2)(𝜇𝑋,𝑀𝑃
2 −𝑚𝑀𝐷
2𝜎𝑋
2)
= [−(−2𝜇𝑋,𝑀𝑃𝜇𝑌,𝑀𝑃 + 2𝑚𝑀𝐷
2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑋𝑌)
− 2𝑈𝐵∄𝑀𝑃(𝜇𝑌,𝑀𝑃
2 −𝑚𝑀𝐷
2𝜎𝑌
2)]
2
 
Eq. E-24 
After transformation transformations it becomes: 
 
𝑈𝐵∄𝑀𝑃
2 (𝜇𝑌𝑀𝑃
2 −𝑚𝑀𝐷
2𝜎𝑌
2) + 𝑈𝐵∄𝑀𝑃(−2𝜇𝑋,𝑀𝑃𝜇𝑌𝑀𝑃 + 2𝑚𝑀𝐷
2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑥𝑦)
+ (𝑥2 −𝑚𝑀𝐷
2𝜎𝑋
2) = 0 
Eq. E-25 
The unknown is 𝛼, and after replacing 𝜇𝑋,𝑀𝑃 and 𝜇𝑌,𝑀𝑃 by their expressions in function of 𝛼 the 
equation becomes: 
𝛼2{[𝑈𝐵∄𝑀𝑃𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑌 − 𝜏)]
2 − 2𝑈𝐵∄𝑀𝑃𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑌 − 𝜏)𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋 − 𝜏) + 𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋 − 𝜏)
2} 
+𝛼{2𝑈𝐵∄𝑀𝑃
2𝜇𝑌𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑌 − 𝜏) − 2𝑈𝐵∄𝑀𝑃[𝜇𝑋𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑌 − 𝜏) + 𝜇𝑌𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋 − 𝜏)] + 2𝜇𝑋𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋 − 𝜏)} 
+𝑈𝐵∄𝑀𝑃
2(𝜇𝑌
2 −𝑚𝑀𝐷
2 𝜎𝑌
2) + 2𝑈𝐵∄𝑀𝑃(−𝜇𝑋𝜇𝑌 +𝑚𝑀𝐷
2 . 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑥𝑦) + 𝜇𝑋
2 −𝑚𝑀𝐷
2 𝜎𝑋
2 = 0 
Eq. E-26 
The lowest root of this equation is the sensitivity associated with the probability of missed 
detection 𝑚𝑀𝐷 . 
Configuration 2: 
 𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑,𝑀𝑃 = 𝐿𝐵∄𝑀𝑃  Eq. E-27 
Where 𝑈𝐵∄𝑀𝑃 is the upper detection threshold set in order to set the 𝑃𝐹𝐴.  
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𝛼2{[𝐿𝐵∄𝑀𝑃𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑌 − 𝜏)]
2 − 2𝐿𝐵∄𝑀𝑃𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑌 − 𝜏)𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋 − 𝜏) + 𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋 − 𝜏)
2} 
+𝛼{2𝐿𝐵∄𝑀𝑃
2𝜇𝑌𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑌 − 𝜏) − 2𝐿𝐵∄𝑀𝑃[𝜇𝑋𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑌 − 𝜏) + 𝜇𝑌𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋 − 𝜏)] + 2𝜇𝑋𝐾𝑐𝑐(𝑋 − 𝜏)} 
+𝐿𝐵∄𝑀𝑃
2(𝜇𝑌
2 −𝑚𝑀𝐷
2 𝜎𝑌
2) + 2𝐿𝐵∄𝑀𝑃(−𝜇𝑋𝜇𝑌 +𝑚𝑀𝐷
2 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑥𝑦) + 𝜇𝑋
2 −𝑚𝑀𝐷
2 𝜎𝑋
2 = 0 
Eq. E-28 
The lowest root of this 2nd order equation is the sensitivity associated with the probability of 
missed detection 𝑇ℎ𝑀𝐷 . 
Differential ratio metric 
Substitute 𝑋 by 𝑁, and 𝑌 by 𝑍 in the general expression  
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Appendix H 
Stanford diagrams of the different solutions and 
algorithms tested 
This appendix aims at verifying that no integrity loss has been observed on the dataset. Such an event 
is said to occur if the 𝐻𝑃𝐸  exceed the 𝐻𝑃𝐿  without detection within the 𝑇𝑇𝐴. This condition is 
necessary (but not sufficient) to ensure that the solution proposed perform a sufficiently high level of 
integrity. The Stanford plots are given for each sub solutions and solutions, augmented with the 
integrity monitoring algorithms of reference presented in section 8.3.  
A. Train control 
A. 1. Inflation of the measurement error model 
A. 1. 1. Standard solution separation algorithm 
  
Figure 154 Stanford diagrams plotted for the two subsystems (based on GPS on the left and 
GLONASS on the right) after inflation of weighting scheme in suburban and urban environments. 
IMU and track database measurement are integrated. 
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Figure 155 Stanford diagram plotted for the combined system after inflation of weighting scheme in 
suburban and urban environments. IMU and track database measurement are integrated 
A. 1. 2. Solution separation based on sub mechanizations 
  
Figure 156 Stanford diagrams plotted for the two subsystems (based on GPS on the left and 
GLONASS on the right) after inflation of weighting scheme in suburban and urban environments 
(approach based on separated mechanizations). IMU and track database measurement are integrated 
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Figure 157 Stanford diagram plotted for the combined system after inflation of weighting scheme in 
suburban and urban environments (approach based on separated mechanizations). IMU and track 
database measurement are integrated. 
 
A. 2. Approach based on the selection of the measurements 
A. 2. 1. Standard solution separation algorithm 
  
Figure 158 Stanford diagrams for each subsystem (based on GPS on the left and GLONASS on the 
right) after selection of the measurements. IMU and track database measurement are integrated. 
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Figure 159 Stanford diagram the combined system after selection of the measurements. IMU and track 
database measurement are integrated. 
A. 2. 2. Solution separation based on sub mechanizations 
  
Figure 160 Stanford diagrams plotted for the two subsystems (based on GPS on the left and 
GLONASS on the right) after selection of the measurements in suburban and urban environments 
(approach based on separated mechanizations). IMU and track database measurement are 
integrated. 
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Figure 161 Stanford diagrams plotted for the combined system after selection of the measurements in 
suburban and urban environments (approach based on separated mechanizations). IMU and track 
database measurement are integrated. 
 
B. ETC 
B. 1. Inflation of the measurement error model 
B. 1. 1. Standard solution separation algorithm 
 
Figure 162 Stanford diagrams plotted for the GPS/GLONASS/IMU/WSS solution with conventional 
solution separation algorithm. Approach based on the inflation of the weighting scheme in suburban 
and urban environments 
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B. 1. 2. Solution separation based on sub mechanizations 
 
Figure 163 Stanford diagrams plotted for the GPS/GLONASS/IMU/WSS solution with solution 
separation using sub mechanizations. Approach based on the inflation of the weighting scheme in 
suburban and urban environments 
B. 2. Approach based on the selection of the measurements 
B. 2. 1. Standard solution separation algorithm 
 
Figure 164 Stanford diagrams plotted for the GPS/GLONASS/IMU/WSS solution with conventional 
solution separation. Approach based on the selection of the measurements. 
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B. 2. 2. Solution separation based on sub mechanizations 
 
Figure 165 Stanford diagrams plotted for the GPS/GLONASS/IMU/WSS solution with solution 
separation using sub mechanizations. Approach based on the selection of the measurements. 
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Appendix I 
Evaluation of the KF estimation error 
 
This appendix justifies Eq. 8-35. In this appendix, the following assumptions are considered: 
 At any time, the GNSS measurement error vectors and the process noise vector are 
independent each other.  
 The initial prediction of the state vector is independent on the ranging error vectors  
 The initial prediction of the covariance matrix of the state vector is independent of the 
multipath ranging error vectors.  
 It is assumed that the Kalman filter contains the exact models of the transition state matrix 
and of the design matrix. 
The position prediction is denoted 𝑥𝑘+1|𝑘. We have:  
 𝑥𝑘+1|𝑘 = 𝑥𝑘+1 + 𝛿𝑥𝑘+1 Eq. I-1 
where: 
 𝑥𝑘+1 the true position 
 𝛿𝑥𝑘+1 is the position error 
Let us denote 𝛿𝑥𝑘+1|𝑘+1 the estimation of the position error by the KF, we have: 
 𝛿𝑥𝑘+1|𝑘+1 = 𝛿𝑥𝑘+1 − 𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1 Eq. I-2 
where: 
 𝛿𝑥𝑘+1 is the true error on the estimated position 
 𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1 is the error on the estimation of the position error 
We have: 
 𝑥𝑘+1|𝑘+1 = 𝑥𝑘+1|𝑘 − 𝛿𝑥𝑘+1|𝑘+1 = 𝑥𝑘+1 + 𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1 Eq. I-3 
Thus the position error is given by: 
 𝑥𝑘+1|𝑘+1 − 𝑥𝑘+1 = 𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘+1 Eq. I-4 
The state vector at time 𝑘 + 1 is given by the state propagation equation: 
 𝛿𝑥𝑘+1 = 𝐹𝑘𝛿𝑥𝑘 +𝑤𝑠𝑘 Eq. I-5 
The updated state vector is obtained in the Kalman filter as follows: 
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 𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
+ = 𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
− + 𝐾𝑘+1[𝛿𝑧𝑘+1 −𝐻𝑘+1𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
− ] Eq. I-6 
The measurement vector at time 𝑘 + 1 is given by the observation model: 
 𝛿𝑧𝑘+1 = 𝐻𝑘+1𝛿𝑥𝑘+1 +𝑤𝑜𝑘+1 Eq. I-7 
The a priori state vector estimated by the mechanization at time 𝑘 + 1 is obtained as: 
 𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
− = 𝐹𝑘𝛿𝑥𝑘
+ Eq. I-8 
Let’s assume that the estimation of the error at time is affected by an error, it can be written: 
 𝛿𝑥𝑘
+ = 𝛿𝑥𝑘 − 𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘 Eq. I-9 
Then by using Eq. I-8 in Eq. I-6 we have: 
 𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
+ = 𝐹𝑘𝛿𝑥𝑘
+ + 𝐾𝑘+1[𝛿𝑧𝑘+1 −𝐻𝑘+1𝐹𝑘𝛿𝑥𝑘
+] Eq. I-10 
If it is assumed that the measurements are affected by an error vector 𝐸𝑘+1: 
𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
+ = 𝐹𝑘𝛿𝑥𝑘
+ + 𝐾𝑘+1[𝐻𝑘+1𝛿𝑥𝑘+1 + 𝐸𝑘+1 −𝐻𝑘+1𝐹𝑘𝛿𝑥𝑘
+] Eq. I-11 
Replacing 𝛿𝑥𝑘
+ by its expression Eq. I-9: 
𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
+ = 𝐹𝑘[𝛿𝑥𝑘 − 𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘] + 𝐾𝑘+1{𝐻𝑘+1𝛿𝑥𝑘+1 + 𝐸𝑘+1 −𝐻𝑘+1𝐹𝑘[𝛿𝑥𝑘 + 𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘]} Eq. I-12 
Replacing 𝛿𝑥𝑘+1 leads to: 
𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
+ = 𝐹𝑘[𝛿𝑥𝑘 − 𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘] + 𝐾𝑘+1{𝐻𝑘+1{𝐹𝑘𝛿𝑥𝑘 +𝑤𝑠𝑘} + 𝐸𝑘+1 −𝐻𝑘+1𝐹𝑘[𝛿𝑥𝑘 − 𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘]} Eq. I-13 
But 𝛿𝑥𝑘+1 = 𝐹𝑘𝛿𝑥𝑘 +𝑤𝑠𝑘 
Then: 
𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
+ − 𝛿𝑥𝑘+1 = −𝐹𝑘𝑑𝛿𝑥(𝑘) + 𝐾𝑘+1{𝐻𝑘+1𝑤𝑠𝑘 + 𝐸𝑘+1 +𝐻𝑘+1𝐹𝑘𝑑𝛿𝑥𝑘} − 𝑤𝑠𝑘 Eq. I-14 
It can be written:  
𝛿𝑥𝑘+1 − 𝛿𝑥𝑘+1
+ = (𝐼 − 𝐾𝑘+1𝐻𝑘+1){𝐹𝑘[𝛿𝑥𝑘 − 𝛿𝑥𝑘
+] − 𝑤𝑠𝑘} − 𝐾𝑘+1𝐸𝑘+1 Eq. I-15 
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Figure 166 Validation of the relation on simulated measurements 
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Appendix J 
Calculation of the critical bias in the case of a 
LS/WLS 
 
When the position is estimated with a LS/WLS, the estimation error is given by: 
 𝑑𝑥 = (𝐻
𝑇𝑅−1𝐻)−1𝐻𝑇𝑅−1𝐸 Eq. J-1 
Let’s assume that the measurement errors are centered except one which is biased. The error can be 
modelled by: 
 𝐸~𝒩(𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠, 𝑅) Eq. J-2 
and: 
 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = [0 … 𝑏𝑖 … 0]
𝑇 
 𝑅 = [
𝜎1
2 … 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 … 𝜎𝑁
2
] 
As the sum of centered normally distributed terms and a deterministic term due to the bias, the 
position error is normally distributed. We focus on the horizontal component of the error. The 
parameters of the 2D normal distribution are given by: 
 𝐸[𝑑𝑥
𝐻] =
[
 
 
 
 [(𝐻𝑇𝑅−1𝐻)
−1
𝐻𝑇𝑅−1]
1,𝑖
[(𝐻𝑇𝑅−1𝐻)
−1
𝐻𝑇𝑅−1]
2,𝑖]
 
 
 
 
𝑏𝑖 Eq. J-3 
It’s covariance is given by: 
 cov(𝑑𝑥
𝐻) = [
[cov(𝑑𝑥𝐻)]1,1 [cov(𝑑𝑥
𝐻)]1,2
[cov(𝑑𝑥𝐻)]1,2 [cov(𝑑𝑥
𝐻)]2,2
] Eq. J-4 
where the terms of the covariance can be written by: 
 [cov(𝑑𝑥
𝐻)]1,1 =∑[((𝐻
𝑇𝑅−1𝐻)−1𝐻𝑇𝑅−1)1,𝑗]
2
(𝑅)𝑗,𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
 Eq. J-5 
 [cov(𝑑𝑥𝐻)]2,2 =∑[((𝐻
𝑇𝑅−1𝐻)−1𝐻𝑇𝑅−1)2,𝑗]
2
(𝑅)𝑗,𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
 Eq. J-6 
 [cov(𝑑𝑥𝐻)]1,2 =∑((𝐻
𝑇𝑅−1𝐻)−1𝐻𝑇𝑅−1)1,𝑗((𝐻
𝑇𝑅−1𝐻)−1𝐻𝑇𝑅−1)2,𝑗(𝑅)𝑗,𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
 Eq. J-7 
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The two component of the horizontal error vector are correlated. Since cov(𝑑𝑥𝐻) is a covariance 
matrix, it is positive semi-definite. Therefore it is diagonalizable and its eigenvalues are positive. The 
matrix of the eigenvectors denoted 𝑃⊥ is orthogonal. Let’s denote 𝐷𝐻 the eigenvalue decomposition of 
cov(𝑑𝑥𝐻), it verifies:  
 𝑃⊥
𝑇 cov(𝑑𝑥𝐻)𝑃⊥  = 𝐷𝐻 Eq. J-8 
Let us multiply 𝑑𝑥𝐻 by 𝑃⊥
𝑇. The random errors on the two components are then uncorrelated. 
 𝐸 [𝑃⊥
T𝑛𝐻(𝑃⊥
T𝑛𝐻)
𝑇
] = 𝑃⊥
T𝐸[𝑛𝐻𝑛𝐻
𝑇 ]𝑃⊥ = 𝐷𝐻 Eq. J-9 
Then the two components of the horizontal error are independent in this basis. Moreover, 𝑃⊥
𝑇𝑑𝑥𝐻 has 
the same norm as 𝑑𝑥𝐻  because multiplying a vector by an orthogonal matrix keep the norm invariant. 
The bias after rotation (𝑏𝑖
′) is given by: 
 𝑏𝑖
′ = 𝑃⊥
T𝑏𝐻 = 𝒪𝑏𝑖 Eq. J-10 
with : 
 𝒪𝑖 = 𝑃⊥
T [
[(𝐻𝑇𝑅−1𝐻)−1𝐻𝑇𝑅−1]1,𝑖
[(𝐻𝑇𝑅−1𝐻)−1𝐻𝑇𝑅−1]2,𝑖
] Eq. J-11 
Let’s denote 𝜎 the maximum diagonal term of 𝐷𝐻. The following inequality can be written: 
 𝑃(‖𝑑𝑥
𝐻‖ ≥ 𝐻𝐴𝐿) = 𝑃(‖𝑃⊥
𝑇𝑑𝑥𝐻‖ ≥ 𝐻𝐴𝐿) ≤ 𝑃(𝜖 ≤ 𝐻𝐴𝐿2𝜎2) Eq. J-12 
where 𝜖 follows a non-central chi square distribution with 2 degrees of freedom and with a parameter 
of non-centrality (𝜆𝑏𝑖 ) that can be obtained from the probability of exceedance associated to the 
critical bias (𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡/𝑃𝑓) and the value of the “threshold” 𝐻𝐴𝐿
2𝜎2. Finally, a lower bound of the critical 
bias (due to the inequality in J-12) is given by: 
 𝑏𝑖 = √
𝜎2
(𝒪𝑖1)
2
+ (𝒪𝑖2)
2√𝜆𝑏𝑖 Eq. J-13 
The expression is equivalent to what has been determined for the Kalman filter.  
 
 
 
 
